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Curiosity is always transgressive, always a sign of the rejection of the known as 
inadequate, incorrect, even uninteresting.1
What kind of questioning does an invitation to ‘queer’ international law call for? 
In putting this collection together, I have understood ‘queering’ international law 
as both a scholarly and an activist project, inspired by a hope for change that is far 
more ambitious than LGBTI normative inclusion, as important as that is. Like 
feminist and postcolonial structural critiques of the discipline, the terminology of 
queer signals a curiosity about the conceptual and analytical underpinnings 
of international law’s adjudication of the normal. A queer analysis cannot be 
answered by granting equal rights, although this may constitute a partial response. 
Queering international law presents a fundamental challenge to the usual way of 
framing international legal problems and crafting solutions. The terminology 
of queer also signals a concern with pleasure, which may require ‘taking a break’2 
from the politics of heteronormative injury, in order to celebrate human sexuality 
and gender expression in all its diversity and fluidity, beyond the dualistic confines 
of heterosexuality/homosexuality and male/female. 
Whether or not the analytics of sexuality alone provide an adequate foundation 
for queer theory is a matter of some debate. In my view, while sexuality has its 
own biopolitical forms and governmental modes, its analytics are deeply 
intertwined with other systems of hierarchy, including those of sex/gender, class, 
race, indigeneity and (dis)ability. They are all vectors of power that are constituted 
in relation to each other. This understanding is more or less shared by the other 
contributors to this collection. By paying close attention to the imperial histories 
that accompany the operation of sexual and gender norms in the neoliberal 
present, the extraordinary power these norms have to shore up the status quo and 
1  Barbara M Benedict, Curiosity: A Cultural History of Early Modern Inquiry (University of 
Chicago Press, 2001) 2.
2  Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton University 
Press, 2006).
2  Dianne Otto
create fear and panic in the face of the shifting contours of the ‘abnormal’ – 
Muslims, sex workers, migrants, asylum seekers, feminist and SOGI rights activists 
– is revealed. By changing meanings, unsettling taxonomies and inverting 
conventions, it is my hope that queer curiosity can open new ways to imagine a 
more peaceful, equitable and inclusionary world, and offer fresh means and 
methods to work towards its realisation.
In the crisis-saturated international community of today, new ways of framing 
and applying international law are desperately needed. We need an international 
legal framework that can build solidarity rather than foster division, promote 
redistributive values rather than private enrichment, challenge the entrenched 
inequalities of the quotidian rather than normalising and exploiting them, advance 
positive peace rather than militarism, and ensure environmental sustainability 
rather than degradation. The critical insights of queer theory can offer new 
insights into how international law works to reinforce unequal relations of power, 
resources and knowledge, and how this might be resisted. It promises to enrich 
our understanding of the conceptual and practical limits of the discipline and 
help us to imagine the liberatory possibilities that emerge from challenging 
these limits. Just as feminist curiosity exposed international law’s gendered frame-
work, and postcolonial curiosity its European underpinnings, queer curiosity 
makes visible its [hetero]sexual ordering that is so taken for granted that it is 
considered ‘natural’. 
In fact, curiosity has a decidedly queer genealogy. At least since Eve’s desire for 
forbidden knowledge, curiosity has been linked to the Old Testament account of 
man’s [sic] fall into sin and death, which was connected, through Eve, with lust, 
pride and the pursuit of improper knowledge (more than God allows).3 In keeping 
with this tradition of treating curiosity as a dangerous inclination, iconographer 
Cesare Ripa portrayed curiosity as a wild, feminine force, operating without regard 
to law and order, in his 1611 guide to moral emblems.4 
Ripa’s commentary describes his representation in the following way: 
She has abundance of Ears and Frogs on her Robe; her Hair stands up on 
end; Wings on her Shoulders; her Arms lifted up; she thrusts out her Head 
in a prying Posture. The Ears denote the Itch of knowing more than concerns 
her. The Frogs are Emblems of Inquisitiveness, by reason of their goggle-
Eyes. The other things denote her running up and down, to hear, and to see, 
as some do after News.5
Just as the transgressiveness of queer thinking is often maligned today, Ripa 
associates curiosity with deviant expressions of gender, uncontrollable sexual 
3  Peter Harrison, ‘Curiosity, Forbidden Knowledge, and the Reformation of Natural Philosophy 
in Early Modern England’ (2001) 92 Isis 265, 267.
4  Cesare Ripa, ICONOLOGIA or Moral Emblems (Benj Motte, 1709) figure 80 <https://
archive.org/details/iconologiaormora00ripa>. 
5  Ibid (emphasis in the original).
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Figure 1 Curiosity, Cesare Ripa, 1611
desires and interest in myriad forms of knowledge considered disruptive and 
dangerous to the status quo.
Yet, even as curiosity moved from vice to virtue over the course of the 
seventeenth century and into the eighteenth, its rehabilitation was tied up with 
the emergence and celebration of scientific knowledge, which imposed a new set 
of limits on thinking in the guise of specific procedures of rationality associated 
4  Dianne Otto
with empiricism and objectivity.6 This highly disciplined form of curiosity was 
lauded as a means to seek knowledge for public benefit and social advancement.7 
Scientific inquiry left a vast realm of curiosities outside proper knowledge, and 
many of those who asked improper questions were pathologised by the new 
sciences as mad, or criminalised as a danger to society. According to Michel 
Foucault’s genealogy, nineteenth-century European scientific (medico-juridical) 
thought produced the figure of ‘the homosexual’ as a species who, along with 
other perverts, became ‘a type of life’ that was observed, analysed, categorised, 
re-educated and constrained.8 He identified three other focal points for the 
production of sexual knowledge in the West, which emerged around the same 
time – the hysterical woman, the masturbating child and the ‘Malthusian couple’ 
who were willing to take ‘responsible’ control of their reproductive potential.9 
Thus, science made possible a vast expansion of the biopolitical reach of the state 
and its laws into more intimate, private areas of life.
Theories of evolution were also complicit in producing the new species of the 
sexual deviant, underscoring its racialised dimensions. Thus, outside the West, 
the degenerate (undeveloped) sexual practices of the totality of colonised people 
were imagined and produced by Europeans as needing civilisation, providing 
justification for colonialism.10 At the same time, the metropole’s understanding of 
its own enlightened bourgeois sexuality was shaped in contradistinction to the 
racialised imperial accounts of the uncontrollable libidinal energies of ‘savages’.11 
These developments in science helped to institute and normalise hierarchies of 
sexual difference globally, in the name of universal progress and enlightenment.
Thus, curiosity took on a paradoxical quality, representing both ‘value and 
valuelessness’.12 Curiosity was lauded if it served elite interests as the ‘trademark 
of progress itself ’,13 by fostering increased consumption14 and legitimating 
imperial exploitation.15 At the same time, those whose curiosity cast them as 
freaks, including rebellious women, uncivilised natives, effete Orientals, sex work-
ers, transsexuals, pirates and other queer figures, were vilified. Yet curiosity’s 
paradoxical character has also meant there is the propensity for curiosity’s taboo 
subjects to become valued and, in various ways, commodified and co-opted to 
 6  Benedict, above n 1, 25–8.
 7  Harrison, above n 3, 280.
 8  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Robert Hurley trans, Vintage, 
first published 1976, 1990 edn) vol 1, 101.
 9  Ibid 104–5.
10  Neville Hoad, ‘Arrested Development or the Queerness of Savages: Resisting Evolutionary 
Narratives of Difference’ (2000) 3 Postcolonial Studies 133, 134.
11  Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things (Duke University Press, 1995) 6–7.
12  Benedict, above n 1, 3.
13  Ibid 1.
14  Ibid 37–8. 
15  Ibid 251.
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serve imperial ends.16 Israel’s portrayal of itself as a gay-friendly tourist destination 
even as it continues to build its illegal wall is just one example of turning queerness 
into a neoliberal imperial commodity.17 Yet there have also always been efforts by 
the outcasts to subvert these dualistic geographies of value by (re)asserting their 
humanity and struggling for change. The reclamation of the derogatory language 
of queer as a positive assertion of transgressive sexual practices, identities and 
politics is one such effort to expose and subvert the inequitable conventional 
orderings of life and law.
Cynthia Enloe regards curiosity as an important characteristic of feminist 
epistemology.18 The primary target of Enloe’s curiosity is militarism and her 
technique is to start by ‘taking women’s [everyday] lives seriously’,19 thereby 
problematising the public/private dichotomy, politicising the personal and making 
visible masculinist forms of power that are so normalised they are no longer 
noticed. She draws attention to the Star Wars inspired weaponry-shaped pasta in 
a can of Heinz tomato and noodle soup, and latex condoms patterned as army 
camouflage, to illustrate that militarism has become an accepted part of everyday 
life.20 In her view, the transgressive nature of feminist curiosity lies in its power to 
question and destabilise received gendered norms and settled grounds of analysis, 
together with the willingness to admit surprise and to think afresh.21 Like queer 
theory, feminist analysis is thus not confined to seeking equal rights, but treats 
gender analytically, as ‘a primary way of signifying relations of power’,22 which 
intersects with other articulations of power like race, class and nation.
More recently, Cynthia Weber employs ‘queer intellectual curiosity’ as an inter-
national relations method.23 Her curiosity ‘refuses to take for granted the 
personal-to-international institutional arrangements’, taking readers on a journey 
of discovery that reveals what happens to our understanding of international 
politics when the variable of sexuality is included in mappings of its relations 
of power. Cynthia searches for, and finds, proliferating figurations of ‘the homo-
sexual’ in international affairs, and examines the work these figures do to invest 
the modern state with authority and legitimacy. She shows how these figurations 
16  Ibid 246–7.
17  Aeyal Gross, ‘The Politics of LGBT Rights in Israel and beyond: Nationality, Normativity, 
and Queer Politics’ (2015) 46 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 81.
18  Cynthia Enloe, The Curious Feminist: Searching for Women in a New Age of Empire (University 
of California Press, 2004).
19  Cynthia Enloe, ‘A Conversation with Cynthia Enloe on Curiosity, Confidence, and Feminist 
Questions’ (2014) 38(2) Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 13, 14.
20  Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (University 
of California Press, 2000) 1–2.
21  Cynthia Enloe, ‘The Surprised Feminist’ (2000) 25 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and 
Society 1023, 1025.
22  Joan Wallach Scott, ‘Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis’ in Gender and the 
Politics of History (Columbia University Press, revised edn, 1999) 28–50.
23  Cynthia Weber, Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to 
Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2016) 19.
6  Dianne Otto
also do work beyond the state to sexualise the formal and informal ways that 
international relations are arranged. 
In a similar way, this collection seeks to engage curiosity transgressively, to show 
how sexuality works as a fundamental organising principle in international law. By 
uncovering some of the manifold ways that tropes of sexual and gender deviance 
have helped to institute, legitimate, authorise and sustain a neoliberal international 
legal order that is socially and economically unjust, dependent on violence and 
environmentally unsustainable, a powerful case is made for fostering more con- 
versations between queer theory and activism, and international law. Queer 
curiosity brings to the mix of emancipatory (improper) curiosities, and the critical 
analysis they foster, a particular concern with conventions of sexuality and the part 
they play in signifying hierarchical relations of power – not only in their attachment 
to material bodies, but to structures of understanding that constitute the norms 
and practices of international law. 
I want to particularly emphasise that the contributors to this collection do not 
think of queer theory as autonomous from, or as surpassing, feminist analysis.24 
There is a strong feminist tradition of support for sexual freedom that has 
coexisted, not always easily, with feminist concern with sexual violence and 
exploitation.25 There is also a long-standing feminist critique of ‘compulsory 
heterosexuality’,26 and insistence that ‘sex/gender’ is a performative, social 
construct rather than biologically based.27 In many respects, queer theory expands 
the feminist project by drawing attention to the demonisation of all sexual and 
gender minorities, which includes others, as well as women. 
Yet the paradoxes of curiosity are ever present. Enloe describes the risk of 
producing consequences that have unintended effects, as presenting us with 
‘puzzles’.28 I will draw attention to just four of them here, which haunt many of 
the discussions in the chapters that follow:
How can discrimination and violence experienced by queer individuals and 
communities be addressed without reaffirming the regulatory power of the 
nation-state to confer rights and responsibilities through its technologies of 
gay marriage, gay consumerism and gay patriotism, which domesticate queer 
desires and de-radicalise queer politics? 
24  Judith Butler, ‘Against Proper Objects: Introduction’ (1994) 6(2–3) Differences: A Journal 
of Feminist Cultural Studies 1.
25  See, eg, Carole S Vance (ed), Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality (Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1984); Dianne Otto, ‘Between Pleasure and Danger: Lesbian Human 
Rights’ (2014) (6) European Human Rights Law Review 618.
26  Adrienne Rich, ‘Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence’ (1980) 5 Signs: Journal 
of Women in Culture and Society 631.
27  Margaret Davies, ‘Taking the Inside Out: Sex and Gender in the Legal Subject’ in Ngaire 
Naffine and Rosemary J Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 
1997) 25.
28  Enloe, above n 20, 299.
Introduction: Embracing queer curiosity  7
How can appeals be made to international human rights law to make precarious 
queer lives more liveable without legitimising the heteronormative imperial 
heritage of the normative framework of international law? 
How can queer activists work in transnational coalitions to support challenges to 
the homophobic laws and practices of states without the treatment of ‘the 
homosexual’ serving as a new measure of ‘civilisation’? 
How can queer social and cultural change be promoted (and enjoyed) without 
assimilation into the pink economies of neoliberalism which run counter to 
queer visions of redistributional and egalitarian economics?
Antecedents
This collection did not just ‘fall from the sky’. Acknowledging some of its 
antecedents is to honour those who had the courage to lay the groundwork for 
this and other challenging exchanges between queer scholars/activists and the 
discipline of international law. The earliest interventions were in the field of 
international human rights law. If we go back to 1948, the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) by the UN General Assembly 
declared a new global era in which states would strive to ensure that everyone 
enjoyed human rights and fundamental freedoms.29 This was a hopeful moment, 
when the member states of the United Nations affirmed the full humanity of every 
human being, recognising everyone’s intrinsic value and dignity. Yet there were 
many gaps in the coverage of the UDHR. While these gaps reflect the conceptions 
of humanity that prevailed at that time, I still find it bewildering that homosexuals 
were not protected explicitly in the UDHR because of their internment in Nazi 
concentration camps during the Second World War, where many thousands of 
them died.30 Indeed, this omission, and the support of the Allies for the continued 
criminalisation of homosexuality in post-war Germany,31 confounds every sense 
of inherent human dignity, at least from the perspective of today. Instead, the 
UDHR, and the other international human rights instruments that followed in 
its wake, confined sexuality to heterosexual marriage and, even then, only by way 
of obscure references to the right to ‘found a family’.32 There was no reference to 
sexual freedom or to reproductive rights.
29  Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd 
plen mtg, UN Doc A/810 (10 December 1948) (‘UDHR’).
30  See, eg, Geoffrey J Giles, ‘The Institutionalization of Homosexual Panic in the Third Reich’ 
in Robert Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (eds), Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany (Princeton 
University Press, 2001) 233, 243, 249–50. 
31  Nicole LaViolette and Sandra Whitworth, ‘No Safe Haven: Sexuality as a Universal Human 
Right and Gay and Lesbian Activism in International Politics’ (1994) 23 Millennium: Journal 
of International Studies 563, 567. 
32  See, eg, UDHR, UN Doc A/810, art 16(1); International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into force 23 
March 1976) art 23(2).
8  Dianne Otto
It was not until 1982 that the Human Rights Committee, which monitors the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (‘ICCPR’), in its first decision 
dealing with lesbians and gay men, found that the Finnish government was 
justified in limiting the freedom of expression of positive views about homo- 
sexuality on radio and television programmes, in order to protect public morals.33 
A report on the legal and social problems of sexual minorities, commissioned 
in 1983 by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and 
Protection of Minorities,34 usually a very progressive body, relied heavily on 
‘stereotypes and misinformation’ and claimed disparagingly that same-sex 
relationships never last35 – even though we were 35 years into the new era of 
universal human rights and freedoms. Finally, it was an Australian case, brought 
by gay Tasmanian Nicholas Toonen, which led the Human Rights Committee to 
find, in 1994, that anti-sodomy laws were a violation of the right to privacy, as 
protected by article 17 of the ICCPR.36
A sign of the move from a focus on human rights to a broader queer interest 
in international legal circles was the American Society of International Law’s first 
panel on ‘Queering International Law’ held at its 2007 Annual Meeting.37 In 
2008, the European Society of International Law hosted an Agora entitled 
‘Sexuality and Gender in International Law’ at its Biennial Conference38 and, in 
2011, a Queer Legal Theory Workshop was organised at the School of Oriental 
and African Studies (SOAS) in London, which included a panel focused on 
international law.39 This collection brings together a number of scholars who 
played key roles in these developments, as well as young scholars who are eager 
to bring new insights and enthusiasm to this growing field.
Early in 2015, I invited a number of academics working with queer, feminist 
and postcolonial theories and practices in international law and related disciplines 
33  Human Rights Committee, Report of the Human Rights Committee, 37th sess, Supp No 
40, UN Doc A/37/40 (22 September 1982) annex XIV, 165 [10.3]–[11].
34  Jean Fernand-Laurent, Study on Legal and Social Problems of Sexual Minorities, UN 
ESCOR, UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988/31(13 June 1988). 
35  Douglas Sanders, ‘Getting Lesbian and Gay Issues on the International Human Rights 
Agenda’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 67, 88. 
36  Human Rights Committee, Communication No 488/1992, 50th sess, UN Doc CCPR/
C/50/D/488/1992 (31 March 1994) (‘Toonen v Australia’).
37  ‘Queering International Law’ (2007) 101 American Society of International Law Proceedings 
119–32: Ralph Wilde (chair), Dianne Otto, Doris E Buss, Amr Shalakany and Aeyal Gross 
(presenters).
38  Agora, ‘Sexuality and Gender in International Law’ (European Society of International Law 
3rd Biennial Conference, Heidelberg, Germany, 4–6 September 2008): Dianne Otto (chair), 
Aeyal Gross, Marjolein van den Brink, Zoe Pearson and Sari Kouvo (presenters) <http://
www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Heidelberg%20Programme.pdf>.
39  ‘Queer Perspectives on Law: Sharing Reflections’ (SOAS Spring Queer Legal Theory 
Workshop, 13 May 2011). Co-organisers: Aeyal Gross and Dianne Otto, hosted by 
the Centre for the Study of Colonialism, Empire and International Law (CCEIL) and the 
SOAS Centre for Gender Studies <https://www.soas.ac.uk/cceil/events/13may2011-queer-
perspectives-on-law-sharing-reflections.html>. 
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to contribute to this collection. Scholars from Australia, Canada, India, Israel, 
Kenya, Norway and the United Kingdom agreed to participate. They presented 
early drafts of their chapters at a two-day legal theory workshop, hosted by the 
Institute for International Law and the Humanities (IILAH) at Melbourne Law 
School, 14 to 15 December 2015. The workshop participants rose to the challenge 
of locating their analyses in the interstices of queer, feminist and postcolonial 
theory and activism, fostering alliances and borrowings from across theoretical 
and disciplinary boundaries, while promoting a better understanding of the 
complicities and compromises that engagement with power, in the form of 
international law, may extract. 
The structure of this collection
The four themes in the title of this collection gesture towards some of the 
paradoxes facing queer engagement with international law: complicities, 
possibilities, alliances and risks. The chapters have been grouped around these 
themes. Together, these themes reflect an observation made by Foucault, ‘that 
nothing is an evil in itself, but everything is dangerous’.40 I take him to mean 
that there is no guarantee that any particular scholarly or activist strategy for 
change (resistance) will be ‘successful’, but that there is nevertheless always the 
possibility of transformation. That queer efforts to challenge the normal practices 
and operations of international law and politics will face many dangers is therefore 
part of the journey – to be desired rather than feared. Most of the chapters overlap 
several of the themes, oscillating between optimism and despair. Ultimately, their 
final placement in this volume is as much due to my own queer idiosyncrasies as 
to the author’s choice of orientation. 
Complicities: Sexuality, coloniality and governance
The first group of chapters explore the theme of colonial and governmental queer 
complicities in three quite disparate contexts: British efforts to play a leading 
role in the removal of anti-sodomy laws which it had imposed on its colonies; 
global attempts to regulate the mining of precious and rare minerals; and the 
neoliberal model of Internet governance. In Rahul Rao’s examination of 
the emerging discourse of ‘atonement’ among British elites for the legacy of anti-
sodomy laws in Commonwealth countries, the neo-colonial complexities are 
highlighted and the important question as to why atonement seems more 
contemplable for the sexual injustices of colonialism than for its racial crimes is 
raised. In the second chapter, Doris Buss and Blair Rutherford argue that the 
artisanal and small-scale miner is cast as a queer figure, a mining ‘outlaw’, used to 
40  Colin Gordon, ‘Governmental Rationality: An Introduction’ in Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (University 
of Chicago Press, 1991) 1, 46.
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bolster the global regulation of ‘industrial’ mining as the norm. They show how 
sexuality continues to operate as one axis along which unequal global legal 
relations are constituted (despite efforts elsewhere at atonement). Monika 
Zalnieriute, in the third chapter, draws attention to how the Information-
Industrial-Complex, dominated by the United States and several of its major 
corporations, has come to control Internet governance, enabling repression of 
the rights of queer people in the global North and South, even as it claims to be 
supporting Internet freedom. All three chapters pinpoint the continuing utility of 
tropes of sexual excess and perversion for extending neoliberal global governance, 
despite appearances of sexual liberality. 
Possibilities: Rethinking violence, war and law
The queer possibilities of international law’s commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of international disputes and to promoting transitional justice are 
explored in this section. In Chapter 4, Vanja Hamzi  analyses the paradox of 
international law’s continuous evolution towards evermore-diverse forms 
of juridical violence through the frame of the UN Security Council’s first-ever 
meeting on the persecution of ‘LGBT Syrians and Iraqis’ by the so-called Islamic 
State in 2015. He argues that the meeting produced some ‘productive voids’ 
which allow for the theorising of the absence of international law, and thus the 
absence of juridical violence. The Security Council is also the focus of Tamsin 
Phillipa Paige’s chapter, which explores some of the heteronormative assumptions 
that inform the Council’s determinations of when it can legitimately authorise 
violence in response to a threat to the peace. She argues that these assumptions 
serve to legitimate the culture of impunity that attends wartime sexual violence. 
In Chapter 6, Maria Elander picks up on the theme of impunity in the context of 
testimonies of sexual and gender-based violence at the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia. Engaging with the testimonies of transgender activist 
Sou Southeavy, she raises questions about whose testimony is accorded space and 
what is heard. The possibilities of productive voids, and of taking seriously the 
violence endured by sexual outsiders, offer new footholds for queer engagements 
with (or without) international law. 
Alliances: Making queer lives matter
The third section questions the costs of alliances made in the advocacy of LGBTI 
human rights. In Chapter 7, Ratna Kapur argues that rights advocacy has become 
embedded within a security discourse which has taken the radicality out of queer, 
rather than resulting in the queering of international human rights. She argues 
that there are abundant possibilities for queer radicality outside the parameters of 
the liberal imaginary. This is followed by Aeyal Gross’s examination of ‘global gay 
governance’, emerging through LGBT advocacy in international economic and 
human rights institutions. He argues the importance of a cost-benefit analysis that 
assesses the promise of making queer lives matter against the risk of co-option by 
Introduction: Embracing queer curiosity  11
global institutions for their own purposes. Finally, Anniken Sørlie’s chapter shows 
how, despite legislative efforts in many countries to remove the requirement of 
sterilisation before a change in legal gender is allowed, parenting laws continue 
to reconstitute transgender people as ‘other’ to the norm of heterosexual biological 
kinship. These costs are among the dangers that Foucault warns about. The 
challenge is to find ways to hold on to queer aspirations for transformative change, 
while struggling to maximise sexual and gender freedoms in the present.
Risks: Troubling statehood, sovereignty and its borders
The last section turns to the nation-state, bringing to light the figurations of 
sexual and gender perversity operating at its formative moments in international 
law, and in its contemporary anxieties about border protection. In Chapter 10, 
Bina Fernandez examines queer struggles for reform of immigration and asylum 
laws, which, in order to make applicants legible to the state, have led to the 
construction of LGBTI identities in specifically classed, raced, gendered and 
imperial ways. She suggests a re-alignment of queer migrant activism with a ‘no 
borders’ politics in order to hold on to queer radicality. Nan Seuffert’s chapter 
takes us back to the sixteenth-century work of Francisco de Vittoria, which 
argued that the Spanish invasion of Mesoamerica could be justified on the basis 
of universal natural law duties of friendship and hospitality. By unpacking the 
allegory of Sodom and Gomorrah in his work, she points to the sedimentation 
of discourses of sexuality in international law at its inception. My final chapter 
argues that national heteronormative allegiances help to justify militarism and 
carceral states, and thus the urgent need to value the myriad other assemblages of 
human kinship and loyalty. Some thoughts are offered as to how queer kinship 
systems might reshape border protection strategies and shift military resources 
into ensuring that all lives matter.
Queering international law means taking a break from the accepted methods 
of getting things done. The goal is to open new ways of seeing international legal 
problems and expose the limitations of international law’s normal responses to 
them. Queer curiosity looks to the shifting constellations of non-normative 
subject positions, which are not only sexually marked, but also distinguished by 
reference to race, class, gender and other vectors of power. Moving against the 
grain of identitarian and disciplinary separations, the queer contributors to this 
collection seek to open up the possibilities of emancipatory alliances and more 
complex and mobile understandings of power, both within and beyond the law. 
It is hoped that asking queer questions will lead to solutions that ensure, rather 
than threaten, the proliferation of diverse practices of freedom and pleasure, and 





Sexuality, coloniality  
and governance

1 A tale of two atonements
Rahul Rao*
The claim that homosexuality is a Western ‘import’ is frequently used to discredit 
demands for the decriminalisation of queer sex in many non-Western societies. A 
common response to this argument has been the rejoinder that the criminalisation 
of same-sex sexualities was a Western colonial legal intervention – that is, it is 
institutionalised homophobia that is the Western import. This is especially true 
of territories once ruled by the British.1 French colonies were largely spared an 
anti-sodomy law because most were annexed after it had been dropped from the 
Napoleonic Code in 1806. This code also influenced France’s European 
neighbours and their colonies.2 One study notes that ‘the Commonwealth includes 
42 (53.8%) of the 78 states which continue to criminalise same-sex sexual 
behaviour, and only 12 (10.6%) of 113 where it is legal’, before concluding that 
‘the criminalisation of same-sex sexual behaviour by the British Empire, and 
associated colonial culture, have had a lasting negative impact’.3 Michael Kirby, 
former Justice of the High Court of Australia, speaks of sexual minorities being 
‘kept in legal chains by the enduring penal code provisions of the British Empire’.4 
*  Thanks are due to Grietje Baars, Maria Elander, Gina Heathcote, Jordan Osserman, Dianne 
Otto, Robbie Shilliam, Akshi Singh and all participants at the ‘Queering International Law’ 
workshop held at Melbourne Law School in December 2015. I take full responsibility for the 
views expressed here.
1  Alok Gupta, ‘This Alien Legacy: The Origins of “Sodomy” Laws in British Colonialism’ 
(Research Report, Human Rights Watch, 17 December 2008); Enze Han and Joseph 
O’Mahoney, ‘British Colonialism and the Criminalization of Homosexuality’ (2014) 27 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 268.
2  Michael Kirby, ‘The Sodomy Offence: England’s Least Lovely Criminal Law Export?’ in 
Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites (eds), Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation and Change (Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, 2013) 61, 64.
3  Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites, ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity in the Commonwealth: From History and Law to Developing Activism and 
Transnational Dialogues’ in Corinne Lennox and Matthew Waites (eds), Human Rights, 
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in the Commonwealth: Struggles for Decriminalisation 
and Change (Institute of Commonwealth Studies, 2013) 1, 24. At the time of this writing, 
the number of states criminalising sodomy stands at 75.
4  Kirby, above n 2, 75.
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In the lead-up to the 2011 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting 
(CHOGM) in Perth, he remarked that ‘it’s just a dear little legacy of the British 
Empire. It’s a very special British problem’.5 British lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) activist Peter Tatchell went further by declaring that these 
provisions ‘are not authentic national laws that were freely legislated by the 
indigenous populations’.6
The reminder that anti-sodomy laws are an inheritance from British colonialism 
has shaded into an argument for Britain to play a leading role in their removal, 
particularly in the institutional arena of the Commonwealth. In anticipation 
of the 2011 CHOGM, Tatchell called on then British Prime Minister David 
Cameron to apologise for Britain’s imposition of the sodomy law on its colonies.7 
Under pressure from activists, Cameron responded with an ill-advised comment 
suggesting that British aid would be linked to respect for LGBT rights in recipient 
countries.8 Confronted with the spectre of a novel form of conditionality 
camouflaged as a civilising mission, leaders in Tanzania,9 Uganda,10 Ghana11 and 
elsewhere reacted with hostility. More significantly, a number of African queer 
activists publicly criticised Cameron’s statement, warning that the refusal of aid 
on sexual rights grounds would trigger the scapegoating of queers in these 
countries, reinforce perceptions of the ‘Westernness’ of homosexuality and further 
entrench power disparities between donor and recipient countries.12 Two things 
became apparent in this moment: first, that British elites seemed unusually 
receptive to the suggestion that they ought to recognise anti-sodomy laws in the 
Commonwealth as an unfortunate legacy of British colonialism, with such 
recognition entailing a responsibility on their part to agitate against such laws; but 
second, that the ways in which they sought to assume this responsibility left them 
open, ironically, to charges of neo-colonialism.
In this chapter, I try to do three things. First, I offer an account of an emerging 
discourse of ‘atonement’ among British elites for the anti-sodomy laws in 
 5  Simon Lauder, ‘Commonwealth Leaders to Be Confronted on Homophobia’, ABC News 
(online), 18 October 2011 <http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2011/s3341950.htm>. 
 6  Peter Tatchell, ‘David Cameron Urged: Apologise for Anti-Gay Laws Imposed by UK’ on 
Peter Tatchell Foundation (27 October 2011) <http://www.petertatchellfoundation.org/
commonwealth/david-cameron-urged-apologise-anti-gay-laws-imposed-uk>.
 7  Ibid.
 8  BBC News, ‘Transcript Philip Hammond Interview’, The Andrew Marr Show, 30 October 
2011 (David Cameron) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/andrew_marr_
show/9627898.stm>.
 9  Richard Mbuthia, ‘Tanzania: Africa, Want Aid? Recognise Gay Rights!’, Tanzania Daily News 
(online), 26 December 2011 <http://allafrica.com/stories/201112271071.html>. 
10  ‘Uganda Fury at David Cameron Aid Threat over Gay Rights’, BBC News (online), 
31 October 2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15524013>.
11  ‘Ghana Refuses to Grant Gays’ Rights Despite Aid Threat’, BBC News (online), 2 November 
2011 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15558769>.
12  ‘Statement on British “Aid Cut” Threats to African Countries That Violate LBGTI rights’, 
Pambazuka News (online), 27 October 2011 <http://www.pambazuka.org/activism/
statement-british-aid-cut-threats-african-countries-violate-lbgti-rights>.
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Commonwealth countries that are seen to be a legacy of British colonialism. 
Second, drawing on political theoretic, literary and psychoanalytic resources, 
I develop a critique of the forms in which this atonement is expressed, arguing 
that it is underpinned by a desire to avoid engaging with guilt. Third, I contrast 
this ‘imperious’ atonement with a more equivocal discourse of atonement 
expressed in relation to the question of slavery. In doing so, my aim is not so much 
to make a case for atonement for the treatment of sodomites or slaves under 
colonial rule – a task that is beyond the scope of this chapter – as to think through 
why atonement seems to be more contemplable for the sexual injustices of 
colonialism than for its racial crimes. In doing so, I hope to say something about 
the relative discursive power wielded by claims to sexual and racial justice 
respectively in contemporary British society. 
Responsibility and atonement for anti-sodomy laws  
in the Commonwealth
The notion that Britain bears a historic responsibility for extant anti-sodomy laws 
in Commonwealth countries and that moral and political obligations follow from 
this recognition was articulated most explicitly in a debate on the ‘Treatment of 
Homosexual Men and Women in the Developing World’ in the House of Lords 
in October 2012. Observing the proceedings from the public gallery, Mark 
Gevisser suggested that the most remarkable thing about the debate might have 
been that it was not a debate at all: speakers from across the political spectrum 
seemed to share a consensus that the United Kingdom should protect and advance 
LGBT rights globally.13
Opening the debate, the Conservative peer Lord Lexden, official historian of 
the Conservative Party since 2009, sought to underscore the provenance of laws 
criminalising sexual minorities. In a strikingly romanticised view of pre-colonial 
history and a correspondingly damning indictment of colonialism (all the more 
remarkable for coming from a Tory historian), he noted that ‘[t]he love that had 
freely spoken its name and found expression in . . . native cultures became, in the 
definition of their new British-imported law, an unnatural offence’.14 Another 
Conservative peer, Lord Black of Brentwood, elaborated: ‘It is important to 
explain why the UK, with this House in the vanguard, should care . . . we caused 
this problem. That so many people around the globe still suffer from legal 
discrimination is one toxic legacy of empire. It is our duty to help sort that out’.15 
He would encounter little disagreement from Lord Smith of Finsbury, formerly 
13  Mark Gevisser, ‘Human Rights vs. Homophobia: Who is Winning Africa’s Cultural Wars’ on 
Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (20 June 2013) <http://www.osisa.org/
openspace/regional/human-rights-vs-homophobia-who-winning-africas-cultural-wars>. 
14  UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 25 October 2012, vol 740, col 378.
15  Ibid col 389.
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of the Labour Party and one of the first British MPs to come out as gay and HIV 
positive: 
The continued existence of discrimination, violence and criminalisation in 
so many Commonwealth countries is particularly shaming. There is a bitter 
irony . . . in that most laws in these countries have been inherited from us. 
I believe that that gives us a special responsibility to do whatever we can to 
help to change things.16 
The repeated references to ‘special responsibility’ struck Gevisser as a contemporary 
form of ‘“white man’s burden”: because Britain had brought homophobia to the 
developing world, it was Britain’s responsibility to take it away’. While admiring 
the noble intentions of the speakers, Gevisser wondered ‘whether those brave 
Peers had learned much from the colonial experience: they were still adopting the 
missionary position’.17
The discourse of British responsibility for anti-sodomy laws is also audible in 
civil society. The singer Elton John recently remarked in an interview to CNBC, 
‘these are old laws from the British Commonwealth and they need to be changed 
. . . the Queen could do that with one wave of her hand’.18 While blithe assertions 
of this kind are laughable, more serious and credible voices have been urging the 
British state to advocate for the repeal of anti-sodomy laws globally. Two new 
London-based organisations – Kaleidoscope Trust and Human Dignity 
Trust (HDT) – have been at the forefront of this effort. Besides lobbying govern- 
ment, HDT’s core mission is to provide ‘technical legal assistance’ in the form of 
funding and/or advice to lawyers and activists working to challenge the 
criminalisation of homosexuality through courts. The Trust claims the support of a 
global network of local human rights lawyers as well as large multinational law firms. 
Indeed, its raison d’être lies in bridging these otherwise separate worlds, leveraging 
the resources of the latter (who commit to working for the Trust pro bono) to 
bolster the advocacy efforts of the former. To date, HDT has supported litigation 
in Belize, Jamaica, Northern Cyprus, Singapore and the European Union.19
Notwithstanding its avowed intention to match Northern resources and 
expertise with Southern needs, HDT’s modus operandi has attracted criticism. 
Soon after its formation, Trinidad and Tobago activist Colin Robinson described 
its approach as ‘unproductive’, arguing that the Trust had ‘muscled into a carefully 
16  Ibid col 391. 
17  Gevisser, above n 13. 
18  Sean Mandell, ‘Elton John: The Queen Could Change Anti-Gay Laws in the Commonwealth 
“With One Wave of Her Hand” – Watch’, Towleroad (online), 5 November 2015 <http://
www.towleroad.com/2015/11/elton-john-the-queen-could-change-anti-gay-laws-in-the- 
commonwealth-with-one-wave-of-her-hand-watch/>.
19  Human Dignity Trust, ‘Legal Cases Challenging the Criminalisation of Homosexuality 
Supported by the Human Dignity Trust’ (2016) <http://www.humandignitytrust.org/
pages/OUR%20WORK/Cases>. 
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planned constitutional suit by local and regional actors in Belize, daringly spun in 
the media as the Trust’s global campaign kick-off’.20 Indeed, HDT CEO Jonathan 
Cooper, QC, seemed to reinforce this image in early publicity for the organisation. 
Speaking to The Guardian’s Zoe Williams, Cooper explained: 
‘I email our legal panel, asking: anyone have any experience of litigating in 
Belize? Someone comes back and says yeah, we’ll represent you in this legal 
challenge. They bring in as their counsel [former UK attorney general] Lord 
Goldsmith, and the former attorney general of Belize, Godfrey Smith. We 
turn up as the international community, with a legitimate interest in the 
outcome of this case, but we do change the nature of the struggle because 
we have approached it on the basis that it’s a major legal challenge. That is 
our intention’. They’re not going to know what’s hit them, [Williams] 
observe[s]. ‘You almost feel sorry for the judge!’ Cooper replies, delighted. 
. . . ‘We will fundraise, and there is something rather charming that you can 
say to somebody: “If you give us £50,000, I can more or less guarantee that 
you will have decriminalised homosexuality in Tonga.” And actually, you 
know, that’s great.’21
Let us bracket, for a moment, the hubris of the claim of legal standing as framed 
in this way: ‘we turn up as the international community’. In contrast to Cooper’s 
focus on international legal intervention, Robinson emphasises local solutions 
that do not rely solely on law reform and that are led by Southern organisations. 
In his words:
The chorus coming from the powers who gave us the sodomy laws in the 
first place has shifted to singing morality in a different key, often appealing 
more to righteousness than to shared values. And they have outshouted 
those of us working within our own nations to build ownership for a vision 
of postcolonial justice, national pride and liberty that includes sexual 
autonomy. . . . Global North advocates wanting the same changes often 
believe they have the answers but get in the way by taking the reins too 
often rather than following our lead. It is essential that those who genuinely 
support our equality listen to us, get behind where we are going, and push 
in the same directions.22
It is conceivable that this early critique had considerable, even if unacknowledged, 
impact on how HDT functions. Today, the organisation’s publicity strongly 
endorses the principle of local ownership. Its public events in London have tended 
20  Colin Robinson, ‘Decolonising Sexual Citizenship: Who Will Effect Change in the South of 
the Commonwealth?’ (Discussion Paper, Commonwealth Advisory Bureau, April 2012).
21  Zoe Williams, ‘Gay Rights: A World of Inequality’, The Guardian (online), 14 September 2011 
<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/sep/13/gay-rights-world-of-inequality>.
22  Robinson, above n 20, 6. 
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to be organised around the visits of the Southern activists whom the Trust spends 
much of its time supporting. Nonetheless, the claim of a British duty to work 
towards the repeal of anti-sodomy laws for which it bears historic responsibility 
remains a prominent theme in its advocacy. The Trust has recently begun lobbying 
for the creation of the position of a UK Special Envoy to work towards ending 
LGBT persecution globally, in imitation of the analogous position established 
by the US State Department in 2015. In a briefing paper outlining the rationale 
for such a post, the Trust underscores its belief in the need for international 
intervention with the claim that ‘history shows that a helping hand from outside is 
needed to initiate the domestic protection of LGBT people’. This observation 
is followed up by the claim that ‘the UK, in particular, has the means and obligation 
to advocate for the repeal of criminalising and persecutory laws’. Unsurprisingly, 
the question of ‘obligation’ is tied to Britain’s historic role in introducing anti-
sodomy laws in its colonies. The task of the proposed Special Envoy is framed as 
being necessary ‘to help correct a historical wrong – not to impose an alien foreign 
agenda’.23 The success of HDT’s advocacy is evident in the fact that a number of 
these themes are reflected in the April 2016 report of an All Party Parliamentary 
Group (APPG) on Global LGBT Rights. The product of testimony from a range 
of different stakeholders, this report is more nuanced on the implications of the 
colonial provenance of anti-sodomy laws, noting that while this ‘offers a justification 
for British action to address the persecution faced by LGBT people . . . the same 
colonial history that impels action can also lead to accusations of neo-colonialism 
when that action fails to take into account local contexts’.24 The report recommends 
the identification of a single authority responsible for the coordination of 
international LGBT advocacy across government departments, but remains 
agnostic on the question of what form this authority should take.
Buried in the discourse of a putative British ‘responsibility’ for anti-sodomy laws 
in the Commonwealth is a deeper misunderstanding of the very notion of 
responsibility. Certainly, reminders that such laws are a legacy of colonialism are 
appropriate insofar as they point to the origin of these laws. Yet we cannot fully 
account for their persistence without paying attention to their appropriation and 
resignification by postcolonial states. Former colonies have taken ownership of 
sodomy laws in a variety of ways: some have decriminalised sodomy or are in the 
process of doing so (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Hong Kong, Bahamas, 
Cyprus, South Africa, Vanuatu, Fiji, Belize); others have widened the ambit of 
anti-sodomy laws to criminalise sex between women (Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Malawi), 
enhance already existing punishments (Uganda), or introduce new offences 
23  ‘Should the UK Government Appoint a Special Envoy to Work towards Ending the 
Persecution of the LGBT Community across the Globe?’ (Discussion Paper, Human Dignity 
Trust, 3 July 2015) 5–6 <http://www.humandignitytrust.org/uploaded/Library/Other_
Material/Special_Envoy_Six_Reasons_-_3_July_2015_FINAL.pdf>.
24  ‘The UK’s Stance on International Breaches of LGBT Rights’ (Report, All Party Parliamentary 
Group on Global LGBT Rights, April 2016) 12–13 <http://www.appglgbt.org/#!publications/
cghg>.
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(Nigeria); and still others have introduced anti-sodomy legislation after 
decolonisation (Cameroon, Benin, Senegal). To put the point more generally, if 
swathes of colonial law remain in force in the postcolony, this is a function of the 
commonality of interest shared by colonial and postcolonial governments alike 
in ‘seeing like a state’.25 Equally, postcolonial states might find new uses for old 
laws. Whatever the motivation, we must read the persistence of colonial law in 
the postcolony not simply as a sign of neglect by the postcolonial state, but as 
expressive of conscious policy.
Western activists responding to postcolonial anti-sodomy laws find themselves 
having to strike a difficult balance between two opposite and equally problematic 
tendencies: first, the ‘homonationalist’ tendency to construct the Orient as a 
backward space of homophobia needing intervention from an enlightened 
Occident;26 second, what might be called a ‘homoromanticist’ tendency to view 
the Orient as blameless for its contemporary predicaments, these being attributed 
solely to the interventions of Occidental modernity. Indeed, the difficulty of 
avoiding these antithetical extremes can be seen in the way some activists have 
ricocheted between both positions. Thus, Kirby’s 2011 statement about anti-
sodomy laws being a ‘dear little legacy of the British Empire’27 stands in contrast 
to a stroppier observation in 2015: ‘It is pathetic to blame this on British colonial 
administrators. Most Commonwealth countries have been independent for 
50 years and the responsibility is theirs alone.’28 Kirby’s contradictions exemplify 
the dilemma of Western activists who, in seeking to avoid homonationalism and 
homoromanticism, find themselves flirting with both.
Antithetical as these tendencies seem, we ought to view them as complementary 
facets of Orientalism – one in which the Orient is denigrated for its backwardness, 
and the other in which it is overvalued for its noble savagery.29 While recognising 
that both tendencies are problematic, it is the second of these that I am examining 
here. In attributing postcolonial anti-sodomy laws largely to colonial imposition, 
contemporary metropolitan ‘atonement’ discourses evacuate the agency of 
postcolonial states in preserving such laws, protecting them from challenge, and 
putting them to new use. Joel Nana, a prominent Cameroonian LGBT activist, 
framed the problem eloquently: 
If we truly believe that Africans are human, we should also be able to 
understand that they can make their own decisions. These decisions may be 
25  James C Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition 
Have Failed (Yale University Press, 1998). 
26  Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University Press, 
2007). 
27  Lauder, above n 5.
28  ‘Human Dignity Trust Launches Criminalisation in the Commonwealth 2015 Report’, 
Human Dignity Trust (online), 22 November 2015 <http://www.humandignitytrust.org/
pages/NEWS/News?NewsArticleID=470>.
29  Edward Said, Orientalism (Penguin, 1979). 
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influenced by the need to protect or to violate rights, for real or perceived 
personal or collective good, but they remain African decisions. They are 
owned and defended. Denying them the agency that allows them to do that 
is similar to stripping them of their humanity.30
Failing to give ‘credit’ for homophobia where it is due, metropolitan ‘atonement’ 
effectively delivers insult in the same breath as it offers apology. To understand 
how attempts to atone can get it so wrong, we need to think more deeply about 
the effect of atonement. How can atonement for imperialism end up looking so 
imperious? 
Imperious atonement
In his novel Atonement, Ian McEwan – always a reliable guide to the affective lives 
of the British upper classes – offers a finely drawn portrait of the anatomy of 
atonement. The details of the plot need not concern us here. Suffice it to say that 
the young protagonist, Briony Tallis, driven by a potent mix of ambition, passion 
and jealousy, is led to commit an act for which she will later feel the need to atone. 
Convinced of her destiny as a writer, Briony weaves a series of events that she has 
watched from afar into a narrative of lust, betrayal and violation, akin to the dark 
fairy tales that her precocious 13-year-old imagination favours. Placed in the 
position of sole witness, her ‘vile excitement’ and self-importance lead her to level 
an allegation that will prove unfounded, but will forever alter the lives of the other 
protagonists. As the consequences of her actions slowly become apparent to her, 
Briony is wracked with guilt and shame. Distancing herself from family and 
abandoning plans to go to university, she embraces the arduous life of a nurse in 
the London of the Second World War, in penance for her act of falsehood. Her 
offer to recant her incriminating testimony is received with scepticism, her every 
expression of atonement compromised by the self-interest of wanting to clear a 
conscience whose weight she can no longer bear. Towards the end of the novel, 
we realise that these scenarios of atonement have only ever been played out in 
Briony’s mind. Coming too late to make any difference in the lives that she has 
so drastically altered, it is the novel itself – it turns out that we have been reading 
Briony’s novel – that is the act, or better still, the speech act of atonement. This 
places us, as readers, in the difficult position of having nothing but the (more than 
occasionally self-justifying) narrative offered by the wrongdoer as our sole account 
of events. As Briony herself wonders on the penultimate page of her self-flagellating 
meditation: ‘[H]ow can a novelist achieve atonement when, with her absolute 
power of deciding outcomes, she is also God?’31
Understanding atonement not merely as an act of contrition, but as an affective 
voyage that navigates the treacherous shoals of guilt, shame, resentment, self-pity, 
30  Quoted in Gevisser, above n 13.
31  Ian McEwan, Atonement (Vintage, 2002) 371. 
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ambition and self-interest, across gradients of power, might take us some way 
towards appreciating how atonement can seem very far from an exercise in 
humility. Because atonement purports to establish a new relationship between 
actors, we might further unpack it by drawing on the object relations theory of 
psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. Julia Gallagher has argued that Klein is particularly 
useful for an understanding of morality in international relations because 
relationships are central to her thought and practice.32 Object relations theory 
explains the development of the psyche during early childhood through 
an account of how people relate to objects – both real objects in the world 
around them, and the internal objects that they build unconsciously to reflect and 
help them to make sense of the world. As Gallagher explains, the child experiences 
external objects through projection, and mentally internalises these objects which 
then constitute her personality, thereby shaping further encounters with, and 
internalisations of, external objects. In doing so, the child is both author of, 
and subject to, her internal objects, which are built on both positive and negative 
interactions with the world. If at first the positive and the negative seem separable, 
with ‘good’ objects fostering security and well-being and ‘bad’ objects bringing 
frustration and pain, it is in the child’s shocked realisation that both good and 
bad are personified in the same object – the mother – that the reparative impulse 
is born as an attempt to attenuate the hateful feelings that the child experiences 
for the mother whom she also loves.33 As Will Kaufman explains, for Klein, this 
reparative impulse is at the heart of psychic health, enabling a move from the 
destructive, psychotic, immature stage – the ‘paranoid-schizoid position’ – to 
the mature, integrated stage that she calls the ‘depressive position’.34 It is the 
experience of pain and guilt in the depressive position that fuels the reparative 
urge.
And yet guilt provides only a starting point, and a particularly fraught one at 
that, for the reparative drive which can itself take different trajectories. Even 
sympathetic commentators have criticised as introverted Klein’s thinking about 
reparation, which focuses more on making reparation to one’s injured internal 
objects than to external ones. For C Fred Alford, this kind of reparation is ‘morally 
untrustworthy, as likely to be satisfied by painting a picture about the terrible 
deeds one has done as by making amends to actual victims’.35 This might also be 
why Derek Hook is suspicious of reactions to guilt, which, despite the gestures of 
reparation that may flow from them, are often fundamentally self-serving in being 
motivated primarily by the need to alleviate the atoner’s psychic discomfort. Hook 
32  Julia Gallagher, ‘Can Melanie Klein Help Us Understand Morality in IR? Suggestions for a 
Psychoanalytic Interpretation of Why and How States Do Good’ (2009) 38 Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 295.
33  Ibid 298–302, 304.
34  Will Kaufman, ‘On the Psychology of Slavery Reparation: A Kleinian Reading’ (2007) 4 
Atlantic Studies 267, 269.
35  C Fred Alford, Psychology and the Natural Law of Reparation (Cambridge University Press, 
2006) 6 quoted in ibid 270.
24  Rahul Rao
questions whether a reparative act that is more concerned with salving one’s own 
pain can constitute a genuinely ethical act.36
Klein herself recognised that a subject overwhelmed by guilt may choose to 
deny or refuse it rather than acknowledge and work through it, provoking gestures 
of what she called ‘manic reparation’. As Hanna Segal explains:
Manic reparation is a defence in that its aim is to repair the object in such a 
way that guilt and loss are never experienced. An essential feature of manic 
reparation is that it has to be done without acknowledgement of guilt. . . . 
The object in relation to which reparation is done must never be experienced 
as having been damaged by oneself. . . . The object must be felt as inferior, 
dependent and, at depth, contemptible. There can be no true love or esteem 
for the object or objects that are being repaired, as this would threaten the 
return of true depressive feelings.37
From this, Kaufman extracts what he sees as the hallmarks of manic reparation, 
namely a sense of ‘control’ over the object of reparation, a sense of ‘triumph’ 
through which the object’s true value is diminished in relation to oneself and a 
sense of ‘contempt’ for the object.38
Much of this is strikingly visible in the British discourse of ‘atonement’ for 
Commonwealth anti-sodomy laws. This might sound paradoxical because, on 
the face of it, the discourse does acknowledge guilt in astonishingly categorical 
terms. Yet the guilt is easily displaced onto a historic self, demarcated from the 
contemporary self by the temporal rupture of decolonisation and of Britain’s own 
decriminalisation of sodomy by the 1967 Sexual Offences Act. This means that, 
protestations of guilt notwithstanding, the object in relation to which reparation 
is done is not experienced as having been damaged by a recognisable self. British 
decriminalisation, albeit too late to benefit what were by then former colonies, 
fuels the sense of triumph and superiority vis-à-vis the object (we have progressed, 
they have stagnated). The zealous assumption of British ‘responsibility’ for anti-
sodomy laws in the Commonwealth, blind to the postcolonial agency that 
perpetuates these laws, effectively constructs the objects of reparation as passive, 
inferior and in need of a ‘helping hand’. Cameron’s incipient articulation of 
‘gay conditionality’ reasserts a desire for control and betrays the delusions 
of omnipotence that are a hallmark of manic reparation. One suspects that this 
rare expression of ‘atonement’ for colonialism at the highest levels of British 
government has been forthcoming only because it is thought to furnish the 
requisite standing for a moral crusade in which Britain can assert leadership.
36  Derek Hook, ‘White Privilege, Psychoanalytic Ethics, and the Limitations of Political Silence’ 
(2011) 30 South African Journal of Philosophy 494, 497.
37  Hanna Segal, Introduction to the Work of Melanie Klein (Karnac Books, 1988) 95 –6 quoted 
in Kaufman, above n 34, 271. 
38  Kaufman, above n 34, 271. 
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Equivocal atonement 
Anti-sodomy laws were but one manifestation of colonialism and their persistence 
only one of its many toxic legacies. So one might expect the shame and outrage 
expressed in relation to them to be magnified with respect to colonialism in toto. 
This is not the case. To illustrate this claim, I juxtapose ‘atonement’ for anti-
sodomy laws with a more fractious discourse on the question of Britain’s historic 
responsibility for slavery. These discourses are not easily comparable. Atonement, 
such as it is, for anti-sodomy laws is a relatively recent discourse that has emerged 
out of a small circle of largely British LGBT activists. Discussions about 
responsibility for, and the legacies of, slavery have been geographically more 
widespread and historically more long-running, acquiring particular intensity 
most recently in 2007 on the 200th anniversary of the abolition of slavery. These 
discussions have taken place across continents at virtually every level of society 
from grassroots movements to intergovernmental negotiations. To render these 
incomparable discourses comparable, I mirror the argument offered above with 
an analysis of the ways in which ‘atonement’ for slavery was expressed in one 
institutional arena: the British Parliament.
In March 2007, the House of Commons commemorated the bicentenary 
of the abolition of the slave trade in a wide-ranging debate. Many contributors 
to the debate were unsparing in their descriptions of the ‘trade’ and in 
acknowledging the extent to which Britain had benefited from it, naming the royal 
family, the Church of England, the City and indeed Members of Parliament 
themselves as beneficiaries of the £20 million compensation that was paid to slave 
owners when the trade was abolished in 1807.39 Notwithstanding this candour, 
the debate is shot through with discursive moves that seek to mitigate Britain’s 
culpability for slavery.
The two most common arguments in the service of mitigation were offered 
at the outset by then Labour Deputy Prime Minister John Prescott, who opened 
the debate by citing the lyrics of a slave chain re-enactment that he had reportedly 
seen Ghanaian children perform: ‘Not every black man was innocent. Not every 
white man was guilty.’40 A number of speakers sought to substantiate the first 
point by drawing attention to the involvement of Arab and African slave raiders 
in the trade, with one member describing slavery as ‘a darker chapter in the 
development of every world civilisation’.41 Alongside this de-exceptionalisation of 
the European slave trade came an assertion of British virtue prominent in the very 
framing of the debate as a commemoration of abolition rather than of the trade 
itself. Thus, Prescott opened the debate by seizing what he described as ‘an 
historic moment for the United Kingdom, which led the world in legislating 
39  See, eg, the contributions of Chris Bryant, Vince Cable, Diane Abbott, Dawn Butler, Jeremy 
Corbyn and Claire Curtis-Thomas. 
40  UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 March 2007, vol 458, col 689.
41  Ibid cols 763, 704, 741–2. See also UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 10 May 
2007, vol 691, cols 1556–9.
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against the vile trade in the slavery of human beings’.42 Conservative MP William 
Hague, biographer of abolitionist William Wilberforce, described abolition as ‘a 
moral benchmark of which other civilised societies rightly took note’.43 Another 
Conservative, Malcolm Moss, ruled out an apology for the slave trade, asserting 
triumphantly that ‘it was our country that produced the moral giants of their 
time’.44 Obscuring the fact that one out of every two enslaved Africans shipped 
across the Atlantic was transported in British ships, the debate was effectively an 
exercise in ‘remembering the abolition, forgetting the “trade”’.45 
Underpinning the anxiety to mitigate blame for the slave trade were concerns 
about the demand for an apology by the British state to descendants of slaves in 
its former colonies, principally in the Caribbean – a gesture that many in the 
British establishment fear could potentially strengthen the case for reparations. 
Certainly, such anxieties lurked beneath then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
expression of ‘deep sorrow’, rather than categorical apology, on the eve of the 
bicentenary.46 (More recently, Cameron reiterated this position while on a trip to 
Jamaica, ruling out the possibility of Britain making reparations to its former 
Caribbean colonies and urging these countries to ‘move on’ from such demands.)47 
Speakers across party lines in the Commons expressed support for Blair, avoiding 
– in some cases explicitly refusing – apology, while offering expressions of ‘sincere 
regret’, ‘profound regret’ and ‘acknowledgement’ instead.48 Only one MP, Liberal 
Democrat Malcolm Bruce, spoke of the need to ‘apologise unreservedly and show 
shame for our actions’, but even he quickly rowed back with the disclaimer that 
‘the world cannot go on trading apologies instead of delivering leadership and 
action that move things forward and create change’.49
The imperative to ‘move things forward’ became a key temporal trope in the 
debate that obviated a reckoning with the past. For many speakers, the inexorably 
forward movement of time provided a cue to speak about the present and future 
rather than the past, so that large swathes of a debate that was supposed to be 
about the slave trade and its abolition segued into a discussion about contemporary 
human trafficking. When one member, Conservative Anthony Steen, was rebuked 
by the Speaker for straying too far from the topic of the debate, he protested – 
42  UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 March 2007, vol 458, col 687. 
43  Ibid col 696. 
44  Ibid col 742. 
45  Emma Waterton, ‘Humiliated Silence: Multiculturalism, Blame, and the Trope of “Moving 
On”’ (2010) 8 Museum and Society 128, 131. 
46  ‘Blair “Sorrow” over Slave Trade’, BBC News (online), 27 November 2006 <http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/6185176.stm>. 
47  ‘David Cameron Rules Out Slavery Reparation during Jamaica Visit’, BBC News (online), 
30 September 2015 <http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-34401412>. 
48  UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 March 2007, vol 458, cols 710, 741–2, 
773. 
49  Ibid col 750. In a later debate in the House of Lords, only the black peer Lord Morris of 
Handsworth endorsed the imperative of apology, see UK, Parliamentary Debates, House 
of Lords, 10 May 2007, vol 691, col 1555. 
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quite rightly50 – that ‘at least 50 per cent. of hon. Members’ speeches have 
concentrated on human trafficking and the new forms of slavery’.51 Pressing as 
these issues are, their discussion had the effect of dimming the spotlight that the 
debate was meant to have shone on British institutions and their culpability for 
the slave trade. For one thing, the geography of contemporary human trafficking 
is different from that of the Middle Passage, in that the old slave-owning powers 
have become the countries of destination, refuge and potential rescue of trafficked 
persons rather than the most proximate agents of their enslavement. Those agents 
are now located elsewhere – in Russia and Eastern Europe, Asia and sub-Saharan 
Africa. In addition, the discussion of contemporary slavery focused almost entirely 
on sexual slavery, as if to insinuate that ‘race slaves’ are a thing of the past, while 
‘sex slaves’ are a problem for the present. Such a framing, even if unintentional, 
obscures the sexual slavery that was an inescapable element of plantation life, as 
well as the racialisation of contemporary human sex trafficking.
Many of the speeches suggested that time was the great obstacle to the offering 
of an apology. Some argued that morality is historically contingent: acts considered 
crimes against humanity today were not morally wrong at the time they were 
committed, making their retrospective condemnation anachronistic.52 In insisting 
on viewing slave owners as ‘men of their time’, the objection on grounds of 
anachronism takes a rather flattened view of the past, failing to recognise the ways 
in which time is always already split. One could go as far back as the writings of 
the sixteenth-century Spanish theologian Bartolomé de las Casas to find influential 
critiques of European conquest, genocide and slavery emerging almost con- 
temporaneously with the advent of these practices.53 More importantly, slaves, 
and former slaves such as Olaudah Equiano, themselves articulated powerful and 
eloquent objections to their enslavement.54 To speak of slave owners as ‘men of 
their time’ is effectively to place the voices of slaves living in the same time, out 
of time, and thereby out of humanity itself.
The more widely articulated temporal objection to apology underscored a 
putative lack of connection between those who committed morally heinous acts 
and those being called upon to apologise on their behalf. Liberal Democrat Vince 
Cable opined that ‘in any sensible ethical system, one cannot apologise for things 
that happened 10 generations ago’.55 For Conservative Tobias Ellwood, the lack 
50  See, eg, UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 March 2007, vol 458, cols 
710, 714, 718, 728, 766. 
51  Ibid col 728.
52  Ibid cols 741–2.
53  Bartolomé de las Casas, A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies (Project Gutenberg, 
first published 1542, 2007 edn) <http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/20321/
pg20321-images.html>. 
54  Olaudah Equiano, The Interesting Narrative of the Life of Olaudah Equiano, or Gustavus Vassa, 
the African Written by Himself (Project Gutenberg, first published 1789, 2005 edn) <http://
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of any ‘direct connection’ between today’s leaders and their predecessors made 
an apology unfeasible.56 Introducing temporal rupture in the narrative of the nation, 
such statements sever the past from the present, allowing the contemporary 
nation to disclaim responsibility for the actions of its prior iterations. Remarking 
on this tendency, Emma Waterton notes that ‘paradoxically, while there is a 
strongly-held view that one cannot feel guilty about those things you did not 
commit, there is no such injunction against feeling pride in a temporally distant 
group’s achievements’.57 Indeed, as we have seen, much of the debate featured 
precisely such expressions of pride in the past as exemplified by figures like 
Wilberforce and others associated with the abolitionist movement. Moreover, as 
the recent Brexit discourse demonstrates, far from declining with the passage 
of time, pride in the past is continually renewed and recycled, with nostalgia for 
empire enjoying a resurgence at the time of this writing because it seems to 
reassure an anxious populace that Britain can thrive when unencumbered by 
continental entanglements.58
Writing against the disavowal of responsibility for the actions of prior genera-
tions, Janna Thompson has argued for a view of the state as an intergenerational 
agent that transcends individuals and generations and that can take decisions, act 
and assume responsibility in its own right. Indeed, without such a conception of 
intergenerational responsibility, it would be impossible for present citizens to 
enter into commitments that bind future generations. As Thompson explains:
Present citizens have a moral entitlement to impose . . . obligations on future 
citizens only if they have reason to believe that in making such commitments 
they are operating in the framework of a practice that requires them to take 
responsibility for the commitments made by past citizens and the injustices 
that they have committed. Those who think that they are entitled to impose 
demands on future people must be prepared to assume the responsibilities 
intrinsic to a transgenerational polity.59
Perhaps unsurprisingly, black MPs had less difficulty making connections with the 
past, pointing to numerous present-day accumulations of wealth that had been 
built on profits from the slave trade, and drawing lines of continuity between 
slavery and the conditions in which communities descended from slaves lived 
today. Labour MP Diane Abbott, the first black woman to be elected to the 
Commons, wondered ‘whether the extraordinary brutality of the slave plantation 
experience in the West Indies mark[ed] Caribbean life today’, noting that Jamaica, 
56  Ibid col 762.
57  Waterton, above n 45, 133. 
58  Nadine El-Enany, ‘Brexit as Nostalgia for Empire’ on Critical Legal Thinking (19 June 2016) 
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59  Janna Thompson, ‘Apology, Justice, and Respect: A Critical Defense of Political Apology’ in 
Mark Gibney, Rhoda E Howard-Hassmann, Jean-Marc Coicaud and Niklaus Steiner (eds), 
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the country of her parents, had the highest murder rate in the world.60 Her 
colleague Dawn Butler referred specifically to the legacy of slavery, defining 
‘legacy’ as ‘what has been passed to the present’ and remarking, in a poetic turn 
of phrase, that ‘those enslaved gave their tomorrows for our todays’.61 Speeches 
by Abbott (and Jeremy Corbyn) were also instrumental in offsetting the 
‘Wilberforcemania’62 of some members with the crucial reminder that slavery was 
brought to an end, in no small measure, by the agency of slaves themselves in 
insurrections such as the Haitian Revolution and countless lesser-known 
rebellions.63
While clearly seeking to force a more meaningful reckoning with the legacy of 
slavery, what is striking about the interventions by black MPs is that they too 
seemed deeply cautious about broaching the subject of apology and/or reparations. 
Having wondered about links between past and present, Abbott backpedalled – 
‘I do not want to stretch the thought too far’64 – and while raising the subject of 
reparations, Butler did so only in respect of the indemnity that Haiti had been 
forced to pay France for its freedom;65 indeed, when speaking of the future, she 
could countenance only ‘emotional and spiritual reparation to repair minds’.66 
David Lammy, MP for Tottenham and then Culture Minister, pleaded that he ‘did 
not want to get into a blame fest’ and commended Blair for having ‘gone further 
than any other leader of any western democracy’ in his expression of sorrow for 
the country’s slave-trading past.67 
It is difficult, looking simply at the record of the 2007 debate, to fully grasp 
why black British politicians, with rare exceptions (Lammy’s predecessor Bernie 
Grant being one), have been so pusillanimous in their approach to the question 
of apology and reparations. Those who are descendants of slave ancestors but also 
present-day representatives of the state that did more than any other to enable 
the slave trade, find themselves caught in the uncomfortable double bind that 
Homi K Bhabha theorises as the liminal, hybrid space of the colonised native 
elite.68 One cannot underestimate the pressures of hostile white constituents, or 
the incentives for disciplined parliamentary behaviour offered by the prospect of 
career advancement. It should be pointed out, however, that a figure like Abbott 
60  UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 March 2007, vol 458, col 704. See also 
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has forged an alternative parliamentary career for herself precisely by defying the 
Blairite line on most issues. So why not on this one? One answer may lie in an 
intervention that Abbott made in the midst of Butler’s speech:
Does my hon. Friend agree that it is important for young black people to 
learn about the black involvement in this country’s history, and about the 
reality of the slave trade? Does she accept that they have to understand that 
they are not merely the passive recipients of charity from the majority 
community and that they can be the architects of their own fate?69
We can hear in Abbott’s intervention an anxiety that the demand for too much 
atonement from white Britain might obviate the agency and responsibility that 
black people, in her view, ought to exercise in relation to their own futures. 
In coming to grips with the reticence of black British politicians to endorse 
the notion of apology and/or reparations for slavery, we must also consider the 
less edifying possibility of the instrumentalisation of black faces by a white estab-
lishment to legitimate a stance of denial and disavowal. When the United States 
famously withdrew from the 2001 Durban Conference Against Racism, Racial 
Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in protest against the equa-
tion of Zionism with racism, but also because of the appearance of the demand 
for slavery reparations on the conference agenda, its objections were articulated 
by then Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice, both African Americans. Following US withdrawal, it was left to Britain and 
other Western European countries to lead the opposition to this demand. The 
British delegation was led by the black Labour politician Baroness Valerie Amos 
(now Director of SOAS, University of London, where I am employed). Hilary 
Beckles – historian, advocate for reparations and head of the delegation from 
Barbados – recalls Amos’s contribution to the conference:
Amos was adamant that slavery and slave trading were not crimes because 
the British Parliament, and its colonial machinery, had made them legal. 
Despite two hundred years of black resistance and rebellion, she insisted that 
the slave system was legal because the British Parliament deemed it to be so. 
Aware that national law does not legalize crimes against humanity, she did 
not retreat in the face of overwhelming historical arguments.70
Resting on a strictly positivist interpretation of international law, Amos’s position 
seemed – to her Caribbean counterparts – unwilling to entertain the moral 
responsibilities that Britain owed, as a duty of justice rather than charity, to the 
countries that were ravaged by its slave trade and that, left undischarged, 
69  UK, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 20 March 2007, vol 458, col 720.
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undermined the prospects for a moral global economy.71 Reading the 2007 British 
parliamentary debates, Beckles concludes bitterly that ‘it was a shameful sight to 
see and hear descendants of enslaved blacks singing the Blair song in and out of 
Parliament. What was clear . . . was that the black group in the British Parliament 
did not support, even moderately, the notion of reparations as reconciliation.’72 
Beckles’s indictment brings to mind the odious image of black minstrel 
performance at the behest of white directors, leaving us with an image, quite 
literally, of the white state making anti-black arguments in blackface. 
(Why) is sex sexier than race?
In December 2013, the computer pioneer and Second World War codebreaker 
Alan Turing was granted a posthumous royal pardon for a 1952 conviction for 
gross indecency.73 Turing had been arrested for having sex with a 19-year-old man 
and was given a choice between chemical castration and a sentence of imprisonment. 
He chose the former, but was dead within two years as a result of what was 
described, not without controversy, as suicide. The 2013 pardon was the result of 
a campaign launched by a coalition of computer scientists, historians and LGBT 
activists who were determined to honour Turing’s memory for his contribution 
to the war effort and to science. It followed a 2009 apology from the then Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown, who said ‘on behalf of the British government, and all 
those who live freely thanks to Alan’s work, I am very proud to say: we’re sorry. 
You deserved so much better.’74 While a number of factors distinguish the apology 
to Turing from the non-apology for slavery, the former reinforces the impression 
that the British state appears more willing to atone for past sexual injustices in 
which it was complicit than for its racial crimes. So, it is worth considering whether 
the differences between these contexts are morally significant. In what follows, 
I want to make a distinction between factors that appear to distinguish these 
contexts but that, on closer scrutiny, ought not to; and factors that do indeed 
distinguish them in ways that might illuminate why atonement is more forthcoming 
in some contexts than others.
First, let us consider the question of time. In contrast to arguments disavowing 
responsibility for slavery on grounds of a lack of connection between slave owners 
and present-day representatives of the state, in the Turing case the evident lack of 
connection between the authorities who had zealously enforced an unjust law 
against him and present-day representatives of the state did not seem to affect the 
71  Max du Plessis, ‘Historical Injustice and International Law: An Exploratory Discussion of 
Reparation for Slavery’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 624.
72  Beckles, above n 70, 197. 
73  ‘Royal Pardon for Codebreaker Alan Turing’, BBC News (online), 24 December 2013 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-25495315>. 
74  Gordon Brown, ‘I’m Proud to Say Sorry to a Real War Hero’, The Telegraph (online), 
10 September 2009 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/gordon-brown/ 
6170112/Gordon-Brown-Im-proud-to-say-sorry-to-a-real-war-hero.html>. 
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ability or willingness of the latter to take responsibility for the actions of their 
predecessors. Here, ‘direct connection’ was established by the continuous 
corporate personality of the state rather than by an affinity between the individuals 
who committed the injustice and those who apologised for it. Moreover, the 
question of moral anachronism was never raised insofar as the Turing case 
was concerned, even though it might justifiably have been: after all, Turing was 
retrospectively pardoned for an act that had been considered criminal at the time 
of its commission under a duly constituted law whose procedural status as law had 
never been contested then or since. If anything, the enormously popular Turing 
pardon demonstrated a public appetite for morally anachronistic gestures in 
the service of justice and, perhaps more importantly, as an affirmation of the 
contemporary values of the political community. So much for the dogs that might 
have barked, but did not.
This leaves a different kind of temporal claim, namely that the Turing case was 
more amenable to apology because of the shorter lapse of time between the 
commission of the injustice and the demand for apology. Like the Turing case, 
Britain’s ‘responsibility’ for anti-sodomy laws in its former colonies can be dated, 
at the latest, to the moment of decolonisation in the mid twentieth century, 
roughly a century and a half after the end of slavery. But the significance of the 
putative temporal difference between these contexts can be challenged in two 
ways. First, we can ask, empirically, whether slavery ended when we think it did. 
Here, the choice of 1807 as marking the end of slavery in British commemorations 
becomes suspect when we recall that the possession of slaves was not outlawed in 
the British Empire until 1834 (and in the Spanish colonies until the 1880s). When 
Beckles reminds us that former slave-owning families such as the Lascelles of 
Harewood retained their sugar plantations in Barbados until as recently as 1975, 
it becomes easier to appreciate how slavery can remain part of ‘living memory’75 
in the Caribbean and how the shame associated with it can continue to infuse the 
post-Emancipation present.76 Writing in a US context, Angela Davis has drawn 
lines of continuity between the political economy of slavery and the contemporary 
‘prison-industrial complex’, unsettling the received wisdom about the achievement 
of emancipation and civil rights.77 Second, even accepting that slavery ended well 
before the prosecution of sodomy did, we can ask the conceptual question of 
whether the passage of time should attenuate the case for atonement. It may be 
supposed that a shorter lapse of time makes the case for apology more compelling 
because the injury is fresh in the minds of victims (if still alive) and/or their 
descendants, or because they have had less time and opportunity to adjust to its 
consequences. Yet to accept this argument would impose an arbitrary limitation 
on the period within which acknowledgements for historic injustice ought to be 
made. Moreover, it would overlook the fact that it is precisely in circumstances of 
75  Beckles, above n 70, 16, 168–9.
76  Shepherd, above n 62.
77  Angela Davis, The Prison Industrial Complex (AK Press, 1999). 
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gross power disparities between perpetrator and victim that injustices tend to 
remain unacknowledged for long periods.
This brings us to a second possible distinction between the Turing apology and 
the slavery non-apology, namely money. The only criticism of the Turing pardon 
was that it had not been extended to the nearly 50,000 men who had been 
convicted under the same law. The fact that some of these men were still alive and 
might have become entitled to compensation as a result of such a move may have 
weighed on the minds of those who operationalised the royal prerogative of 
mercy. In the context of reckoning with the legacies of slavery, the demand for 
reparations, not to mention the presumed scale of such reparations were they to 
be meaningful, seems to exercise a chilling effect on even non-monetary 
expressions of atonement for slavery, because of the feared link between words 
and money. It seems clear that atonement is more easily contemplable in contexts 
in which it is seen to have no serious material repercussions. 
Third, we cannot ignore Turing’s exceptional status as a white man of genius 
committed to the defence of the state through his efforts to break the Nazi 
Enigma code, in understanding why the demand for apology on his behalf was 
successful. I suggest that atonement in the British establishment for anti-sodomy 
laws in the colonies is informed by the awareness that such laws also punished 
people within or near that establishment – elite white men like Oscar Wilde and 
Turing. At a reception in the Chamber of the Speaker of the House of Commons 
marking the formation of the APPG on Global LGBT Rights in 2015, I listened 
as MPs expressed grateful incredulity at the possibility of doing such work in an 
institution where poignantly remembered (unnamed) senior colleagues had been 
unable to be ‘out’, let alone take public positions on LGBT issues, in the not very 
distant past.78 That white elites also suffer(ed) as queers allows an elision between 
‘queer’ and ‘whiteness’, spurring atonement for anti-sodomy laws in a way that is 
not forthcoming with regard to slavery. 
Picture the atonement discourses for anti-sodomy laws and slavery as two 
triangles. The former is an inverted triangle, standing on its apex: a small group 
of civil society voices who have generated an astonishingly contrite discourse for 
this particular legacy of colonialism at the highest levels of British politics. The 
latter is a triangle standing on its base: an enormous, transnational, multi-
generational grassroots movement advanced by pan-Africanist voices in civil 
society and some state institutions in the Caribbean, black America, sub-Saharan 
Africa and Western Europe, that struggles to have its arguments taken seriously 
by the governments of former slave-owning powers. Since 2014, British Afro-
Caribbean people have marked Emancipation Day (1 August) by walking from 
Brixton to Westminster in London to reiterate the demand for reparation in 
commemorative marches that are comparable in their size and vivacity with the 
78  Participant observation, UK, House of Commons, 21 July 2015. 
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most raucous Gay Pride marches, but with only a fraction of the coverage in 
mainstream media.79
My argument should not be taken to imply that Britain has more adequately 
reckoned with the sexual injustices that are a legacy of its colonial rule. If anything, 
this chapter has been a study in two styles of atonement, both of which are 
problematic. If imperious atonement assumes too much responsibility for the 
state of the contemporary world, equivocal atonement does not assume enough. 
If imperious atonement hovers uncertainly between the extremes of viewing the 
postcolony as sole author or non-author of its fate, equivocal atonement seems 
keener to apportion blame for the heinous outcomes that it is called to account 
for. Time, which is equivocal atonement’s great alibi for inaction, poses fewer 
problems in imperious atonement’s manic quest to rewrite its legacy. Both styles 
of atonement offer ways of managing a difficult past without changing too much 
about oneself or the world.
79  Rastafari Movement UK, Reparations March 2014 (15 October 2014) YouTube <https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=vjqxkC9Gr04>. 
2 ‘Dangerous desires’
Illegality, sexuality and the global 
governance of artisanal mining
Doris Buss and Blair Rutherford*
The mining of precious and rare minerals has recently become the subject of 
increased international attention and regulation. Starting in the 2000s, and with 
the sharp rise in commodity prices, a new surge in international and transnational 
efforts unfolded to regulate mining in the global South, particularly on the African 
continent. Those initiatives have spawned an array of voluntary frameworks, 
global norms and standards, regional agreements, new national mining codes and 
mining policies, all in the service of opening up, and ‘better regulating’, mining 
economies. Collectively, these developments are part of a new global governance 
regime on the extractive sector.
Sexuality is more relevant to this emerging regime than suggested by this rather 
dry summary. Mining for precious minerals, particularly in the Western imaginary, 
conjures images of risk and reward: the allure of found wealth – gold nuggets or 
diamonds extracted from the earth’s secret interiors that can make a poor man 
rich; combined with danger – the unregulated frontiers where mines and 
enterprises collapse, and wily salesmen and women rob the poor of their pittances. 
These tropes of desire and danger1 are centrally implicated in the global claims 
made about the need for particular types of mining regulation. In this chapter, 
*  Our analysis draws in part from our involvement in two projects on the gendered dynamics of 
artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) in six countries on the African continent: Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda (funded through Growth and Economic 
Opportunities for Women, International Development Research Centre, Canada, Department for 
International Development, UK, William and Flora Hewlett Foundation), in one project; 
Kenya, Mozambique and Sierra Leone in the other (funded by the Government of Canada’s 
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council, Insight Grant, awarded 2014, No 435-
2014-1630). These projects are conducted with colleagues in Africa and Canada. We thank all 
our colleagues for enriching our understanding of ASM and particularly Jennifer Hinton who 
read and commented on earlier versions of this chapter and has generally been a patient and 
wise guide for us in this research. Our thanks also to Dianne Otto for her encouragement and 
patience.
1  Roseann Cohen, for example, refers to depictions of artisanal and small-scale gold mining in 
Colombia in terms of ‘dangerous desires’: Roseann Cohen, ‘Extractive Desires: The Moral 
Control of Female Sexuality at Colombia’s Gold Mining Frontier’ (2014) 19 Journal of Latin 
American and Caribbean Anthropology 260, 260.
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we read the emerging global governance regime on mining in terms of the 
‘evolutionary tropes’ of development discourses that cohere through raced, 
gendered and sexualised meanings.2 Law, and particularly the determination of 
who has law and who needs it, is a key mechanism through which hierarchical 
conceptions of order are racially and sexually inflected.3
Our focus is more particularly on a form of mining that, until recently, was 
largely overlooked by researchers and policy makers; artisanal and small-scale 
mining (ASM). With limited or no mechanisation, ASM is a rudimentary type 
of mining which provides a livelihood for tens of millions of people worldwide 
and which is now increasingly embraced by international actors as an important 
poverty-alleviation activity.4 Operating in a contradictory legal space, ASM has 
historically been minimised, criminalised or ignored in formal legal structures 
otherwise oriented towards ‘industrialised’ mining.
The artisanal gold miner in dominant legal and policy approaches, we argue, is 
a queer figure; a mining ‘outlaw’, whose excesses and underdeveloped form 
are often referenced in official accounts of ASM’s dangers. In these figurations, 
ASM helps to bolster ‘industrial’ mining as the norm against which ASM is the 
perversion. Sexuality is operable here, not so much in terms of sexual practices 
(or, at least, this is not directly our focus), but as providing one of the discursive 
structures5 through which constructs of disorder and order cohere. Reading the 
regulation of mining through sexuality as episteme6 highlights the productive 
power of discourses on mining’s dangers; the kinds of legal, regulatory order that 
emerge as necessary against the disorders attributed to ASM. Sexuality is not the 
only context in which the artisanal miner is figured, but in this chapter we highlight 
it as one axis along which ‘uneven global legal relations’ are constituted.7
The chapter begins with an introduction to the emerging global regime on 
governing the extractives sector that is premised on state and corporate 
transparency and self-exposure and a dialectic between law and disorder. In the 
2  Neville Hoad, ‘Arrested Development or the Queerness of Savages: Resisting Evolutionary 
Narratives of Difference’ (2000) 3 Postcolonial Studies 133, 133. See also Cynthia Weber, 
Queer International Relations: Sovereignty, Sexuality and the Will to Knowledge (Oxford 
University Press, 2016); Roderick A Ferguson, ‘Of Our Normative Strivings: African American 
Studies and the Histories of Sexuality’ (2005) 23(3–4) Social Text 85.
3  Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism: China, the United States, and Modern Law (Harvard 
University Press, 2013) 5.
4  Jennifer J Hinton, ‘Communities and Small-Scale Mining: An Integrated Review for 
Development Planning’ (Report, Communities and Small-Scale Mining Initiative, World Bank 
Group, December 2005); Gavin Hilson, ‘Small-Scale Mining, Poverty and Economic 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Overview’ (2009) 34(1–2) Resources Policy 1. 
5  Gayle S Rubin, ‘Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality’ in Henry 
Abelove, Michèle Aina Barale and David M Halperin (eds), The Lesbian and Gay Studies Reader 
(Routledge, 1993) 3.
6  Michel Foucault, ‘Politics and the Study of Discourse’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and 
Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality (University of Chicago 
Press, 1991) 53, 55 quoted in Ferguson, above n 2, 87.
7  Teemu Ruskola, ‘Raping like a State’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1477, 1527.
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second section, we explore the sexualised dimensions of disorder as they are 
articulated in relation to the ‘numerous negatives’8 often imputed to ASM. Sexual 
metaphors, and moralising discourses of ASM’s sexual excesses, we argue in the 
third section, have helped to rationalise the global governance of ASM. Focusing 
specifically on the global regulation of ‘conflict minerals’, we explore the ways 
in which foundational dichotomies between private/public, secrecy/disclosure 
and excess/restraint resonate with sexualised meanings that serve, ultimately, 
to construct an idealised, self-regulating global subject. The focus of global 
regulation of mineral extraction comes to rest on the conditions for self-managed 
restraint of both artisanal miners and a global class of consuming subjects. 
The global governance of mining
International and national policy makers, agencies and donors have, over the last 
decade or more, unrolled various initiatives to reform resource extraction on the 
African continent in order to address the twin concerns of armed conflict/
criminality and endemic poverty. These initiatives include establishing global 
standards and monitoring mechanisms to improve mining governance within 
mineral-rich states of the global South, such as the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI),9 regimes aimed at encouraging changes in 
corporate behaviour in the extractives sector, such as the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidelines for 
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk 
Areas,10 as well as more regional mechanisms to identify shared approaches and 
priorities, such as the African Mining Vision and the efforts of the International 
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR).11 Alongside and in relation to 
these initiatives are further efforts supporting revisions of national mining codes. 
 8  Gavin Hilson and Angélique Gatsinzi, ‘A Rocky Road Ahead? Critical Reflections on the 
Futures of Small-Scale Mining in sub-Saharan Africa’ (2014) 62(A) Futures 1, 4; for discussion 
see Chris Huggins, Doris Buss and Blair Rutherford, ‘A “Cartography of Concern”: Place-
Making Practices and Gender in the Artisanal Mining Sector in Africa’ (2016) 74 Geoforum 
182.
 9  Which is described on its website as a ‘global standard to promote the open and accountable 
management of natural resources’, in text emblazoned on a photograph of a room of African 
men sitting in a large press conference: ‘Who We Are’, Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI) <https://eiti.org/about/who-we-are>.
10  The website for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
describes the Guidelines as providing ‘detailed recommendations to help companies respect 
 human rights and avoid contributing to conflict through their mineral purchasing decisions 
and practices’: OECD, ‘OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of 
Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’, <http://www.oecd.org/corporate/
mne/mining.htm>.
11  A 12-member body of state governments in Africa’s Great Lakes region formed to promote 
regional stability and which has undertaken significant work to increase and harmonise legal 
regimes on mining in the region: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region 
<http://www.icglr.org/index.php/en>.
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Bonnie Campbell characterises these as unfolding in ‘generations’ as changing 
conceptions of the state’s role in regulating the sector drive variations in legal 
frameworks.12 The 1990s saw upwards of 30 African countries reform their mining 
codes,13 and the 2000s witnessed yet another wave of mining law reform which 
Hany Besada and Philip Martin have suggested constitutes a fourth generation,14 
unfolding alongside the transnational regimes of the EITI and others.
Concerns about the so-called ‘resource curse’ loom large in these efforts. The 
term is a catch-all phrase referring to the failure of states to economically benefit 
and develop despite the presence of valuable natural resources such as oil, gas and 
minerals. The ‘curse’ is that valuable minerals can undermine local economies or 
encourage corruption and oligarchy in states, fostering, in turn, the conditions 
for armed conflict.15 Country examples given of the resource curse tend to be 
exclusively African – Nigeria, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Angola, 
and the list goes on.16
While a number of scholars are critical of the phrase ‘resource curse’ and its 
reductionist approach to the complex political economies of resource extraction,17 
the general concerns behind the term are influential in international approaches 
to resource governance. The resulting myriad of regimes and programmes at 
national, international and regional levels are targeting not just mining codes and 
policies, but also state structures, from taxation to land registration, deemed 
necessary for ‘improved governance capacity’. Regional reforms are also unfolding 
to encourage consistency across national standards, for example in the Great Lakes 
region,18 and global initiatives that work through private sector (corporations), 
civil society, donor and recipient country collaborations on extractive industries 
are increasingly influential.19 The extractives governance regime thus encompasses 
a diffuse, multi-sited, multi-scalar set of institutions, relations, ideas/consciousness, 
12  Bonnie Campbell (ed), ‘Regulating Mining in Africa: For Whose Benefit?’ (Discussion Paper 
No 26, Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 2004).
13  James Otto, Craig Andrews, Fred Cawood et al, ‘Mining Royalties: A Global Study of Their 
Impact on Investors, Government and Civil Society’ (Report, Directions in Development: 
Energy and Mining, World Bank, 2006) xvi.
14  Hany Besada and Philip Martin, ‘Mining Codes in Africa: Emergence of a “Fourth” 
Generation?’ (2015) 28 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 263.
15  See, eg, Jeffrey D Sachs and Andrew M Warner, ‘The Curse of Natural Resources’ (2001) 
45(4–6) European Economic Review 827. 
16  See, eg, Terra Lawson-Remer and Joshua Greenstein, ‘Beating the Resource Curse in Africa: 
A Global Effort’, Council on Foreign Relations (August 2012) <http://www.cfr.org/africa-
sub-saharan/beating-resource-curse-africa-global-effort/p28780>. 
17  Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, ‘“May God Give Us Chaos, So That We Can Plunder”: A Critique of 
“Resource Curse” and Conflict Theories’ (2006) 49(3) Development 14. 
18  The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region has undertaken significant work, 
including through the Lusaka Declaration to increase and harmonise legal regimes on mining: 
above n 11.
19  See, eg, above n 9.
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flows and locales that are better described as an ‘assemblage’20 rather than a single 
system. The legal disciplinary categories of international, national or comparative 
do not fully capture the (legal) orders entailed within this regime. While some 
aspects of this governance regime could be comprised of, and give rise to, plural 
legal orders, this too has conceptual limits because of the complex flows and 
normative orderings that are not necessarily ‘legal’ or law-like.21
Our focus is on ASM as a site of, and embedded within, various, multi-scalar 
governance relations. This focus on governance, rather than specific legal orders, 
is informed by work of international relations and African studies scholars who 
have begun to explore the global dimensions of governmentality; the different 
and dispersed processes, institutions, agencies and subjects through which 
management of conduct is enacted.22 Such an approach allows for an emphasis on 
complex governance techniques, effects and ideological claims, without, at the 
same time, reifying the contours (boundedness) of the state and its non-state 
corollaries – civil society and private sector actors. It also opens up for consideration 
a greater variety of relations and ‘micro-centres’23 of control where legal meaning 
is created, and legal actors figured, in relation to the global governance of resource 
extraction.
Finally, we read this emerging regime of resource governance as another 
example of what John and Jean Comaroff have referred to as a ‘dialectic of law 
and disorder’24 where ‘legal fetish’25 unfolds in a ‘pas-de-deux’ with preoccupations 
with criminality and disorder.26 Law, and the need for more and different kinds of 
law, is a driving force in efforts to govern mining, which is consistently placed in 
relation to claims about ‘disorder’ and ‘lawlessness’ associated with resource 
governance that are mostly, but not entirely, located on the African continent. We 
explore this dialectical relationship and, particularly, the ways in which allegations 
about sexual excess, and the use of sexual metaphors, buttress depictions of 
disorder and criminality against which the demands for legality are constructed.
20  Aihwa Ong and Stephen J Collier (eds), Global Assemblages: Technology, Politics, and Ethics 
as Anthropological Problems (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008).
21  The question of ‘global law’ and its relation to spatially demarcated, plural legal order is 
outside the scope of this chapter. See, eg, Hans Lindahl, ‘A-Legality: Postnationalism and the 
Question of Legal Boundaries’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 30.
22  See, eg, James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing States: Toward an Ethnography of 
Neoliberal Governmentality’ (2002) 29 American Ethnologist 981; William Walters, ‘Some 
Critical Notes on “Governance”’ (2004) 73(1) Studies in Political Economy 27; James 
Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Duke University Press, 
2006); Sally Engle Merry, ‘New Legal Realism and the Ethnography of Transnational Law’ 
(2006) 31 Law & Social Inquiry 975.
23  Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things (Duke University Press, 1995) 190.
24  John L Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, ‘Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction’ 
in Jean Comaroff and John L Comaroff (eds), Law and Disorder in the Postcolony (University 
of Chicago Press, 2000) 1.
25  Ibid 22–35. 
26  Ibid 5.
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Desires and dangers in artisanal and small-scale  
mining (ASM)
Paradoxically, ASM is both central and marginal to current efforts at promoting 
better governance of the mining sector. It relies on the low-cost labour of millions 
of people, for whom it is an important, if dangerous and unreliable, livelihood 
when other sectors such as agriculture are diminishing because of neoliberal 
economic policies, armed conflict and climate change, for example. Indeed, the 
World Bank estimates that 100 million people worldwide work in, or rely on, 
ASM.27
Despite the large numbers of people engaged in ASM and related livelihoods, 
it has been widely disparaged by policy makers. As a low yield form of mining 
compared to ‘industrial mining’, which routinely takes place without or in 
‘violation’ of licences or property rights, ASM is often positioned as an impediment 
to developing the large-scale mining sector in Africa. It is routinely depicted in 
terms of ‘numerous negatives’, including environmental degradation, illegality 
and criminality, exploitation and occupational hazards, prostitution, marriage 
breakdown, sexual liberty, disease and drug-use.28 The various harms attributed 
to ASM historically have led to contradictory legal and policy responses.
In the 1980s and into the 1990s, mining laws and policies on the continent 
were directed at ‘opening up’ African countries to entry by international mining 
companies for large-scale extraction. In this period, donors and international 
agencies, like the World Bank, worked with state governments to develop or revise 
domestic mining laws to attract ‘greater foreign investment through decreased 
regulation, liberalised social and labour policies, and more private sector-friendly 
ownership and taxation schemes’.29 These revisions tended to ignore or criminalise 
ASM, with legal regimes providing no route for artisanal miners to operate legally, 
effectively mandating their permanent informality and illegality. Efforts that did 
unfold to ‘formalise’ the sector, such as through requirements for licences, were 
ill-suited and poorly implemented.30 Licensing regimes, including many that 
operate today, may require travel to a capital city, the cost of which is beyond most 
artisanal miners, and/or involve application forms requiring good literacy skills 
or access to notaries. Further, some of the definitions of legal artisanal mining 
specify conditions – such as the maximum depth of a mine shaft – inconsistent 
with actual practices. Thus, ASM has become something of an open secret:31 
nominally illegal, even criminal, often passively tolerated, with occasional expensive 
27  World Bank, ‘Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining’ (21 November 2013) <http://www.
worldbank.org/en/topic/extractiveindustries/brief/artisanal-and-small-scale-mining>.
28  For a discussion, see Hilson and Gatsinzi, above n 8, 4.
29  Besada and Martin, above n 14; Campbell, above n 12.
30  Gavin Hilson and James McQuilken, ‘Four Decades of Support for Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Mining in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Critical Review’ (2014) 1 Extractive Industries and Society 
104.
31  Ibid 112.
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police or military crack-downs or requests for payments to forestall such 
enforcements of ‘the law’, while widely practised and seen at the grassroots level 
as a legitimate livelihood option.
Starting in the 2000s, international concerns about ongoing armed conflict and 
human rights abuses in the DRC and neighbouring countries introduced a new 
dynamic. At that time, sexual violence became a key theme in international 
concerns about the wars in eastern DRC, which was described as the ‘rape capital’ 
of the world, and the ‘worst place’ to be a woman.32 International policy makers 
also began to investigate the role of multinational companies operating in the 
region, the role of ‘illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources and financing 
of armed groups’.33
These efforts led, in turn, to the development of new laws and policies aimed 
at regulating the trade in ‘conflict minerals’, laws that were often justified by 
reference to concerns about sexual violence and related human rights abuse. 
Section 1502 of the 2010 US Dodd-Frank Act34 is the leading example. Under 
this highly influential yet hastily implemented law, US-registered corporations 
are required to monitor and report on where and from whom they buy minerals 
used in their products, with the aim of reducing armed conflict and (sexual) 
violence in the region by ensuring that the mineral supply chain, from the eastern 
DRC mine site to the electronic gadgets purchased in the global North, is certified 
as ‘conflict free’.35
At the root of these concerns about conflict minerals is ASM. After decades of 
state decay, followed by years of armed conflict, ASM is an important form 
32  The origin of the description of DRC as ‘rape capital’ is not clear. Press reports from 2007 
quote John Homes, a ‘top UN humanitarian official’, as saying that rape in DRC has become 
‘almost a cultural phenomenon’ and in intensity and frequency ‘worse than anywhere else in 
the world’: Stephanie McCrummen, ‘Prevalence of Rape in E. Congo Described as Worst 
in World’, Washington Post Foreign Service (online) (9 September 2007) <http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/08/AR2007090801194.html>. 
‘Rape capital’ is used by media outlets in 2007–8 but becomes a frequent reference by 2010 
when Margot Wallström, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict, wrote that eastern DRC ‘has been labelled the rape capital of the 
world’: Margot Wallström, ‘“Conflict Minerals” Finance Gang Rape in Africa’, The Guardian 
(online) (15 August 2010) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/aug/ 
14/conflict-minerals-finance-gang-rape>. Human Rights Watch, in its 2009 World Report 
chapter on DRC, wrote, ‘[i]n a region already labelled “the worst place in the world to be a 
woman”’: ‘Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC): Events of 2009’ (Report, Human Rights 
Watch) <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/democratic- 
republic-congo>. 
33  Vuyelwa Kuuya, ‘The Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, Business & Human Rights Resource Centre 
(1 November 2008) <https://business-humanrights.org/en/doc-the-illegal-exploitation- 
of-natural-resources-and-other-forms-of-wealth-in-the-democratic-republic-of-congo>. 
34  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111-203, 124 Stat 
1375 (2010) (‘Dodd-Frank Act’). 
35  See also Doris Buss, ‘Sexual Violence, Conflict Minerals, and the “Economies of Appearance”’ 
(unpublished manuscript).
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of mining in eastern DRC and neighbouring areas, and the source of livelihoods 
for many. As a conflict-driven livelihood of last resort, ASM is also enmeshed in 
coercive authority structures implicating state and non-state militias.36 The legal 
and regulatory response to ‘conflict minerals’, such as section 1502, were de facto 
directed at ASM, linking it with armed conflict, violence and criminal, ‘black 
market’ economies. The dominant policy response, as we write in late 2016, is the 
insistence on ‘formalising’ the artisanal sector, to minimise the conditions seen as 
giving rise to criminality, illegality and the ‘black market’ global trade in minerals.
Formalisation is a development strategy that endeavours to bring the informal 
economies of ASM into the mainstream through a mix of legal recognition, 
enabling institutional structures and financial supports and incentives.37 Emphasis 
is placed on granting some kind of legal right to artisanal miners from which 
related benefits are hoped to flow: strengthening access to capital to invest in 
better, safer technology, resisting predation by rent-seeking officials/land owners, 
accessing training and improving use of technology and, ultimately, improving 
mining efficiency and environmental protection.38 The resulting approaches to 
formalisation are often highly legalistic, requiring changes to an array of laws and 
institutions, and the establishment of technical regimes for monitoring and 
inspection.39
In Africa’s Great Lakes region, concerns about ASM’s link to black market 
mineral trade and armed conflict have resulted in a globalised regime of monitoring 
and regulation that is even more technical and legalistic. Requirements established 
by section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act mean that corporations must report on 
the origin of designated minerals, gold and tin, tantalum and tungsten (referred 
to as ‘3TGs’) used in their products, leading in turn to an array of initiatives to 
both formalise ASM and the mineral trade, but also monitor and certify – as 
‘conflict free’ – 3TGs from the region and along each stage of the global supply 
chain. The costs of complying with section 1502 are estimated at US $3–4 billion 
initially and between US $200 and 600 million annually thereafter.40
36  Louise Arimatsu and Hemi Mistry, ‘Conflict Minerals: The Search for a Normative 
Framework’ (International Law Programme Paper No 2012/01, Chatham House, September 
2012).
37  Laura Barreto, ‘Analysis for Stakeholders on Formalization in the Artisanal and Small-Scale 
Gold Mining Sector Based on Experiences in Latin America, Africa, and Asia’ (Report, UN 
Environment Programme, September 2011); ‘Analysis of Formalization Approaches in the 
Artisanal and Small-Scale Gold Mining Sector Based on Experiences in Ecuador, Mongolia, 
Peru, Tanzania and Uganda’ (Report, UN Environment Programme, June 2012).
38  Barreto, above n 37.
39  Such as, for example, Mozambique’s Natural Resources and Environment Protection Force, 
an environmental ‘police force’ to ensure ASM is conducted in compliance with the law: 
Buss’s field notes, Maputo, Mozambique, July 2016 and Rutherford’s field notes, Manica 
district, Mozambique, 2016.
40  National Association of Manufacturers v Securities and Exchange Commission (DC Cir, 
No 13-5252, 18 August 2015) 15.
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Sexuality and gender in ASM
The ‘numerous negatives’ of ASM against which the fetishism of legalisation 
currently unfolds are clearly imbricated in – and make reference to and perpetuate 
– colonial, raced, gendered and sexualised discourses through which highly 
unequal, idealised conceptions of order are constructed. Our focus is on the 
operation of just one of these – sexuality, often in combination with gender – as 
a vector along which some constructs of ASM’s ‘numerous negatives’ cohere. In 
highlighting sexuality, we recognise that it is not always the principal matrix 
through which meaning is constructed and social life ordered. Yet, following 
Michel Foucault,41 Anne McClintock42 and Ann Laura Stoler,43 we attend to 
sexuality as an important vector along which contemporary discourses of self 
and other, order and criminality, are both constituted and inflected with racial and 
colonial meanings in contemporary forms of global governance.
Sexuality operates in multiple ways in the complex social, political and economic 
relations that structure ASM sites. Hard rock and, in particular, underground 
artisanal mining sites are, at one level, saturated with sexual and gendered imagery. 
Livelihood practices are also entangled in gendered and sexualised norms and 
performances that combine in ways central to the organisation of women’s 
and men’s roles in, and access to, mining-related livelihoods.
The digging and exploitation of mine ‘shafts’, the term that is common in some 
sub-Saharan countries, such as Kenya, is the privileged activity on a mine site that 
also gives rise to an array of livelihoods, from crushing, sifting and washing ore, 
to the manufacture and sale of food, alcohol and domestic and sexual services. In 
many artisanal gold-mining areas, there are strict gendered norms and taboos 
against women going into the shafts where the ore is dug and extracted. The shafts 
are hot, humid, tight enclosures, and worked almost entirely by groups of men. 
They are spaces constructed in terms of desire and danger.
Other than the buyers of gold, the men who work, own or control the shaft 
generally gain the greatest financial rewards on the mine site. The other mining 
activities – stone crushing, washing and panning – are more accessible to women, 
but can be financially more risky and less lucrative. Shafts are generally owned by 
men and getting (into) a shaft is a good prospect for making money.44
In some mine sites, the edict against women in the shafts is framed in terms of 
magic or luck; women will ‘chase away’ the gold; they bring bad luck. Sometimes 
this prohibition is tied specifically to women’s menstrual cycle as the source of 
41  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Robert Hurley trans, Vintage, 
first published 1976, 1990 edn) vol 1.
42  Anne McClintock, Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest 
(Routledge, 1995).
43  Stoler, above n 23, 190–5. See also Weber, above n 2.
44  This section and the following discussion rely on field notes of the authors and colleagues 
generated in the course of visits in 2015 and 2016 to selected ASM gold sites in Kenya, 
Mozambique, DRC, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Uganda.
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pollution and curse. Some men in an artisanal tin-mining area in Western Uganda 
noted its similarity to a restriction against women entering tomato gardens during 
their menstrual cycle for fear their presence would lead to the drying up of the 
plants. If women enter the mines at any time, according to these men, menstruating 
or not, the tin will disappear. In other regions, such as western Kenya’s Migori 
gold belt, women are said to be ‘weak’ or not sufficiently courageous to be in the 
shafts. Alternatively, women are excluded from shafts for their own safety precisely 
because shafts are dark, small places where miners work in close proximity with 
each other often wearing limited clothes given the high temperatures in the shafts. 
Hence, the argument goes, sexual violence would be inevitable if women were in 
the shafts. Relations between men who share these tight enclosures, in states of 
undress, are generally not remarked upon. Modesty and respectability were also 
emphasised by women and men in ASM sites in eastern DRC, as only immediate 
family members should see men in such a state of undress. As one woman involved 
in gold mining in Ituri province, DRC, exclaimed, ‘In the digging area, men dress 
badly! It is not good to see the body of a man who is not your husband! We are 
African!’45
The concerns of illicit sexual liaisons were particularly marked for married 
women. A married woman working with men in mining activities without the 
presence of a husband is rare, for the fear expressed by many men is that she 
would could be ‘wooed’ by one of the men and have sex with him. In Tonkolili 
district, Sierra Leone, migrant men digging in alluvial gold mines said they 
would only hire a married woman to cook food for them after gaining permission 
from her husband; otherwise, hiring a married woman would arouse her 
husband’s suspicions and could lead to conflict. In the Ituri gold mines, it was 
common for sites to have a person called ‘mother chief ’, who was married to 
the man who is the ‘camp commander’. Among other duties, she is in charge 
of regulating the morals of women working and living in the mining area. For 
instance, she identifies those who are the ‘free women’ (femmes libre — those 
never married) and those who are married. This is sartorially symbolised with 
the camp rule encouraging married women to wear two ‘pagnes’ (cloth wraps) 
and the free and/or single women using one pagne, a skirt and/or pants. People 
interpret the extra wrap worn by married women to signify that they are ‘taken’ 
(controlled) by a husband, while the other women are potentially ‘available’ for 
relationships with men.46
Thus, mine sites are places in which sexuality and sexual relations unfold within 
specific cultural contexts and practices. Katja Werthmann, in her study of artisanal 
gold mining in Burkina Faso, for example, found that some young women 
are drawn to gold mining because of the economic opportunities available, 
45  Field notes, University of Kisangani and the Associates for Research and Education for 
Development, 2015.
46  Ibid.
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as well as the freedom to exercise sexual autonomy;47 a finding resonant with a 
larger history of African women moving to towns or even missions to try to 
escape patriarchal (or matriarchal) controls over their sexuality and lives.48 
Similarly, ASM sites may hold out the possibility of (limited) forms of sexual 
self-expression, although they remain structured by gendered power relations, 
which subject women (and men) to forms of exploitation and danger, as well 
as pleasure.
In the organisational dynamics of the ASM site, the length of the shaft matters. 
The deeper and thus riskier the shaft becomes, the harder life is for everyone 
in the mine area. Deep shafts can encounter more flooding and require more 
technology and money in order to access the gold. Accidents are often fatal and 
may result in officials closing a mine, usually temporarily, but often with an 
enormous impact on the many men and women who rely on it for their daily 
livelihoods. Characterisations of masculinity in terms of courage and strength take 
on a particular resonance within an artisanal mining site where all other livelihoods 
are reliant upon the men successfully exploiting the shaft.
There is a distinct homosociality and, at times, sexualised hypermasculinity 
among the men in these ASM sites. In Mozambique’s Manica district, miners, 
diggers and shaft owners commonly expressed both a masculine camaraderie and 
competitiveness. Men who worked in some of the activities of the mines, but did 
not enter the shafts, were commonly depicted in feminised terms as scared or 
weak, while school-aged boys who did odd jobs around the mines were considered 
to be miners (and men) in training, learning the ropes of mining. Men worked 
together in teams, but there was also competition among them that could lead to 
fights or accusations of cheating. At the same time, when a cave-in occurred, loud 
whistles called men from other pits and shafts to come and try to dig out the 
affected men. In such events, women were said to provide ‘supportive roles’, 
bringing food and drink to the frantically digging men.49
In Katanga, south-east DRC, Jeroen Cuvelier describes the masculine 
dimensions of an ASM ‘mining sub-culture which has its own moral economy’ 
and includes an embrace of kivoyou, or ‘deviant lifestyle’, comprised of profligate 
spending, ‘swearing, wearing eccentric or expensive clothes, cross-dressing, 
drinking excessively, being disrespectful towards senior members of society and 
speaking hindubill – a kind of tongue-in-cheek, “underworld” slang’. 50 Mining is 
47  Katja Werthmann, ‘Working in a Boom-Town: Female Perspectives on Gold-Mining in 
Burkina Faso’ (2009) 34 Resources Policy 18.
48  See, eg, Teresa A Barnes, ‘We Women Worked So Hard’: Gender, Urbanization, and Social 
Reproduction in Colonial Harare, Zimbabwe, 1930–1956 (Heinemann, 1999); Dorothy L 
Hodgson and Sheryl A McCurdy (eds), ‘Wicked’ Women and the Reconfiguration of Gender 
in Africa (Heinemann, 2001); Blair Rutherford, Farm Labor Struggles in Zimbabwe: The 
Ground of Politics (Indiana University Press, 2017).
49  Rutherford field notes, above n 39.
50  Jeroen Cuvelier, ‘Money, Migration and Masculinity among Artisanal Miners in Katanga 
(DR Congo)’ (2016) Review of African Political Economy 7.
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seen as an important process for developing one’s masculinity, and in which 
attention to the male body, and the camaraderie among men, were key features. 
Cuvelier’s research suggests that these norms of masculinity are a departure from 
earlier identities. As T Dunbar Moodie’s pathbreaking work on sexuality among 
male South African industrial gold miners in pre-apartheid and apartheid South 
Africa reminds us, these forms of masculinity – including the roles of ‘mine wives’ 
– can shift and need to be placed in the wider cultural politics and political 
economy of particular locales in specific historical conjunctures.51
While there is not space in this chapter to do justice to the operation of gender 
and sexuality in structuring ASM sites, the examples above point to some 
important features. First, they indicate that sexuality and sexualisation of mining 
practices is an important, albeit complex, part of the organisation of ASM sites. 
Second, sexuality is woven into gendered norms and behaviours that structure 
how women and men pursue mining-related livelihoods and that may, in turn, 
condition forms of physical and economic vulnerability. And, third, these gendered 
and sexed relations vary over time in relation to the changing dynamics of mining, 
its geology and location in a larger political economy of resource extraction. Yet, 
while gender and sexuality are complex, multihued vectors of ASM practices and 
identities, the dominant portrayals of ASM in terms of its ‘numerous negatives’ 
tend to a highly reductionist account of gender and sexuality in terms of dangerous 
masculinity and vulnerable femininity.
Gender, sexuality and the constructs of ASM’s dangers
A recurring theme in the moralising discourses on ASM’s ‘numerous negatives’ is 
its threat to ‘normal’ sexuality. The sexualisation of ASM sites takes place both 
through the insistent characterisations of them as disordered and disorderly, and 
more directly, as linked to prostitution, sexual promiscuity and family break-up, 
along with child labour, alcoholism, disease and environmental destruction. In 
one of the few published studies on gender and gold mining in Kenya’s western 
region,52 the authors note the high rates of venereal and sexually transmitted 
diseases and the connection with ‘prostitutes’ who 
took advantage of the miners at Kilingili, Chavakali, Mbale and other 
neighboring towns where a majority especially the young miners went for 
entertainment and to socialize in the evenings and weekends. Drunkenness 
51  T Dunbar Moodie, ‘Migrancy and Male Sexuality on the South African Gold Mines’ (1988) 
14 Journal of Southern African Studies 228.
52  Media coverage is also scant, but here too both prostitution and child labour have been 
the focus of international news stories: ‘Gold Mining Beats School Any Day’, IRIN (online) 
(9 February 2012) <https://www.irinnews.org/report/94822/kenya-gold-mining-beats-
school-any-day>; ‘Tackling Underage Sex Work in Nyanza’s Gold Mines’, IRIN (online) 
(7 February 2012) <https://www.irinnews.org/fr/node/251581>.
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was also another problem . . . [leading] men into cheap and unprotected sex, 
and depletion of hard earned family incomes.53
A study of galamsay, artisanal miners in Ghana, similarly asserted that 
the growth in population of people from different backgrounds . . . has 
increased active social life, resulting in prostitution and sexual promiscuity, 
and as a result the increased spreading of communicable diseases such as 
syphilis, gonorrhea and AIDS. There are also cases of drug abuse among 
small-scale gold miners. This is especially prevalent among illegal operators.54
In each of these examples, the negatives of ASM are consistently linked to the 
social and sexual life of the mines; sexually transmitted disease alongside 
drunkenness and prostitution that feeds from profligacy. Gendered characterisations 
of these sexual wrongs, in which those who work in the mine sites are simultaneously 
risky and at risk, are also important, with men depicted as either dupes or dissolutes 
and women as both predators and victims.55
The preoccupation with the sexual dimensions of ASM’s negatives continues 
in the more recent focus on conflict minerals and their linkage to sexual 
violence in eastern DRC. While sexual violence and sexualised forms of 
exploitation in ASM are important and serious, the predominant concerns 
about the sexual in depictions of ASM’s negatives does not capture the complex 
social and economic dynamics that structure sexual activity, as discussed above. 
It also tends towards policy prescriptions that emphasise abolition or prohibition, 
which may undermine women’s already precarious economic roles within mining 
sites, as Dianne Otto has noted in the context of sexual prohibitions in 
peacekeeping.56 In contemporary, official discourse, ASM is now positioned as 
in need of reform and aid, but this sits alongside historical policy approaches closer 
to abolition. 
53  Maurice Amutabi and Mary Lutta-Mukhebi, ‘Gender and Mining in Kenya: The Case of 
Mukibira Mines in Vihiga District’ (2001) 1(2) Jenda: A Journal of Culture and Women 
Studies 1, 16.
54  P A Eshun, ‘Sustainable Small-Scale Gold Mining in Ghana: Setting and Strategies for 
Sustainability’ in B R Marker, M G Petterson and F McEvoy (eds), Sustainable Minerals 
Operations in the Developing World (Geological Society, 2005) 61.
55  Cohen, above n 1. Feminist geographer, Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, notes that in policy context, 
women are almost invariably depicted as negatively impacted by ASM, and usually in the form 
of prostitution: Kuntala Lahiri-Dutt, ‘Digging Women: Towards a New Agenda for Feminist 
Critiques of Mining’ (2012) 19 Journal of Feminist Geography 193.
56  Dianne Otto, ‘The Sexual Tensions of UN Peace Support Operations: A Plea for “Sexual 
Positivity”’ (2007) 18 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 33. See also Mats Utas, 
‘Victimcy, Girlfriending, Soldiering: Tactic Agency in a Young Woman’s Social Navigation of 
the Liberian War Zone’ (2005) 78 Anthropological Quarterly 403.
48  Doris Buss and Blair Rutherford
Legal fetish and ‘consumer appetites’
So far in this chapter, we have explored how sexual and gendered metaphors 
and norms, found in policy-level discourses as well as the social lives of artisanal 
mines, construct the sexual order of mining and its regulation. Overwhelmingly, 
ASM is constructed (by those on the outside) in terms of numerous, sexualised 
negatives, while sexualised and gendered tropes are mobilised by those within 
mining communities to structure hierarchical and unequal economic practices. 
In this last section, we move from sexual metaphors to the operation of binaries 
– of publicity and secrecy, excess and restraint – through which sexual meanings 
are dispersed.57
Stoler provides a powerful case for reading colonialism through a matrix of race, 
empire and sexuality, a move that requires going beyond a ‘neat story of colonizers 
pitted against the colonized’.58 ‘Colonial discourses of desires’, she writes, ‘were 
also productive of, and produced in, a social field that was always specific about 
class and gender locations’.59 For Stoler, ‘discourses of sexuality’ operated to 
define social and political orders through which membership, rights and 
recognition, both within and outside of ‘Europe’, were indexed along racial, class 
and sexualised vectors.60 Attending to the ways in which sexual morality becomes 
imbricated in discourses on, for example, citizenship or legality, can reveal how 
certain values, like ‘self-restraint, self-discipline [or] managed sexuality’, become 
woven into the ‘truths’ of, in Stoler’s case, European identity.61
Deconstructing binaries, and their indexing of values, is one mechanism for 
considering the epistemological force of sexuality. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick suggests 
that homosexual/heterosexual may be one ‘master’ binary that is entangled in the 
‘filaments of other important definitional nexuses’,62 which she lists as ‘secrecy/
disclosure, knowledge/ignorance, private/public, [and] masculine/feminine’ to 
name a few. Stoler, in the quote above, draws our attention to the significance of 
‘self-restraint’ and ‘self-discipline’ in colonial constructs of self and other. In the 
following discussion, we examine how similar binaries are deployed in current 
policy discourses on mining governance and through which order and disorder 
take on sexualised meanings, shaping, in turn, their normative force.
Earlier, we explored the ways in which ASM sites are constructed through 
overlapping normative orders and discourses in which gendered and sexualised 
conceptions of risk pervade, influencing the policy frameworks premised on the 
sexualised dis/orders of artisanal mining. In response, policy prescriptions directed 
at regulating ASM sites overwhelmingly embrace ‘formalisation’, in which legal 
57  Ferguson, above n 2, 85.
58  Stoler, above n 23, 199.
59  Ibid 178.
60  Ibid 7–10.
61  Ibid 177–8. See also McClintock, above n 42.
62  Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Epistemology of the Closet (University of California Press, first 
published 1990, 2008 edn) 11. 
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regulation of mining activity, through licences, mining associations such as 
cooperatives and designated mining areas, is presumed to provide the order 
needed for economic development. These policy prescriptions are embedded in 
development programmes aimed at specific national mining contexts and within 
emerging global regulatory regimes seeking to end elite predation, armed conflict 
and sexual violence. In these contexts, law and legalisation, and the order they 
will initiate, are celebrated as the route to economic and social development.
The presumptions about the need for law, and the sources for legal guidance, 
are normative moves by which global legal subjects (the undeveloped and lawless 
versus the developed and law-abiding) are constituted.63 While the emphasis on 
the legal in the regulation of extractives certainly demarks a duality between the 
global North, as the source of law/legal knowledge, and the global South and 
Africa in particular, as unruly and in need of law, this binary, when read through 
sexualised meanings, is more nuanced.
On one level, the sexualisation of the wrongs of ASM tends to characterise 
African states, and mining sites specifically, as lawless spaces. But discourses on the 
globalised threats posed by African mining construct dangerous sexual excess as 
something found not just in the (African) mine site, but also within the global 
North. The concerns about conflict and sexual violence linked to mining in the 
Great Lakes region have led to a view that global legal regulation is needed also 
to keep in check excess desires for African minerals.
As mentioned earlier, section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act is one of the most 
significant and catalysing developments in the globalised regime for mining 
regulation. Among its notable features is its focus on requiring corporations to 
review and report on their global supply chains. Section 1502 does not prevent 
corporations from buying ‘conflict minerals’. It merely requires that corporations 
research the origins of the minerals used in their products and disclose on 
corporate websites and in annual reports whether or not products are ‘DRC 
conflict free’. This is, in effect, a rather soft and seemingly bland regulatory 
device that compels a form of corporate self-knowledge (where its minerals come 
from) and public revelation (by way of websites and annual reports). In this 
respect, section 1502 buttresses other extractives sector governance initiatives, 
like the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidelines for Responsible Supply Chains,64 and 
also state-directed mechanisms, like the EITI, that operate primarily through 
ideals of ‘transparency’ that are, in turn, secured, through corporate or state 
self-disclosure.
Underlying these transparency regimes is a characterisation of social and 
political problems and their resolution ‘through a dynamic of concealment 
and disclosure, through a primary opposition between what is hidden and what 
63  Ruskola, above n 3.
64  OECD, ‘OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from 
Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas: Second Edition’ (2013) <http://www.oecd.org/
corporate/mne/mining.htm>.
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is revealed’.65 Section 1502, for example, and the extensive governance regime it 
has initiated, implicitly constructs ‘the problem’ of sexual violence and armed 
conflict in central Africa in terms of an equation about lack of knowledge (even 
secrecy) about mineral origins and the transformative potential of ‘making 
known’; drawing on the weight given to transparency as a marker of rational 
modernity starting in the last half of the twentieth century.66 The logic of section 
1502 goes something like this: transnational corporations do not know (refuse to 
know?) the source of their minerals and thus contribute (knowingly?) to armed 
conflict in DRC. Making those corporations discover and then make public the 
origins of their minerals will generate public demand in the North for supply chain 
improvements.67
Privacy (secrecy) versus publicity (disclosure) is a foundational binary through 
which sexualised (and gendered) orders have been constituted within the 
Western imaginary.68 In the context of conflict minerals, this binary also operates 
with sexualised meanings, particularly in terms of the connotations of excessive 
‘appetites’ (for Africa’s commodities) that are to be managed through a new legal 
order predicated on transparency and self-restraint.
One of the key advocacy organisations promoting adherence to section 1502 
is the US-based Enough Project. Headed by Washington and Hollywood-insider, 
John Prendergast, Enough released a campaign drive in the late 2000s for 
increased US response to ‘conflict minerals’. A 2009 advocacy video and lobbying 
brochure begins with this statement by Prendergast:
The time has come to expose a sinister reality: Our insatiable demand for 
electronics products such as cell phones and laptops is helping fuel waves 
of sexual violence in a place that most of us will never go, affecting people 
most of us will never meet. The Democratic Republic of the Congo is the 
scene of the deadliest conflict globally since World War II. There are few 
other conflicts in the world where the link between our consumer appetites 
and mass human suffering is so direct.69
65  Jodi Dean, Publicity’s Secret: How Technoculture Capitalizes on Democracy (Cornell University 
Press, 2002).
66  Harry G West and Todd Sanders (eds), Transparency and Conspiracy: Ethnographies of 
Suspicion in the New World Order (Duke University Press, 2003).
67  For a recent illustration of this logic, in which corporations that rely on cobalt for making 
their products (such as the vast majority of those involved in computer and cellphone 
manufacture) are urged to demand that cobalt be included with the 3TGs as a ‘conflict 
mineral’, see Katherine Martinko, ‘What You Should Know about the Cobalt in Your 
Smartphone’, Treehugger (21 October 2016) <http://www.treehugger.com/corporate-
responsibility/what-you-should-know-about-cobalt-your-smartphone.html>.
68  Sedgwick, above n 62; Davina Cooper, Challenging Diversity: Rethinking Equality and the 
Value of Difference (Cambridge University Press, 2004) ch 5. 
69  John Prendergast, ‘Can You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the 
Worst Sexual Violence in the World’, Enough (1 April 2009) <http://www.enoughproject.
org/publications/can-you-hear-congo-now-cell-phones-conflict-minerals-and-worst-sexual- 
violence-world>. 
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In the language of Enough, the appetites for minerals are found among ‘us’ (those 
in the United States and other countries of the global North), and our consumption 
of consumer electronics that are tied through a ‘complex chain of events’ to 
‘widespread sexual violence in Congo’. But while ‘we’ are part of the problem, 
our complicity may be ‘unconscious’ and, thus, can be redressed by ‘consciously 
becom[ing] part of the solution’; using ‘our considerable market muscle to 
demand evidence from companies such as Apple, Nokia, Hewlett Packard, and 
Nintendo that their products do not contain conflict minerals’.70 In this formu- 
lation, Enough locates our base desires in the unconscious and maps a route 
forward through a conscious commitment to consumer activism and restraint. 
The answer is not to deny ourselves the electronics we desire, but to manage those 
desires and the sources of our fulfillment.
Campaigns such as this, and the emerging regime for regulating conflict 
minerals, can thus be read as doing more than simply (re)coding a foundational 
binary between (civilised) global North and (unruly) Africa. It is also a process, 
drawing on Stoler again, by which the ‘truth’ of Northern identity is ‘lodged in 
self-restraint, self-discipline, in a managed sexuality that was susceptible and not 
always under control’.71 The recognition that just as ‘“the colonized” were driven 
by an insatiable instinct, certain Europeans were as well’72 serves, ultimately, to 
rationalise a regulatory regime premised on the control of ‘insatiable demands’, 
the management of which indexes the making of a good global society, marked 
as such by its putative role in protecting African women. Underpinning this 
characterisation of conflict minerals, and equally the resource curse, is a conception 
of ‘the problem’ as one of excess and secrecy. Mining itself, and the global 
consumption of minerals (and electronics) are not the problem, or at least, they 
are not the problem when managed appropriately, including through exposing 
the actions of Western companies in propping up African militias which are 
inflicting sexual violence against African women. 
Conclusion
Sexuality is an important vector along which ideas, expectations and understand-
ings of mining in Africa are unfolding as a matter of global governance. While 
mining, sexual regulation and colonial intervention in the continent have a long 
history, contemporary discourses, and their preoccupations with the intricately 
technical practices of good governance, can appear quite distant from the intimate 
realms of the sexual. The increasing interest in mining, and mining-related regula-
tion as a tool for development in Africa, with its focus on the technical dimensions 
of corporate and state ‘transparency’, may also make it harder to see mining in 
relation to sexual practice and sexualised meanings. Placing sexuality at the 
70  Ibid.
71  Stoler, above n 23, 177–8.
72  Ibid.
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centre of the analysis opens up important questions about how sexualised con-
notations of disorder operate to normalise particular forms of globally orchestrated 
mining regulation.
We suggest that the emerging regime for governing the extractives sector 
needs to be viewed in terms of the implicit binaries it re-encodes between restraint 
and excess, public and private, disclosure and secrecy. These binaries, when read 
in terms of sexualised meanings, reinforce ideas of the forms (and authors) of 
good politics and good governance premised on self-revelation and disclosure, 
and self-managed restraint. These qualities, while echoing some key tenants of 
neo-liberalism, also serve to validate a global order in which resource extraction, 
when ‘properly’ managed and conducted, is beyond question. Indeed, against the 
aberrancy of artisanal mining, large-scale mining becomes the unstated norm.
Finally, we have sought to illustrate the importance of attending to the multiple 
sites where ideas of normative order, including legality, are constituted. The global 
regulation of mineral extraction unfolds at multiple scales, from the norms and 
practices found in individual artisanal and small-scale mines, to the discourses on 
mining and governance that occur in national, regional and internationalised 
policy sites. Legal order, we suggest, is constituted, at least in part, by and through 
the sexualised ordering of meanings and practices at these multiple scales. 
3 The anatomy of neoliberal 
Internet governance
A queer critical political economy 
perspective
Monika Zalnieriute*
This chapter moves beyond narratives of the liberatory role of the Internet and 
digital technologies for queer communities by examining the current neoliberal 
model of Internet governance from a queer critical economy perspective. 
In particular, it discusses how the neoliberal model has been used to repress and 
limit the rights of queer people (among others) and how such repressions have 
been justified. I start by outlining the celebrated dominant narrative of the 
liberatory potential of the Internet for various oppressed and marginalised groups 
such as queer people, women, ethnic and racial minorities, before introducing 
the emerging counter-narrative, which suggests that these evolving technologies 
enable new modes of control and suppression that can be exercised by way of the 
communication mediums themselves. In the second part, I discuss the anatomy 
of the neoliberal model of Internet governance and introduce the concept of 
the Information-Industrial-Complex (IIC) and its significance in the political 
economy of the Internet. I explain how the IIC has enabled powerful state and 
non-state actors to repress the rights of queer people both in the global South 
and North. The third part focuses on the ways in which the repression of queer 
rights on the Internet, as well as the structurally unjust system of Internet 
governance, built around the needs of the IIC, is maintained and justified. The 
prevailing narratives for justifying and sustaining the current Internet governance 
model are juxtaposed to those deployed in other areas of international politics 
and law, such as ‘pinkwashing’, to achieve strategic geopolitical ends and maintain 
the (im)balances of global power and economy. The chapter concludes that such 
similarities are unsurprising, given that the Internet is a socio-technical system, 
which is not simply a neutral technology (like is often mistakenly assumed), but 
rather reflects normative political bargains and continuing battles for power and 
resources. In the fast-changing and complex reality of the information economy, 
the ‘struggle for new rights’1 – both offline and online – for queer communities 
*  I dedicate this chapter to Sandra Amanka, for all the love and comradeship in my life. I would 
also like to express my gratitude to Dianne Otto for the invaluable comments and suggestions 
for the earlier drafts of this chapter. All errors, as usual, remain my own.
1  Clifford Bob (ed), The International Struggle for New Human Rights (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2009).
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around the globe inevitably has to continue. This chapter aims to reveal the power 
disparities involved in information exchange and debunk the justifications that 
support such disparities in order to better understand the state of the art and open 
the way for new strategies of queer resistance.
Competing narratives about the Internet and queer 
communities
It is difficult to deny that information and communication technologies have 
revolutionised the ways in which individuals, communities and societies communi- 
cate, exchange information and participate in democratic processes.2 While the 
so-called information age brings novel opportunities for various marginalised 
communities to effect social change, it also conveys new modes for oppression 
and control that can be exercised through the communication mediums. Two 
dominant and perhaps interdependent narratives can be ascertained on the impli-
cations of digital technologies for queer political engagement and the advancement 
of queer communities – the dominant celebratory narrative and the emerging 
disquieting counter-narrative. 
The celebrated dominant narrative
The liberatory narrative maintains that the Internet is a critical space for 
communities and individuals whose voices are often marginalised, negated and 
discriminated against in everyday life.3 For such communities, the Internet is 
understood as a vital ‘public platform’ that overcomes the significant barriers to 
access presented by traditional media and political representation.4 For queers, the 
Internet is often argued to provide an invaluable medium for transcending 
geographic boundaries and reducing isolation, providing access to safe virtual 
communities and connecting members to education, information about queer 
identity and civic engagement.5 In addition to providing access to crucial 
information resources, the Internet for queer communities is also portrayed as an 
especially vital space for democratic deliberation.6 This is particularly so for 
2  See, eg, Natasha Primo, ‘Gender Issues in the Information Society’ (Report, UNESCO, 
2003).
3  ‘I Want Respect and Equality – Racial Discrimination: National Consultations: Racism and 
Civil Society’ (Report, Australian Human Rights Commission, 2001) <https://www.
humanrights.gov.au/i-want-respect-and-equality-racial-discrimination-national-consultations- 
racism-and-civil-society#forward>. 
4  Jac sm Kee (ed), ‘://EROTICS: Sex, Rights and the Internet’ (Research Study, Association 
for Progressive Communications, 2011) 1. 
5  Natalie T J Tindall and Richard D Waters, Coming out of the Closet: Exploring LGBT Issues in 
Strategic Communication with Theory and Research (Peter Lang, 2013). 
6  Rebecca Walker, Lesbian Deliberation: The Constitution of Community in Online Lesbian 
Forums (PhD thesis, University of Wollongong, 2010) <http://ro.uow.edu.au/cgi/view 
content.cgi?article=4637&context=theses>. 
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younger generations who are much more ready to engage in activism via social 
networks than their older peers.7 Political awareness of younger members of the 
LGBT communities thus often comes from their engagement with online 
discussion forums and social platforms.8 In tandem with these democratising 
conceptions of the Internet, empirical data suggests that queer communities 
were among the earliest adopters of digital technology, relying on the Internet to 
a much greater extent than the general population to combat social isolation, 
marginalisation and lack of access to health, economic and legal information, 
especially in rural areas.9
The narrative of celebration is based on popular conceptions of the Internet as 
an inherently democratising and liberating medium because it facilitates 
information exchange. These conceptions stem from Jürgen Habermas’s ‘theory 
of communicative action’,10 as well as Manuel Castells’s ‘rising network society’,11 
which generally depict the Internet as a key facilitative space for the exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, providing access to critical information, the 
building of knowledge, the expression of thoughts and beliefs, and the formation 
of networks and communities, and for mobilising for change.12 Such conceptions 
have also gained traction among mainstream, international political institutions, 
with the former UN Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression pronouncing 
that ‘the Internet . . . facilitates the realization of a range of human rights’.13 
However, these liberatory claims have also been co-opted for geopolitical and 
commercial purposes which form the central core of the (in)famous US ‘Internet 
Freedom’ agenda.14 The agenda, as will be discussed later in this chapter, has been 
 7  Jac sm Kee and Jan Moolman, ‘Sexuality and Women’s Rights’ in Global Information Society 
Watch 2011: Internet Rights and Democratization (Report, Association for Progressive 
Communications, 2011) 46 <https://www.giswatch.org/sites/default/files/gisw_-_
sexuality_and_womens_rights.pdf>. 
 8  ‘Out Online: The Experiences of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Youth on the 
Internet’ (Report, GLSEN, 2013) <http://www.glsen.org/sites/default/files/Out%20
Online%20FINAL.pdf>.
 9  Mary L Gray, Out in the Country: Youth, Media, and Queer Visibility in Rural America (New 
York University Press, 2009); Jessie Daniels and Mary L Gray, ‘A Vision for Inclusion: An 
LGBT Broadband Future’ (Research Paper, LGBT Technology Partnership, April 2014) 
<http://academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1213&context=gc_pubs>.
10  Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Thomas McCarthy trans, Beacon 
Press, 1984) vols 1, 2.
11  Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society: The Information Age: Economy, Society, and 
Culture (Wiley, 2nd edn, 2009) vol 1.
12  sm Kee (ed), above n 4; ‘Going Visible: Women’s Rights on the Internet’ (Thematic 
Consultation, Association for Progressive Communications, October 2012) <https://www.
apc.org/en/node/15912>.
13  Frank La Rue, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, UN GAOR, 17th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN 
Doc A/HRC/17/27 (16 May 2011) 7.
14  US Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘Internet Freedom’, <http://www.
humanrights.gov/issues/internet-freedom/>.
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the main ideological construct, crafted by the US State Department and US 
technology giants, supporting and legitimating the current model of US private-
sector-dominated Internet governance.15
The emerging counter-narrative
While the Internet has indeed boosted freedom of communication and partici- 
patory democracy as professed by the liberatory narrative, it has also been 
progressively subjected to increased surveillance and monitoring techniques, as 
well as content regulation, in both liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes 
around the globe. Examples of limitations on queer expression and exercise of 
fundamental rights online are numerous. The most worrying ones are death 
penalties for accessing LGBT content online in countries such as Sudan, Saudi 
Arabia, Yemen, Mauritania, Somalia and Iran.16 More modest restrictions range 
from explicit blanket bans of queer expression online, such as the Russian anti-gay 
propaganda law,17 to covert Internet filtering mechanisms, like the Internet filters 
in public schools in the United States and other countries.18 They also include 
‘real name’ policies of Internet platforms, such as Facebook,19 and controversial 
decisions by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN), such as not approving an LGBT community application for the .lgbt 
and .gay top level domain name.20 The LGBT community application intended to 
create an explicit LGBT community space on the Internet by ending community 
domain names with .lgbt or .gay, such as, for example, www.mentalhealth.lgbt. 
However, ICANN did not consider the LGBT community to be ‘community 
enough’ and the community application was not given priority over the commercial 
interests.21 In addition to these intentional restrictions, scholars and activists have 
15  Shawn M Powers and Michael Jablonski, The Real Cyber War: The Political Economy of 
Internet Freedom (University of Illinois Press, 2015).
16  Daniels and Gray, above n 9.
17  For the Purpose of Protecting Children from Information Advocating for a Denial of Traditional 
Family Values 2013 (Russian Federation).
18  American Civil Liberties Union, ‘ACLU “Don’t Filter Me” Initiative Finds Schools in Four 
More States Unconstitutionally Censoring LGBT Websites’ (11 April 2011) <https://www.
aclu.org/news/aclu-dont-filter-me-initiative-finds-schools-four-more-states-unconstitutionally- 
censoring-lgbt>.
19  Andrew Griffin, ‘Facebook to Tweak “Real Name” Policy after Backlash from LGBT Groups 
and Native Americans’, The Independent (online) (2 November 2015) <http://www.
independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/facebook-to-tweak-real-name-policy-
after-backlash-from-lgbt-groups-and-native-americans-a6717061.html>; Powers and 
Jablonski, above n 15.
20  Monika Zalnieriute and Thomas Schneider, ‘ICANN’s Procedures and Policies in the Light 
of Human Rights, Fundamental Freedoms and Democratic Values’ (Report, Council of 
Europe, 2014) 15–35. 
21  See Eve Salomon and Kinanya Pijl, ‘Applications to ICANN for Community-Based New 
Generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs): Opportunities and Challenges from a Human Rights 
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also noted how the Internet is transforming the way in which queer individuals 
experience violence and social exclusion.22 For example, online threats, stalking, 
bullying and sexual harassment are just a part of the online aggression faced by 
queer communities,23 and it is a challenge to find meaningful ways to respond to 
such threats. To a much greater extent than is often assumed, such restrictions 
present a daily struggle for queer communities to connect with like-minded peers, 
raise awareness, conduct advocacy work and even access critical health information 
online.
Contrary to the popular belief that Internet filtering and censorship is only 
demanded and imposed by authoritarian governments, limitations on queer 
content online are also imposed by democratic governments, as well as by private 
actors and social media platforms themselves. Critical information for queer 
communities is often inaccessible due to the Internet censorship policies in many 
countries, ranging from a blanket ban on LGBT-related content in some countries 
to Internet filters installed in public library networks and public schools.24 It is 
true that queer communities encounter extra hurdles in the countries with 
explicitly discriminatory national legislation, affecting their rights to free speech 
online, such as the Russian anti-LGBT censorship laws already mentioned.25 
Similar legislation also exists in Lithuania,26 despite being a member state of the 
European Union. This makes providing positive information to young LGBT 
people a real challenge, especially through school-based Internet access. It is 
unclear to what extent access to queer community websites is limited by public 
schools and public libraries in other EU member states, or in the global North 
more generally. This issue urgently requires empirical research. The limited 
research which has been conducted in the United States suggests that the Internet 
filtering of queer content, including critical health-related information (and even 
words such as ‘breast cancer’),27 may be prevalent in Western liberal democracies.28
Even in countries with strong free speech reputations, such as the United 
States, Internet censorship is hardly a minor issue. For example, the American 
Perspective’ (Report No DGI(2016)17, Council of Europe, 2016) <https://rm.coe.int/
CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680
6b5a14>; David Goldstein, ‘ICANN Controversially Rejects .GAY Community Application 
Again’, DomainPulse (4 February 2016) <http://www.domainpulse.com/2016/02/04/
icann-rejects-gay-community-application/>.
22  Gray, above n 9.
23  ‘Out Online’, above n 8.
24  sm Kee (ed), above n 4.
25  Susie Armitage, ‘Russia’s Main Online Support Group for LGBT Teens May Soon Be 
Blocked’, BuzzFeed News (6 April 2015) <http://www.buzzfeed.com/susiearmitage/
russias-main-online-support-group-for-lgbt-teens-may-soon-be>. 
26  See, eg, Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effect of Public Information 
2002 (Lithuania), No IX-1067 (as last amended on 22 December 2009, No XI-594).
27  Daniels and Gray, above n 9.
28  See Kevicha Echols and Melissa Ditmore, ‘Restricted Access to Information: Youth and 
Sexuality’ in sm Kee (ed), above n 4.
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Civil Liberties Union’s (ACLU) ‘Don’t Filter Me’ project revealed Internet filters 
on school computers that are unconstitutionally blocking access to hundreds of 
LGBT websites, including sites that contain vital resources on subjects like 
bullying and student gay-straight alliances.29 Disturbingly, the ACLU research 
suggests that the filters do not block access to comparable anti-LGBT websites 
that address the same topics with negative connotations.30 Most worryingly, the 
research revealed that most schools were not aware that their filters were blocking 
not only sexually explicit websites, but were also configured to block LGBT 
websites.31
Furthermore, the rise of large-scale data collection and algorithm-driven analy-
sis targeting sensitive information poses many threats for LGBT communities, 
who are especially vulnerable to privacy intrusion due to their often hostile social, 
political and even legal environments.32 Much publicly available data, such as 
Facebook friend information or individual music playlists on YouTube, are incred-
ibly effective at inferring individual sexual preferences with high levels of accuracy.33 
The accuracy of the online trail of information we leave is argued to be higher 
than predictions by our human friends about our personal sexuality and gender 
preferences.34 If widely traded advertising information ‘correctly discriminates 
between homosexual and heterosexual men in 88% of cases’,35 then most Internet 
users should assume that all of the companies advertising to them can predict their 
sexual orientation with a high degree of accuracy – and are incentivised to do so 
in order to sell them products. Issues may go well beyond simple product advertis-
ing, and can potentially include different treatment in, for example, health and 
life insurance policies,36 as well as in so-called ‘predictive policing’ (prevention of 
crime before it happens).37 Such ready access to personal information can get even 
more complicated with the ‘real name’ policies of social platforms, such as 
29  ACLU, above n 18.
30  Parents, Families, and Friends of Lesbian and Gays, Inc v Camdenton R-III School District 
(Mo Dist Ct Cent Div, No 2:11-cv-04212, 15 February 2012) 5. 
31  ACLU, ‘Don’t Filter Me’ (Final Report, 2012) 5 <https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/
dont_filter_me-2012-1001-v04.pdf>. 
32  EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, ‘EU LGBT Survey: European Union Lesbian, Gay, 
Bisexual and Transgender Survey’ (Report, 2013) 14 <http://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/
files/eu-lgbt-survey-results-at-a-glance_en.pdf>. 
33  Michal Kosinski, David Stillwell and Thore Graepel, ‘Private Traits and Attributes Are 
Predictable from Digital Records of Human Behavior’ (2013) 110 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 5802. 
34  Wu Youyou, Michal Kosinski and David Stillwell, ‘Computer-Based Personality Judgments 
Are More Accurate than Those Made by Humans’ (2015) 112 Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences 1036.
35  Kosinski et al, above n 33.
36  Angela Daly, ‘The Law and Ethics of “Self Quantified” Health Information: An Australian 
Perspective’ (2015) 5 International Data Privacy Law 144.
37  Zeynep Tufekci, ‘Engineering the Public: Big Data, Surveillance and Computational Politics’ 
(2014) 19 First Monday <http://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/4901>.
The anatomy of neoliberal Internet governance  59
Facebook,38 which may place queer people in danger of physical assaults in certain 
parts of the world. 
The global scope of restrictions
Thus, it becomes clear that the centrality of the Internet as a communication tool 
has also led to new approaches to surveillance, both commercial and non-
commercial, and novel ways to restrict queer and sexual expression online. 
While it is true that many restrictive measures are domestically applied, such as 
Internet filters in public schools, there are also many restrictions that are global 
in scope, such as the Facebook censorship mechanisms and real name policies. 
This contrasts sharply with the popular belief that such restrictions are mainly 
targeting particular people (individual queer and LGBT activists, for example) or 
specific groups (LGBT organisations and queer collectives), and only in specific 
countries (extremely conservative and hostile to human rights and freedoms), 
where non-conforming sexual expression and behaviour are criminalised. In fact, 
empirical research suggests that these limitations on queer and sexual expression 
and rights advocacy online are often imposed at the global level.
So the important challenge becomes to understand how and why such global 
restrictions work. Where and with whom is such centralised capacity located? It is 
often claimed by various liberal institutions in the West, including the US White 
House, that the Internet is not controlled by any single entity or organisation, 
but it is rather a ‘network of networks’ where information just flows freely.39 We 
are led to believe that it is only repressive governments that misuse the Internet, 
like ‘shutting it down’ during the Egyptian and Syrian uprisings or conducting 
‘denial-of-service attacks’ (making websites inaccessible) on undesirable political 
or human rights organisations.40 It is claimed that such things do not happen 
in the West. Instead, Western governments, as well as Google and Facebook, are 
portrayed as defenders of Internet ‘freedom’: they are the ones fighting for 
freedom of expression in China and Russia. Recall, for example, Google leaving 
China because the Chinese government asked for its cooperation with Internet 
censorship.41 So how can it be that these very same private actors and governments 
filter and censor queer and sexual expression online? How does it work? Why do 
other governments, and private and civil society actors, accept such arrangements 
38  Griffin, above n 19. 
39  This is a famous construct of the Internet Freedom Agenda, see, eg, Internet Association, 
‘Protecting Internet Freedom’, <https://internetassociation.org/policy-platform/protecting- 
internet-freedom/>.
40  See Laura DeNardis and Andrea M Hackl, ‘Internet Control Points as LGBT Rights 
Mediation’ (2016) 19 Information, Communication & Society 753.
41  See, eg, how Google is presented as a very anti-censorship human rights defender, 
Kaveh Waddell, ‘Why Google Quit China – and Why It’s Heading Back’, The Atlantic 
(online) (19 January 2016) <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/01/
why-google-quit-china-and-why-its-heading-back/424482/>.
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whereby some actors can exercise centralised global control over what is popularly 
regarded as an ‘ungovernable’ medium free from governmental authority and 
regulation?
In the next section, I will explore these questions by zooming in to the anatomy 
of the Internet governance model, and describing how its main proponent – the 
IIC – has succeeded in establishing a hegemonic neoliberal communications 
system. I hope to prompt readers to critically re-assess their perceptions of 
the liberatory role of the Internet for queers (among others) and of altruistic 
corporate claims about the freedom offered by the Internet for everyone, by 
having a closer look at the political economy of the Internet and information 
flows, as well as the techno-imperial and neo-colonial nature of the current 
Internet governance regime.
The dominance of the US Information-Industrial- 
Complex (IIC)
In short, the answer to the questions above is simple: the global scope of restric- 
tions on queer and sexual expression is possible because of the nature of the 
technical structures and design of the Internet.42 The Internet infrastructure, 
ranging from the Domain Name System (DNS) to algorithmic governance by 
Internet platforms, is increasingly co-opted by various public and private actors 
to impose restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights in the digital sphere.43 
However, neither I nor you could impose such restrictions because we lack access 
to this infrastructure. So the more nuanced question arises: who has access and 
can exercise control over the Internet infrastructure? While various actors in the 
international sphere influence and shape ‘permissible’ online content and decide 
on the boundaries of human rights online, it is dominated by the US government 
and a few US-based information technology giants.44 The interdependent 
relationships between these actors has been described as the IIC.45 In this section 
I will start by describing this complex, then discuss how it operates at both 
domestic and international levels, and conclude by arguing that human rights 
standards online are being set by the IIC.
The emergence of US dominance
The dominance of the global information and communications sphere by the 
United States, and a handful of multinational corporations, has been widely 
42  Laura DeNardis, The Global War for Internet Governance (Yale University Press, 2014).
43  Laura DeNardis, ‘Hidden Levers of Internet Control: An Infrastructure-Based Theory of 
Internet Governance’ (2012) 15 Information, Communication & Society 720.
44  Ben Wagner, Global Free Expression – Governing the Boundaries of Internet Content (Springer, 
2016).
45  Powers and Jablonski, above n 15.
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identified and studied by international communications scholars.46 To explain 
the initial emergence of US dominance in this field in the second half of the 
twentieth century, political-economist Herbert Schiller provided a critical account 
of how US public resources were used to support a privatised communications 
system driven by commercial interests, as opposed to civic and democratic values, 
and how the US government promoted and protected the interests of US 
communications and media firms domestically and internationally.47 To understand 
these processes and dynamics, Schiller developed the concept of the ‘military-
industrial-communications-complex’ to expose and analyse the relationships 
between the US Department of Defense and communications corporations.48 He 
detailed how the Department of Defense ‘channeled enormous funds from its 
astronomical budget into research and development on new information and 
communication technologies’, and how public resources were used to support 
the growth of these ‘later-to-be-privatized’ information communication techno- 
logies, such as computer electronics, satellites and the future infrastructure of the 
Internet.49 Although the global communications landscape has since been 
completely transformed by digital technologies and the Internet, Schiller’s 
concept of the military-industrial-communications-complex, as well as his broader 
theory of US empire and cultural imperialism, continues to have enduring 
conceptual, descriptive and analytical relevance in the twenty-first century, as 
demonstrated by important critical scholarship exploring the political economy of 
communications.50
The contemporary situation, in the so-called Information or Digital Economy, 
is essentially the same. The older media corporations have been replaced by 
the information technology giants, such as Google, Apple, Facebook, Verisign 
and GoDaddy, and the mutually beneficial and interdependent relationships 
between the US government and information technology corporations are 
well established. Grounding their work on Schiller’s insights, Shawn M Powers 
and Michael Jablonski explain how the dynamics of the IIC have catalysed the 
rapid growth of information and communication technologies within the global 
economy, while firmly embedding US strategic interests and companies at the 
heart of the current neoliberal regime.51 Maintaining this central strategic position 
46  Daya Kishan Thussu, International Communication: Continuity and Change (Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2nd edn, 2006).
47  Herbert I Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire (Westview Press, 2nd edn, 
1992) 63–75. 
48  Ibid. 
49  Ibid 5.
50  Les Levidow and Kevin Robins, Cyborg Worlds: The Military Information Society (Free 
Association Books, 1989); Richard Maxwell, Herbert Schiller (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003); 
Vincent Mosco, The Political Economy of Communication: Rethinking and Renewal (Sage, 
1996); Dan Schiller, ‘The Militarization of US Communications’ in Janet Wasko, Graham 
Murdock and Helen Sousa (eds), The Handbook of Political Economy of Communications 
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2014) 262. 
51  Powers and Jablonski, above n 15, 47.
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necessitates action and support from the US government, both domestically and 
internationally. 
The domestic level: Continuous support and subsidisation
Just as Schiller described the continuous subsidisation of private communications 
companies back in the 1960s and 1970s, the contemporary IIC is also supported 
by the enormous amounts of US government money allocated to these techno- 
logy giants and the many procurement contracts it awards to them. It is useful to 
recall that the invention and early deployment of the Internet in the 1950s and 
1960s was funded by the US government, particularly the Department of Defense, 
until the commercialisation of the Internet in 1995.52 However, commercialisa-
tion did not mean that the US government became uninvolved. For instance, in 
2015, US $171 million were awarded to a Silicon Valley consortium ($75 million 
by the Pentagon and $96 million by universities and local governments) to 
support research and development into wearable technology (clothing or acces-
sories incorporating digital technologies, such as activity trackers).53 As earlier, 
these same companies are often contractors of the Department of Defense.54 
As pointed out by Tanner Mirrlees, the billions of dollars acquired by these com-
panies from the Department of Defense undermines the neoliberal claim that 
private and corporate wealth is accrued because free markets are separated from 
public expenditure.55
Against this background, the extent to which the US government and agencies, 
such as the US National Security Agency (NSA), have direct (unconstitutional 
and illegal) access to the infrastructure of information technology giants is 
not very surprising. As revealed by Edward Snowden back in 2013, the NSA was 
secretly and directly tapping into user data collected by all the major US technology 
giants, such as Apple, Google, Facebook and Microsoft.56 These companies 
allowed the NSA to directly collect the personal data of their customers and never 
informed the public of such governmental access. 
52  Barry M Leiner, Vinton G Cerf, David D Clark et al, ‘A Brief History of the Internet’ 
(1997) e-OTI: OnTheInternet <http://www.isoc.org/oti/printversions/0797prleiner.
html>. 
53  W J Hennigan, ‘Secretary of Defense Unveils $75-Million Investment in Silicon Valley 
Venture’, Los Angeles Times (online) (28 August 2015) <http://www.latimes.com/business/
la-fi-pentagon-cyber-20150829-story.html>. 
54  See InsideGov, ‘Research Government Contracts’, <http://government-contracts.insidegov.
com/>. 
55  Tanner Mirrlees, ‘US Empire and Communications Today: Revisiting Herbert I Schiller’ 
(2015) 3(2) Political Economy of Communication 3, 16. 
56  Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, ‘NSA Prism Program Taps in to User Data of Apple, 
Google and Others’, The Guardian (online) (8 June 2013) <https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data>.
The anatomy of neoliberal Internet governance  63
The international level: The Internet freedom agenda 
In addition to domestic subsidisation, internationally the US government 
enthusiastically promotes the so-called ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda, which favours 
large US information technology giants and US economic interests. This is 
particularly apparent with regard to globally ‘normalised’ strong legal protections 
for intellectual property rights, advertising-based consumerism and the 
commodification of information and personal data.57 To maintain the global 
dominance of the IIC, the US government opposes, and so far has effectively 
prevented, the establishment of any international organisation and the drafting of 
any multilateral treaty that would regulate the management of critical Internet 
resources, such as domain names. Second, it aggressively promotes the ‘free flow 
of information doctrine’ and the global free trade regime, intellectual property 
enforcement and other policies that suit its interests and favour the IIC.
The dominance of the neoliberal US model of Internet governance is reflected 
in the current international arrangements over Internet infrastructure and critical 
resources. These arrangements present a unique challenge in international law and 
international relations, as the Internet is the only communications medium that 
lacks a binding international treaty, or intergovernmental organisation, to oversee 
its operation. In part, this situation reflects the early cyber-libertarian perception 
of the Internet as a ‘network of networks’ – an ‘ungovernable’ communications 
medium compared to previous technologies, such as radio, television, print media 
and the telephony.58 While cyber-libertarian ideas have since been overshadowed 
by more realist accounts of Internet control,59 the dominant paradigm, still 
promoted by the IIC, is that because ‘the Internet is different from other net-
works, its governance must also be different than that of other networks’.60 
Therefore, instead of being internationally regulated by states, the Internet 
infrastructure and resources are governed under the so-called ‘multistakeholder’ 
model.61 In 2005, the UN-sponsored World Summit on the Information Society 
defined Internet governance as ‘the development and application by govern- 
ments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that 
57  Powers and Jablonski, above n 15.
58  See, eg, Leiner et al, above n 52.
59  Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who Controls the Internet?: Illusions of a Borderless World 
(Oxford University Press, 2008).
60  See, eg, Don MacLean, Internet Governance: A Grand Collaboration: An Edited Collection 
of Papers Contributed to the United Nations ICT Task Force Global Forum on Internet 
Governance, New York, March 25–26, 2004 (UN Publications, 2004). 
61  Laura DeNardis and Mark Raymond, ‘Thinking Clearly about Multistakeholder Internet 
Governance’ (paper presented at the Eighth Annual GigaNet Symposium, Bali, Indonesia, 
21 October 2013) <http://www.phibetaiota.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/
Multistakeholder-Internet-Governance.pdf>. 
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shape the evolution and use of the Internet’.62 As such, ‘multistakeholderism’ has 
been successfully promoted as a better, ‘unique and novel alternative’ to the 
outdated conventional governance models of international law.
Multistakeholderism is supported by the two main Internet governance 
institutions – the ICANN (mentioned above) and the Internet Engineering 
Task Force (IETF). These organisations are respectively responsible for the 
global coordination of the DNS and the development of Internet standards and 
protocols. They both operate as non-profit corporations registered in the United 
States, but claim to be global and open for any interested stakeholders to 
participate, and maintain that they develop policies or Internet standards based 
on consensus. It is hardly surprising that those ‘interested’ stakeholders are largely 
private for-profit corporations from the IIC, whose business models are built 
around the Internet, such as Internet platforms and search engines like Google, 
Amazon, Facebook and e-Bay, Internet service providers like Telstra and Verisign, 
and domain name registrars like GoDaddy. Nevertheless, it is claimed that 
‘[c]ivil society organizations and governments participate alongside these 
stakeholders in contributing to the development of technical policies’.63 Therefore, 
Internet governance is often depicted ‘not [as] the product of an institutional 
hierarchy, but rather, [as emerging] from the decentralized, bottom-up 
coordination of tens of thousands of mostly private-sector entities across the 
globe’.64 Multistakeholderism is portrayed as the only suitable and logical model 
for the Internet (it has to be assumed because of its ‘distinct’ and ‘decentralised’ 
nature), and public regulation is presented as unviable (because governments 
are incapable of understanding the operation and nature of the Internet). 
Recent efforts by the Obama Administration to move the supervisory role of the 
National Telecommunications Agency over ICANN and DNS to an ‘international 
multistakeholder community’ were welcomed because it had avoided ‘a 
governmental or intergovernmental solution’.65 However, the clear dominance 
of a few US-based information technology giants, as well as the central role played 
by the US government in Internet governance, undermines all these claims. 
Power is clearly centralised in the US IIC rather than dispersed among multiple 
stakeholders.66
While the underlying logic of the multistakeholder model of Internet governance 
theoretically implies that no other international organisations should interfere 
with matters related to the Internet, the US government, the main facilitator and 
62  Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, UN Doc WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E 
(18 November 2005) <http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html>. 
63  See, eg, Jonathan Masters, ‘What is Internet Governance?’, Council on Foreign Relations 
(23 April 2014) <http://www.cfr.org/internet-policy/internet-governance/p32843>.
64  Ibid.
65  See, David McCabe, ‘Obama Administration Approves Transition of Internet Domain 
System’, The Hill (online) (9 June 2016) <http://thehill.com/policy/technology/ 
282860-commerce-approves-domain-name-transition>.
66  Powers and Jablonski, above n 15. 
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promoter of the multistakeholder model, applies this idea selectively to suit its 
interests. For example, while the UN and the International Telecommunications 
Union should not, under the multistakeholder framework, interfere with Internet 
policy and governance; according to the United States, the World Intellectual 
Property Organization’s treaties should be applied to the Internet.67 Similarly, 
the United States and its allies, such as the European Union and Australia, 
argue that the World Trade Organization (WTO) is capable of adopting certain 
decisions regarding the Internet.68 Indeed, the WTO is one of the core platforms 
through which the United States maintains its control via the ‘free flow of 
information doctrine’, which was promoted by the US State Department in the 
GATT, GATS and TRIPS negotiations.69 The doctrine is a crucial element in 
the neoliberal model of Internet governance and the digital economy because it 
allows US corporations to collect and monetise the personal data of individuals 
from around the world, without paying any taxes on such activities. If ‘data is the 
new oil’, as it is often proclaimed,70 the fact that the new oil is not taxed should 
attract some critical thinking, at least by those who do not benefit from these 
arrangements. However, the free flow of information doctrine has been so 
successfully ingrained that it is now taken for granted by states and Internet 
users alike.
Given the unprecedented global dominance of many of the US information 
technology giants, such as Google and Facebook, the United States and its 
corporate actors have an incomparable advantage in exporting their rules and 
social norms, and normalising them as ‘universal’ principles of the Internet. For 
example, data protection and privacy are not part of the ‘universal’ values of 
Internet Freedom, while robust intellectual property protection and gambling 
bans are not only argued to be viable and doable, but are strictly enforced. 
‘Information colonialism’, ‘techno-imperialism’ and similar terms are used to 
describe the dominance of the IIC internationally and the means by which it 
maintains and extends its control over economic and policy matters.71
67  See Catherine Saez, ‘US Defender of Internet Freedom, Keen on Protecting IP Rights’, 
Intellectual Property Watch (8 March 2013) <http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/03/08/
us-as-defender-of-internet-freedom-keen-on-protecting-ip-rights>.
68  See Communication from the European Union and the United States: Contribution to the 
Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc S/C/W/338 (13 July 2011); 
Communication from Australia: Suggestions on ICT principles, WTO Doc S/C/W/349 
(26 September 2012).
69  Herbert I Schiller, Culture Inc: The Corporate Takeover of Public Expression (Oxford 
University Press, 1991) 118; Herbert I Schiller, Mass Communications and American Empire 
(Westview Press, 2nd edn, 1992) 93.
70  See, eg, Jonathan Vanian, ‘Why Data Is the New Oil’, Fortune (online) (11 July 2016) 
<http://fortune.com/2016/07/11/data-oil-brainstorm-tech/>.
71  Sharon J McLennan, ‘Techno-Optimism or Information Imperialism: Paradoxes in Online 
Networking, Social Media and Development’ (2016) 22 Information Technology for 
Development 380. 
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Privatised human rights governance: De facto global standards set by 
the Information-Industrial-Complex
Since a large part of the Internet architecture and infrastructure is coordinated 
and owned by private actors, such as Internet intermediaries, this ownership 
enables them to directly set de facto global standards for human rights online, 
including the rights of queer, LGBT and other communities. Recent examples 
of Facebook removing animated videos promoting breast cancer awareness,72 the 
iconic photograph of a girl fleeing a Napalm attack during the Vietnam War in 
1972 (restored after a huge protest on social media)73 and a number of pictures 
of mothers breastfeeding their children74 indicate that it is very often private 
Internet platforms that own virtual Internet infrastructure, who set global free 
speech standards online about, for example, which parts of bodies can be displayed 
(not allowing for female nudity and nipples in particular). 
These standards are set through Facebook’s content moderation and standard 
contractual policies, to which users must agree in order to be able to use the 
service. Similarly, Internet intermediaries decide on the permissible levels of 
personal data protection and privacy, and sometimes even physical security for 
queer individuals, as is demonstrated by Facebook’s ‘real name’ policies, not 
allowing individuals to use pseudonyms or non-legal names on its platform, and 
thus subjecting certain groups, such as transgender people, to the danger of 
72  ‘Facebook Apologises for Removing Breast Cancer Awareness Video’, BBC (online) 
(20 October 2016) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37721193>.
73  ‘Facebook U-Turn over “Napalm Girl” Photograph’, BBC (online) (9 September 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-37318040>.
74  Facebook vs Breastfeeding Alliance <https://www.facebook.com/the.ban.on.breastfeeding/>. 
Figure 3.1  ‘Offensive’ animated breast cancer awareness image removed by 
Facebook (restored after public outcry, with apology from Facebook)
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physical violence in hostile environments.75 Likewise, actual decision-making 
about the level of protection of the right to privacy and whether one has a ‘right 
to be forgotten’ – to have their personal data removed from the Google search 
engine – are made internally by the sub-contractors of Internet giants – and the 
guidelines and criteria for such decisions are largely unknown to the public. 
As such, the basic tools of accountability and governance – public and legal 
transparency and pressure  – are very limited,76 with private corporate actors 
holding the most power over queer expression and sexual freedom online.
In effect, this leads to privatised human rights governance, whereby private 
actors establish the boundaries of human rights online, such as freedom of 
expression and privacy protection, in accordance with their business models.77 
The opportunities for queer and other non-mainstream sexual and gender 
communities to effectively communicate, raise awareness, provide access to critical 
information and knowledge about legal rights, health and community resources 
– as promised by the liberatory narrative of Internet Freedom – are in reality often 
deliberately limited by various public and private actors. As discussed, the actors 
that exercise most control over the freedom of expression of queer communities 
on the Internet are not only the ‘usual suspects’ touted by the Western media, 
such as the governments of Russia, China and Iran. On the contrary, the most 
powerful actors are part of the IIC, which is at the very heart of the neoliberal 
model of multistakeholder Internet governance and the Internet Freedom agenda. 
While this agenda claims that information should move freely online, there are 
numerous examples of the architectural and technical features of the Internet 
being employed by IIC actors to restrict rights of queer communities to freedom 
of expression and association, privacy, security and self-autonomy. It is precisely 
the Internet infrastructure – both virtual and physical – that enables those in 
control to prevent the exercise of fundamental human rights in the digital 
environment, usually without users being aware that this is happening. Particular 
features of the Internet’s architecture and infrastructure, such as Internet protocols 
and domain names, as well as algorithms and the standard contractual clauses of 
Internet intermediaries, enable them to restrict the fundamental rights of queer 
and LGBT communities, defeating even constitutional protections of free speech, 
privacy, equality and non-discrimination, as well as avoiding obligations imposed 
by international human rights law. 
75  Griffin, above n 19.
76  Catherine Buni and Soraya Chemaly, ‘The Secret Rules of the Internet’, The Verge (13 April 
2016) <http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/13/11387934/internet-moderator-history- 
youtube-facebook-reddit-censorship-free-speech>.
77  Ben Wagner, ‘Algorithmic Regulation and the Global Default: Shifting Norms in Internet 
Technology’ (2016) 10(1) Etikk i praksis – Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 5; Emily Taylor, 
‘The Privatization of Human Rights: Illusions of Consent, Automation and Neutrality’ 
(Paper No 24, Global Commission on Internet Governance, January 2016) 24 <https://
ourinternet-files.s3.amazonaws.com/publications/no24_web_2.pdf>.
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Justifications: Panics of sexual immorality, security and 
repressive capture
This brings me to another important question: what justifications are put forward 
by actors – both public and private – for limiting queer expression and other rights 
online? In this part, I also examine the prevailing narratives for justifying and 
sustaining the dominance of the US IIC over Internet policy. I examine, in turn, 
the justifications proffered for Internet censorship and mass surveillance, and 
how the arguments of human rights defenders have been co-opted to serve the 
‘Internet Freedom’ agenda. I conclude by drawing links between these justifications 
and those deployed in other areas of international politics and law. 
Justifying Internet censorship: Sexual and gender panics 
Internet censorship and filtering policies, and restrictions on queer and LGBT 
expression online, are often justified as protecting cultural and religious ‘values’, 
which in effect preserve mainstream heteronormative gender and sexual norms, 
roles and stereotypes. As suggested by Human Rights Watch, ‘traditional values 
are often deployed as an excuse to undermine human rights’.78 Indeed, back 
in 2012, the UN Human Rights Council agreed that ‘traditions shall not be 
invoked to justify harmful practices violating universal human rights norms and 
standards’, thereby acknowledging that ‘tradition’ is often invoked to justify 
human rights violations and condemning the practice.79 A number of other human 
rights NGOs have noted that for women, as well as many marginalised groups, 
‘traditional values’ are regularly invoked to restrict the enjoyment of human rights 
because, from a conservative viewpoint or the perspective of those in authority, 
they challenge mainstream norms.80
The Internet censorship and filtering policies are often built around so-called 
sexual and moral panics, which mobilise public fears and anxieties about the 
‘dangers’ of sexual content and interaction. As argued by Dianne Otto, sexual and 
gender panics play a critical role in what she describes as ‘crisis governance’ in 
international law. 81 These panics, according to Otto, help to ‘divert attention from 
78  See Graeme Reid, ‘The Trouble with Tradition: When “Values” Trample over Rights’ (2013) 
Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/
africa>.
79  Resolution Adopted by the Human Rights Council 16/3: Promoting Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind, 
GA Res 16/3, UN GAOR, 16th sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/16/3 
(8 April 2011).
80  See Joint Written Statement Addressed to the Advisory Committee Stemming from Human 
Rights Council Resolutions: Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through 
a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind, UN GAOR, 7th sess, Agenda 
Item 3(a)(viii), UN Doc HRC/AC/7/NGO/1 (8–12 August 2011).
81  Dianne Otto, ‘Decoding Crisis in International Law: A Queer Feminist Perspective’ in 
Barbara Stark (ed), International Law and Its Discontents: Confronting Crises (Cambridge 
University Press, 2015) 115. 
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larger injustices perpetrated in the name of the emergency, while also enabling the 
adoption of ever more personally invasive laws and regulations that states would 
otherwise not be able to justify’.82 As documented by many free speech scholars 
and advocates, the protection of children is a particularly sensitive issue, with 
panicked concerns about child pornography, the protection of children from 
sexual predators and, increasingly, from access to any explicit sexual information, 
are manipulated to justify the enormous, ever-expanding Internet filtering 
apparatus.83 The so-called ‘censorship creep’84 often results in filtering out crucial 
health-related information in public spaces, such as libraries and schools, and basic 
information about gender and sexuality that many young people simply wish to 
become informed about. A recent example, already mentioned, was the filtering 
out of the term ‘breast cancer’, as well as removing cancer awareness videos on 
social platforms, even when animation was used rather than actual human breasts, 
for being ‘offensive’ or ‘indecent’ and therefore inappropriate for children. The 
result is that such information is filtered out for people around the world.85 
Facebook has also routinely removed pictures of mothers breastfeeding their 
children.86 Other photos have reportedly been removed, including one of a 
mammogram and another of a technician who tattoos nipples and areolas for 
breast cancer survivors.87
Policy debates around the development of these censorship mechanisms, 
or terms of services by social platforms, seldom include the perspectives of those 
who are deemed to need that ‘special protection’ – be they children or young 
people, or (as it would seem from Facebook’s policies) people around the world 
who are ‘sensitive’ to nudity, and female breasts and nipples in particular. 
Interestingly, it is only female breasts and nipples that are considered ‘indecent’ 
or ‘offensive’, leading to some strategic self-censorship by some breast cancer 
campaigners, who release videos and photographs with male – rather than 
female – breasts to avoid removal by Facebook.88 Thus, it is not simply nudity 
which is considered ‘offensive’, but rather female nudity, leading to questions not 
only of censorship by private actors, but also discriminatory censorship based on 
82  Ibid 117. 
83  See, eg, Sonia Corrêa, Horacio Sívori and Bruno Zilli, ‘Internet Regulation and Sexual 
Politics in Brazil’ (2012) 55 Development 213.
84  Laurie Penny, ‘David Cameron’s Internet Porn Filter Is the Start of Censorship Creep’, The 
Guardian (online) (3 January 2014) <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/
jan/03/david-cameron-internet-porn-filter-censorship-creep>.
85  ‘Facebook Apologises for Removing Breast Cancer Awareness Video’, above n 72. 
86  Facebook vs Breastfeeding Alliance, above n 74. 
87  Carol Off, ‘Facebook Bans Technician Who Tattoos Nipples and Areolas for Breast Cancer 
Survivors’, CBC Radio (online) (11 October 2016) <http://www.cbc.ca/radio/asithappens/
as-it-happens-tuesday-edition-1.3800033/facebook-bans-technician-who-tattoos-nipples- 
and-areolas-for-breast-cancer-survivors-1.3800040>.
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sex and gender. As stressed by cancer awareness campaigners, it is ‘incomprehensible 
and strange how one can perceive medical information as offensive’.89 In the end, 
while queer and LGBT young people and children are supposedly the intended 
‘beneficiaries’ of this censorship along with all other children, they are denied 
agency in the design and the effects of these protectionist policies. What is needed 
then is a more proactive approach from queer communities and activists to make 
sure that their voices are heard in debates and decision-making around technology 
design. Currently, these debates are dominated by white rich males from Silicon 
Valley and those who direct the global Internet governance institutions, such as 
the ICANN and the IETF.
It would be naive to think that sexual and moral panics are mobilised only in 
countries where sexual and gender freedom is not respected, even criminalised, 
because numerous examples of censorship of queer and LGBT content online 
suggest that such filtering is just as prevalent in Western liberal democracies as it 
is in conservative Eastern European, African, Asian and Middle Eastern countries. 
Justifying mass surveillance: Security and terrorism panics
In Internet policy, many otherwise unjustifiable restrictions on the exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms have been imposed in the name of panics about 
national and transnational ‘security’ and the ‘prevention of terrorism’. These 
restrictions have led, in the eyes of Internet activists, to a ‘digital decay of human 
rights’,90 which has enabled private and public actors to overcome democratic 
safeguards and the rule of law by adopting numerous private ad hoc measures and 
memorandums of understanding between public actors and private technology 
companies. Examples of unlimited personal data collection and illegal mass-
surveillance practices requiring cooperation by governments and technology 
companies are prevalent and numerous, as revealed by Snowden in 2013.91 
Whenever public information about these Internet mass-surveillance programmes 
and restrictions on fundamental freedoms becomes available, they are first of all 
justified on the grounds of national security and prevention of terrorism.92 And if 
the public still remains unconvinced of the proportionality and necessity of such 
blanket mass-data collection practices, they are then defended by Western 
89  ‘Facebook Apologises for Removing Breast Cancer Awareness Video’, above n 72.
90  ‘Human Rights and Privatised Law Enforcement: Abandoning Rights – Abandoning 
Democracy – Abandoning Law’ (Report, European Digital Rights Association, 25 February 
2014) <https://edri.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/EDRi_HumanRights_and_
PrivLaw_web.pdf>.
91  Zygmunt Bauman, Didier Bigo, Paulo Esteves et al, ‘After Snowden: Rethinking the Impact 
of Surveillance’ (2014) 8 International Political Sociology 121.
92  The terrorism prevention paradigm is also used by governments to demand cooperation 
for private actors: see, eg, Nicholas Watt and Patrick Wintour, ‘Facebook and Twitter Have 
“Social Responsibility” to Help Fight Terrorism, Says David Cameron’, The Guardian 
(online) (16 January 2015) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/16/cameron- 
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governments and technology giants as a lesser (even negligible) evil than the 
mass-surveillance programmes conducted by repressive governments like Russia 
and China.93 This kind of defence is also indirectly offered by many academics 
working explicitly within the Internet governance field, who often repeat very 
similar narratives of legitimation, portraying the IIC as a great defender of human 
rights, which simply happened (‘allegedly’) to conduct secret mass-surveillance 
programmes.94
Justifying the ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda: Panics of repressive capture
Sadly, the goals, ideas and language of human rights defenders have also been 
co-opted by governmental and corporate powers to justify and sustain the 
structures that favour their strategic and commercial interests. Advocates for 
the human rights of LGBT people have inadvertently been drawn into the service 
of ‘crisis governance’ and exploited for geopolitical ends in international politics.95 
A good illustration is ‘pinkwashing’ – the way in which many Western states, 
especially the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel, have used their 
pro-gay laws and policies to draw xenophobic comparisons between the sexual 
freedoms (superiority) of the West and the ‘unfreedoms’ of many non-Western 
(uncivilised) states.96
Similarly, the ‘Internet Freedom’ agenda heavily promotes the view that non-
Western countries, particularly China and Russia, cannot be trusted to respect 
human rights online.97 Some, if not most, forms of Internet privacy and free 
speech advocacy, as well as feminist and queer digital rights advocates, have 
inadvertently supported the ‘Internet Freedom’ paradigm by drawing similar 
xenophobic comparisons between the digital and Internet freedoms (superiority) 
of the West and the ‘unfreedoms’ of many non-Western (‘evil’ authoritarian) tradi- 
tions, aligning particularly well with the neoliberal model of Internet governance, 
dominated by the United States. The difference, in this case, is that the primary 
93  Matthias Schulze, ‘Patterns of Surveillance Legitimization: The German Discourse on the 
NSA Scandal’ (2015) 13 Surveillance & Society 197.
94  Francesca Musiani, D L Cogburn, L DeNardis et al (eds), The Turn to Infrastructure in 
Internet Governance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2015).
95  Daphne Rousseau, ‘LGBT Campaigners Say Israel “Pinkwashing” to Distract from Palestinian 
Occupation’, Yahoo! News (online) (4 June 2016) <https://www.yahoo.com/news/lgbt-
campaigners-israel-pinkwashing-distract-palestinian-occupation-183337145.html>.
96  See Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University 
Press, 2007); Sarah Schulman, Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (Duke 
University Press, 2012); Aeyal Gross, ch 8, this volume, ‘Homoglobalism: The emergence 
of global gay governance’.
97  See, eg, Leigh Munsil, ‘Cruz: Obama Proposal Puts Internet Freedom in Hands of Russia, 
China’, The Blaze (online) (24 June 2016) <http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/06/24/
cruz-obama-proposal-puts-internet-freedom-in-hands-of-russia-china/>.
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‘uncivilised others’ are the governments of China and Russia, rather than those 
of Muslim nations.98
It would be naive to think that digital rights and Internet policy are like a binary 
in which digital rights are fully protected in the West, and fully undermined by 
repressive governments outside the West. However, it is precisely this binary that 
is touted by the ‘Internet Freedom’ paradigm: that increased censorship and 
intensified mass surveillance by undemocratic and repressive governments is the 
only (and a very threatening!) alternative to the current US-dominated neoliberal 
model. This framing of the danger and imminence of Internet ‘capture’ by 
repressive governments is the response to any criticism of the current model, 
which is praised as a ‘global Internet multistakeholder community’.99
In summary, all of these justifications are heavily reliant on paradigms of fear 
and panic. They have enabled various states – both authoritarian and liberal – to 
restrict queer expression and rights online, in the name of defending freedoms 
against threats from ‘outsiders’. Similar narratives have also very effectively 
enabled the IIC to maintain its dominance over Internet policy, content and 
infrastructure. 
Conclusion
And so the IIC techno-empire thrives, and is especially strong because it owns 
large parts of the Internet infrastructure, on which global economic, political and 
social structures are dependent in the twenty-first century. A basic understanding 
of the anatomy of Internet governance is necessary to inform queer human rights 
advocacy in contemporary international law and politics, because of its power 
to shape the social and economic relations of our time. In this chapter, I have 
briefly outlined the neoliberal model of the Internet governance, showing how it 
reflects the economic and geopolitical interests of Western, particularly US, power. 
In doing so, I have challenged the dominant narratives of ‘Internet Freedom’ 
promoted by the US government and its corporate technology allies. I have 
sought to debunk the popular belief that online queer expression and advocacy of 
LGBT human rights is limited only in the global South. Internet restrictions on 
queer expression are also imposed in the global North, by both liberal governments 
and multinational technology giants, who are often portrayed as champions of 
human rights and freedoms online. 
Real-life examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate that such a belief, which 
is prevalent among queer communities and activists, is not only naive, but deeply 
problematic. At its worst, the belief that human rights on the Internet, as well as 
gender and sexuality freedoms, are respected and protected by the West reflects 
98  Ibid.
99  The US government has initially advocated ‘a private-sector-led’ Internet governance model; 
however, gradually the term was replaced with a ‘multistakeholder model’. See Milton L 
Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance (MIT Press, 2010).
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xenophobic, neo-imperial assumptions about the lack of civility of states outside 
Western liberal democracies. Conveniently, the global spread of ‘sodomy’ laws 
through the ‘civilising mission’ of the British colonial empire is forgotten.100 
Similarly, the Internet Freedom agenda downplays the West’s mass surveillance and 
Internet filtering programmes, if they come to light, as marginal and incomparable 
to the restrictions on freedom imposed by states like Russia and China. Indeed, 
they might be incomparable, but for very different reasons than it is often assumed. 
Whereas China, just like many other governments, does engage in Internet filtering 
and surveillance activities, the scope of such activities is usually confined to the 
territory of China, which is separated from the rest of the world by the ‘Great 
Firewall of China’.101 In contrast, Western-imposed restrictions on the exercise of 
fundamental rights and freedoms online, including queer expression and human 
rights advocacy, are often global in scope because it is the US government and US 
corporations who exercise the greatest control over Internet infrastructure and the 
multistakeholder neoliberal model of Internet governance.
With no meaningful opposition to the global standard setting and continuing 
expansion of the IIC, the ‘global default’102 position of the Internet enables US 
technology giants to shape and influence queer, sexual and other content online, 
without the knowledge of Internet users. When discriminatory online restrictions 
on queer rights come to light, they are usually justified by manufacturing panics 
about sexual morality and protection of children. Similarly, the threat of the 
‘repressive capture’ of the Internet by illiberal states is used by the IIC to maintain 
its dominance over Internet policy, content and infrastructure. Similarities between 
these narratives of fear and those employed in other areas of international law and 
politics are unsurprising, given the socio-technical nature of the Internet. Indeed, 
the Internet is not simply a neutral technology, as often mistakenly assumed, but 
rather reflects domestic and global normative political bargains and continuing 
geo-political battles for power and resources. In the fast-changing and complex 
reality of the global information economy, the struggle for visibility and human 
rights – both offline and online – for queer communities around the globe has to 
continue.
100  See Enze Han and Joseph O’Mahoney, ‘British Colonialism and the Criminalization of 
Homosexuality’ (2014) 27 Cambridge Review of International Affairs 268. 
101  The term was coined in Geremie R Barme and Sang Ye, ‘The Great Firewall of China’, Wired 
(6 January 1997) <https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3/>.




violence, war and law

4 International law as 
violence
Competing absences of the other
Vanja Hamzi
Always mistrust the law.1
Law and violence are an old couple and analytical forays into their affairs have 
produced a welter of disparate diagnoses, most of which, however, agree that this 
relationship is an unhealthy but necessary ‘fact of life’. As with many children in 
abusive families, we are cautioned that any alternative to enduring this relationship 
in our lives would be catastrophic and that we ‘better shape up’ for a long journey 
ahead and, indeed, ‘better understand’ that all this is for our own good.2 For 
instance, in Law’s Violence, Austin Sarat and Thomas Kearns conclude ‘that violence, 
as a fact and a metaphor, is integral to the constitution of modern law, and that law 
is a creature of both literal violence, and of imaginings and threats of force, disorder, 
and pain’.3 Without either literal or abstract violence, we are told, there can be no 
law. But law is, or rather ought to be, because it also holds a promise that it can 
contain and control the violence it deems brute and excessive, the very violence 
of the world outside law. The imperfection immanent to law’s violent taming of 
extralegal violence is law’s driving force, an anomaly built into the system to ensure 
its preservation. For Sarat and Kearns, ‘[v]iolence stands as the limit of law, as a 
reminder of both law’s continuing necessity and its ever-present failing. Without 
1  An ancien régime saying, recorded in Nicole Castan, ‘The Arbitration of Disputes under the 
Ancien Régime’ in John Bossy (ed), Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in 
the West (Cambridge University Press, first published 1983, 2003 edn) 219, 224.
2  The allusion to ‘You’re the One That I Want’ from Grease (1978) is not accidental.
3  Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns, ‘Introduction’ in Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns (eds), 
Law’s Violence (University of Michigan Press, 1995) 1. As for the evidence of ‘modern’ law’s 
inevitable coupling with violence, Sarat and Kearns provide an eclectic list of seminal works, 
including Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (C B MacPherson (ed), Penguin Books, first published 
1651, 1981 edn); Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (A Wedberg trans, Russell & 
Russell, 1961); Norberto Bobbio, ‘Law and Force’ (1965) 49 Monist 321; Walter Benjamin, 
‘Critique of Violence’ in Walter Benjamin, Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical 
Writings (Peter Demetz (ed), Edmund Jepchott trans, Schocken Books, first published 
1978, 1986 edn), 277–300; Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Violence and Legal Subjection’ (unpublished 
typescript, 1991).
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violence, law is unnecessary, yet, in its presence, law . . . may be impossible’.4 The 
couplet of law and violence is thus forever entangled in a double bind: a distressing 
existential drama that both threatens and makes the relationship possible.
But, although apparently interdependent, law and violence are not in an equal 
relationship. Whether it is described as a product of social and economic relations 
or, more alarmingly, as biologically predetermined (as ‘inherent heritage’)5 in 
humans and other animals, violence is thought to pre-date law and exist both 
within and without law’s life-worlds. In contrast, law is constituted by violence, 
because violence ‘provides the occasion and method for founding legal orders, it 
gives law (as the regulator of force and coercion) a reason for being, and it provides 
a means through which the law acts’.6 This aetiological connection is, however, 
typically denied by law and contrasted with law’s seemingly nobler originative 
myths – such as those of justice, peace and security – which are also projected as 
law’s ultimate ends. It is non-violence, then, in which law claims to inhere and in 
which it wants to rest. Except that, as ever, law’s claims are deceptive.
Samera Esmeir has demonstrated in her analysis of the recent wars in Iraq how 
law’s operations for global peace, security and non-violence ‘are themselves 
productive of their own violence’7 and how wars can be ‘carried out for the 
law’.8 Thus, the violence of non-violence mediated through law reaffirms law’s 
subordinate relationship with violence, a relationship in which violence is not only 
law’s raison d’être but its magistra vitae, too – the ultimate heuristic device for 
contemplating law’s past, present and future.
International law is particularly notorious for its continuous evolution towards 
evermore-diverse forms of juridical violence. From the falsehood of imperial 
pacifism that characterised the early-twentieth-century efforts to juridify war,9 
through the perils of the multiple turns to ‘pragmatism’ and quasi-proportionality 
with regard to legally sanctioned uses of force,10 to the infinitude11 of contemporary 
warfare – international law’s spectacles of violence seem to proliferate at an 
 4  Sarat and Kearns, above n 3, 2.
 5  For a recent example of biological determinism in legal scholarship, see István T Kristó-Nagy, 
‘Violence, Our Inherent Heritage’ in Robert Gleave and István T Kristó-Nagy (eds), Violence 
in Islamic Thought from the Qur’ n to the Mongols (Edinburgh University Press, 2015) 2–17.
 6  Sarat and Kearns, above n 3, 4.
 7  Samera Esmeir, ‘The Violence of Non-Violence: Law and War in Iraq’ (2007) 34 Journal of 
Law and Society 99, 102.
 8  Ibid 103 (emphasis in the original).
 9  Gerry Simpson, Law, War and Crime: War Crimes Trials and the Reinvention of International 
Law (Polity Press, 2007) 140–56. For Simpson, the Treaty of Versailles (1919) provided a 
revolutionary legal interpretation of war and crime and laid the ground for a criminalisation 
of war at the Nuremberg trials (1945–6). 
10  For an illuminating analysis of the law on the use of force, see Gina Heathcote, ‘Feminist 
Perspectives on the Law on the Use of Force’ in Marc Weller (ed), The Oxford Handbook of 
the Use of Force in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2015) 114.
11  The ‘war on terror’ and ‘cyber warfare’ being but some of the most recent expressions of 
global warring that defy the neat distinction between the ius ad bellum and the ius in bello, 
as they, indeed, defy the distinction between ‘war’ and ‘peace’ as such. 
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unprecedented pace. Is it, then, too preposterous to ask what insights could be 
obtained if international law is posited no longer as a discipline and practice 
intrinsically committed to regulation of violence, but as violence itself?
If it is presumed that all law is violence, then the time-honoured analytical dyad 
of ‘law and violence’ no longer makes sense. Law’s violence becomes the very 
essence of law and law’s violence against both literal and abstract forms of 
extralegal violence can be seen as law’s intrinsic survival strategy – something law 
does in order to be, in order to distinguish itself from an otherwise indistinguish- 
able multitude of violent acts. Law’s difference from such acts is then merely 
circumstantial and contingent, owed to particular societal conditions that rule 
over it, rather than vice versa (thus exposing the fallacy of the rule of law). Such 
law is not exceptional, not worth preserving at any cost; it can and perhaps should 
wither away.12
If all law is violence, then international law is perfectly suited for global violent 
pursuits. It is well entrenched and institutionalised and it provides multiple fora 
of engagement, each violent in its own right and with respect to a specific set of 
conditions that govern, or purport to govern, human lives and relations. This 
chapter considers one such forum – the UN Security Council – which has evolved 
over time into perhaps the most potent symbol of legally sanctioned state violence 
in international relations, not least because of its botched attempts to curb wars 
and punish war crimes. The Council is also, as Dianne Otto avers, the ‘seat of 
power of the world’s superpower(s), whose permanent members are also the 
world’s largest arms dealers’.13 Initially envisaged as pursuing military actions in 
its own right, instead of merely ‘advising’ states on such matters, and even ‘having 
armed forces continuously available to it’,14 the Council has gradually moved 
towards juridical, rather than literal, forms of violence. Those are epitomised in 
the establishment of its ad hoc war crimes tribunals, which followed the Yugoslav 
and Rwandan conflicts in the 1990s, and subsequently in its resolutions on 
counter-terrorism. The oxymoronic formulae on which the Council has relied in 
these operations, such as its insistence on international legal enforcement of global 
peace, justice and security, reveal all too plainly the violent nature of such 
purportedly non-violent acts. As Jacques Derrida suggests, ‘[t]he word enforceability 
reminds us that there is no such thing as law that doesn’t imply in itself, a priori, 
12  The bold claim that all law will wither away (in the advent of a true communist society) is, of 
course, a staple of Marxist jurisprudence. See, eg, China Miéville, Between Equal Rights: 
A Marxist Theory of International Law (Brill, 2005). 
13  Dianne Otto, ‘Beyond Stories of Victory and Danger: Resisting Feminism’s Amenability to 
Serving Security Council Politics’ in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds), Rethinking 
Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 157, 159.
14  Vaughan Lowe, Adam Roberts, Jennifer Welsh and Dominik Zaum, ‘Introduction’ 
in Vaughan Lowe et al (eds), The United Nations Security Council and War: The Evolution 
of Thought and Practice since 1945 (Oxford University Press, 2008) 1, 12.
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. . . the possibility of being “enforced”, applied by force’.15 The Council’s repeated 
vows to ‘kill insecurity for security’ and to ‘defeat violence for peace’16 should 
therefore be understood literally – as acts of juridical aggression, as international 
law’s own war on war.
The discussion on the intrinsic violence of the Council’s dealings in international 
law, which in turn reveals the intrinsic violence of international law, is framed in 
this chapter in relation to a single recent event: the ‘first-ever’ Security Council 
meeting on the persecution of ‘LGBT Syrians and Iraqis’ by the so-called ‘Islamic 
State’ (hereinafter ISIS),17 which took place on 24 August 2015.18 I argue that, 
while ‘dealing with’ but also perpetrating and perpetuating multiple forms of 
violence, this event, at the same time, reveals some productive voids, especially with 
regard to the dominant framing of the subjectivities and subjects of the 
international legal discourse and intervention. Such voids, I propose, allow for 
theorising the absence of international law and, in turn, the absence of the subject 
of juridical violence.
On the pages that follow, I revisit, first, certain loci classici of critical theory’s 
discussions on violence, so as to assess their relevance for my premise that all law 
is violence. I inquire, in particular, whether the diverse categories of violence, as 
devised by critical theorists, make sense in law’s life-worlds and, if not, what is to 
be done.19 I turn, then, to international law’s (intrinsic) violence as espoused in the 
Security Council’s engagements with ISIS – that newly begotten hostis humani 
generis20 – as well as with ISIS’s potential ‘perfect alterity’ in the image of ‘LGBT 
Syrians and Iraqis’. I conclude that this conceptual meeting of two unlikely actants 
15  Jacques Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The “Mystical Foundation of Authority”’ (1990) 11 Cardozo 
Law Review 919, 925 (emphasis in the original).
16  Esmeir, above n 7, 103.
17  The acronym ‘ISIS’ denotes the so-called ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’, which is also 
known as ‘ISIL’ (substituting the word ‘Syria’ with ‘the Levant’), Da’ish or Daesh (the Arabic 
equivalents of ‘ISIL’/‘ISIS’), or simply ‘Islamic State’ (IS). Although this terrorist 
organisation hardly needs any introduction, it is worth noting that, on 29 June 2014, ISIS 
proclaimed itself to be an Islamic state (al-dawla al-islam ya) and global caliphate (khil fa). 
By the end of 2015, ISIS was thought to control territory inhabited by c 10 million people 
in Syria and Iraq, while its affiliates control small areas of Afghanistan, Libya and Nigeria. In 
the sea of less-than-mediocre literature on ISIS, only two journalistic accounts currently stand 
out – Abdel Bari Atwan’s Islamic State: The Digital Caliphate (Saqi, 2015) and Patrick 
Cockburn’s The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution (Verso, 2015). 
18  See Michelle Nichols, ‘UN Security Council to Meet on Islamic State Gay Attacks’, Reuters 
(online) (13 August 2015) <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/08/13/uk-mideast-crisis- 
islamic-state-gay-idUKKCN0QI26I20150813>. 
19  To echo Lenin’s ‘What Is to Be Done’, which, coincidentally, although relating to a different 
context, asks an important additional question: ‘what is there in common between economism 
and terrorism?’ See Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, ‘What Is to Be Done?’ in Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, 
Essential Works of Lenin: ‘What Is to Be Done?’ and Other Writings (BN Publishing, 2009) 
53, 108. 
20  Hostis humani generis (‘enemy of humankind’) is a legal term-of-art denoting an entity (for 
instance, a pirate ship) operating outside the bounds of the law (traditionally admiralty law 
and nowadays public international law) and outside the jurisdiction of national law. 
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(or ‘personalities’) of international law – one deemed quintessentially evil and the 
other quintessentially good – is not an ordinary event. Rather, it probes the very 
foundations of law’s violence and signals an existential crisis amid the global 
operations of international law – thus revealing an alegal space for critique and 
contemplation or, simply, for a life imagined beyond law. 
Towards a critique of law as violence
Out of an array of critical engagements on the political Left with violence as a 
social phenomenon, two analytical encounters are almost proverbial for their 
depth and the number of productive responses they were able to elicit. First is 
Walter Benjamin’s notoriously dense ‘Critique of Violence’, published in 
1921.21 Second is Jean-Paul Sartre’s controversial ‘Preface’ to the 1961 edition of 
Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth.22 Both texts have proven difficult 
to render into English, not least because the words Recht and droit in German 
and French respectively denote both ‘law’ and ‘right’ (a trait shared across 
many Germanic, Romanesque and Slavic languages), while the German word 
Gewalt means not only ‘violence’, but also, as Derrida carefully noted, ‘legitimate 
power, authority, public force’.23 The failures and misfortunes of translation – 
taken as a linguistic, philosophical and cultural labour – thus befall, in particular, 
Benjamin’s text.24
At the same time, Benjamin’s text has been described as ‘at once “mystical” . . . 
and hypercritical’ – a ‘text which, in certain respects, can be read as neo-messianic 
Jewish mysticism (mystique) grafted onto post-Sorelian neo-Marxism (or [the] 
reverse)’.25 It might be this Benjaminian ‘mystical critique’ that propelled Slavoj 
Žižek to compose his 2008 book on violence out of ‘six sideways glances’, rather 
than ‘confronting violence directly’.26 In so doing, Žižek is careful not to succumb 
to the mystique of violence itself. ‘My underlying premise’, he writes, ‘is that there 
is something inherently mystifying in a direct confrontation with [violence]: the 
overpowering horror of violent acts and empathy with the victims inexorably 
function as a lure which prevents us from thinking.’27 The same, perhaps, could 
be said of the lure of law (with the noun ‘lure’ echoing uncannily the word ‘rule’) 
in its messianic mode – the law that solemnly resolves that justice be done. 
21  Walter Benjamin, ‘Zur Kritik der Gewalt’ (1921) 47 Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und 
Sozialpolitik 809. For an English translation, see Benjamin, above n 3, 277–300. 
22  Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Préface’ in Frantz Fanon, Les damnés de la terre (François Maspero, 1961) 
17. For an English translation, see Jean-Paul Sartre, ‘Preface’ in Frantz Fanon, The Wretched 
of the Earth (R Philcox trans, Grove Press, 2004) xliii.
23  Derrida, above n 15, 927. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid 979.
26  Slavoj Žižek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections (Profile Books, 2008) 3. The sixth of these 
reflections directly concerns Benjamin’s ‘Critique of Violence’.
27  Ibid.
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Benjamin’s approach to the lure of both law and violence is to bring these terms-
of-art (that is, ‘law’ as Recht and ‘violence’ as Gewalt) into a symbiotic relationship 
in which their interdependence becomes the key for their dialectical difference as 
well as their metaphysical unity.28 This symbiosis is achieved through a series of 
distinctions. Benjamin distinguishes, for example, between ‘lawmaking violence’ 
(rechtsetzende Gewalt) and ‘law-preserving violence’ (rechtserhaltende Gewalt) to 
account for two different ways in which violence is memorialised and built into 
the (legal) system and, crucially, to move beyond the impasse contained in the 
distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘positive’ law. ‘Among all the forms of violence 
permitted by both natural law and positive law’, Benjamin suggests, ‘there is not 
one that is free of the gravely problematic nature . . . of all legal violence’.29 To 
explain this nature, he erects yet another pair of oppositions – that of ‘mythic 
violence’ (mytische Gewalt) and ‘divine violence’ (göttliche Gewalt) – the former 
denoting the very lure of law, its mystifying powers to keep us forever entrapped 
in its vicious circle, while the latter suggests a path to liberation from that circle. 
‘Divine violence’, in that sense, is quite literally a deus ex machina: a type of 
violence, such as ‘the proletarian general strike [that] sets itself the sole task 
of destroying state power’,30 which will ultimately open ‘again all the eternal 
forms’.31 Benjamin’s ‘divine violence’ is, thus, revolutionary in that it serves no 
means other than that of liberating us from the intrinsic injustice of law;32 it 
reminds us of the possibility of a life outside law and juridical violence.
While a lawless life for Benjamin is a possibility, it is not a life without violence. 
Whether ‘divine violence’ is conceived as a temporary occurrence or, indeed, a 
road to a new form of ‘sovereignty’,33 it can only set us free from one pervasive 
form of violence – that of law as such. Absent a revolution, even that is but a 
distant dream. So, what is to be done?
Sartre’s answer, in his ‘Preface’ to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, seemed 
to be to embrace, even celebrate, the insurgent violence of the oppressed, since 
such violence, ‘like Achilles’ spear, can heal the wounds it has inflicted’.34 Sartre’s 
call to arms, as it were, was primarily intended to wake the ‘Europeans’35 to Third 
World de-colonial struggle. Still, the would-be self-soothing properties of violence 
in his reference to Achilles’s spear elicited a barrage of criticism. For instance, in 
her essay On Violence, Hannah Arendt dismisses this reference as utter nonsense: 
‘[i]f this were true’, she writes, ‘revenge would be the cure-all for most of our 
28  Thus bringing together dialectical materialism and Abrahamic metaphysics, the latter of which 
can be observed, for example, in the f  concept of wa dat al-wuj d (Unity of Existence).
29  Benjamin, above n 3, 293.
30  Ibid 291.
31  Ibid 300.
32  Cf Žižek, above n 26, 169.
33  After all, Benjamin concludes his analysis with the assertion that ‘[d]ivine violence . . . may 
be called sovereign violence’; Benjamin, above n 3, 300.
34  Sartre, above n 22, lxii.
35  Ibid xlviii. 
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ills’.36 Against this zero-sum exchange, Judith Butler’s analysis centres on the 
specific context in which Sartre wrote this text:
Sartre’s portrayal of insurgent violence is meant to provide insight into the 
person who lives under [colonial] oppression. As such, it serves as a recon-
struction of an induced psychological state. It also reads as a fully instrumental 
rationalization for violence and thus as a normative claim. Indeed, the 
violent acts by which decolonization is achieved are also those by which 
man ‘recreates himself’. Sartre is describing a psychopolitical reality, but he is 
also offering, we might say, a new humanism to confound the old, one that 
requires, under these social conditions, violence to materialize.37
Butler’s analysis situates Sartre within his own existential drama, especially with 
regard to his self-avowed existential humanism and its normative limits. In this 
struggle, Sartre’s affirmation of the violence of the colonised is at the same time 
an affirmation of ‘the masculine [as] the presumptive norm of humanization’.38 It 
is this gender-biased humanist normativity bent on violence that Butler primarily 
objects to and proposes, instead, that we seek a touch ‘and form of yielding 
that establishes a relation to a “you”’, that is, to ‘a pronoun that is open-ended 
precisely on the question of gender’.39 For Butler, then, this would be a search for 
an insurrectionary human beyond the constraints of humanism, and, indeed, an 
emancipatory quest beyond violence:
If there is a relation between this ‘you’ whom I seek to know, whose gender 
cannot be determined, whose nationality cannot be presumed, and who 
compels me to relinquish violence, then this mode of address articulates a 
wish not just for a nonviolent future for the human, but for a new conception 
of the human where some manner of touch other than violence is the 
precondition of that making.40
Butler’s presumptive ‘you’, then, is a ‘you’ still-untainted by law, gender roles and 
other forms of violence – the ‘you’ whose ways of being in the world invite me to 
explore the act of touch as an expression of infinite possibilities.41
36  Hannah Arendt, On Violence (Harcourt, 1970) 20. 
37  Judith Butler, ‘Violence, Nonviolence: Sartre on Fanon’ in Senses of the Subject (Fordham 
University Press, 2015) 171, 186–7 (emphasis added). 
38  Ibid 197.
39  Ibid.
40  Ibid.
41  See generally Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity 
(Duke University Press, 2003); Luce Irigaray, ‘Toward a Divine in the Feminine’ in Gillian 
Howie and J’annine Jobling (eds), Women and the Divine: Touching Transcendence (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009) 13.
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The life-worlds of Butler’s ‘you’ stand in opposition to law’s life-worlds. The 
former entail conceptual and affective journeys into the human beyond violence. 
The latter are the worlds of radical violence that enliven but ultimately defeat the 
human. For violence cannot be cured by law; law can only beget more violence. 
As such, law cannot be other-than-violence. 
The Security Council ‘meets’ to mete out the evil and  
the good
But, how can non-violence-other-than-violence42 and other-than-legal ways to 
approach conflict and suffering ever be convincing in a world such as ours? Even 
if it is presumed that global ‘peace’, ‘justice’ and ‘security’ are all concepts steeped 
in violence – literal (subjective), symbolic and systemic43 – can their oppositional 
pairs – global war, injustice and insecurity – ever be contained by anything other 
than sheer force, including the force of law?
Writing from Paris the day after the 13 November 2015 terrorist attacks, Judith 
Butler recalled, once again, the strange ‘metrics of grievability’ that render some 
human lives infinitely more grievable than others,44 and warned that ‘this [the Paris 
attacks] will take some time to think through’.45 This echoes Žižek’s earlier 
discussed concern with the lure of violence/law, with its compulsive urge to 
‘intervene’, to be ‘drawn in’ and, in doing so, to succumb to a ‘hypocritical 
sentiment of moral outrage’.46 This affective response only reinforces the presumed 
inevitability of violence/law. Instead of doing first and thinking later, is there a 
time to do the opposite? If so, the key question should be: what is it that law/
violence does to contain and eradicate those most direct and most appalling forms 
of violence deemed extralegal?
When, on 24 August 2015, the Security Council convened its Arria-Formula 
meeting47 on ISIS and its persecution of ‘LGBT Syrians and Iraqis’, it did so, 
42  Cf Esmeir, above n 7. Esmeir’s focus is, decidedly, on violent aspects of non-violence. One 
would, however, hope that there are also some aspects of non-violence that remain 
non-violent.
43  To borrow Žižek’s classification of direct and visible, linguistic and formative, and economic 
and political forms of violence, respectively; Žižek, above n 26, 1.
44  ‘Mourning [here in Paris] seems fully restricted within the national frame. The nearly 50 dead 
in Beirut from the day before are barely mentioned, and neither are the 111 in Palestine 
killed in the last weeks alone, or the scores in Ankara’, Judith Butler, ‘Mourning Becomes 
the Law’, Instituto 25M Democracia (14 November 2015) <https://instituto25m.info/
mourning-becomes-the-law-judith-butler-from-paris/>. 
45  Emphasis in the original. For ‘[i]t is difficult to think when one is appalled’: ibid. For her 
enlightening exploration of post-9/11 America, see Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers 
of Mourning and Violence (Verso, 2006). For her critique of state violence and the media-
induced ‘metrics of grievability’, see Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? 
(Verso, 2010). 
46  Žižek, above n 26, 5.
47  So named after a Venezuelan diplomat who introduced the format in 1992 to allow for ‘very 
informal, confidential gatherings which enable Security Council members to have a frank and 
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apparently, to make history. ‘This will be a historic meeting’, proclaimed US 
Ambassador to the UN Samantha Power: ‘[i]t will be the first Security Council 
meeting on LGBT rights’.48 While LGBT rights are no stranger to the international 
legal system, they have been, indeed, absent from the Council’s agenda, not least 
because at least one of its permanent members, Russia, opposes their existence 
tout court. Meanwhile, the Council’s dealings with other ‘comparable’ issues – 
most notably its agenda on women, peace and security – have been less than 
impressive.49 The agenda that was hoped (by some feminists involved in its original 
drafting) to play an important role ‘in disrupting the gendered assumptions of 
collective security discourse, principally by (re)presenting women as vital 
participants in conflict resolution and peace-building’,50 quickly proved to be the 
very opposite. Four of the Council’s seven follow-up resolutions ‘focus[ed] solely 
on women as victims of sexual violence’.51 So, what exactly, if anything, was historic 
about the ‘secretive’ and ‘informal’ Council’s Arria-Formula meeting on ISIS and 
LGBT rights?
First, some facts. The meeting was organised by the United States and Chile, 
whose ambassadors delivered prepared remarks, along with UN Deputy Secretary-
General Jan Eliasson and International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission (since renamed OutRight Action International) Executive Director 
Jessica Stern. Of the 15 Security Council members, 13 were present and nine 
delivered remarks as well. Although in attendance, representatives from China, 
Russia, Nigeria and Malaysia (predictably) did not speak.52
The meeting was also addressed by a representative of one Muslim-majority 
country, who ‘delivered generally supportive remarks’, a representative of one 
Muslim human rights organisation, ‘reaffirming the need to address abuses 
committed against all marginalized persons impacted by the conflict, including 
private exchange of views . . . with persons whom the inviting member or members of the 
Council . . . believe it would be beneficial to hear and/or to whom they may wish to convey 
a message’: UN Secretariat, ‘Working Methods Handbook: Background Note on the “Arria-
Formula” Meetings of the Security Council Members’ (Informal Non-Paper, UN Security 
Council, 25 October 2002) <http://www.un.org/en/sc/about/methods/bgarriaformula.
shtml>. 
48  Reported in Scott Long, ‘The UN Security Council Debates Gays and ISIS: Why This is a 
Bad Idea’ on Scott Long, A Paper Bird (23 August 2015) <http://paper-bird.net/2015/ 
08/23/the-un-security-council-terrible-idea/>. This entry provides an illuminating analysis 
of the Arria-Formula event in question and should be read in conjunction with other posts 
on the matter available at the same blog. 
49  As inaugurated by SC Res 1325, UN Doc S/RES/1325 (31 October 2000). For a critical 
appraisal of feminist engagements with the Security Council, see Otto, above n 13, 157–72.
50  Dianne Otto and Gina Heathcote, ‘Rethinking Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and 
Collective Security: An Introduction’ in Dianne Otto and Gina Heathcote (eds), Rethinking 
Peacekeeping, Gender Equality and Collective Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 1, 2.
51  Ibid 2–3.
52  See Michael K Lavers, ‘Islamic State Focus of UN Security Council’s First LGBT Meeting’, 
Washington Blade (online) (24 August 2015) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/ 
2015/08/24/islamic-state-focus-of-u-n-security-councils-first-lgbt-meeting/>. 
86  Vanja Hamzi
LGBTI persons’, and an anonymous ‘Iraqi gay man’ who spoke to the Council 
via telephone.53
Finally, the Council heard ‘Subhi Nahas, a gay man from the Syrian city of 
Idleb who received refugee status . . . and now lives in San Francisco’.54 He ‘spoke 
during the briefing on behalf of the Organization for Refuge, Asylum and 
Migration’.55 ‘I have witnessed with my own eyes the annihilation of civility 
and humanity as I knew them’, Nahas told the Council. ‘For millions of Syrians 
both in and outside the country, time is running out. For my compatriots who do 
not conform to gender and sexual norms, the eleventh hour has already passed. 
They need your help now.’56
The US Ambassador Power, OutRight Executive Director Stern and Syrian 
witness Nahas briefed the press later in the day. Stern told reporters that ISIS has 
executed at least 30 men charged with ‘sodomy’. ‘It is the obligation of the 
international community to take action’, she concluded.57 Nahas told the press 
that he would support international military intervention in order to stop ISIS 
and end the war in Syria.58
Thus ended the ‘historic’ gathering. Its flimsy ‘recognition’ of ‘LGBT Syrians 
and Iraqis’ as victims of ISIS’s rule of terror coincided with a new wave of 
public executions of those accused of committing the ‘deeds of Lot’s 
people’ (‘am l qawm L )59 that ISIS perpetrated and duly reported in social 
media. Two days before the Council’s Arria-Formula meeting, ISIS militants 
reportedly threw nine male citizens of the city of Mosul from the top of a 
high building, after a ‘judge’ of an ‘Islamic court’ set up by ISIS condemned 
those people to death for the ‘deeds of Lot’s people’.60 An ISIS-orchestrated 
53  As this paragraph draws on a confidential report, the relevant identities are concealed for their 
own protection.
54  Lavers, above n 52.
55  Ibid.
56  Ibid (emphasis added).
57  Ibid. For Stern’s remarks delivered at the Arria-Formula meeting, see OutRight Action 
International, ‘Jessica Stern’s Remarks at Historic UN Briefing on LGBT People Focuses 
[sic] on Persecution and Killings in Iraq and Syria’ (Media Release, 24 August 2015) 
<https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/jessica-sterns-remarks-historic-un-briefing- 
lgbt-people-focuses-persecution-and-killings>. 
58  Lavers, above n 52.
59  So-described in ISIS propaganda in order to invoke the Qur’ nic rendition of the Biblical 
parable about the Prophet Lot (L ) and thus ‘prove’ that severe punishments of male same-
sex sexual acts are not only commendable, but obligatory, in Islamic law. On the fallacy and 
danger of such claims, see Vanja Hamzi , Sexual and Gender Diversity in the Muslim World: 
History, Law and Vernacular Knowledge (I B Tauris, 2016) 90–1.
60  Scott Long, ‘New Killings: ISIS Answers the UN Security Council’ on Scott Long, A Paper 
Bird (25 August 2015) <http://paper-bird.net/2015/08/25/new-killings-isis-answers-the-
un-security-council/>. In this post, Long suggests that this might be the largest number that 
ISIS has murdered at one time for ‘sodomy’, and provocatively concludes that ‘[i]t’s hard 
not to suspect this wave of killing was a pre-emptive answer to [the] UN Security Council 
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execution for ‘sodomy’ was also reported only a couple of weeks after the Council’s 
meeting.61
The Arria-Formula meeting took place within the context of other such 
‘informal’ and ‘secretive’ conversations that the Council has recently organised 
on other atrocious acts committed by ISIS that are seemingly deemed condemn-
able but ‘sensitive’ – such as the sexual enslavement of women and girls and 
ISIS’s targeted killing of Christian, Yazidi, Turkic and Kurdish groups. While 
the Council’s resolutions have already affirmed the need to combat terrorism 
‘by all means, in accordance with . . . international law’,62 its attempts to ‘raise 
awareness’ on crimes that ISIS has committed against particular groups – based 
on their ethnic or, indeed, sexual and gender difference – are a tricky business. On 
the one hand, as evidenced by the silence (and one rather lukewarm response) 
of certain state representatives at the Arria-Formula meeting of 24 August 2015, 
recognising some of these groups’ very existence might be a problem for some 
of the Council’s members – let alone condemning such crimes publicly. Such 
‘recognition’ might give those groups a type of ‘presence’ – indeed, a ‘personality’ 
– in international law and politics that could later be invoked to condemn violence 
(both literal and juridical) that many member states happily commit or condone 
against those or other comparable groups.63 On the other hand, emphasising the 
plights of particular groups such as these is seemingly necessary for building a 
case for the referral of ISIS’s crimes to the International Criminal Court.
But how could ISIS’s violence be effectively singled out and juridified 
(criminalised) without involving other participants in the wars in Syria and Iraq? 
The International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction over ISIS is as problematic 
as ISIS’s stand in international law in general. As an international terrorist 
organisation with an ominous claim to statehood that is both territorial (currently 
meeting on gays and ISIS – which was making headlines in both Western and Arab media 
fully nine days earlier’.
61  Scott Long, ‘New ISIS Execution for “Sodomy”: Attention, UN Security Council’ on Scott 
Long, A Paper Bird (17 September 2015) <http://paper-bird.net/2015/09/17/new-isis- 
execution-attention-un-security-council/>.
62  SC Res 2199, UN Doc S/RES/2199 (12 February 2015) (emphasis added). The resolution 
condemns all forms of trade with terrorist organisations and authorises its member states’ 
economic sanctions targeting such trade. At the time of writing this chapter, a Council 
resolution specifically authorising the use of force against ISIS is yet to be adopted, although 
Resolution 2249 calls upon the Council’s member states ‘that have the capacity to do so to 
take all necessary measures, in compliance with international law, . . . on the territory under 
the control of ISIL, . . . in Syria and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to prevent 
and suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL, . . . and to eradicate the safe haven 
they have established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria’: SC Res 2249, UN Doc 
S/RES/2249 (20 November 2015) (emphasis added). For the resolutions explicitly 
calling for a political solution to the Syrian crisis, see SC Res 2254, UN Doc S/RES/2254 
(18 December 2015); SC Res 2268, UN Doc S/RES/2268 (26 February 2016).
63  The likelihood of such further developments is precisely what, I presume, the LGBT 
organisations involved in the dealings with the Security Council rely upon: the likelihood 
that, as I hope to demonstrate here, does not come without its own costs. 
88  Vanja Hamzi
primarily in Iraq and Syria, its most-evident physical ‘strongholds’) and 
extraterritorial (with its claim to a global – both ‘real’ and ‘virtual’ – caliphate),64 
coupled with most extreme forms of violence, ISIS’s ‘personality’ in international 
law is perhaps closest to that of the hostis humani generis, otherwise reserved 
for pirates and certain rogue states, such as Nazi Germany during the Second 
World War.65 The crimes of ISIS in Syria and Iraq cannot be referred to the 
International Criminal Court by those states, as they have not ratified the Rome 
Statute.66 But the Security Council could vote a referral of both of these states, 
rather than ISIS specifically (as a non-state actor), to the International Criminal 
Court, as it did with Libya in 2011.67 However, the likelihood of that happening 
is slim. Since the Rome Statute is ‘designed to prevent one-sided referrals’,68 a 
referral would open the Syrian regime to prosecution, possibly along with all 
Syrian rebel formations. This would hardly be welcomed by Russia and China – 
two of the Council’s permanent members – given their support of the Assad 
regime. As for Iraq, its government and the various paramilitary formations would 
also find themselves prosecutable, something the remaining three permanent 
member states in the Security Council could find troublesome.69
With the deadlock in the Security Council yet again resembling the ‘old’ Cold 
War fault lines, what little remains other than literal violence of war is to resort to 
the equally déjà-vu rhetoric of ‘compassion’ and ‘peace-building’ in international 
relations and law. It is this role that the Council has most readily embraced, even 
if it involves, at times, ‘sensitive’ issues such as the situation of sexually diverse and 
gender-variant people in Muslim-majority states. There is, however, nothing 
64  A case in point is ISIS’s investment in the production of both material and phantasmagorical 
presence in the world. For an analysis of ISIS’s ‘Cyber Caliphate’ division, the declaration of 
its ‘cyber war’ on the United States and its own rip-off video game as important elements 
of its global warfare, see generally Atwan, above n 17.
65  The regulation of piracy was the original ‘trigger’ of the recognition that individuals had 
‘personality’ in international law. Pirates, however, were of necessity ‘rogue’ and beyond 
the reach of a single state, and as such the (conceptual) precursors to war criminals and 
international terrorists. All of them came to be characterised as a hostis humani generis; see 
Simpson, above n 9, 162. The ‘pirate’ or ‘rogue’ state, defying the mores of international 
relations, inherited this status.
66  The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted on 17 July 1998, provides 
for the Court’s direct jurisdiction over the states that have ratified this treaty. States that are 
party to the Rome Statute, however, could prosecute their own nationals for international 
terrorist activities and war crimes committed in Syria and Iraq, or they could refer them to 
the International Criminal Court, since the Court has personal jurisdiction over them. Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature 17 July 1998, 2187 UNTS 
90 (entered into force 1 July 2002).
67  SC Res 1970, UN Doc S/RES/1970 (26 February 2011). 
68  Kevin Jon Heller, ‘John Bellinger’s Op-Ed on ISIS and the ICC (Updated)’, Opinio Juris 
(2 April 2015) <http://opiniojuris.org/2015/04/02/john-bellingers-curious-op-ed-on- 
isis-and-the-icc/>. 
69  ‘[N]ot least because it would provide the ICC with a backdoor to prosecuting their nationals 
for aiding and abetting rebel crimes’: ibid (emphasis altered).
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‘historic’ in its Arria-Formula meeting on ISIS and ‘LGBT Syrians and Iraqis’. 
The meeting conferred only a ‘contextual’ (victim-based) recognition upon such 
individuals – violating, at the same time, their right to belong to, or devise for 
themselves, any other categories of personhood.70 In doing so, it made the lives 
of ‘LGBT Syrians and Iraqis’ temporarily grievable,71 albeit only inasmuch as this 
designation could serve a ‘higher’ legal and moral purpose – the putative ‘robust’ 
protection of ‘civility’ and ‘humanity’ as ‘we’ know them, that is, as they are 
known and protected in international law and as they are to be recognised and 
protected in the global war on ISIS. That a world law should be protected by a 
world war against a world enemy is, of course, not a coincidence; it is the very 
nature of international law as violence, the very nature of ‘consensus-building’ 
involved in the difficult task of embedding ISIS into the politically polarised 
system of international crimes and punishments. Since the juridification of 
ISIS cannot be achieved without unravelling the threads of international power 
relations – the relations in which international law as violence remains deeply 
invested – the violence of ISIS, as opposed to the violence of states or other 
non-state combatants, has to be made special: it has to be recognised as not just 
malum prohibitum (‘evil [as or because] prohibited’) but malum in se (‘evil in 
itself ’). As with the other hostes humani generis, ISIS as ‘evil incarnate’ invites 
international law to intervene with extreme violence, to kill in order to let live. 
This is the law as morality as violence, the law of the peremptory norm, or indeed 
a commandment, that there is something ‘divine’, or perhaps ‘natural’ (as an 
existential imperative), in exterminating the enemy.72
But constructing a ‘personality’ of an archetypal evil requires that an equally 
exemplary good be summoned, too. It is only in the opposites of these legal and 
moral actants par excellence that violence as law (rather than law as violence), or 
perhaps violence as the Law, could ever hope to be cleansed (‘justified’).73 The 
70  There is an abundance of literature on the (epistemic) violence involved in the deployments 
– however ‘strategic’ – of the acronym ‘LGBT’ as a catch-all identitary episteme for sexually 
diverse and gender-variant human subjectivities across cultures, societies, geographies and 
times. For my own take on the matter, see Vanja Hamzi , ‘Unlearning Human Rights 
and False Grand Dichotomies: Indonesian Archipelagic Selves beyond Sexual/Gender 
Universality’ (2012) 4(1) Jindal Global Law Review 157. 
71  Cf the ‘metrics of grievability’ in Butler, ‘Mourning Becomes the Law’, above n 44. Butler’s 
critique centres on the differential metrics of grievability that render some lives less grievable 
than others. My contention is that this differentiation also has a temporal effect; the lives less 
grievable are also grieved for a shorter period of time. 
72  It should, then, come as no surprise that the early ideas on how to establish a global legal and 
political system of ‘collective security’ came from the notorious Cardinal Richelieu of France 
in 1629 and were partially reflected in the 1648 Peace of Westphalia; see Andreas Osiander, 
The States System of Europe 1640–1990: Peacemaking and the Conditions of International 
Stability (Oxford University Press, 1994) 40–3. The ‘divine’ violence of the law as morality 
as violence should not be confused with Benjamin’s ‘divine’ violence of the oppressed. 
73  In order for law to ‘accommodate and control violence without becoming a captive of its own 
violent instincts’; Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns, ‘Making Peace with Violence: Robert 
Cover on Law and Legal Theory’ in Austin Sarat and Thomas R Kearns (eds), Law’s Violence 
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Council’s beckoning towards ‘LGBT Syrians and Iraqis’ and other ‘personalities’ 
(women and girls, Christians and Yazidis, Kurds and Turkmens) was no doubt an 
effort to conjure up the good from across the political divide in order to make the 
evil of ISIS more palpable, more personal, more punishable. The good are 
summoned so that evil can be eradicated, so that the violence of such eradication 
can be done in the name of the good. The LGBT organisations and individuals 
involved in this purification ritual of international law should be aware of the 
circumstances in which their temporary, contingent and informal ‘recognition’ 
before the Security Council had become possible.
I have argued elsewhere74 for alegality as an exploratory site of other-than-legal 
life-worlds, through which the ideological dyad of legal/illegal could be effectively 
challenged. It is perhaps in the same fashion that the problem of law as violence 
could be productively approached. The events such as the Security Council’s 
Arria-Formula meeting of 24 August 2015 are not ordinary inasmuch as they 
signal the increasing need on the part of international law to justify its operations 
in absolute terms, as the battle between good and evil. As ever, the language of 
the apocalypse is the language of crisis and the crisis currently befalling international 
law might be quite existential in nature. It is the crisis of violence spilling 
everywhere, of violence that no longer seems containable even by most violent 
acts of law. In it, it is becoming abundantly clear to law’s various subjects that law 
is just violence, too.
Could such realisation lead to an alegal space for critique and contemplation 
amid the warring world? Could such a space survive, as Žižek and Butler had 
hoped,75 the mindless accusations of being seemingly inert, cowardly and 
dispassionate in a time of global crises, each more ominous than the last? If law is 
abandoned, even if only theoretically, as the repository of people’s identities and 
hopes that, in turn, constitute law’s subjects, it should be possible to imagine and 
be in touch with the self and the ‘you’ in the human who do not conform to the 
dominant subjectivities and subjects of international law and legal-cum-military 
interventions – the constraints of the LGBT identitary matrix being a case in 
point. Such alegal selves corresponding to alegal others – thus living (in) the void 
of law – could lead to novel experiences and interpretations of the absence of law’s 
violence. This would require an inverse logic in our approach to the problem 
of violence: a logic that no longer summons law’s violence to tame excessive 
forms of violence in the world, but seeks, instead, to abandon law’s violence (and, 
with it, the law as such) first and foremost in our search for a less violent future.
(University of Michigan Press, 1995) 211, 213. The authors conclude, and I concur, that 
such purification cannot succeed – that law is of necessity ‘jurispathic’.
74  Vanja Hamzi , ‘Alegality: Outside and beyond the Legal Logic of Late Capitalism’ in Honor 
Brabazon (ed), Neoliberal Legality: Understanding the Role of Law in the Neoliberal Project 
(Routledge, 2016) 192.
75  Cf Žižek, above n 26, 179–83; Butler, ‘Mourning Becomes the Law’, above n 44.
5 The maintenance of 
international peace and 
security heteronormativity
Tamsin Phillipa Paige*
We are not your kind of people.
Speak a different language, we see through your lies.
We are not your kind of people.
Won’t be cast as demons, creatures you despise.1
Violence is a peculiar thing; it intrigues some people, horrifies others, and yet 
others just become numb to it from too much exposure. At an international level, 
the UN Security Council is gatekeeper to the use of lawful and legitimate violence 
under its mandate to maintain international peace and security. Under Chapter 
VII of the UN Charter, the Council has the power to authorise the lawful use 
of force by states in response to a finding under article 39 of a ‘threat to the peace’, 
‘breach of the peace’ or an ‘act of aggression’. It also has the capacity to levy 
sanctions and other similarly coercive measures through this power. Such 
authorisations, along with the right to self-defence, are the only exceptions to the 
prohibition of the use of force explicitly recognised by the UN Charter. More 
recently, in the context of the Council’s gender mainstreaming efforts through its 
‘Women, Peace and Security’ agenda, the United Kingdom has suggested that 
systematic sexual violence, when employed as a tactic of war, should be considered 
a threat to the peace within the meaning of article 39, leading to authorisations 
of violence to combat the phenomena. However, the six resolutions adopted on 
the matter tell us that sexual violence as a ‘tactic of war’ does not constitute a 
threat to the peace, but they do not tell us why not.2 In this chapter, my goal is 
to explore why the Permanent Five members of the Security Council (P5) have 
*  This chapter was written during my time as a Visiting Researcher with Nottingham International 
Law and Security Centre and as a Visiting Scholar at Columbia Law School (as an Endeavour 
Scholarship recipient).
1  Garbage (American-Scottish alternative rock band), ‘Not Your Kind of People’, released 
14 May 2012.
2  SC Res 1820, UN Doc S/RES/1820 (19 June 2008) (‘Resolution 1820’); SC Res 1882, UN 
Doc S/RES/1882 (4 August 2009); SC Res 1888, UN Doc S/RES/1888 (30 September 
2009) (‘Resolution 1888’); SC Res 1960, UN Doc S/RES/1960 (16 December 2010) 
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taken this position.3 I will examine the justificatory discourse of the P5 found in 
public statements they have made about sexual violence in Council meetings.4 
I will not be conducting an examination of the resolutions themselves, as this has 
already been aptly done by others.5 Rather, my analysis will study official statements 
made by each of the P5 in the course of adopting those resolutions. Before we 
proceed, it is worth noting that when considering the existence of a threat to the 
peace it has been well established that the Security Council possesses a discretion 
fettered only by the limits of jus cogens norms and the purposes and principles set 
out in Chapter I of the UN Charter.6 Inger Österdahl offers a succinct description 
of the limits faced by the Council: ‘Put in simple terms, the Security Council may 
basically decide or do anything it wishes and it will remain within the limits of the 
legal framework for its action.’7
As a queer woman, I am no stranger to violence. I have experienced it personally 
and witnessed it done to others; both physical violence and other, subtler forms 
of violence.8 My interest in the conditions under which violence, particularly 
(‘Resolution 1960’); SC Res 2106, UN Doc S/RES/2106 (24 June 2013); SC Res 2272, 
UN Doc S/RES/2272 (11 March 2016).
3  The focus on the P5 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) rather 
than all members of the Security Council is done for two reasons. First, the time periods 
involved in the study mean that there is no consistency in the rotating members and thus their 
positions are relatively unhelpful. Second, the ability of the P5 to veto a resolution makes them 
somewhat more equal than others in the context of the Security Council, regardless of the 
myth of sovereign equality. Should all of the P5 agree on a resolution then it is most likely to 
pass.
4  By ‘justificatory discourse’ I mean the public statements made by a state in relation to how 
they justify their position on any given issue. See Ian Johnstone, ‘Security Council Deliberations: 
The Power of the Better Argument’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 437.
5  See, eg, Karen Engle, ‘The Grip of Sexual Violence: Reading UN Security Council Resolutions 
on Human Security’ in Gina Heathcote and Dianne Otto (eds), Rethinking Peacekeeping, 
Gender Equality and Collective Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 23; Gina Heathcote, 
‘Naming and Shaming: Human Rights Accountability in Security Council Resolution 1960 
(2010) on Women, Peace and Security’ (2012) 4 Journal of Human Rights Practice 82; Dianne 
Otto, ‘Power and Danger: Feminist Engagement with International Law through the UN 
Security Council’ (2010) 32 Australian Feminist Law Journal 99.
6  Note by the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR, UN Doc S/23500 (31 January 
1992); Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic a/k/a ‘Dule’ (Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals 
Chamber 29, 2 October 1995); Prosecutor v Joseph Kanyabashi (Decision on the Defence Motion 
on Jurisdiction) (International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 29, Trial Chamber II, Case No 
ICTR-96-15-T, 18 June 1997); Daniel Pickard, ‘When Does Crime Become a Threat to 
International Peace and Security?’ (1998) 12 Florida Journal of International Law 1, 19–20.
7  Inger Österdahl, Threat to the Peace: The Interpretation by the Security Council of Article 39 of 
the UN Charter (Iustus, 1998) 98.
8  My most vivid memory of violence is not physical but verbal. When someone I had known my 
whole life found out I was queer they informed me that I was an abomination and a threat to 
the safety and wellbeing of all people, especially children. I was told this while their children 
were being looked after by someone who I knew to be a child sex offender. The absurdity of 
this incident is still not lost on me.
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in the form of armed force, might be formally authorised comes from these 
experiences. I personally think the anticipation of impending violence is worse 
than the experience of violence itself, but that may not be the case for everyone. 
With my interest in the issue acknowledged, I begin by examining the justificatory 
discourse of the P5 on the relationship between sexual violence in war and the 
finding of a threat to the peace. I then discuss how the choice of language largely 
excludes all forms of sexual violence outside of a heteronormative, male 
perpetrator/female victim framework and explain why this is problematic, in 
spite of the good work being done to address sexual violence.9 Although the 
question of whether sexual violence as a tactic of war could be considered a threat 
to the peace was a relatively settled matter by the end of 2010, the debate 
regarding the Security Council’s involvement in combating wartime sexual 
violence has continued. Therefore, statements made at meetings since 2010 
continue to provide insight into the heteronormative discourse of the P5 and will 
also be discussed.
P5 discussions of sexual violence as a ‘tactic of war’ and/or 
‘threat to the peace’
The topic of sexual violence as a tactic of war has received significant attention 
from the Security Council during the last decade, with official reports and meeting 
transcripts on this issue generating around 1,000 pages of text between 2008 and 
June 2016. There was pressure from a number of states for the Council to take 
action in relation to article 39 by recognising that the use of widespread and 
systematic sexual violence as a tool of war could constitute a threat to the peace. 
However, all six of the relevant resolutions were made under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter,10 which means they did not rely on an article 39 determination. 
Instead, the resolutions expressed concern about sexual violence as a tactic of 
war. In order to discover the diversity of positions taken by the P5 on the 
relationship between sexual violence as a tactic of war and as a threat to the peace, 
we must look beyond the resolutions. From 2008 to 2011, there was significant 
discussion of the relationship of sexual violence as a tactic of war and the concept 
of threat to the peace in the Security Council’s debates on Women, Peace and 
Security.11 Some of the debates in this time period relating to Children and Armed 
 9  The use of heteronormative language also serves to contribute to, and perpetuate, unhelpful 
and limiting gender stereotypes. See, eg, Heathcote, above n 5, 99–100; Dianne Otto, 
‘Queering Gender [Identity] in International Law’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal of Human 
Rights 299.
10  Resolution 1820, S/RES/1820; SC Res 1882, S/RES/1882 (2009); Resolution 1888, 
S/RES/1888; Resolution 1960, S/RES/1960; SC Res 2106, S/RES/2106 (2013); SC Res 
2272, S/RES/2272 (2016).
11  Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 16th Supplement 2008–2009 Part VII: 
Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression 
(Chapter VII of the Charter), 454–5; Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 
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Conflict also addressed this issue.12 Between 2008 and 2010, the Secretary-
General’s reports on the issue of sexual violence as a tactic of war provided details 
of its occurrence in ten non-international armed conflicts already on the Council’s 
agenda,13 and in an additional three conflict settings.14 Further, the Secretary-
General recommended that the Council find this issue to be a threat to the peace,15 
highlighting the importance placed upon the issue by the UN Secretariat, which 
is responsible for most of the Security Council’s fact-finding. That some 
members of the P5 ignored this recommendation also highlights the Secretariat’s 
limited ability to influence Council decisions and outcomes. I turn now to a brief 
discussion of the context of the Security Council debates about the problem of 
sexual violence in war before examining the positions taken by each of the P5 on 
the question of whether it could constitute a threat to the peace.
Context of the debates
The issue of sexual violence as a tactic of war was first raised at the Security 
Council by the United Kingdom,16 following a conference jointly organised by 
the UN Development Fund for Women (now known as UN Women), the UN 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the UK government. The conference 
was aimed at ‘the prevention of widespread and systematic sexual violence in 
conflict and post-conflict contexts’.17 The Security Council debate this prompted 
led eventually to the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1820,18 the first Security 
Council resolution focused solely on the issue of sexual violence as a tactic of war, 
and the second of its Women, Peace and Security resolutions. Resolution 1820 
included a provision requiring the Secretary-General to monitor data relating to 
occurrences of wartime sexual violence and report to the Security Council on 
17th Supplement 2010–2011 Part VII: Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of 
the Peace, and Acts of Aggression (Chapter VII of the Charter), 27–9.
12  SC 6114th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6114 (29 April 2009); SC 6114th Mtg, UN Doc S/
PV.6114 (Resumption 1) (29 April 2009).
13  These conflicts were Afghanistan, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Somalia and Sudan. UN Secretary-General, 
Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, UN GAOR, 63rd sess, 
Agenda Item 60 (a), UN Doc A/63/785-S/2009/158 (26 March 2009) 17, 22, 24–6, 33, 
36–7, 44–5, 55, 57, 66, 97, 104 (‘Children and Armed Conflict’).
14  These conflicts were Colombia, the Philippines and Uganda. Ibid 117, 126, 143.
15  UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1820, UN SCOR, UN Doc S/2009/362 (20 August 2009) [56] (‘SG 
Report Resolution 1820’).
16  Karen Pierce, Letter Dated 16 June 2008 from the Charge D’affaires A.I. of the Permanent 
Mission of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island to the United 
Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council, UN SCOR, UN Doc 
S/2008/402 (18 June 2008).
17  Ibid 2.
18  Resolution 1820, S/RES/1820; SC 5916th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.5916 (Resumption 1) 
(19 June 2008) 40.
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progress of implementation of the Resolution.19 The Resolution also called for, 
inter alia, an immediate cessation of the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war, 
parties to conflicts to take immediate steps to prevent its use and the Secretary-
General to implement effective training for peacekeeping forces to prevent and 
respond to wartime sexual violence.20 Soon after, the Secretary-General’s 2008 
annual report on Women and Peace and Security characterised sexual violence as 
a tactic of war and a systematic security concern that needed to be addressed.21 
The report emphasised the urgent need to prevent sexual violence in war,22 but 
did not include a recommendation in relation to Chapter VII.
The problem of wartime sexual violence was also highlighted in the Secretary-
General’s 2009 annual report on Children in Armed Conflict.23 While the report 
generally addressed issues surrounding the involvement of children in armed 
conflicts, it identified the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war in numerous 
ongoing conflicts.24 The report also contained a section addressing issues of sexual 
violence in war as experienced by children, focusing on the particular vulnerability 
of children and the widespread under-reporting of sexual violence being perpe-
trated against children in armed conflict situations,25 but it did not characterise 
the problem as a threat to the peace.
In 2009, the Secretary-General presented his first report pursuant to the 
implementation of Resolution 1820. The report made for difficult reading. It 
noted, inter alia, the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war in conjunction 
with genocide and ethnic cleansings,26 the inadequacy of municipal law in states 
where wartime sexual violence is occurring and how this compounds impunity 
issues,27 how the majority of amnesties in conjunction with peace negotiations 
undermine efforts to combat impunity,28 the inadequacy of support systems for 
survivors of wartime sexual violence29 and that sexual violence is a tactic used by 
both state and non-state actors in conflict.30 Most importantly, for present 
purposes, the Secretary-General urged the Security Council to address the issue 
under Chapter VII as a threat to the peace.31 While no specific recommendations 
19  Resolution 1820, S/RES/1820 [15].
20  Ibid [2]–[3], [6]–[7], [9].
21  UN Secretary-General, Women and Peace and Security: Report of the Secretary-General, UN 
SCOR, UN Doc S/2008/622 (25 September 2008) [5]–[7].
22  Ibid [96]–[97].
23  Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc A/63/785-S/2009/158.
24  The specific conflicts are detailed at above nn 13, 14.
25  Ibid 154–60; for a definition of children in the context of armed conflict see article 38 of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 
UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).
26  SG Report Resolution 1820, UN Doc S/2009/362, [15] –[16].
27  Ibid [23].
28  Ibid [28].
29  Ibid [30].
30  Ibid [45].
31  Ibid [56].
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were made about what sort of enforcement measures the Council should employ, 
it is clear that resolutions made under Chapter VII would be legally binding on 
all states – in contrast to the current non-binding Chapter VI resolutions. This 
would open the door to a wide range of sanctions and the possibility of the 
Security Council authorising the use of force in conflicts where sexual violence is 
used as a military tactic.
The 6302nd Security Council Meeting in April 2010 included oral briefings 
from the recently appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Sexual Violence in Conflict,32 Margot Wallström, who highlighted that:
From the Trojan War to the nuclear age, rape has existed in symbiotic relation- 
ship with armed conflict. And yet, it is a relationship we are just beginning to 
understand. History has perpetuated the ancient myth of ‘arms and the 
man’, prioritizing the plight of soldiers on the front lines while relegating 
women to the sidelines.33
She also noted, ‘our approach to rape in places where peace and order prevail no 
more equips us to address systematic rape as a war strategy than our approach 
to murder prepares us for genocide. . . . [T]he crimes are incomparable’.34 In the 
oral briefings related to the passing of Resolution 1960, the third resolution on 
sexual violence, the Secretary-General noted, ‘[s]exual violence is one of the only 
crimes where the victims – and not the perpetrators – are left with stigma’,35 and 
‘[h]istorically, sexual violence by soldiers was prosecuted with a view to restoring 
military discipline, rather than upholding women’s rights’.36 Notably, both the 
Secretary-General and Wallström present wartime sexual violence in hetero- 
normative terms. They characterise all perpetrators as male direct participants to 
hostilities, and all victims as female civilians, even though, by their own evidence, 
wartime sexual violence occurs more broadly.37 That the dynamic of male belliger-
ent perpetrator/female civilian victim is the most common form of sexual violence 
in war is not in dispute. However, what would it have cost them to use more 
inclusive language so that other victims of sexual violence would not be silenced 
and excluded, and the violence they have suffered further compounded?
While adopting Resolution 1960 extended the Secretary-General’s monitoring 
and reporting requirements, it also signalled the death knell for considerations of 
sexual violence being a threat to the peace.38 At this time it became abundantly 
clear that Russia would veto any attempt to have sexual violence as a tactic of 
32  This position was established in Resolution 1888, S/RES/1888 [4].
33  SC 6302nd Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6302 (27 April 2010) 2.
34  Ibid.
35  SC 6453rd Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6453 (16 December 2010) 3.
36  Ibid 5.
37  Children and Armed Conflict, UN Doc A/63/785-S/2009/158 [154]–[155].
38  For more details on the effect of Resolution 1960 see Heathcote, above n 5.
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war defined in this way.39 Pursuant to its Women, Peace and Security agenda, 
the Security Council has continued to debate its involvement in combating 
wartime sexual violence and the issue was also discussed in one meeting of the 
‘Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict’ thematic agenda.40 Yet it was not until 
June 2013 that the presumption of male belligerent perpetrator/female civilian 
victim was broken. In the 6948th Security Council Meeting in April 2013, 
Zaninab Bangura, who had replaced Wallström as the Special Representative, 
noted that for over 20 years the United Nations has had evidence of widespread 
and systematic rape of women, girls and men as a tactic of war.41 At the same time, 
Bangura observed, appropriately, that the vast majority of instances fit the dynamic 
of male perpetrator/female victim.42 However, five years after adopting the first 
Council resolution devoted to addressing sexual violence, the inclusion of men as 
potential victims was an important step to more inclusive language and policies 
that will diminish the number of silenced victims and work against impunity for 
perpetrators.
The use of more inclusive language by the Secretary-General and other 
individuals briefing the Security Council has continued since then. In the 7160th 
Meeting, the Secretary-General noted that wartime sexual violence affected 
all facets of society, ‘women and men, girls and boys’.43 Similarly, when Helen 
Durham briefed the Council on behalf of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross in relation to the protection of civilians in armed conflict, she noted that 
‘[w]hile also affecting men and boys during armed conflict, the impact of sexual 
violence on women and girls is disproportionately greater’.44 Her statement makes 
it clear that women and girls are most often the victims, yet does not exclude the 
recognition that victims may also include men and boys. The use of this type of 
inclusive language is evident in all following briefings to the Security Council.45 
Yet there continues to be silence about the particular vulnerabilities of those in 
the LGBTIQA community who express non-stereotypical queer gender and 
sexual identities.
The justificatory discourse of the P5
The justificatory discourse of the P5 regarding the relationship between sexual 
violence as a tactic of war and the concept of threat to the peace ranged from: 
insistence that sexual violence as a tactic of war in and of itself constitutes a threat 
39  See below for Russian meeting statements on sexual violence in armed conflict.
40  SC 7374th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.7374 (30 January 2015).
41  SC 6984th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6984 (24 June 2013) 4.
42  Ibid.
43  SC 7160th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.7160 (25 April 2014) 2.
44  SC 7374th Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 5.
45  SC 7428th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.7428 (15 April 2015) 2–5; SC 7704th Mtg, UN Doc 
S/PV.7704 (2 June 2016) 2–5.
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to the peace46 by the United Kingdom, implied support for the notion by France, 
non-commitment by the United States, and disagreement by Russia and China, 
albeit for different reasons. While the position of each of the P5 differed on 
the relationship between sexual violence as a tactic of war and the finding of a 
threat to the peace, the justificatory discourse used to substantiate and articulate 
their positions focused on two main issues. The arguments centred, first, on the 
relationship between violence against women in armed conflict and the Security 
Council’s mandate to maintain international peace and security and, second, 
on the Council’s role in women’s equality politics generally. Further, all of the P5 
used heteronormative language to articulate their position, which has only recently 
begun to see some change.
The United Kingdom made its position on this issue clear from the outset. In 
the debates preceding adoption of the first sexual violence resolution, Resolution 
1820, the United Kingdom stated that ‘widespread and systematic sexual violence 
can pose a threat to international peace and security’,47 and acts of sexual 
violence as a warfare tactic are ‘such unacceptable abuses that [they] threaten 
international peace and security’.48 Beyond this they countered the argument that 
conflict-related sexual violence has always existed and therefore does not warrant 
an extension to the understanding of threat to the peace:
But some, of course, will say, what is new about this? After all, it is true that 
rape and sexual violence have been associated with conflict before records 
began to be kept. Three things have changed. First, sexual violence is 
now being used as a tool of warfare, rather than it being just a tragic by-product 
of conflict, and it is taking place on a much larger scale than we have seen 
before. Secondly, we now better understand how sexual violence damages the 
prospects of postconflict recovery. And, thirdly and perhaps most important, 
we have the means to tackle this problem within our reach.49
They argued that the Security Council needed to take a leadership role by 
proposing practical measures that can be taken by all parties to armed conflict to 
prevent such tactics and to ensure those who commit sexual violence in conflict 
are ‘brought to justice’.50
The United Kingdom made it clear that sexual violence in armed conflict was 
not simply a women’s equality issue, but an issue of international peace and 
46  While the positions of the P5 regarding threat to the peace varied greatly, all states 
supported Security Council action on this issue generally; see Resolution 1820, S/RES/1820; 
SC Res 1882, S/RES/1882 (2009); Resolution 1888, S/RES/1888; Resolution 1960, 
S/RES/1960; SC Res 2106, S/RES/2106 (2013); SC Res 2272, S/RES/2272 (2016).
47  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 14.
48  SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 10–11.
49  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 14.
50  Ibid 15.
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security.51 They suggested a number of strategies. First, sexual violence monitoring 
and reporting mechanisms needed to be expanded to include children (with no 
mention of gender) in addition to women.52 Second, that ‘[i]f we are serious about 
preventing and resolving conflict, then we need to be serious about addressing 
conflict-related sexual violence’.53 The key to ending sexual violence as a tactic of 
war in the long term was to establish and develop the rule of law in areas of war 
and post-conflict recovery,54 and to end impunity for perpetrators.55 The United 
Kingdom’s commitment to action was reiterated: ‘this requires more than just 
warm words; it requires meaningful actions that will ultimately make a difference 
to the situation of women on the ground’.56
In advocating for a finding of threat to the peace in relation to sexual violence, 
the United Kingdom’s arguments were unremittingly heteronormative. That the 
alternative to classification as a threat to the peace was to classify the problem as 
solely a women’s issue, illustrates their heteronormative assumptions and also 
explains their decision to debate wartime sexual violence as a part of the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda. The issue is thereby narrowed by focusing solely on 
the most affected group, and the opportunity for all victims to be represented is 
lost. Even if this focus was a strategic decision, made to garner support for a 
finding of threat to the peace in relation to sexual violence as a tactic of war, it 
undermines the United Kingdom’s calls for ending impunity. That use of inclusive 
language would not have undermined their position on threat to the peace can 
be seen in the post-2010 statements by the United Kingdom. After the question 
of whether sexual violence could constitute a ‘threat to the peace’ had been settled 
in 2010, the United Kingdom began to speak about wartime sexual violence in 
broader terms than simply female civilian victims, often using gender-inclusive 
language. In the 6722nd Security Council Meeting in February 2012, they urged 
an end to impunity for ‘conflict-related sexual violence against women, men, girls, 
and boys’.57 Later in the 7374th Meeting, in January 2015, they called for special 
provisions in humanitarian programming ‘for vulnerable populations, such as 
the young, the disabled, the elderly and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex communities’,58 while also acknowledging that female civilians are the 
largest group impacted by wartime sexual violence.59
France’s position on the issue of sexual violence in armed conflict was clear in 
their opening statement in the debates preceding the adoption of Resolution 1820: 
51  SC 6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 7.
52  SC 6114th Mtg, S/PV.6114 (2009) 28.
53  SC 6180th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6180 (7 August 2009) 23.
54  Ibid.
55  SC 6114th Mtg, S/PV.6114 (2009) 28; SC 6195th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6195 (30 September 
2009) 8; SC 6411th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6411 (26 October 2010) 23–4. 
56  SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 24.
57  SC 6722nd Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6722 (23 February 2012) 16.
58  SC 7374th Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 8.
59  Ibid.
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‘The history of men has long been the history of their violence. In that intermarriage 
of blood and history, the war of men has all too often also been the story of 
violence against women.’60 The French continued to treat violence against women 
during war as a security issue, through the following debates. When discussing 
whether or not the Security Council should act specifically on sexual violence as a 
tactic of war, they argued that it should:
Doubts have at times been raised: should a debate on the issue of sexual 
violence in armed conflict be included on the agenda of the Security Council, 
which debates issues of peace and war? For France, that debate has been 
decided. One cannot establish peace by remaining silent on the subject of 
rape and violence done to women.61
However, France only implied its support for the notion that wartime sexual 
violence could be the basis of a finding of a threat to the peace under article 39, 
through its statement of full support for the Secretary-General’s recommendations 
in his report pursuant to Resolution 1820 (discussed above), which included the 
Security Council taking Chapter VII action on this issue;62 support that was 
reiterated in April 2010.63 In both the Women, Peace and Security and Children 
and Armed Conflict thematic agendas, France argued the key to ending sexual 
violence as a tactic of war was to end impunity,64 proposing that the presence of 
sexual violence as a tactic of war be added to the criteria examined when the 
Council considers the imposition of sanctions under Chapter VII in response to 
a situation.65 Beyond ending impunity, they suggested ‘[f]ocus needs to be placed 
on the prevention of sexual violence, in particular to ensure that such violence 
does not become a systematic tactic of warfare’.66
Like the United Kingdom, in all these discussions about whether wartime 
sexual violence could constitute a threat to the peace, France spoke only in 
heteronormative terms, assuming female victims and male perpetrators. Following 
the rejection of a threat to the peace approach in 2010, France continued 
to adhere to a heteronormative framework in its focus on ending impunity, with 
only one exception.67 In the 7160th Meeting, France highlighted that ‘[w]omen, 
men and children are being sexually abused’, while also observing that women 
60  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 16.
61  Ibid.
62  SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 8.
63  SC 6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 15.
64  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 17; SC 6114th Mtg, S/PV.6114 (2009) 14; SC 6411th 
Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 20.
65  SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 13.
66  SC 6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 15.
67  SC 6722nd Mtg, S/PV.6722 (2012) 20–1; SC 6948th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6948 (17 April 
2013) 17–18; SC 6984th Mtg, S/PV.6984 (2013) 12; SC 7374th Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 
15; SC 7428th Mtg, S/PV.7428 (2015) 8–9.
The maintenance of heteronormativity  101
and girls are disproportionately impacted by sexual violence due to the risk of 
pregnancy.68
The US position has been clear and consistent. At the meeting discussing the 
adoption of Resolution 1820, they said ‘[w]hen women and girls are preyed upon 
and raped, the international community cannot be silent or inactive. It is our 
responsibility to be their advocates and their defenders.’69 Further, ‘[the US is] 
proud that today we can respond to that lingering question with a resounding 
“yes”. This world body now acknowledges that sexual violence in conflict zones 
is, indeed, a security concern’.70 Later in December 2010, the United States 
declared, ‘our shared responsibility for the maintenance of international peace 
and security includes a profound responsibility to safeguard the lives and security 
of women and girls, who make up at least half of humankind’.71 This clarity about 
the Security Council’s responsibility to address sexual violence in armed conflict 
as a security concern did not extend to the question of whether, when the issue 
was sufficiently grave, sexual violence would constitute a threat to the peace. 
At no point in the debates did the United States express a position on this 
question. Rather, they continued to use general language, for example, ‘the fight 
to end sexual violence has yet to be universally recognised as central to securing 
international peace and security’.72
In the view of the United States, sexual violence as a tactic of war is a security 
issue (but not necessarily a threat to the peace) and is accompanied by the 
argument that the way to end sexual violence is through ending impunity.73 
Further, they have characterised amnesties as a ‘troubling dynamic of men with 
guns forgiving other men with guns for crimes committed against women. If 
peace processes are to succeed and endure, they must avoid this pitfall’.74 The 
United States has also addressed the issue in more complex terms, as needing 
cultural and social change:
It is time for all of us to assume our responsibility to go beyond condemning 
this behaviour and take concrete steps to end it, to make it socially un- 
acceptable, to recognize that it is not cultural; it is criminal. And the more 
we say that, over and over and over again, the more we will change attitudes 
68  SC 7160th Mtg, S/PV.7160 (2014) 14–15.
69  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 4.
70  Ibid 3.
71  SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 25.
72  Ibid 24.
73  SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 4–5; SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 3; ‘[We are 
eager to work] to ensure a coordinated approach to addressing a series of critical issues, 
ending the cycle of impunity, helping national authorities strengthen the rule of law . . . 
providing assistance to victims and creating a framework to prevent emerging or recurring 
outbreaks of violence or to provide early warning if they cannot be staved off’: SC 6302nd 
Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 9; SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 25.
74  SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 5.
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and create peer pressure and the conditions for the elimination of this 
violation.75
Once the question of whether sexual violence as a tactic of war might constitute 
a threat to the peace was off the agenda, the language used by the United States 
became extremely broad and inclusive. While the focus remained on female 
civilians as victims, the language was often gender neutral or inclusive of other 
types of victims. The United States stated, for example, when discussing the pro-
tection of civilians in armed conflict, that war ‘does not discriminate on the basis 
of gender, [but] does disproportionately affect those who are marginalized, 
vulnerable or oppressed’.76 Finally, at the 7704th Meeting, on 2 June 2016, the 
United States stressed the need for improved documentation of violations 
‘against marginalized groups of victims, including women and girls, men and 
boys, ethnic and religious minorities; and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender 
and intersex individuals’.77 This inclusive language supports their goal of ending 
impunity for perpetrators by not silencing or excluding any victim category.
While Russia supported each of the six resolutions that dealt specifically 
with sexual violence as a tactic of war, taking the position that ‘in conflict as in 
peacetime, sexual violence is a detestable crime that requires condemnation and 
strict sanctioning’,78 this support was given under protest. Russia repeatedly 
argued that singling out one particular type of violence against women and 
children, in isolation from other threats they faced in armed conflict, ‘significantly 
reduces’79 efforts to provide protection, end poverty and the inequalities that lead 
to conflict, and address gender inequality,80 stating:
The United Nations should, as a priority, respond to systematic mass violence 
against women and children. Equal attention should be given to all categories 
of such violence in conflicts. Of serious concern are cases in which women 
and children are killed or injured, including as a result of the indiscriminate 
or excessive use of force.81
Further, they argued since other UN agencies were addressing issues of sexual 
violence, the Security Council’s role should be confined to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. Therefore, Council work on wartime sexual 
75  SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 4.
76  SC 7374th Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 16.
77  SC 7704th Mtg, S/PV.7704 (2016) 10.
78  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 26.
79  SC 6005th Mtg, UN Doc S/PV.6005 (29 October 2008) 15.
80  Ibid 14–15; SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 26; SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 
11; SC 6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 16; SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 28; 
SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 21.
81  SC 6005th Mtg, S/PV.6005 (2008) 15.
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violence would be a ‘hardly optimal’82 use of resources. They asked, ‘[s]hould we 
really turn a blind eye to other grievous crimes against civilians, including women 
and children? In that connection, the Secretary-General’s proposals [found in his 
report pursuant to Resolution 1820] merit careful study, perhaps in a broader 
context’.83 Russia argued repeatedly that to address the issue in isolation failed to 
take into account the totality of protection issues during armed conflict.84 It 
follows that Russia’s position all along was that sexual violence as a tactic of war 
does not constitute a threat to the peace.85
The only instance where Russia’s choice of language could perhaps be regarded 
as inclusive was in the 7374th Meeting in January 2015, when speaking on the 
topic of Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict in relation to sexual violence. 
In this instance, they stated, ‘[w]omen and girls, as well as other categories of 
civilians, continue to be victims of various forms of violence’.86 It is probably 
reading too much into this statement to treat it as an awkward attempt at inclusive 
language. Also, even though the subject matter of the debate was wartime sexual 
violence, Russia has consistently pointed out that sexual violence is only one of 
many horrors faced by civilians in conflict zones.87
The assumption of heteronormativity by Russia is hardly surprising. It reflects 
the hyper-masculine nationalist persona presented by the Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin. It is also not surprising given the institutionalised homophobia 
within Russia.88 Yet this heteronormativity and adherence to gender stereotypes 
is arguably of little consequence. Russian assertions that wartime sexual violence is 
a symptom rather than a cause of war, and thus lies outside the Security Council’s 
mandate, means their position has little impact upon the question of impunity and 
concerns about the silencing of certain victims, as all victims of wartime sexual 
violence are treated equally, in a sense, by being excluded from the mandate.
82  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 26.
83  SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 14.
84  Ibid; SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 11; SC 6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 16; 
SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 28; SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 21.
85  SC 6722nd Mtg, S/PV.6722 (2012) 15; SC 6948th Mtg, S/PV.6948 (2013) 20–1; SC 
6984th Mtg, S/PV.6984 (2013) 25–6; SC 7160th Mtg, S/PV.7160 (2014) 20–1; SC 
7374th Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 10; SC 7428th Mtg, S/PV.7428 (2015) 17; SC 7704th 
Mtg, S/PV.7704 (2016) 21–2.
86  SC 7374th Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 9.
87  SC 6984th Mtg, S/PV.6984 (2013) 25–6; SC 7160th Mtg, S/PV.7160 (2014) 21; SC 
7428th Mtg, S/PV.7428 (2015) 17.
88  See, eg, Human Rights Committee, Communication No 1932/2010, 106th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/106/D/1932/2010 (30 November 2012); Innokenty Grekov, ‘Russia’s Anti-
Gay Law, Spelled Out in Plain English’, Policy.Mic (8 August 2013) <http://mic.com/
articles/58649/russia-s-anti-gay-law-spelled-out-in-plain-english#.67nRdKqKP>; Nora 
Fitzgerald and Vladimir Ruvinsky, ‘The Fear of Being Gay in Russia: Putin’s State Has 
Allowed Violence against the Russian LGBT Community to Spike’, Politico Magazine 
(22 March 2015) <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/03/russia-putin- 
lgbt-violence-116202>.
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Finally, China has taken the view that sexual violence is deeply related to war 
and thus within the Security Council’s mandate for the maintenance of inter- 
national peace and security.89 At the first meeting on sexual violence, China 
acknowledged that ‘[i]n the many conflicts underway today, women continue to 
be the most direct victims, and violence against women remains an extremely 
grave concern’.90 They have also consistently pointed out that sexual violence 
within armed conflict constitutes a violation of international law and urged all 
parties to conflicts to ‘abide by international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law’.91 However, given their interrelatedness, they argued wartime 
sexual violence should not be dealt with as an independent issue,92 repeatedly 
stressing, ‘Governments bear the primary responsibility for protecting women in 
their respective countries.’93 In line with this view that sexual violence is a domes-
tic issue, China argued, like Russia, the ‘Security Council should focus on 
preventing and reducing instances of armed conflict, thereby decreasing the root 
causes of women’s suffering’.94
Beyond this, China’s position on violence against women was somewhat 
paradoxical. On the one hand, China welcomed ‘concepts such as gender equality, 
the empowerment of women and the prevention of and fight against sexual 
violence’,95 regularly condemning ‘all acts of violence against women in conflict 
situations, including sexual violence’.96 On the other hand, China argued, like 
Russia, that the role of the Security Council was to deal with threats to international 
peace and security, and other UN organs are responsible where such a threat does 
not exist,97 confirming that China does not see wartime sexual violence as a stand-
alone issue of international security. They also stated in October 2008 that: 
Unable to protect their personal security, women can hardly take an effective 
part in peace processes or political life. We attach great importance to 
this question . . . As the organ that bears the primary responsibility for the 
89  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 19; SC 6005th Mtg, S/PV.6005 (2008) 26.
90  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 19.
91  SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 14; See also SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 
19; SC 6114th Mtg, S/PV.6114 (2009) 17; SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 18.
92  SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 19; SC 6005th Mtg, S/PV.6005 (2008) 26.
93  SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 21; see also SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 
20; SC 6114th Mtg, S/PV.6114 (2009) 18; SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 14; SC 
6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 17; SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 29; SC 6453rd 
Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 18.
94  SC 6302nd Mtg, S/PV.6302 (2010) 17; See also SC 6005th Mtg, S/PV.6005 (2008) 26; 
SC 6114th Mtg, S/PV.6114 (2009) 17; SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 20–1; 
SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 29; SC 6453rd Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 18.
95  SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 20.
96  SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 14; see also SC 5916th Mtg, S/PV.5916 (2008) 19; 
SC 6180th Mtg, S/PV.6180 (2009) 20; SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 29; SC 6453rd 
Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 18.
97  SC 6195th Mtg, S/PV.6195 (2009) 14; SC 6411th Mtg, S/PV.6411 (2010) 30; SC 6453rd 
Mtg, S/PV.6453 (2010) 18.
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maintenance of international peace and security, the Security Council should 
step up its efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts so that the 
root causes of women’s suffering in war can be removed and their rights and 
interests protected to the greatest extent possible.98 
While China may attach great importance to the question of gender equality, 
other statements call this into question. By insinuating that women are incapable 
of protecting themselves, China demonstrates a stereotyped view of women as 
victims who lack agency, and therefore need to be protected, in a more overt way 
than any other P5 state. Rather than understanding that women suffer oppression, 
sexual violence and exclusion from civil society as a result of social structures that 
systematically privilege men, their approach naturalises these structures, which 
perpetuate gender equality. China’s heteronormative approach to wartime sexual 
violence continued through all the ensuing debates.99
Even though China’s approach is very similar to Russia’s, its impact was far 
more consequential for two reasons. First, Russia did not make direct statements 
of support for gender equality, whereas China made such statements frequently. 
By failing to translate this support into inclusive language and support for Security 
Council action that promotes gender equality, China’s position is hypocritical. 
The harm in this position is its dishonesty in offering words of hope to oppressed 
people only to have those hopes dashed by a failure to act on such words. Second, 
where Russia rejected the Council’s role without a specific argument regarding 
who was responsible for protecting victims, China made it clear that this was the 
domestic responsibility of victims’ states. The effect is to exclude and silence 
Chinese victims of wartime sexual violence from the international security agenda. 
While all of the P5 use language that reinforces oppressive and heteronormative 
gender stereotypes, China’s reliance on them was the most overt.
This section has laid bare the peculiar nature of violence. Here we have the same 
set of facts – widespread use of sexual violence in armed conflict, usually (but not 
always) targeting women – yet this violence elicits different responses from each 
P5 state, with the only common ground being the decision to frame those 
responses in a heteronormative manner. Russia and China declare it to be some-
body else’s problem – in Russia’s case there are other international organisations 
better able to address sexual violence which they see as a symptom of armed 
conflict, and for China it is the domestic responsibility of the states in question. 
For the United Kingdom, it is a Chapter VII Security Council issue, and France 
notionally supports the United Kingdom. The United States agrees it is a security 
issue, but has not committed itself to the use of Chapter VII. These varied 
98  SC 6005th Mtg, S/PV.6005 (2008) 26.
99  SC 6722nd Mtg, S/PV.6722 (2012) 23–4; SC 6948th Mtg, S/PV.6948 (2013) 11–12; SC 
6984th Mtg, S/PV.6984 (2013) 21; SC 7160th Mtg, S/PV.7160 (2014) 11–12; SC 7374th 
Mtg, S/PV.7374 (2015) 11; SC 7428th Mtg, S/PV.7428 (2015) 20–1; SC 7704th Mtg, 
S/PV.7704 (2016) 14–15.
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responses highlight the way in which language use impacts legal formation, inter-
pretation and application, the truly fascinating nature of violence, and most 
importantly, the difficulties with thinking of, analysing and addressing the Security 
Council as a unified entity.
As a researcher who works almost exclusively on security issues, and extensively 
on the Security Council, I am firmly of the belief that Russia is correct about the 
nature of the issue of wartime sexual violence and the role of the Council. The 
Security Council is not the most appropriate international body to address sexual 
violence as it is a symptom of armed conflict, and the Council would serve victims 
better by working to resolve the conflict and allowing more competent 
organisations to address sexual violence. That said, the Council would better serve 
the victims of sexual violence by acknowledging it occurs in a broader framework 
than male perpetrator and female victim.
The problem with exclusionary language choices
It is well established that sexual violence as a tactic of war occurs in a manner 
beyond the dichotomy of male perpetrators/female victims, as predominantly 
discussed by the Security Council. In the years preceding these debates, there were 
a number of public demonstrations that sexual violence as a wartime tactic is not 
restricted to male perpetrators and female victims. Of particular note was the 
torture and abuse of Abu Ghraib prisoners of war who were subjected to sexual 
violence during interrogations by the US military.100 The courts martial that took 
place as a result of these incidences,101 as well as public statements made by officers 
involved,102 demonstrated quite clearly that the sexual violence involved both male 
and female perpetrators, and male and female victims.103 The investigation into 
this incident noted that sexual violence, conducted in conjunction with other 
abuses, was ‘systematic’104 in nature, and resulted from a broader tactical decision 
relating to interrogation of detainees for military intelligence.105 Another widely 
publicised incident was the failure of Canadian Forces to stop sexual violence 
100  Antonio M Taguba, ‘Article 15-6 Investigation of the 800th Military Police Brigade’ 
(Oversight Report, No AR 15-6, US Military, 27 May 2004) 16–17.
101  Thom Shanker, ‘6 G.I.’s in Iraq Are Charged with Abuse of Prisoners’, New York Times 
(online) (21 March 2004) <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/21/international/
middleeast/21IRAQ.html>; Associated Press, ‘England Sentenced to 3 Years for Prison 
Abuse: Soldier Dishonorably Discharged for Abu Ghraib Scandal’, NBC News (online) 
(28 September 2005) <http://www.nbcnews.com/id/9492624/ns/us_news-crime_and_
courts/t/england-sentenced-years-prison-abuse/#.VJdMlF7AA>.
102  BBC Radio 4, ‘Iraq Abuse “Ordered from the Top”’, BBC News (online) (15 June 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/3806713.stm>.
103  Taguba, above n 100, 16–20.
104  Ibid 16.
105  Ibid 18–20.
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against boys in Afghanistan, committed by Afghan soldiers.106 The redacted 
executive summary of the Board of Inquiry report, released on 19 April 2016, 
clears the Canadian Forces of any wrongdoing,107 noting in particular that no 
ordering of Canadian Forces personnel to ignore sexual abuse committed by 
Afghan soldiers ever occurred.108
Despite strong evidence that sexual violence in war occurs outside of the 
framework of male perpetrators/female victims, the P5 have been unwilling to 
engage with the issue as a whole. By dealing almost exclusively with the most 
common type of wartime sexual violence, male belligerent perpetrator/female 
civilian victim, other forms of sexual violence have remained invisible, encouraging 
impunity for the perpetrators.109 It could be argued that this was because the issue 
was discussed as a part of the Women, Peace and Security agenda; however, this 
is unconvincing for two reasons. First, it was also discussed in relation to children 
in armed conflict with evidence demonstrating the issue affected both boys and 
girls. Second, the choice to place the debates within this setting was an active 
decision that encouraged exclusion, rather than accidental.
There are a number of ways in which the P5’s avoidance of discussing sexual 
violence in more inclusive ways might be explained. Acknowledging female 
perpetrators would undermine social and cultural constructions of women as 
innocents, inherently peaceful and incapable of committing such atrocities.110 
Where the sexual violence has a male victim, the reluctance can be explained by 
the prevalence of homophobia, which drives the belief that sexual violence 
feminises the victim and suggests they may be homosexual, rather than a victim 
of sexual violence.111 The failure to engage with sexual violence involving those 
who cannot be classified as cisgendered can be understood as a direct result of the 
invisibility of individuals who do not neatly fit into the normalised gender binary 
and the fear of undermining heteronormative social structures.112
106  Rick Westhead, ‘Don’t Look, Don’t Tell, Troops Told’, Toronto Star (online) (16 June 
2008) <https://www.thestar.com/news/2008/06/16/dont_look_dont_tell_troops_told.
html>; Rick Westhead, ‘Canadian Military Still Investigating Afghanistan Sex Assault 
Claim’, Toronto Star (online) (4 July 2013) <http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/ 
07/04/canadian_military_still_investigating_afghanistan_sex_assault_claim.html>.
107  National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces, Government of Canada, Board of Inquiry 
– Allegation of Assault of a Civilian by Afghan National Security Forces and the Canadian 
Forces Response to Such Incidents (2016) [1.30]–[1.44] <http://www.forces.gc.ca/en/
about-reports-pubs-boards-inquiry/ptsd-exec-summary.page#summary>.
108  Ibid [1.41].
109  Helen Durham and Katie O’Byrne, ‘The Dialogue of Difference: Gender Perspectives 
on International Humanitarian Law’ (2010) 92(877) International Review of the Red Cross 
31, 49.
110  Ibid 41–2.
111  Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Male/Male Rape and the “Taint” of Homosexuality’ (2005) 
27 Human Rights Quarterly 1274, 1290; Durham and O’Byrne, above n 109, 48.
112  Laura J Shepherd and Laura Sjoberg, ‘Trans- Bodies in/of War(s): Cisprivilege and 
Contemporary Security Strategy’ (2012) 101 Feminist Review 5, 11; Dianne Otto, 
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Further, the domestic audience of each of the P5 may be an influencing factor. 
In the Western democracies of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, 
governments rely upon women’s votes in election cycles, so there may be a fear 
that more inclusive language in relation to what many see as a ‘women’s issue’ 
could alienate this block and endanger re-election.113 For Russia, the failure to be 
more inclusive is clearly an extension of domestic institutionalised homophobia, 
where anti-gay laws and state violence against the LGBTIQA community is 
commonplace.114 China’s response may be accounted for by the continuing 
influence of Confucianism on Chinese law and society, particularly with regard to 
heteronormative gender roles and sexual morality.115
While these explanations may be true, they do not excuse the Security Council 
for perpetuating impunity in relation to sexual violence outside of a heteronormative 
framework. To engage in discussions of wartime sexual violence in a manner that 
addresses female perpetrators, male victims, and perpetrators and victims from the 
LGBTIQA community (in particular transgender people), in addition to the most 
common dynamic of male perpetrators/female victims, would help to end the 
impunity for sexual violence the P5 all profess to be concerned about. However, 
such a challenge to dominant heteronormative world views seems unlikely 
to happen any time soon, although hints of it can be seen in the more recent 
interventions by the United Kingdom and the United States. The Security Council 
is mandated to secure and maintain international peace and security. In choosing 
to use almost exclusively heteronormative language to debate an issue central to 
maintaining international peace and security, even if it does not warrant Chapter 
VII action, the Council has failed the world at large.
The analysis of the language used by the P5 when discussing the relationship 
between threat to the peace and sexual violence as a tactic of war reveals a number 
of things. First, it displays the wide variety of interpretations and focuses that are 
in play when discussing the issue of sexual violence which are not apparent when 
the resolutions are the only texts considered. Second, it reveals the policy decision 
of each of the P5 states to perpetuate gender binaries and the heteronormative 
stereotypes they rely upon. While this approach may have been successful in 
bringing the issue of wartime sexual violence to the foreground of international 
legal developments in the 1990s, the question for today is why this clearly 
‘Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading “Gender” in Counter-Terrorism Discourses’ 
(2013) 4(2) Jindal Global Law Review 79, 82.
113  For examples of some mainstream feminism having issues with inclusion, see generally Otto, 
‘Queering Gender’, above n 9, 306–9; Cleis Abeni, ‘Feminist Germaine Greer Goes on 
Anti-Trans Rant over Caitlyn Jenner’, Advocate (26 October 2015) <http://www.advocate.
com/caitlyn-jenner/2015/10/26/feminist-germaine-greer-goes-anti-trans-rant-over-
caitlyn-jenner>; Katie Ellis, ‘Destroy the Joint, Sure, but Feminism Must Include Disability 
Politics’, The Conversation (24 November 2014) <https://theconversation.com/
destroy-the-joint-sure-but-feminism-must-include-disability-politics-51119>.
114  See, eg, at above n 88.
115  See, eg, Teemu Ruskola, ‘Law, Sexual Morality, and Gender Equality in Qing and 
Communist China’ (1994) 103 Yale Law Journal 2531.
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exclusionary language continues to be used, despite not being supported by facts 
and despite its contribution to perpetuating impunity.
The evidence that the use of sexual violence as a tactic of war is more widespread 
than its most common form of male perpetrator/female victim is irrefutable and 
evidence to this effect was before the Security Council well before debating this 
issue. The possible reasons for their continued use of heteronormative language 
are ultimately not compelling. They serve only to legitimate cultures of impunity 
for sexual violence as a tactic of war, which can only create more harm in the long 
run. On the question of the relationship between sexual violence as a tactic of war 
and threats to the peace under Chapter VII, Russia makes the most compelling 
argument. Wartime sexual violence is one of many symptoms of war and for the 
Council to prioritise it as a Chapter VII trigger would distract from the many 
other devastating effects of war endured by civilians in conflict zones. Further, the 
Security Council can best combat wartime sexual violence by focusing on ending 
and preventing conflicts, just as the way to end violence against queer people is 
to change the structural inequalities, cultural beliefs and social practices that foster 
trans- and homo-phobia.
6 In spite
Testifying to sexual and  
gender-based violence during  
the Khmer Rouge period
Maria Elander*
On 23 August 2016, Sou Sotheavy appeared before the Extraordinary Chambers 
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) to give testimony. Before the bench, the parties 
and an auditorium filled with listeners, she spoke about her experience of being 
forced to marry during the Khmer Rouge regime. She told the Court how she had 
not known her spouse beforehand and how neither of them had been able to refuse 
the marriage. Sotheavy appeared as one of a handful of women and men to testify 
during the trial segment dedicated to the charge of the regulation of marriage as an 
‘other inhumane act’ of crimes against humanity in the massive Case 002 against the 
surviving leaders of the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK), colloquially known 
as the Khmer Rouge. While the testimony in itself is notable for the unusual charge 
of forced marriage as an international crime, Sotheavy’s appearance further 
challenged stereotypes of victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). As 
a transgender woman, her experience of the marriage was as a person identifying 
as a woman, but forced to live as a man and marry a woman. Later she explained, 
‘forced marriage [for heterosexual persons] implies pain alone. However, for 
homosexual people . . . it became an impossible thing’.1 
Testimonies are particular speech acts, a way of giving word to and bearing 
witness to an experience. Through testimony, experiences are given certain shape, 
guided by rituals, conventions and formal legal rules. Significantly, testimony 
requires someone who hears, someone who listens to the ‘creation of knowledge 
de novo’.2 If successful, testimony may turn an experience into knowledge, perhaps 
*  The research presented here stems in part from research conducted in Cambodia during 
June 2016, which was generously funded by the Faculty of Arts Special Studies Program Short 
at the University of Melbourne, ethics ID 1646468.1. I am also grateful to Khom Sakhan for 
translation and transcription, Amber Karanikolas for research assistance, the organisers and 
participants at the Feminist Experiences of Law Symposium in Melbourne where an earlier 
draft was presented, Dianne Otto for support and useful comments, and Sou Sotheavy for so 
generously sharing her story with me.
1  Interview with Sou Sotheavy (Phnom Penh, 4 June 2016).
2  Dori Laub, ‘Bearing Witness, or the Vicissitudes of Listening’ in Shoshana Felman and Dori 
Laub, Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis and History (Taylor & 
Francis, 2013) 57 (emphasis in original).
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register an experience in law and history.3 Testimonies occur at various places. 
Whether testimony can or should occur inside courtrooms has been fiercely 
debated.4 With its demand for narrow factual details, often subjected to cross-
examination, trial testimony in many ways runs counter to the workings of 
trauma. As a result, some have turned to alternative, non-judicial settings for 
the presentation of testimonies that can be given, listened to and registered 
without having to submit to legal evidentiary demands.5 Testimonies may be 
disruptive. They may resist and challenge dominant narratives and trigger breaks 
in the understandings of a certain event. As Kali Tal puts it, ‘bearing witness is an 
aggressive act . . . Its goal is change’.6 On this basis, testimonies about experiences 
of SGBV are often presented ‘in spite’: in spite of silencing, in spite of cultures of 
shame and stigma. Those listening are interpellated as part of breaking the silence. 
By listening, they are part of registering and recognising this experience of sexual 
and gender-based harm.
It is within this context of testimony, and the questions about place, silence 
and the listener, that I examine the presentation of SGBV testimonies during the 
Khmer Rouge regime. In 2010, the ECCC decided not to charge the surviving 
leaders for the many rapes that had occurred in security centres, at worksites and 
in communes. The only charge explicitly presented as concerned with SGBV is 
the ‘regulation of marriage’ as a crime against humanity.7 In order to hear testi-
monies about rape and sexual violence outside of marriage, civil society set up 
alternative, non-judicial hearings.8 These have also been presented ‘in spite’: in 
spite of a court which failed to pay proper attention to the various forms of SGBV 
during the regime and in spite of cultures of silence. The non-judicial hearings are 
then places where experience of SGBV may be heard. Yet, as I argue, while these 
3  The discussion about whether testimonies are beneficial for the person testifying or for societal 
reconciliation is not something I engage with here. Instead, see, eg, Fiona C Ross, ‘On Having 
Voice and Being Heard: Some After-Effects of Testifying before the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission’ (2003) 3 Anthropological Theory 325.
4  See, eg, Marie-Bénédicte Dembour and Emily Haslam, ‘Silencing Hearings? Victim-Witnesses 
at War Crimes Trials’ (2004) 15 European Journal of International Law 151; John D Ciorciari 
and Anne Heindel, ‘Trauma in the Courtroom’ in Beth Van Schaack, Daryn Reicherter and 
Youk Chhang (eds), Cambodia’s Hidden Scars: Trauma Psychology in the Wake of the Khmer 
Rouge (Documentation Center of Cambodia, 2011) 121.
5  I am thinking here both of tribunals that to some extent mimic legal hearings, often called 
Peoples’ or Women’s Tribunals, as well as hearings that are state organised, but not based on 
criminal law, such as truth and reconciliation hearings. 
6  Kali Tal, Worlds of Hurt: Reading the Literatures of Trauma (Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 7, quoted in Mona Lilja, Gender in a Global/Local World: Resisting Gendered Norms: 
Civil Society, the Juridical and Political Space in Cambodia (Ashgate, 2013) 70.
7  Prosecutor v Chea (Closing Order) (ECCC, Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 15 September 
2010) (‘Case 002 Closing Order’). I discuss the charge of the regulation of marriage in Maria 
Elander, ‘Prosecuting the Khmer Rouge Marriages’ (2016) 42 Australian Feminist Law 
Journal 163.
8  See below. 
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testimonies are framed as breaking silences and registering truths, the framing also 
leaves out some testimonies and experiences.
In this chapter, I describe two narratives on SGBV during the Khmer Rouge 
period that have emerged from survivor testimonies. One has been produced 
in the confines of the legal formality of the ECCC and the other in alternative 
non-judicial fora. While the criticism of trials for the way they limit testimony is 
well established, the alternative fora also establish limits to what can be told and 
heard through testimony. I start by describing the way in which SGBV during 
the Khmer Rouge regime has been dealt with in Case 002.9 I then examine the 
responses by civil society and their production of an alternative narrative. I argue 
that while the testimonies organised by civil society are presented as acts of resist-
ance against the silencing of SGBV by the ECCC, they are also acts of exclusion. 
To illustrate the exclusion, I turn to the testimonies by Sotheavy. Notably, her 
testimony cannot be heard in the alternative fora, but it is given space inside the 
courtroom. 
Presenting sexual and gender-based violence at the ECCC 
The ECCC is not known for having effectively dealt with SGBV during the Khmer 
Rouge period. This internationalised criminal court, operating within the 
Cambodian judicial system, but with certain international features such as 
substantive law, staffing and funding, began operating in 2006 after a long period 
of difficult negotiations.10 To date, it has concluded one case, against the former 
head of notorious security centre S-21,11 as well as the first part of Case 002 against 
the surviving former leaders.12 The trial hearings for the second part of Case 002 
are expected to finish by the end of 2016. The case as a whole covers the entire 
period over which the court has jurisdiction (17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979), 
and charges have been laid in relation to crimes including forced movement of 
population as a crime against humanity, genocide against the Cham and Vietnamese 
minorities, execution of soldiers of the former Khmer Republic and internal 
 9  It should be noted that the Khmer Rouge and the CPK are not synonyms. The ‘Khmer 
Rouge’ was a name accorded to the CPK by Prince Sihanouk. However, for purposes of 
brevity and simplicity, the two names will be used interchangeably here. 
10  On the negotiations, see Tom Fawthrop and Helen Jarvis, Getting Away with Genocide? 
Elusive Justice and the Khmer Rouge Tribunal (University of New South Wales Press, 2005); 
David Scheffer, All the Missing Souls, A Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals 
(Princeton University Press, 2012).
11  Prosecutor v Eav (Judgement) (ECCC, Trial Chamber, Case No 001, 26 July 2010).
12  There were initially four charged persons, but after Ieng Sary died in 2013 and Ieng Thirith 
was first found unfit for trial and then died in 2015, there are now two persons charged: 
Nuon Chea, former ‘Brother no 2’, and Khieu Samphan, former Head of State. In 2014, the 
two were found guilty of crimes against humanity and sentenced to life in prison, a conviction 
upheld on appeal. Chea v Prosecutor (Appeal Judgement) (ECCC, Supreme Court Chamber, 
Case No 002/01, 23 November 2016).
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purges of ‘traitors’ – perceived political dissidents.13 However, despite documented 
cases of SGBV in various contexts, the former leaders have only been charged 
with the regulation of marriage. The omission of a charge in relation to the many 
rapes at security centres, worksites and communes has been heavily criticised. 
For example, Margot Wallström, then UN Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, lamented: ‘The Court, which 
was created to give justice to survivors, is faced with a pool of victims without 
recourse to justice – and the accountability and acknowledgment it brings – for 
the crimes they experienced as part of the general atrocities.’14 So why were no 
charges brought against the leaders?
When investigations began in 2006 and 2007,15 little attention was paid to 
SGBV. At the time, the dominant narrative held that rape and other forms of 
sexual violence had not been prevalent during the Khmer Rouge regime. The 
assumption was that the regime had promoted gender neutrality and that its 
moral codes had been so strict that if rape had occurred, both the perpetrator and 
victim would have been punished by death. As one historian put it, ‘the KR . . . 
whatever their own sins, managed to keep [rape and violations against women] at 
an absolute minimum’.16 Thus, faced with the massive task of investigating ‘tens 
of thousands of criminal episodes’,17 SGBV was simply not high on the agenda of 
the ECCC investigators.18 
The investigations into crimes committed by the senior leaders of the CPK took 
four years. During this period, research began to emerge that contradicted the 
belief that there had been few occurrences of rape or sexual violence. For example, 
13  Case 002 Closing Order (ECCC, Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 15 September 2010). 
14  Margot Wallström, ‘The Forgotten Khmer Rouge Victims’, Phnom Penh Post (online) 
(29 May 2012) <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/forgotten-khmer-rouge- 
victims>.
15  The ECCC follows the civil law system in which the prosecutors only conduct a preliminary 
investigation on the basis of which they then ask investigative judges to conduct an 
investigation. Because of its internationalised nature, there is one international and 
one national staff for each important post, ie co-prosecutors, co-investigative judges etc. 
The co-prosecutors began working in 2006 and the co-investigative judges opened their 
investigation in 2007. 
16  Michael Vickery, ‘Wrong on Gottesman’, Phnom Penh Post (online) (28 January 2005) 
<http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/wrong-gottesman>.
17  Global Brief, Interview with Andrew Cayley (9 September 2011) <http://globalbrief.ca/
blog/2011/09/09/on-international-criminal-justice/>. Andrew Cayley was International 
Co-Prosecutor 2009–13.
18  Former Co-Prosecutor Andrew Cayley claims that the Office of the Prosecutor never ‘ignored 
gender-based crimes’ and that ‘female victims were not forgotten’, something former civil 
party lawyer Silke Studzinsky claims never translated into action. Andrew Cayley, ‘KR’s 
Female Victims Not Forgotten’, Phnom Penh Post (Phnom Penh) (1 June 2012); Silke 
Studzinsky, ‘Challenges to a Successful Prosecution of Sexualized and Gender-Based Crimes’ 
(paper presented at the International Conference on Bangladesh Genocide and the Issue 
of Justice, Heidelberg, Germany, 4–5 July 2013) <http://www.civilparties.org/?page_ 
id=48>.
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based on interviews with some 2,100 people, academic Kasumi Nakagawa and the 
NGO, Cambodian Defenders Project (CDP), documented accounts of a range of 
experiences of SGBV, ranging from rape at security centres, to forced marriage, 
survival sex, sexual mutilation and forced nudity.19 For Nakagawa, these accounts 
contradicted the dominant belief that if sexual violence had occurred at all, then 
all victims would have been killed. Instead, she found victims willing to speak 
about the crimes.20 Meanwhile, ECCC civil party lawyer, Silke Studzinsky, met a 
large number of people who claimed to have suffered from SGVG during the 
regime. In 2008, one of them, Sou Sotheavy, lodged the first application at 
the ECCC to become a civil party.21 Notably, this was in relation to gender-based 
crimes, not sexual violence.22 Soon, there were hundreds of applicants.
The Closing Order23 for Case 002 against the surviving leaders was issued in 
2010. And as noted above, this included a charge in relation to the regulation of 
marriage as a crime against humanity. The charge raises questions about what 
exactly the harm is that constitutes the offence. Is it possible to conceive of a 
gender-based crime that is not focused on rape or sexual violence?24 In the Closing 
Order, the regulation of marriage appears as two charges: one of rape and one of 
other inhumane acts. But after the defence successfully challenged the legality 
of classifying rape as a constitutive underlying offence of crimes against humanity, 
arguing (controversially) that when the acts were committed in the 1970s, rape 
was not recognised in international law as a crime against humanity,25 rape – within 
19  The interviews were done in two phases, first with 1,500 persons, and second with 600. 
Nakagawa Kasumi, ‘Gender-Based Violence During the Khmer Rouge Regime: Stories of 
Survivors from the Democratic Kampuchea (1975–1979)’ (GBV Under the Khmer Rouge, 
2nd edn, 2008) <http://gbvkr.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Kasumi-GBV-
Study-2007.pdf>. 
20  Ibid 10.
21  At the ECCC, victims can apply to become civil parties. In the first case, this meant being 
party to the case, but in Case 002 it means participating in the case. All civil parties are 
represented by a civil party lawyer. 
22  Silke Studzinsky, ‘First Civil Party Application before the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) on Gender-Based Violence under the Khmer Rouge Regime’ 
(Press Statement, 3 September 2008). 
23  In accordance with the Internal Rules, the Closing Order ‘sets out the identity of the Accused, 
a description of the material facts and their legal characterisation by the Co-Investigating 
Judges, including the relevant criminal provisions and the nature of the criminal responsibility’. 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Internal Rules (Rev 9) (adopted 16 
January 2015) r 67(2).
24  Indeed, in a case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Appeals Chamber held that forced 
marriage was there ‘not predominantly a sexual crime’: Prosecutor v Brima (Judgment) 
(Special Court for Sierra Leone, Appeals Chamber, Case No SCSL-2004-16-A, 22 February 
2008).
25  Rape was enumerated in the Law on the Establishment of the ECCC as an underlying offence 
(art 5), but the legality was still successfully challenged. Ieng Thirith Appeal against Closing 
Order (ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 18 October 2010) [61]; Ieng Sary’s Appeal 
against Closing Order (ECCC, Pre-Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 25 October 2010) [218]; 
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the context of the marriages – was reclassified as ‘other inhumane acts’.26 Even 
so, the factual description in the Closing Order includes descriptions of both the 
wedding ceremonies and the consummations of marriages, leaving significant 
traces of sexual violence. Much was left to be determined by the trial and the 
judgment.
Whereas the Closing Order made possible a hearing of the marriages during 
trial, no such thing occurred for the many documented rapes outside of marriage. 
This was not because the co-investigative judges did not believe rape had occurred, 
but because they struggled to see a link between these rapes and the surviving 
former leaders of the regime who were being charged. According to the co-
investigative judges, ‘Intimate relationships outside of marriage were considered 
to be against the collectivist approach of the CPK and therefore deemed “immoral” 
and associated with behaviours from the old regime.’27 As justification for this 
view, the judges pointed to the existence of certain moral codes, which they 
translated as ‘Do not take liberties with women’ and ‘We must not do anything 
detrimental to women’.28 Furthermore, despite the fact that the status and posi-
tion of the codes during the Khmer Rouge regime is disputed, the co-investigative 
judges considered them to reflect the official policy of the CPK. On that basis, 
they concluded the policy ‘was to prevent its [rape’s] occurrence and to punish 
the perpetrators. Despite the fact that this policy did not manage to prevent rape, 
it cannot be considered that rape was one of the crimes used by the CPK leaders.’29 
And so, no charges were brought against the leaders in relation to these rapes.
The omission of a charge of rape (outside of marriage) has been widely read as 
reinforcing the prevailing silence about SGBV during armed conflict. Despite the 
co-investigative judges’ acceptance that rapes had occurred, their failure to see a 
link to the accused led many commentators to conclude that the occurrence 
of SGBV and its victims were again being silenced. In her criticism of the lack of 
attention to SGBV at the ECCC, Wallström warned: 
Unless the Court finds a way to address this issue, it will be perceived as 
implicitly re-enforcing the silence about conflict-related sexual violence, and 
not providing a counterbalance to the impunity that has prevailed.30
Decision on Appeals by Nuon Chea and Ieng Thirith against the Closing Order (ECCC 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 15 February 2011) [154].
26  Decision on Appeals by Nuon Chea and Ieng Thirith against the Closing Order (ECCC 
Pre-Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 15 February 2011) [154].
27  Case 002 Closing Order (ECCC, Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 15 September 2010) [191] 
(emphasis altered).
28  Ibid. See also de Langis for another reading of the moral codes: Theresa de Langis, ‘“This is 
Now the Most Important Trial in the World”: A New Reading of Code #6, the Rule against 
Immoral Offenses under the Khmer Rouge Regime’ (2014) 3 Cambodia Law and Policy 
Journal 61.
29  Case 002 Closing Order (ECCC, Trial Chamber, Case No 002, 15 September 2010) [1429].
30  Wallström, above n 14.
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Thus, both the inclusion of the charge of forced marriage and the exclusion of the 
rapes outside of marriage are presented as in spite: The inclusion of marriages 
appears in spite of pressures of silencing, while the rapes outside marriage have 
been excluded in spite of documented occurrences. Consider the reading of the 
charges of forced marriages by Theresa de Langis. For her, they stand as 
the Court’s best last chance to contribute to the ever-evolving body of 
law aimed at better responding to perpetually neglected sexual and other 
gender-based crimes in times of conflict and atrocity globally. Above all, by 
including forced marriage in Case 002/02, the ECCC will finally be in a 
position to explain to survivors – who have courageously broken decades-
long silence despite the risk of social stigma and censure – how gender-based 
violence was a feature of the general mass violence of the catastrophic Khmer 
Rouge regime.31
Here, the charge of the regulation of marriage appears in spite of previous neglect 
both at the ECCC and elsewhere, and thereby becomes representative of SGBV 
in general. Meanwhile, the survivors are presented as having spoken in spite of 
cultures of silencing and stigma. And so, when the ECCC did not provide for a 
space to hear testimonies on rape outside of marriage, activists turned elsewhere. 
Civil society efforts to hear sexual and gender-based violence
When the co-investigative judges failed to find a link between the defendants and 
the occurrence of rape and sexual violence outside of marriage, thereby not 
allowing the issue to go to trial, activists and NGOs in Cambodia stepped in 
to create other forums to hear testimonies. They also wanted to document 
the manifold forms that SGBV took during the regime. The NGOs produced 
alternative, non-judicial spaces in which survivors and witnesses have given 
testimony. As such, they have been important sites for knowledge production and 
possibly spaces which have enabled those giving testimony to narrate and give 
their own account of what happened. Without wanting to diminish the value of 
initiatives such as these, and definitely not wanting to lessen the testimonies 
presented, I believe the presentation and representation of the testimonies need 
to be examined for the way in which they were framed.
Consider the three Women’s Hearings, organised by the CDP, with support 
provided to testifiers by the Transcultural Psychosocial Organisation Cambodia. 
The first hearing focused on Cambodian women’s testimony about SGBV 
during the Khmer Rouge period, while the second took a broader approach 
by also including testimonies from women who had experienced SGBV during 
other conflicts in the Asia-Pacific region (Bangladesh, Timor Leste and Nepal). 
31  Theresa de Langis, ‘A Missed Opportunity, a Last Hope? Prosecuting Sexual Crimes under 
the Khmer Rouge Regime’ (2014) 2 Cambodia Law and Policy Journal 39, 43. 
Testifying to sexual and gender-based violence  117
The third hearing sought to establish an intergenerational link with the younger 
Cambodian generation. Each with slightly different foci, the three hearings 
followed similar formats: survivors and witnesses gave testimony, and a number 
of experts spoke on related topics, for example, applicable laws or broader 
evidence of the prevalence of SGBV during conflict. The testimonies were given 
before a panel composed of experts (other than those who testified) who presented 
a ‘finding’ towards the end.
The hearings have been presented as an occasion to tell and hear the ‘truth’ 
about what had happened. In 2011, the first hearing entitled ‘True Voices of 
Women under the Khmer Rouge’ was presented as a non-judicial, transitional 
justice mechanism for survivors of the Khmer Rouge, providing a forum for truth-
telling about SGBV that took place during that time.32 The hearing originated in 
a project that ‘sought to reveal the truth about the prevalence of gender-based 
violence during the Khmer Rouge rule and, in doing so, uncovered a hidden part 
of Cambodian history’.33
In addition to truth-telling, the idea that they are being organised in spite of 
the tide of history working against them runs across the hearings. The first hearing 
was presented as organised because of ‘great difficulties accessing justice and few 
opportunities to have their [survivors of SGBV perpetrated during the Khmer 
Rouge regime] stories heard’34 and as complimenting the ECCC by ‘ensur[ing] 
that sexual violence was included in the historical account of atrocities’.35 In 
contrast, the report of the second hearing expresses impatience with the ECCC, 
with ‘the inability or unwillingness of formal judicial mechanisms to deliver justice 
for survivors of gender-based crime’.36
How these notions of spite, truth and history-making work together is made 
clear in the foreword to the report from the first hearing written by Sok Sam 
Oeun, Executive Director of CDP. Here, he explains, the aim was ‘to provide a 
forum for the survivors of sexual violence during the Khmer Rouge period to tell 
their stories and contribute to creating an accurate historical record of the crimes 
perpetrated under Khmer Rouge rule’.37 He described the project as necessary to 
‘break the silence and impunity surrounding sexual violence’.38 He quoted from 
32  Alison Barclay and Beini Ye (eds), ‘Women’s Hearing: True Voices of Women under the 
Khmer Rouge, Report on the Proceedings of the 2011 Women’s Hearing on Sexual Violence 
under the Khmer Rouge Regime’ (Report, Cambodian Defenders Project, May 2012) 1. 
33  Ibid.
34  Ibid 2. 
35  Ibid.
36  Theresa de Langis, ‘Asia-Pacific Regional Women’s Hearing on Gender-Based Violence in 
Conflict: Report on the Proceedings 2012’ (Report, Cambodian Defenders Project, 
December 2012) 3.
37  Sok Sam Oeun, ‘Foreword’ in Alison Barclay and Beini Ye (eds), ‘Women’s Hearing: True 
Voices of Women under the Khmer Rouge, Report on the Proceedings of the 2011 Women’s 
Hearing on Sexual Violence under the Khmer Rouge Regime’ (Report, Cambodian 
Defenders Project, May 2012) iv.
38  Ibid. 
118  Maria Elander
a speech given by Wallström, via video-link at the hearing, in which she stated that 
‘the history of rape has been a history of denial . . . every speaker who adds their 
voice to this debate is helping to end centuries of silence that have made rape an 
effective “secret weapon”’.39
Yet, although the hearings were presented as breaking silences, they were never- 
theless silencing some experiences. Notably, all three hearings were exclusively 
about women’s experience of SGBV. The one Cambodian man who testified 
spoke about the rape and murder of his sister.40 Furthermore, in all the reports 
of the hearings, SGBV is used interchangeably with rape, as if rape was not only 
one form of SGBV, but the form. Somewhat contradicting this forefronting of 
rape as the primary form of SGBV is the link made to violence against women. 
The latter two hearings were partly funded by the UN Trust Fund to End Violence 
against Women, and this link is particularly apparent at the third hearing, which 
was presented as aiming ‘to raise awareness [of young Cambodians] of 
SGBV and initiate discussion about responses to past crimes and prevention 
of future violence against women’.41 By these means, in this alternative forum, 
SGBV during the Khmer Rouge period becomes sedimented as an issue that 
affects women and one that has a continuing impact on violence against women 
into the present.
The focus on women is reinforced by the opening of a new exhibition in March 
2016, ‘Sorrows and Struggles: Women’s Experience of Forced Marriage during 
the Khmer Rouge Regime’, at the Tuol Sleng Genocide Museum (‘Tuol Sleng’) 
in Phnom Penh.42 Together with the Choeung Ek Killing Fields located about 
10 kilometres away, Tuol Sleng stands as the primary museum and memorial of 
the Khmer Rouge regime. As such, it is an important space to which both 
Cambodians and foreigners come to remember, honour the victims and learn 
about the period and the regime. A new museum director was recently appointed 
and much has since happened. In addition to the introduction of an audio 
tour and the opening of a room specifically designed for reflection, the exhibition 
on the Khmer Rouge marriages is located in two rooms on the third floor, above 
the space which, when the place served as Security Centre S-21, was reserved for 
female prisoners.43
39  Ibid. 
40  Barclay and Ye (eds), above n 32, 6.
41  ‘Women’s Hearing with the Young Generation’ (Panel Statement, Cambodian Defenders 
Project, 24 September 2013) 1. 
42  George Wright, ‘Tuol Sleng Exhibition to Tell Stories of Forced Marriage’, The Cambodia 
Daily (online) (29 February 2016) <https://www.cambodiadaily.com/news/tuol-sleng- 
exhibition-to-tell-stories-of-forced-marriage-109152/>.
43  Audrey Wilson, ‘Veil Lifting on Cadres’ Unwanted Weddings’, Phnom Penh Post (online) 
(27 February 2016) <http://www.phnompenhpost.com/post-weekend/veil-lifting-cadres- 
unwanted-weddings>.
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The first room is meant to be interactive, featuring a model of a wedding 
ceremony as it occurred during the Khmer Rouge.44 There is a makeshift altar and 
marks on the floor to indicate where visitors should stand. On one of the walls is 
a large print of the only known photo of a wedding ceremony from the period, 
said to depict the wedding between Nun Huy (also known as Huy Sre), head of 
re-education centre S-24, and Prok Khoeun (also known as Prak Samuth), an 
official at S-24 and later deputy of an interrogation team at S-21. Huy is believed 
to have been later killed when a prisoner escaped.45 Across the room hang two 
rows of dark grey fabric with anonymous quotes, alternating between English 
and Khmer, written in white/silver by people who wed in such ceremonies: 
‘I take medicine daily to help with my mental trauma’, one says. ‘I did not know 
at all who my husband was’, says another. The walls in the second room hold 
posters with information about the exhibition and about the particularities of 
marriage during the regime. Anonymous quotes are printed to form the shape 
of a silhouette, possibly showing the image of Prok Khoeun: ‘Often have violence 
in the family’, ‘My baby died of malnutrition’, ‘I was afraid the children would 
hate their father’, ‘We feel no affection for each other’ and ‘My husband threatened 
to kill me’. There are seven panels scattered around the room with testimonies 
by six women and one man. Each testimony on the panels differs somewhat: 
a woman describes trying to resist being married but eventually being forced, and 
how she was later violently forced to consummate the marriage. Another woman 
tells how she was forced to marry a man who was Cham (Muslim)46 and that she 
eventually decided to convert to Islam. A third woman describes a marriage 
characterised by domestic violence. While the pamphlet that introduces the 
exhibitions states it sought to include a man’s perspective and thereby ‘acknowledge 
. . . [men’s] suffering as victims of forced marriage’,47 the exhibition is clearly 
about the suffering of women.
Like the hearings, the exhibition frames the testimonies within a context of 
violence against women and presents women as the primary victims. According 
to the local newspaper, the Phnom Penh Post, work on the exhibition began after 
a meeting with the Women’s Association of the Ministry of Culture and Fine Arts 
and, as the museum director put it in an interview for the article, ‘We really want 
to focus on the impact to women’.48 The exhibition draws heavily on a research 
project by Theresa de Langis that recorded Cambodian women’s oral histories.49
The testimonies in the civil society hearings and at the museum are all presented 
as in spite, in particular in spite of silencing. Perhaps also in spite of the ECCC 
44  The following description is from my visits to the place in June 2016.
45  Wilson, above n 43.
46  Cham is a Muslim minority group in Cambodia. Case 002 hears a charge of genocide against 
the Cham.
47  Text from presentation to exhibition. Photo on file with author. 
48  Wilson, above n 43.
49  Cambodian Women’s Oral History Project: Life Stories of Survival under the Khmer Rouge 
Regime, ‘Testimonies’ <http://cambodianwomenoralhistory.squarespace.com/>.
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and its omission of a charge of rape outside marriage. If the aim is to shed light, 
or rather, to listen to experiences of SGBV, it is also important to listen to the way 
in which the testimonies are framed. At both the hearings and at the museum, the 
subject who has experienced SGBV is framed as a woman.
I now turn to the testimonies by Sou Sotheavy50 which provide one example 
of an experience that is impossible to hear because of the framing of the testi- 
monies in these two spaces. Notably, it was at the ECCC that Sotheavy testified, 
appearing twice, in relation to first the forced population movement and then 
the regulation of marriage. While the charge of forced population movement 
was never presented by the ECCC as one of gender-based harm, it did hold 
these dimensions,51 something that Sotheavy’s testimony clearly brought to the 
surface. 
Sotheavy’s courtroom testimony
On 17 April 1975, I lived at the Olympic Stadium with the transgendered 
people. Khmer Rouge evacuated us from that Olympic Stadium. A lot of 
Khmer Rouge soldiers came to our place and we were ordered to leave the 
city at gunpoint. We were not given enough time to pack our luggage. They, 
upon reaching my room, opened – fired at us. My four friends died including 
Saray, Dy, Roatha, and Phalla. I was completely terrified. I bore witness to 
this execution.52
50  My account of her testimonies draws from a variety of sources such as the trial transcripts 
from her testimony on forced population movement (‘Trial transcript 27 May 2013’). 
However, because the ECCC has at the time of writing (November 2016) not yet published 
the trial transcript for her testimony on the marriages, I use a video showing parts of her 
testimony that is available on the ECCC website: Session 1 – 24 August 2016 – Case 002/02 
– EN/FR (24 August 2016) ECCC <https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/video/trial-video/
session-1-24-august-2016-case-00202-enfr>; Session 2 – 24 August 2016 – Case 002/02 – EN/
FR (24 August 2016) ECCC <https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/video/trial-video/session-2-
24-august-2016-case-00202-enfr>; Session 3 – 24 August 2016 – Case 002/02 – EN/FR 
(24 August 2016) ECCC <https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/video/trial-video/session-3-24-
august-2016-case-00202-enfr>; Session 1, 27 May 2013 (English/French) (27 May 2013) 
ECCC <https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/session-1-27-may-2013-englishfrench> together 
with the reports by two trial monitors: KRT Monitor Case 002/02 – Issue 64 (22–25 August 
2016) (14 September 2016) Khmer Rouge Trial Monitor <https://krtmonitor.
org/2016/09/14/krt-monitor-case-00202-issue-64-22-25-august-2016/>; ‘Segment on 
Forced Marriage Begins’, Cambodia Tribunal Monitor (23 August 2016) <http://www.
cambodiatribunal.org/2016/08/23/segment-on-forced-marriage-begins/>; ‘Civil Party 
Sou Sotheavy Continues Testimony about Forced Marriage’, Cambodia Tribunal Monitor 
(24 August 2016) <http://www.cambodiatribunal.org/2016/08/24/civil-party-sou-
sotheavy-continues-testimony-about-forced-marriage/>. I also interviewed Sotheavy in 
Phnom Penh on 4 June 2016, transcripts on file. 
51  Diana Sankey, ‘Recognition of Gendered Experiences of Harm at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: The Promise and the Pitfalls’ (2016) 24 Feminist Legal 
Studies 7. 
52  Sou Sotheavy, Trial transcript 27 May 2013, 11.
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Thus begins Sotheavy’s statement at the ECCC on suffering in relation to the 
evacuation of Phnom Penh. As Diana Sankey points out, the forced evacuation 
from Phnom Penh displays gendered dimensions of harm, something that 
becomes evident when paying attention to social understandings of harm and to 
pre-existing socio-economic and legal status.53 Sotheavy’s testimony brings these 
dimensions to light. She begins by testifying to the existence of a community of 
transgendered people in Phnom Penh and bears witness to the summary execution 
of her friends. Her journey, if forced movement can be called such, was difficult. 
As she left the city, she joined others who were being evacuated. At one point, she 
and a friend were stopped by a small group of Khmer Rouge soldiers. While 
Sotheavy was told to wait, her friend was raped. She saw how pregnant women 
pushed carts, and she saw the corpses of Buddhist monks, of soldiers from the 
previous regime and civilians. She walked without food or rest. Finally, she arrived 
at her childhood home village. She continued to wear women’s clothes and keep 
her hair long, but was ‘severely discriminated . . . [and] had to hide it [her 
identity]’. So, she cut her hair and concealed her gender identity.54 Eventually, she 
joined a mobile work unit and, as a consequence, moved around, staying at many 
different places. During the coming years, she was raped on multiple occasions, 
she exchanged sex for food and protection, she was abused for her transgender 
nature, accused of moral offences and, as a result, was sent to prison.55
Among Sotheavy’s friends who, like her, were entertainers and/or transgender 
before the Khmer Rouge period, few survived and those who did suffered because 
of this. In a ground-breaking empirical study on gender-based violence against 
sexual minorities during the Khmer Rouge regime, Nakagawa56 interviewed and 
collected testimonies from 48 people, most of whom identified as male-to-female 
transgender persons, but the study also included some gay men, lesbian women 
and female-to-male transgender persons. Nakagawa finds that violence against 
transgender people was extremely common and that most of her interviewees 
were threatened, abused and/or harassed. They all tried to hide their sexuality 
and/or identity during the regime. Nakagawa documents stories of rape and of 
exchanging sex for food or protection.57 Notably, Nakagawa also frames her study 
in terms of breaking the silence. The testimony that is the epigraph to her 
introduction sets the frame: ‘I have never talked about it to anyone. I never talked 
because it seemed shameful.’58
53  Sankey, above n 51. 
54  Sou Sotheavy, Trial transcript 27 May 2013, 11–12, 15, 18.
55  Cambodia Tribunal Monitor articles, above n 50; Interview with Sou Sotheavy (Phnom Penh, 
4 June 2016).
56  Kasumi Nakagawa, ‘Gender-Based Violence against Sexual Minorities during the Khmer 
Rouge Regime’ (Report, 2015).
57  Ibid 61–4.
58  Ibid 16.
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Sotheavy speaks openly about her experiences during the regime. In October, 
or possibly August 1977,59 she was forced to marry. She had on numerous previous 
occasions refused, but she had been relocated to Svay Hill where she was breaking 
rock and she could no longer say no. She spoke with a fellow worker, a woman 
she did not know, and they decided that if there was going to be a wedding, they 
should try to find each other. There were 107 couples married that day, and 
Sotheavy and the woman managed to find each other and be married. When they 
returned to a house occupied by Sotheavy’s relatives, they realised spies were 
monitoring them, checking whether they would consummate the marriage. 
For weeks, the spies checked on the couple. When asked, Sotheavy told them they 
had already consummated the marriage, but they did not believe her, claiming 
that because she was transgender she could not have done so. Eventually, Sotheavy 
was called to a meeting and told that she would be ‘smashed’ – ie killed – unless 
they consummated the marriage. So they did. Her wife became pregnant, but 
as they lived at different work locations and Sotheavy was ill, she was not able to 
visit her daughter.60
What are we to make of Sotheavy’s testimony? While she tells her story as a 
woman, during the regime she was forced to live as a man. Part of her experience 
is this very harm and the harm of having been targeted for her sexuality, as she 
describes it. These are many experiences of sexual violence, yes, and also of 
gendered harm. And even as there is sorrow and hurt, her testimony does not 
originate from a position of shame. Instead, when talking to me she expresses a 
sense of pride about having testified: 
I informed them [the Court] that I was a LGBT, a man who loved man: I 
said about the abuse and violence against me and the forced marriage 
imposed upon me and I asked the Court to consider [it]. Thus, more than 
one hundred people who attended the hearing returned home and said, 
‘there was an old woman who was actually a third-gender person, a man who 
loves man. She dared to speak before the court’. Thus, I am proud as people 
are aware of my story.61
Sotheavy appeared before the Court as a civil party, a victim who successfully 
applied to participate in the case. She was not a witness, but a victim who 
participates in the case and who has been chosen to appear to give testimony 
on behalf of other civil parties and victims. As briefly noted in the introduction, 
court rooms are not known to be conducive to testimony on traumatic experiences. 
The legal demands on witness testimony mean that the narrative has to be 
coherent, logical and contain (correct) factual details, requirements that often 
stand in direct opposition to the way in which trauma operates. At the ECCC, 
59  Sotheavy’s testimonies differ as to which month the wedding was held.
60  Cambodia Tribunal Monitor articles and ECCC videos, above n 50.
61  Interview with Sou Sotheavy (Phnom Penh, 4 June 2016).
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these demands are extended to civil parties who give testimony and statements of 
suffering. In the first trial at the ECCC, the lawyers for civil parties were lambasted 
for not having properly prepared their clients.62 Civil parties were, like witnesses, 
questioned and cross-examined. Expressions of anger by victims were denounced 
and any display of too much emotion was criticised by the judges. Now, with the 
second trial, the civil parties who testify remain mostly within the confines of their 
assigned roles. Sotheavy’s testimonies are exemplar in this regard.63 Tears flow 
down her cheeks, and while she expresses emotion, she remains composed as she 
narrates her story and replies calmly to questions. In her testimony, the loss of her 
family, the hard labour, the imprisonment and the torture all become parts of 
her experiences of the regime, alongside, and probably compounded by, the 
experience of having to hide her gender, the sexual violence and being forced to 
marry. Remarkably, in spite of the court’s rules of evidence and procedure that 
run counter to the workings of trauma, her testimony on the (trans)gendered 
harms of evacuation and forced marriage, with its aspects of both sexual violence 
and gender-based injury, forges a space in which it is heard and recorded. 
The gender of sexual and/or gender-based violence  
in armed conflict
Sotheavy’s experiences and testimonies challenge and complicate what is becoming 
the accepted story about SGBV during the Khmer Rouge period in a number of 
ways. Her testimony does not fit into the frame of the testimonies at the Women’s 
Hearings or the ‘Sorrows and Struggles’ exhibition, but at least some of her 
experiences can be heard at the ECCC.
First, Sotheavy’s testimonies operate in a curious way in relation to the said 
silencing of testimonies on SGBV. By speaking out about the experiences, forging 
a space for them to be heard, her speech act becomes, as Mona Lilja suggests, an 
act of resistance.64 But power is multifaceted and it is rarely as simple as a dominant 
narrative (of silence) being challenged by a testimony. This is perhaps particularly 
the case when it comes to testimonies on rape, as rape occupies a paradoxical 
position. As Nicola Henry suggests, rape occurring during war has long ‘been 
viewed and treated . . . as abhorrent, incomprehensible and unspeakable, yet at 
the same time as inevitable, excusable or even laudable’.65 Here, some testimonies 
62  See, eg, Transcripts of Proceedings, Prosecutor v Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch (ECCC Trial 
Chamber) (‘Duch Transcripts’) 9 July 2009, 53; and Eric Stover, Mychelle Balthazard and 
Alexa K Koenig, ‘Confronting Duch: Civil Party Participation in Case 001 at the Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the Red Cross 
502, 522.
63  See video recordings of her testimonies at Session 1, 27 May 2013 (English/French) (27 May 
2013) ECCC <https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/session-1-27-may-2013-englishfrench>.
64  Lilja, above n 6, ch 6.
65  Nicola Henry, ‘The Fixation on Wartime Rape: Feminist Critique and International Criminal 
Law’ (2014) 23 Social & Legal Studies 93, 95.
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on rape are picked up, repeated and given broader public coverage, some even 
becoming powerful in themselves. These testimonies figure in relation to various 
narratives, not always conducive to eliminating rape in conflict or challenging 
the structures that tolerate or even condone SGBV more broadly.66 As Cynthia 
Enloe has pointed out, sometimes making rape visible can be ‘dangerously easy’.67 
What is notable about Sotheavy’s appearance and her testimonies is the way in 
which she demonstrates this paradoxical position of testimonies on SGBV: she 
speaks inside the Courtroom, in spite of the place being reputed for silencing 
victims of SGBV, but she is excluded from speaking at the alternative forums, 
despite these being presented as offering a place for truth-telling about SGBV 
during the Khmer Rouge. What will ultimately be registered in the legal judgment 
is yet to be seen. The acts of inclusion and exclusion seem to be constant.
Second, Sotheavy speaks in spite of a dominant narrative of women being 
victims of SGBV. The exclusive focus on women’s suffering at the hearings and 
its dominance at the museum means that Sotheavy’s experiences do not fit. The 
focus solely on women as victims of SGBV is not exclusive to the ECCC or 
Cambodia. Based on an examination of the discursive construction of gender-
based violence during conflict in organisations and institutions concerned with 
the protection of civilians in armed conflict as well as international courts and 
tribunals dealing with its aftermath, Charli Carpenter argues that gender-based 
violence is exclusively framed in relation to women and excludes the experiences 
of civilian men and boys.68 In her reading, much of the violence that would be 
categorised as gender based if the victim was a woman, is either characterised 
as a gender-neutral crime – torture, for example – or not recognised at all if the 
victim was a man, occluding the gender dimensions of the harm. What Sotheavy’s 
testimonies show is that SGBV does not affect only women. Indeed, some of her 
remarks, as well as some made in the testimonies in Nakagawa’s study, suggest 
that people were targeted by the Khmer Rouge for their (homo)sexuality or 
transgender identity.
The focus on women as the victims of SGBV during conflict has meant that 
examinations of its legacies, if examined at all, tends to focus on post-conflict 
domestic violence and violence against women. It is now well documented that 
armed conflict leads to heightened levels of domestic violence in its aftermath. 
Conflict has an impact on state formation, ideology and political economy, all of 
which in turn tends to disadvantage women and impact domestic violence.69 
66  See, eg, Dubravka Žarkov, The Body of War: Media, Ethnicity, and Gender in the Break-Up of 
Yugoslavia (Duke University Press, 2007).
67  Cynthia Enloe, Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women’s Lives (University 
of California Press, 2000) 109.
68  R Charli Carpenter, ‘Recognizing Gender-Based Violence against Civilian Men and Boys in 
Conflict Situations’ (2006) 37 Security Dialogue 83. 
69  Katherine Brickell, ‘Towards Intimate Geographies of Peace? Local Reconciliation 
of Domestic Violence in Cambodia’ (2015) 40 Transactions of the Institute of British 
Geographers 321. 
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However, this does not mean that the impact of all forms of SGBV during the 
Khmer Rouge period, or any other conflict, can or should be understood within 
the framework of domestic violence or violence against women. Consider, for 
example, the post-conflict situation for LGBT communities in Cambodia, which 
Sotheavy describes as plagued by state and community violence, arrest and 
imprisonment.70 While it is not a criminal offence to engage in same-sex activities 
in Cambodia, there are no protections available in the form of anti-discrimination 
laws or other means of sanctioning those who violate the rights of LGBT people.71 
But perhaps LGBT is not the right term to use. As Sotheavy explains: 
The Khmer word for us is third-gender people while in English they may 
refer to us as gay, transgender, msm [men having sex with men] or lesbian. 
In Khmer we only have one word to call ourselves. A woman who loves 
woman is a third-gender person; a man who loves man is also a third-gender 
person. Even the bisexual people are third-gender people. We call ourselves 
simply like that with this word that does not contain any discrimination; it is 
a good word. We have coined this word. In the past people called us Kteuy 
which sounded very harsh for us in this modernised society and [is] a very 
dirty term to describe us. For this reason, we gather together to advocate for 
recognition of our status as third-gender people.72
Sotheavy is one of few activists working for the rights of third-gender people, 
having in 2000 established her own NGO, the Cambodian Network for Men 
Women Development, which aims to achieve recognition of the rights of third-
gender persons. For her, the promise of human rights stands in contrast to the 
medicalisation of third-gender persons, which she claims is the predominant 
approach taken by international donors and NGOs: ‘They only focus on health 
issue. They do not care if [people of third-gender] are beaten, mistreated or 
hospitalised.’73 What we need to ask is how the lives of third-gender communities 
in Cambodia today are affected by the structures and attitudes established or 
impacted by the Khmer Rouge period and the SGBV that then occurred. This 
is a question foreclosed if the legacy of SGBV perpetrated during conflict is 
understood as, primarily, domestic violence suffered by women.
The third way in which Sotheavy’s testimony challenges what has become the 
dominant framing of SGBV during the Khmer Rouge regime is the tendency 
for SGBV to be confined to sexual violence, occluding the recognition of 
70  Interview with Sou Sotheavy (Phnom Penh, 4 June 2016).
71  Vicente S Salas, ‘Being LGBT in Asia: Cambodia Country Report’ (Report, UNDP, USAID, 
2014). See also Heidi Hoefinger, Pisey Ly and Srorn Srun, ‘Sex Politics and Moral Panics: 
LGBT Communities, Sex/Entertainment Workers and Sexually Active Youth in Cambodia’ 
in Katherine Brickell and Simon Springer (eds), The Handbook of Contemporary Cambodia 
(Routledge, 2016) 315.
72  Interview with Sou Sotheavy (Phnom Penh, 4 June 2016).
73  Ibid.
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gender-based violence. Sotheavy speaks not only about sexual violence, but 
about a multitude of sexual and gender-based harms. She testifies to the gendered 
harms of forced evacuation and her experience of having to live as a man, which 
cannot be encompassed by sexual violence alone. The charge of the regulation 
of marriage at the ECCC opens a new space for consideration of harms that 
are gendered but not necessarily sexual,74 but the judgment on this charge is yet 
to come and it is not currently clear where it is heading. During the trial, many 
of the questions posed to those testifying focused on the consummation of the 
marriage – the act of sex/rape. Sotheavy’s testimonies, however, demonstrate 
just how manifold SGBV can be. Yes, she experienced rape and sexual violence, 
but also the violence of having to live as a man, of having to get married as a 
man, of having to consummate her marriage as a man and possibly also of being 
targeted specifically because of her transgender status or her sexuality as a man 
loving men. 
Conclusion
In a study on the representations of sexual violence in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC), Charlotte Mertens and Maree Pardy draw attention to a 
discursive formation they call ‘sexurity’, a tripartite amalgam of discourses on the 
securitisation of sexual violence, the sexualisation of security and the language 
of crisis.75 They argue that this amalgam of discourses has framed how sexual 
violence in the DRC is understood and approached, to the extent it has ‘opened 
up certain pathways for highly warranted actions, but it has done so by foreclosing 
others, for example those that might address the consequences of non-sexual 
forms of violence, including the violence of poverty, landlessness and lack of 
education and health services’.76 Drawing on Didier Fassin’s concept of ‘political 
anaesthesia’, they explain that ‘[p]olitical anaesthesia does not indicate a lack 
of commitment to addressing suffering; rather, it presumes that all necessary 
knowledge about the conditions of that suffering has now been established’.77 
It seems to me that SGBV during the Khmer Rouge period is presented through 
certain discursive formations that institute a similar form of political anaesthesia. 
Here, though, it is not the language of security or rape as weapon of war, but 
of SGBV that is blinkered as (sexual) violence against women. While this is not 
necessarily wrong or incorrect, it forecloses other experiences of SGBV, as 
Sotheavy’s testimonies reveal. In spite of the power of the dominant story, her 
testimonies challenge the stereotype that victims of SGBV are only ever women, 
and her experience during the regime offers a more complex and inclusive story 
74  I discuss this in depth in Elander, above n 7.
75  Charlotte Mertens and Maree Pardy, ‘“Sexurity” and Its Effects in Eastern Democratic 
Republic of Congo’ (2017) 38 Third World Quarterly 956. 
76  Ibid 13. 
77  Ibid 2.
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of multiple forms of SGBV than has to date been told in both the ECCC and 
alternative civil society hearings.
Sotheavy makes herself heard and if there is a silence to break, she breaks it. 
Her courage, and that of many others like her, complicates the reductive dominant 
narrative on SGBV during conflict and its effects, and challenges us all to reject 
its certainties and exclusions. 

Part III
Alliances: Making queer 
lives matter 





In August 2015, after footage emerged of members of the Islamic State (IS) 
throwing a gay man off of a roof in Tal Abyad, Syria, the UN Security Council 
called its first organised session on gay rights that was open to all member states.1 
In a closed-door meeting, sponsored by the United States and Chile, the Security 
Council focused on IS and its ongoing persecution of lesbian, gay, bisexual and 
transgender (LGBT) Syrians and Iraqis.2 Thirteen of the 15 countries sitting on 
the Security Council participated in the meetings, with China, Russia, Nigeria and 
Malaysia present, but silent, and Chad and Angola remaining absent. The event 
was celebrated as a landmark where the Security Council had taken up the cause 
of LGBT rights for the first time in its 70-year history.3
The question that I seek to examine in this chapter is how have we arrived at 
a point where the location of LGBT rights within a security discourse marks a 
moment to be celebrated? Or, to put it slightly differently, what ever happened to 
*  I am extremely grateful to Gauri Pillai for her invaluable research assistance. My thanks also to 
Dianne Otto for both her comments and editorial inputs.
1  Such informal meetings are known as Arria-Formula sessions, and were initiated in 1993 by 
Diego Arria, the Venezuelan Ambassador to the United Nations, to create a venue for the 
Security Council to be briefed by NGOs on a variety of issues on the Council’s agenda.
2  Michael K Lavers, ‘Islamic State Focus of U.N. Security Council’s First LGBT meeting’, 
Washington Blade (online) (24 August 2015) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/ 
08/24/islamic-state-focus-of-u-n-security-councils-first-lgbt-meeting/>. 
3  The Security Council has since released a statement on the killing of 49 people and wounding 
of 53 others at Pulse, a gay nightclub in Orlando on 12 June 2016, by Omar Mateen, a 
29-year-old security guard. The act was described in the media as the deadliest terrorist attack 
in the United States since the 9/11 attacks. The resolution, apparently speaking for all 
members, ‘reaffirmed that terrorism in all its forms and manifestations constitutes one of the 
most serious threats to international peace and security’. See ‘Security Council Press Statement 
on Terrorist Attack in Orlando, Florida’ (Press Release, SC/12399, 13 June 2016) <http://
www.un.org/press/en/2016/sc12399.doc.htm>; Kerry Brodie, ‘In a Historic First, U.N. 
Security Council Convenes to Discuss LGBT Rights’, Human Rights Campaign (24 August 
2015) <http://www.hrc.org/blog/in-a-historic-first-u.n.-security-council-convenes-to- 
discuss-lgbt-rights>; US Department of State, ‘UN Security Council Holds Inaugural 
Meeting on LGBT Issues’ (Press Release, 24 August 2015) <https://globalequality.wordpress.
com/2015/08/24/un-security-council-holds-inaugural-meeting-on-lgbt-issues/>.
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queer radicality? My central claim is that queer engagement with human rights 
has taken the radicality out of queer rather than resulting in the queering of 
international human rights. While there are undoubtedly temporal moments 
when the radicalism of the project emerges, these are quickly quenched by the 
lure of normativity and glitter of respectability. I argue that the potential for queer 
radicality remains on the outskirts of human rights, rather than within its embrace, 
and that these possibilities are abundant outside of the parameters of the liberal 
imaginary within which human rights remain immersed.
De-radicalising queer in international human rights 
advocacy
During the course of the past decade, queer advocacy has acquired considerable 
prominence in international human rights advocacy. It has become the new focus 
of academics and activists working in the field of sexuality and sexuality studies. 
While there is a distinction often made between LGBT and queer, the former 
referring to fixed identities, and the latter as a critical anti-normative project, this 
distinction becomes blurred in international human rights advocacy, globally and 
locally, with ‘Q’ at times being added as part of the LGBT acronym, and LGBT 
at times doing ‘queer’ work. While the repeated invocation of queer historically 
constituted a social bond among homophobic persons, its contemporary 
appropriation and redeployment by queer persons for radical political purposes 
has produced its own set of racial and cultural exclusions.4 Even though queer is 
understood as providing the critical intellectual impulse that puts into question 
normativity and drives the political agenda, such drives frequently end up 
reinforcing the dominant normative order of sexuality and gender rather than 
producing freedom from this order in the context of human rights.5 In other 
words, such interventions in the context of human rights have often moved in 
the direction of gay governance, where sexuality becomes both normalised and 
naturalised, and the critical capacities of queer are shorn away through the 
assimilative and normative gravitational pull of human rights. Queer appears 
unable to transform or destabilise the normative foundations of human rights 
that remain firmly embedded in dualistic gender categories and a gender hierarchy,6 
as well as a set of racial and cultural exclusions. In fact, as I argue, queer itself has 
gone normative.
In the international legal arena, LGBT human rights advocacy at the formal 
level has invariably been directed at legal inclusion and the bestowal of rights on 
those subjects who have been disenfranchised, subordinated, stigmatised, 
criminalised and regarded as less than human. There is no doubt that this remains 
4  Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of ‘Sex’ (Routledge, 1993) ch 8.
5  Dianne Otto, ‘Queering Gender [Identity] in International Law’ (2015) 33 Nordic Journal 
of Human Rights 299.
6  Ibid. 
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a compelling and important aspect of the queer political project, especially given 
that LGBT persons in large swathes of the world are reduced to truncated, 
incapable subjects, subjected to exploitation as well as extreme forms of violence, 
and rendered precarious through lack of legal recognition.7 While this goal is 
laudable, in this section I question the claim that such degradations can be 
alleviated by human rights interventions, especially as they have largely failed 
to challenge the normative framework within which sexuality is addressed. 
Moreover, these interventions have at times in fact not only inscribed a set of 
sexual normativities of their own, but also reproduced racial and cultural binaries 
between those societies that are seen as ‘progressive’ and ‘civilised’, and those 
societies that remain in a state of transition until the human rights of their LGBT 
persons are secured.
The prescriptive ‘gay’ international
The universalising impulse of international human rights advocacy has masked the 
exclusions on which human rights have been based, where the world’s others have 
featured as subjects to be rescued from their oppressive cultures, histories and 
civilisational backwardness.8 At the same time, inclusion is based on alignment 
with the dominant sexual, gender, cultural and racial norms that structure the 
human rights project.
Within the arena of human rights, in the specific struggle for LGBT rights we 
are witnessing a polarised response to the sexual subject. At one end, there is an 
increased criminalisation of LGBT lives, where not just the sex act but the very 
identity of homosexuals is criminalised, such as in Nigeria, Uganda, Kenya, 
Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of the Congo and, to some extent, Russia.9 In 
societies where gays and lesbians are denied legal recognition, such denial mobilises 
resistance as well as a claim for social inclusion. At the opposite end of the spectrum 
the struggle for rights claims has challenged the pathologising and criminalising 
of homosexuality, resulting in legal recognition in countries such as Nepal, 
Cambodia, Chile, South Africa, several European countries and the United States. 
The judicial or legislative recognition of same-sex marriages is generally regarded 
as the culmination point of LGBT advocacy and the struggle for legitimacy and 
7  UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discriminatory Laws and Practices and Acts of 
Violence against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, UN 
GAOR, 19th sess, Agenda Items 2 and 8, UN Doc A/HRC/19/41 (17 November 2011); 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Discrimination and Violence against Individuals 
Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, UN GAOR, 29th sess, Agenda Items 
2 and 8, UN Doc A/HRC/29/23 (4 May 2015).
8  Makau Mutua, ‘Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights’ (2001) 
42 Harvard International Law Journal 201.
9  See list of countries criminalising homosexuality and same-sex conduct at ‘76 Countries 
Where Homosexuality is Illegal’ on Colin Stewart, Erasing 76 Crimes (12 August 2016) 
<https://76crimes.com/76-countries-where-homosexuality-is-illegal/>.
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equality.10 At the international level, recognition through the adoption of the 
non-binding but influential Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (‘Yogyakarta Principles’), as well as the Human Rights Council’s recent 
decision to establish a Special Procedure appointing an independent expert on 
sexual orientation and gender identity, are two moments that mark the zenith 
of LGBT advocacy within the human rights apparatus.11 In the choice between 
criminality and legitimacy, the latter is clearly preferable to being an ostracised 
criminal deviant. The struggle for recognition through rights would seem an 
obvious strategy, given that it affords access to economic and social inclusion, 
public standing and legibility – all of which are the core objectives of human rights 
pursuits. Doubtless, it is important that rights continue to be pursued by and for 
illegible constituencies. In the context of homosexuality, it is indeed better to have 
legal recognition, including the option to get married as a gay person, as opposed 
to having an active law that not only persecutes homosexual conduct, but also 
criminalises the very identity of homosexuals. There seems no reasonable argument 
against invoking human rights to challenge legal provisions that call for life 
imprisonment or the death penalty for being gay.
At the same time, we need to inquire into the work that queer is doing in 
international human rights. As Dianne Otto has argued, the Yogyakarta Principles, 
while important, are largely based on biological assumptions about sexuality 
10  See list of countries that have legalised same-sex marriage at ‘Countries Where Gay Marriage 
is Legal’, Ranker <http://ranker.com/list/countries-where-gay-marriage-is-legal/web-
infoguy>; see also Robert Wintemute, ‘From “Sex Rights” to “Love Rights”: Partnership 
Rights as Human Rights’ in Nicholas Bamforth (ed), Sex Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 
(Oxford University Press, 2005) 186. 
11  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Council Establishes Mandate 
against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ 
(Media Release, 28 June 2016) <http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20220&LangID=E>; Yogyakarta Principles. There are several 
significant references to LGBT rights building up the to the Yogyakarta Principles, including, 
for example, Human Rights Council, ‘Joint Statement on Human Rights Violations Based 
on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, 3rd sess, (1 December 2006); Human Rights 
Council, ‘Joint Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity – 
Delivered by Argentina on Behalf of 66 States’ (18 December 2008) <http://arc-
international.net/global-advocacy/sogi-statements/2008-joint-statement/>; Human 
Rights Council, ‘Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’, 27th sess, Agenda 
Item 8, UN Doc A/HRC/27/32 (2 October 2014); Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights, ‘Combatting Discrimination Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity’ <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Discrimination/Pages/LGBT.aspx>, as well 
as the report of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Born Free and 
Equal: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in International Human Rights Law’, UN 
Doc HR/PUB/12/06 (2012); and its campaign for the equal rights of LGBT persons: 
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘UN Human Rights Office Launches 
Unprecedented Global Campaign for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Equality’ 
(Media Release, 26 July 2013) <http://www.prweb.com/releases/2013/7/prweb 
10967571.htm>.
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located in a dualist heteronormative framework that ignores the dynamic 
understandings of gender and gender identity as socially constructed. Gender 
remains confined to two categories, male and female, with the ‘gay’ family 
constructed as monogamous, nuclear and having an emphasis on procreation. 
And gender identity continues to be associated with transgender persons rather 
than as something every person possesses.12
Queer radicality that promised to delink gender as well as sexuality from 
naturalised, normalised, biological categories, finds itself swept into the normative 
vortex of human rights. In other words, queer advocacy finds itself doing the very 
governance work in sexual rights that it sought to challenge. It is thus traversing 
the same route as gender, where governance feminism has increasingly aligned 
itself with the regulatory apparatus of the state and the normative order of gender, 
as well as walking the corridors of power within the UN system.13 The increased 
visibility of LGBT groups in Human Rights Council meetings and the fact that 
the Security Council has taken cognisance of this issue are significant, but they do 
not speak to progress or indicate success in queering human rights. To the 
contrary, they serve as evidence of the de-radicalisation of queer in human rights.
One of the earliest moments to alert us to this de-radicalisation emerged when 
a cache of thousands of disturbing photos taken by US army persons in Abu 
Ghraib prison during the then US-led invasion of Iraq hit the headline news in 
late 2003. Jasbir Puar analysed the responses to these photos, revealing how they 
were almost exclusively presented through a sexual lens, where Iraqi prisoners were 
being intentionally humiliated through sexualised practices that were assumed to 
be repulsive, emasculating and shameful to Muslims. Occluded in such a reading 
were the racial, cultural and gendered dimensions of the torture. These erasures 
reinforced the liberal media’s homophobic practice of caricaturing Muslims, here 
through traumatic images of pure abjection that violently satirise Muslim sexuality/
subjectivity as primitive and grotesque. The brutally racist and sexist dimensions 
that fell out of this avidly consumed cache of photographs remained largely 
unquestioned by queer scholars and advocates, thereby leaving in place the Western 
supposition that repressed sexuality is a defining characteristic of the West’s most 
prominent, adversarial, cultural ‘other’ – namely, ‘the Muslim’. Queer operated to 
shore up US ‘sexual exceptionalism’ that is used to indoctrinate the sexual subject 
into a belief in liberal superiority. Egregious acts such as torture were turned into 
a ‘positive register of the valorisation of (American) life’ that continues to mark it 
as progressive and inclusive.14
12  Otto, above n 5, 310–11.
13  Janet Halley, Split Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton 
University Press, 2006); Janet Halley, P Kotiswaran, C Thomas et al, ‘From the International 
to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work and Sex Trafficking: 
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Gender 335.
14  Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University Press, 
2007) 3.
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What emerged was the collusion of homosexuality and American nationalism 
generated through the rhetoric of patriotic inclusion as well as homonationalism 
pursued by gays and queers.15 In other words, ‘queer’ came to be deployed in 
ways that were complicit with dominant formations of sexuality as ‘homonorma-
tivity’. Sexual exceptionalism continues to operate in ways that include some queer 
subjects, that is, those who conform or assimilate – the ‘good homosexuals’ – 
while it simultaneously casts out non-compliant sexual, gender and racial others. 
‘Queer’ comes to be aligned with a set of (white) secular norms which reinforce 
the racist representations of Islam and Muslims as homophobic and culturally 
backward, where practices such as gay marriage serve as a marker for the distinc-
tion between a racialised, primitive, Muslim population and upright, proper, 
homosexual citizens. It thus serves not as a signifier of sexual identity or sexual 
subversion, but merely as a defused inscription of socio-political difference within 
a larger modality of hierarchical regulation and governance of gender, sexuality 
and gender identity.
Similarly, the meeting by the Security Council to discuss LGBT rights in 
light of the IS attacks on gays in Syria and Iraq did not necessarily advance the 
rights of those on whose behalf such closed meetings were held. It did, however, 
provide further justification for the deployment of deadly weaponry in an already 
confused and lethal militaristic map that has produced untold civilian casualties 
and traumas in the Middle East. A focus on human security has come to increasingly 
appropriate progressive agendas, as has been similarly evident in the women’s 
human rights sphere, specifically in the context of sexual violence against women, 
anti-trafficking and gender, peace and security.16 To all intents and purposes, the 
meeting was more about the propaganda war than about advancing the rights 
of LGBT persons, within Syria or globally. Exhibiting the already endless list of 
atrocities committed by IS serves as one of the continuing justifications for the 
bombardment of an already devastated landscape and population, and a non- 
UN-sanctioned military intervention where no one is held accountable for the 
lives lost and harms done. Such meetings are not coupled with a change in strategy 
to defeat IS that may save more LGBT lives; indeed, the military strategy remains 
unaffected and completely disconnected from these discussions. Further, as 
discussed in the context of the Abu Ghraib photos, it may be that such a response 
exacerbates the image of Muslims as misogynist, sexist, homophobic and culturally 
backward. And it also poses a dilemma for the Middle Eastern/Arab queers who 
seek to oppose oppression within their communities without serving the militaristic 
justifications and brutalities inflicted by the sponsors of the US-led military 
bombardments of Syria and elsewhere. 
A further related consideration that puts the radical credentials of queer into 
question is the often one-dimensional paternalistic reasoning that if legal 
15  Ibid 77.
16  Ratna Kapur, ‘Gender, Sovereignty, and the Rise of a Sexual Security Regime in International 
Law and Postcolonial India’ (2013) 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law 317.
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recognition of homosexuality and/or same-sex marriage is permissible in the 
United States, Canada or France, it is because these societies are just inherently 
better, more civilised and mature than, say, Uganda or the Caribbean or other 
‘underdeveloped’ parts of the world, including India. Such reasoning deflects 
attention, for example, from the way in which Christian evangelicals from the 
United States have been implicated in partly producing an anti-gay agenda not 
only in Uganda, but also in other African countries such as South Sudan and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.17 It is not Islamic orthodoxy but Christian 
evangelicalism from the United States that is driving a homophobic agenda, 
easily received within a context where conservative sexual and gender norms, 
constituted partly by the legacies of the colonial past, continue to resonate in the 
postcolonial present. Economic sanctions or the withdrawal of aid by countries 
whose citizens are implicated in producing or reinforcing homophobia in the very 
places being punitively targeted by such measures, requires that both the injury 
and the restorative/rehabilitative interventions be rigorously problematised.
And, finally, a position that continues to associate human rights and freedom 
with the West, while certain African, Islamic and non-Western societies and their 
leaders are cast as retrogressive and barbaric, does not implicate the ways in which 
homophobia continues to flourish in Western liberal democracies. Abhorrence of 
homosexuality and the homosexual continues to exist as an ideological position 
across these hemispheric divides. For example, while 2015 saw the striking down 
of discriminatory bans on same-sex marriage in the United States, and more legal 
protections based on sexual orientation and gender identity have been enacted at 
the municipal level, the American right wing continues to support anti-gay 
legislation within the United States as well as in other parts of the world, including 
in Uganda and Russia. Similarly, shortly before the move to legalise same-sex 
marriages in France in May 2013, Paris witnessed some of the largest protests seen 
since the 1960s, vast rallies by those opposed to the move to legalise same-sex 
marriage; opposition which has been sustained and continuous.18
17  Among those US evangelicals who have led the anti-gay campaign in Uganda and elsewhere 
is Scott Lively, co-author of The Pink Swastika, a book in which he argued that homosexuals 
were the true inventors of Nazism and responsible for the Nazi atrocities. See Scott Lively 
and Kevin Abrams, The Pink Swastika: Homosexuality in the Nazi Party (Veritas Aeterna 
Press, 4th edn, 2002). See also Antony Loewenstein, ‘US Evangelicals in Africa Put Faith 
into Action, but Some Accused of Intolerance’, The Guardian (online) (19 March 2015) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/mar/18/us-evangelicals-africa-charity- 
missionaries-homosexuality>.
18  ‘France: ION 2013-404 of 17 May 2013 Opening Marriage to Couples of the Same Sex’, 
Fabregat Perulles Sales (29 May 2013) <http://www.fabregat-perulles-sales.com/blog/
france-loi-n-2013-404-du-17-mai-2013-ouvrant-le-mariage-aux-couples-de-personnes-de-
meme-sexe/>; Tom Heneghan, ‘French Conservatives March against Government “Family-
phobia”’, Reuters (online) (2 February 2014) <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-
protests-idUSBREA110AG20140202>; Kim Willsher, ‘France’s Future at Risk from 
“Unnatural Families”, Say Conservative Protestors’, The Guardian (online) (3 February 
2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/02/france-protests-families-paris- 
lyon>.
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Postcolonial queering of human rights?
In human rights, queer has been critiqued precisely for replicating agendas that 
are based on prevalent models in the United States and Europe, erasing or 
marginalising articulations of non-Western perspectives on sex and sexuality, 
while also shoring up the purported civilisational superiority of Western states. 
At one level, the critique suggests that the gay rights movement is nothing more 
than a neo-colonial enterprise that annuls the possibility of a valid, postcolonial, 
Asian narrative of the homoerotic/homosocial.19 As Joseph Massad argues, the 
production of a specific sexual subject in LGBT international human rights advo-
cacy is a culturally imperialistic imposition of Western ontology on Arabs.20 He 
states that a certain modern Western conception of sexuality and sexual identity 
is seen as replacing other non-Western/indigenous forms of sexual practices that 
are not hinged to ‘identity’.21 Momin Rahman similarly argues that there are 
no monolithic or consistent cultural formations of Muslim or Islamic notions 
of sexuality and that the ‘Western’ version of gay sexuality is itself culturally 
specific.22 Rahman does, however, question Massad’s contention that there has 
been a consistent trajectory of the ‘gay international’ in the global arena, pointing 
to empirical assessments confirming that different NGOs and international 
organisations have had mixed results in their advocacy.23
There have been several efforts at trying to negotiate the terrain between a 
prescriptive ‘gay international’ and taking an anti-Western stand that does not slip 
into an essentialising, authentic Third World position – that is – to retrieve the 
critical value of queer. Elaborating on the dilemma posed when evaluating 
the impact of Western discourses of LGBT rights on Third World contexts, Rahul 
Rao questions whether it is possible to find an effective language in which ‘to 
criticize the hierarchies and supremacism that lurk within the cosmopolitan 
politics of LGBT solidarity without minimizing or ignoring the impressiveness 
of communitarian homophobia’.24 The suggestion is that there is a danger of 
slipping into a hegemonic communitarian approach that arrogates to itself 
both the right to determine who is/is not ‘authentically’ queer, and the right to 
prescribe how sexual identities and practices ought to be expressed in a non-
Western context. In light of this danger, Rao asks whether the ‘gay international’ 
offers anything useful in terms of solidarity with ‘traditional’ sexual ontologies 
that are experienced as problematic by the sexually stigmatised subject in the 
19  Stewart Chang, ‘The Postcolonial Problem for Global Gay Rights’ (2014) 32 Boston 
University International Law Journal 329.
20  Joseph Massad, ‘Re-orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World’ (2002) 14 
Public Culture 361; Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
21  Massad, ‘Re-orienting Desire’, above n 21, 361–2. 
22  Momin Rahman, Homosexualities, Muslim Cultures and Modernity (Palgrave MacMillan, 
2014).
23  Ibid 80.
24  Rahul Rao, Third World Protest: Between Home and the World (Oxford University Press, 2010) 
176.
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postcolonial domestic space, and that exact tremendous personal costs.25 What 
emerges is the need for contemporary modes of queerness to be in conversation 
with the ‘global gay identity’, as well as with the local genealogies, practices and 
idioms of same-sex desire, whose diverse manifestations cohere within a single 
nationality or territory.
Similarly, Gayatri Gopinath resists any effort to counter the franchise of the ‘gay 
international’, a product of the Euro-American imperium, through the resurrection 
of a Third World, authentic lesbian subject.26 She dislodges the fixed, prescriptive 
understandings of same-sex desire, using a ‘queer diaspora’ framework and her 
specific focus on queer female diasporic subjectivity.27 She seeks a more nuanced 
approach through an examination of what are recognisable cultural texts such 
as musical genres, films, novels and videos that are both transnational as well as 
rooted in the politics of the local.28 For example, in her discussion of Bollywood 
cinema, Gopinath focuses on queer female subjectivities in popular culture in 
order to disrupt the representations of nationalist, jingoistic, anti-foreign narratives 
that are closely aligned with Indian national identity, as well as the male-male 
relationship that finds its way into such narratives as a part and parcel of the 
patriarchal, national story. She offers a postcolonial queer analysis that stands 
in sharp contrast to the ideological grain of progressive, liberal, feminist and First 
World signifiers of non-heterosexual sexualities, while resisting the lure to resurrect 
a Third World, authentic lesbian subject as a counter to the franchise on the ‘gay 
international’. Her position is not to eulogise the formation of a postcolonial 
queer female subject within Indian popular culture, but to illustrate how such 
formations are both capable of migrating and pollinating other cultural spaces in 
ways that do not fit within a homosexual/heterosexual, male/female, us/them, 
the West and the Rest theoretical binaries.29 While Gopinath does not specifically 
present her argument in the context of human rights, her analysis is useful to 
consider for such a context. Given the tension between universalist prescriptions 
of human rights and cultural relativism, seeking a queer negotiation beyond this 
destructive binary remains crucial. Such arguments retain the possibility of queer 
radicality and its normatively disruptive and subversive possibilities, though the 
question remains whether this radicality can be sustained once brought within 
perimeters of human rights.
The arguments of Massad, Rao, Gopinath and others open up the possibility 
for scrutinising how postcolonial sexual subjectivities are constructed and 
deployed, and moves us away from a thesis based exclusively on the dialectics 
of sexual repression/excess and sexual liberation. While both sexual repression as 
25  Ibid 178; Rahul Rao, ‘Queer Questions’ (2014) 16 International Feminist Journal of Politics 
199.
26  Gayatri Gopinath, Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures (Duke 
University Press, 2005).
27  Ibid 6–7. 
28  Ibid 21. 
29  Ibid 50. 
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well as sexual excess and deviancy have been modes of characterising the native 
subject and have today been incorporated into the justification for ostensibly 
emancipatory imperial interventions in non-Western territories, the sexual 
liberation thesis based on a rights agenda does not examine how such moves 
reinforce the state’s regulatory authority and power to paralyse the overt 
enunciation of sexual subjectivities. Similarly, the liberationist critiques risk 
slipping into a search for authentic Asian practices, identities and sexual 
subjectivities.
Despite the more nuanced positions by postcolonial scholars, it remains evident 
that the contemporary discourse of homosexuality at an international level, and 
specifically within the context of human rights advocacy, continues to be inevitably 
presupposed and constituted against a cultural ‘other’.30 The hegemonic Euro-
American signifiers for same-sex love/non-heterosexual desire are fast becoming 
the prescribed blueprint across the world. The prescriptive gay subject is based on 
specific assumptions, including the idea that this subject exists in opposition 
to heterosexuality and that the fulfilment of same-sex desire and identity can be 
found through public visibility and inclusion in the heteronormative structures 
and the patriarchal institutions of the family. This powerful articulation of the end 
goals of same-sex desire marginalises and de-legitimates other articulations and 
subjectivities in the non-Euro-American contexts. The ultimate performance 
of this identity rests in an ‘out of the closet’ LGBT identity that is prescribed as 
the antidote for all Third World settings. This strategy assumes something about 
freedom and what (queer) freedom should look like – that is, outness as opposed 
to the closet.31 My argument is that such a strategy based on the recovery and 
inclusion of ‘queer voices’ or ‘same-sex desire’ is not up to the task of countering 
the newly emerging hegemonic, colonising queer in human rights.
The influential framework of ‘coming out’ narratives also tends to repudiate the 
varied genealogies and modalities of queer subjectivity, instead locating the issue 
of sexuality within the narrow dialectic of visibility and invisibility. It neither 
captures the very real and particular dangers, anxieties, ambivalences, dilemmas 
and crises of homoerotic experience, nor the plural and diverse ways in which 
gender, gender identity and sexuality may be experienced, lived and performed in 
different cultural contexts.32 Invisibility at times comes at a high emotional cost, 
30  Amr Shalakany, ‘On a Certain Queer Discomfort with Orientalism’ (2007) 101 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 125 (Shalakany further complicates the relationship 
between Orientalism or Western prescriptions of sexuality and the human rights of sexual 
minorities in the context of Egypt).
31  Hassan El Menyawi, ‘Activism from the Closet: Gay Rights Strategising in Egypt’ (2006) 
7 Melbourne Journal of International Law 28; Aeyal Gross, ‘Queer Theory and International 
Human Rights Law: Does Each Person Have a Sexual Orientation?’ (2007) 101 American 
Society of International Law Proceedings 129.
32  Brinda Bose and Subhabrata Bhattacharyya (eds), The Phobic and the Erotic: The Politics of 
Sexualities in Contemporary India (Seagull Books, 2007); Arvind Narrain and Gautam Bhan 
(eds), Because I Have a Voice: Queer Politics in India (Yoda Press, 2005).
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but may be a necessary form of self-protection – which may also mean the protection 
of others – in many parts of the world, especially but not only where homosexuality 
is criminalised, and where being an out queer automatically means risking all 
modes of direct and indirect penalisation. The gaining of queer selfhood through 
visibility may involve great losses, ranging from familial and social rejection and 
ostracism, to being deprived of home, livelihood and services, to discrimination 
and humiliation, to violent assault and sometimes even death at the hands of the 
bigoted and/or the ignorant.
It is certainly problematic to allege that the out ‘gay international’ produced 
by hegemonic ‘Western’ notions of sexuality/sexual subjectivity is clear evidence 
of an imposition by ‘the West on the Rest’, as Massad suggests, yet it is just as 
problematic to assume a monolithic ‘Rest’ in this equation, for the West’s ‘others’ 
form a set constituted by heterogeneous, culturally specific, internally differentiated 
yet cohesive subsets committed to varied ideologies, groupings, practices and 
knowledge paradigms. Moreover, given such diversity, it is obvious that queer 
subsets within the set of any particular queer culture may be wholly or partially 
invisible to one another, may function hierarchically, and/or may not have a 
common language or common interactive ground: for instance, metropolitan 
queers may have no grasp of what it means to be queer in provincial/rural 
contexts, and vice versa; queer men and queer women might have different 
priorities and approaches to complex identity or rights issues, and so on. It may 
be that queerness is not something that requires visibility through rights, which 
paradoxically can produce invisibility through its normative thrust, but rather, 
recognition as already existing and thriving within certain contexts and cultures, 
on the outskirts of human rights, a strategy to which I return in the final segment 
of this chapter. Such already present queerness renders queer human rights 
advocacy an intervention rather than a liberation. As an intervention, human 
rights can also become a form of cultural imperialism, as well as un-freedom for 
the ‘other’. The argument here is not that there should be no engagement with 
rights. Continuous engagement is essential if only to push back the hegemonic 
drive of human rights that assumes to itself the power to determine how to be gay 
in the world or what constitutes oppression and the sources of oppression for 
LGBT persons in different parts of the world. Continuous engagement reveals 
what gets occluded or erased in human rights’ self-appointed role as saviour and 
how queer becomes complicit in this project. There remains a need to complicate 
ideas of human rights as a progressive force that continues with the efforts of the 
queer project, together with questioning the faith that it has the ability to remedy, 
repair or restore the lives of stigmatised sexual ‘others’.
The limits of queer
While the enjoyment of human rights remains an important political project, 
such endeavours do not necessarily contain the possibility of producing the 
radical outcomes and transformations that have inspired queer politics. Rights 
remain tenuous and ambivalent and do not resolve the hatreds and animosities 
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that continue to circulate, even after recognition has been secured.33 In fact, the 
voracious reach and spread of LGBT advocacy has marginalised or erased 
the multiple forms and arrangements that constitute gender and gender identity 
in different cultural contexts. Human rights have a proclivity to aggravate the 
stigmatisation and precariousness of those queers who remain unintelligible either 
because they fail or refuse to conform to gender and sexual norms. At the same 
time, they function to incorporate the sexual subject into the regulatory apparatus 
of the state, where, for example, the recognition of the rights of same-sex couples 
enabled them to walk with the state to ‘tie the knot’, eventually hoping to parent 
or adopt a child, and embrace all of the trappings of heteronormative, reproductive 
bliss. The end result is not an emancipated sexual subject, but one who is regulated 
and sequestered in and through the normative scaffolding of (hetero)sexual rights.
My argument is that there is a need to recognise the limited possibilities of 
queering the terrain of human rights when the sexual subject comes to claim her 
rights. The radical moment is transient or fleeting, given that rights are a discursive 
space amenable to a number of competing and powerful agendas. Ultimately, the 
de-queering of queer in human rights appears inevitable.
In the international arena, LGBT human rights advocacy has incorporated gay 
sexuality into a linear regulatory framework. It is arguable that an uncomplicated 
approach to sexual subjectivity based on identity and framed within the 
heterosexual/homosexual binary is to be welcomed, given the prevailing and 
malicious pockets of homophobia that continue to circulate. And given the 
precarity of LGBT rights, such a strategy may be all that stands between LGBT 
people and the virulent homophobia of orthodox and conservative religious 
groups at the international and domestic levels. While these interventions may 
be breaching the borders of heteronormativity, the point is that protection from 
persecution and intelligibility of some sexual minorities through human rights is 
neither radical nor transformative, but regulatory. Through moulding illegitimate 
desire into a mimesis of more approved forms, queering international human 
rights appears to involve nothing more than the wholesale pursuit of the aspirations 
33  For example, in 2013, the Indian Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling in 2009 that 
read down section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, an old colonial law that criminalised 
sodomy (regardless of sexuality): Suresh Kumar Koushal v NAZ Foundation (2013) 1 SCC 
1 (2014) (11 December 2013) (Supreme Court of India). Yet, even during the period when 
homosexuality had been decriminalised, queer lives remained precarious. In a case decided 
shortly after the 2009 decision, the Allahabad High Court ordered the Aligarh Muslim 
University to reinstate Professor Ramchandra Siras, who was dismissed from his university 
post in 2010 on the grounds of gross misconduct. Siras was gay. Dr Shrinivas Ramchandra 
Siras v The Aligarh Muslim University, Civil Misc Writ Petition No 17549 of 2010 (1 April 
2010) (High Court of Allahabad). The Court agreed with the petitioner’s argument that the 
actions of the university violated his fundamental rights to privacy as well as equality under 
the Constitution. Yet, within days of the Court ruling ordering his reinstatement, Siras was 
found dead in his home, under suspicious circumstances, and his death remains unsolved. 
Siras was in all likelihood murdered despite his legal victory and the fact that homosexuality 
had been decriminalised at the time his case was heard.
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sanctioned and valorised by the heterosexual regime, in order to prove their own 
humanity, feel ‘normal’ and have a sense of stability and social belonging. 
It emerges as a governance project. In the move towards ‘normality’, the 
‘abnormality’ of the queer subject is sanitised, and rendered less objectionable 
to the ‘normal’ and ‘natural’ heterosexual majority. While it is important to give 
greater acknowledgement to the moments of social disruption produced by 
same-sex marriage, that is, to identify the queer moment, the logic underlying the 
act and its outcomes mandate deeper scrutiny. After all, it is in the small moments, 
in the minutiae of daily life within the larger frames of relationships, as in marriage, 
adoption, conception or consensual sex, that state power is most immediately 
exercised and felt, and where it regulates, manages and governs. 
Beyond anti-normativity/normativity
The anti-normativity impulse of queer theory, which has brought a rich and 
radical brand of politics to the understanding of sexuality and gender,34 seems 
to have lost steam in its engagements with human rights. As it is increasingly 
brought within the vision of human rights, queer sexuality ends up as normalised, 
naturalised, procreative and universalised. While the challenges to colonial and 
persecutory laws have been important, the radicality of queer has been lost in this 
pursuit. The more queer finds traction within the arena of human rights, the more 
embedded it has become within dominant racial, religious and cultural norms 
that continue to operate along an inclusionary and exclusionary divide. This 
pursuit may be indicative of how queer itself may have gone normative. Even 
though queer has invariably sought to distinguish itself from normative projects, 
and from LGBT politics that have been cast as a distinctly more liberal enterprise, 
it is not apparent that this distinction has been maintained in the field and practice 
of human rights.
There has been a provocative call from some quarters to distance the queer 
project from anti-normativity as its default position.35 This move is based on the 
insight that queer critique continues to be persistently pursued by the norm that 
devours nearly everything and anything that seeks a space beyond or outside the 
norm. This call invites scholars and advocates to think about ‘what might queer 
theory do if its allegiance to antinormativity was rendered less secure?’36 More 
specifically, what does it mean to think about queer that is not just a defence 
against normativity and identitarian politics? The challenge is not intended as a 
call to disengage with critique, but to explore the alternative spaces that critique 
34  David M Halperin, Saint Foucault: Towards a Gay Hagiography (Oxford University Press, 
1995); Lee Edelman, Homographesis: Essays in Gay Literary and Cultural Theory (Routledge, 
1994).
35  Robyn Wiegman and Elizabeth A Wilson, ‘Introduction: Antinormativity’s Queer 
Conventions’ (2015) 26(1) Differences: A Journal of Feminist Cultural Studies 1. 
36  Ibid 1. 
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may open up in terms of histories, sexuality, political and social desires, as well 
as affect.
In line with the concern that underlies this challenge, I have questioned how 
anti-normativity has been helpful in the field of human rights.37 The critiques 
of the human rights project have exposed the discursive operations of rights and 
how it emerges as a governance project primarily concerned with ordering the 
lives of non-European peoples, rather than as a liberating force. Central to this 
critique is how the pre-given liberal rational subject of human rights is contingent 
and one of the prime effects of power. While the resistive subject of human rights 
has challenged and disrupted the governing norms that structure the human 
rights project, these temporal moments have not translated into a lasting and 
larger transformative project. Instead, as I argue in this chapter, anti-normativity 
does not appear to have helped in the discovering and uncovering of what has 
been muted in normativity. Anti-normativity may generate continuity in the field, 
but once queer has gone normative, what then remains of queer emancipatory 
possibilities?38 For example, David L Eng has argued that the emergence of what 
he describes as ‘queer liberalism’ affirms the freedom and familial ties of specific 
types of queer subjects to the exclusion of race, which is consigned to the ‘dustbin 
of history’, rather than exposing and engaging with how race and sexuality 
are mutually constitutive and coeval.39 Some scholars have argued in favour of 
rejecting the anti-normative stance of queer politics as a way in which to create 
the possibility of engagement with the dynamism of the norm, which is more 
extensive and differentiated than an anti-normative stand allows for.40 According 
to this position, normal, norms and normativity are complex, and an oppositional 
anti-normative stand obscures this complexity and ‘immobilises the activity 
of norms’.41
While this turn speaks to the vibrant possibilities that remain unexplored in 
queer politics, I remain sceptical of the underlying assumption, namely that ‘the 
norm, or normative space, knows no outside’, and that there is no place from 
which to claim to be exterior to the norm, and to ‘possess an otherness which 
would actually make it other’.42 It may be that within legal terms and the human 
37  Kapur, above n 16. 
38  See David L Eng, Judith Halberstam and José Esteban Muñoz, ‘Introduction: What’s 
Queer about Queer Studies Now?’ (2005) 23(3–4) Social Text 1. Eng et al have described 
how this result in queer politics more generally is the equivalent of queer liberalism: 
‘[m]echanisms of normalization [that] have endeavored to organize not only gay and lesbian 
politics but also the internal workings of the field itself, attempting to constitute its governing 
logic around certain privileged subjects, standards of sexual conduct, and political and 
intellectual engagements’: at 4.
39  David L Eng, The Feeling of Kinship: Queer Liberalism and the Racialization of Intimacy 
(Duke University Press, 2010) x–xiv, 57.
40  Wiegman and Wilson, above n 35, 11, 14. 
41  Ibid 14. 
42  François Ewald, ‘A Power Without an Exterior’ in Timothy J Armstrong (ed), Michel Foucault 
Philosopher: Essays Translated from the French and German (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992) 
169, 173. 
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rights arena, norms abound; yet this project is itself bounded and limited by a 
liberal scaffolding which provides little space for radical alternatives or for the 
‘failed’ queer who refuses normative compliance.43 I conclude by suggesting 
that we need to move beyond the anti-normative/normative duality. We need 
to investigate more thoughtfully and consciously what possibilities for queer 
radicality lie beyond normativity, as well as anti-normativity, that remain 
constrained within the liberal imaginary. This requires that we decentre the almost 
unquestioned alignment of queer with the Euro –American genealogy, US 
mappings of queer and US political projects.44 
Recapturing queer radicality
In this vein, I turn to the radical and imaginary possibilities that lie outside the 
limited circumference of human rights. This involves looking into spaces beyond 
the liberal imaginary that are not illiberal but non-liberal, and where there 
exist an abundant supply of queer possibilities and radicality. I show how this can 
be done with the story of Lalla (also known as Lal Ded or Lalleswari), a young 
female mystic from the fourteenth century who was born in and around 1320 
in modern day Kashmir, a divided state in northern India. While there are few 
biographical facts available about her life, what is known is that Lalla was married 
at the age of 12, wherein she was subjected to untold physical abuse and 
mistreatment. At the age of 26, she chose to leave her marital home, renouncing 
the material life including her marriage and defying all social conventions by 
forging her life as a mystic within the tradition of the Kashmiri Shaivite sect of 
renouncers.45 Lalla became an ascetic who wandered about naked, creating and 
writing mystic poetry called a vatsun or Vakh (speech, or more accurately, 
utterance) and reciting proverbs as part of her process of sustained introspective 
contemplation.46 Her poetry witnesses a breaking away from socially and sexually 
43  Sara Ahmed, The Promise of Happiness (Duke University Press, 2010).
44  Anjali Arondekar and Geeta Patel, ‘Area Impossible: Notes Toward an Introduction’ (2016) 
22 GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 151.
45  The basis of this philosophy lies in texts composed between the fourth and eighth centuries 
(the Saiva-agamas) that concern the structure of the cosmos and how to acquire release 
from the cycle of birth and death. This release is secured by recognising the ineffable and 
unitary essence of the universe that is known as the Shiva-principle. While there are many 
variants of the Saivite tradition, in the non-dualist branch of this tradition, there is a 
recognition that the phenomenal world is real only to the extent that it is perceived as existing 
through consciousness and that no object can exist independent of perception. This position 
culminates in the view that there is no world outside of the self. For discussion, see Ranjit 
Hoskote, I, Lalla: The Poems of Lal D d (Ranjit Hoskote trans, Penguin, 2012).
46  In one of her verses, Lalla states: ‘My guru gave me only one advice – from outside transfer 
the attention within. That became Lalla’s initiation. That is why I began to wander naked.’ 
Whether Lalla was a nude ascetic makes little difference to her inward journey where all 
vestiges of materiality including the body are relinquished. Other female mystics have similarly 
wandered naked, including Akka Mahadevi, who lived in South India in the twelfth century. 
Defying all social norms and customs, she wandered nude with only her long hair covering 
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defined norms and experiencing a new way of being free. It is at times highly erotic 
as her quest for self-realisation is also a quest for unconditional love. This self-
realisation and freedom is found in the resolution of her identity as a separate 
individual being, into that which will give her freedom: a conscious self, from 
where the world is perceived and wherein the world also resolves.
Lalla deplored religion and religious practice, especially rituals and external 
worship that for her could never provide the means for what she describes as self-
realisation or freedom. Her life and poetry are exemplary of her own position to 
refuse a life governed by social expectations and their accompanying prohibitions 
and constraints. While Lalla’s inward journey is neither sexually explicit nor 
based on sexual identity, her journey at the metaphysical and philosophical level 
represents an experience outside of binary thought rather than reliant on sexual 
acts and identities, which tend to be the focus of human rights advocacy. To be 
more specific, it represents a position outside the norm that does not exist in 
opposition to it, but thrives despite its presence. It is a position that simultaneously 
produces dissidence and also introduces the possibility for wide-ranging political 
and epistemological transformation. 
Human rights constitute a ‘civilised’ community and a privileged circle of 
certain kinds of human beings and human alliances, an inclusion and legitimacy 
that is denied to failed queer subjects. Lalla’s story serves as the metaphor for the 
crowd of outcasts, like the ‘homosexual dissident’ that works towards a radical 
alternative mode of being.47 It is not a location that is based on sex acts or sexuality, 
but is a direction that queer politics can take in order to retain or resume its 
radicality. While it may be argued that this position represents a form of sexual 
evasiveness, when homosexual sex-acts may demand visibility and an aggressive 
strategy of ‘show and tell’ in a homophobic world, such a response obscures that 
which is queer about this kind of strategy – the productive possibilities that lie in 
recapturing a radicality based on an alternative epistemology. The queering of 
human rights ultimately takes us in the direction of more rights, but does not 
necessarily retain a radical politics or the possibility of queering of human rights. 
In fact, as discussed, it may take us along the road to respectability and harbour 
within it a lethal and destructive agenda – of militarisation and violence as 
resolution, which marked the Security Council meeting on LGBT rights with 
which this chapter began.
Queer becomes implicated in the production of governmental power through 
which it also acquires visibility and presence, ultimately collaborating with the very 
power it sets out to challenge. Its subversive capacities recede, and it becomes a 
technique for assimilation and co-optation. The story of Lalla proposes another 
her body: ibid; Jaishree Kak, ‘Introduction’ in Mystical Verses of Lall : A Journey of Self 
Realisation (Jaishree Kak trans, Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 2007); Jaishree Kak Odin, To 
the Other Shore: Lalla’s Life and Poetry (Vitasta, 1999).
47  Leela Gandhi, ‘A Case of Radical Kinship: Edward Carpenter and the Politics of Anti-Colonial 
Sexual Dissidence’ in Brinda Bose and Subhabrata Bhattacharyya (eds), The Phobic and the 
Erotic: The Politics of Sexualities in Contemporary India (Seagull Books, 2007) 92. 
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possible trajectory, that is, perhaps a utopian space that opens up possibilities of 
developing radical alternative associations that are not based on gender binaries 
or sexual hierarchies. Linking queer to a tradition and context that has been 
projected historically as backward and uncivilised not only brings it into close 
alliance with that which is productively different as well as indeterminate, but 
also repudiates the heteronormative/homonormative and reproductive processes 
that continue to ensnare queer when it steps onto the terrain of human rights and 
strip it of its radicality.
8 Homoglobalism 
The emergence of global  
gay governance 
Aeyal Gross*
In September 2016, the UN Human Rights Council appointed an Independent 
Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual 
orientation and gender identity (SOGI).1 Less than a month later, the World Bank 
President announced the appointment of an advisor on SOGI, a newly created 
senior position tasked with promoting lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and 
intersex (LGBTI) inclusion throughout the work of the World Bank.2 Both 
developments are part of a wider trend of global institutions beginning to engage 
with LGBT/LGBTI3 issues.
In this chapter, I identify and analyse these developments, arguing that we are 
witnessing an emerging phenomenon I call ‘global gay governance’ (GGG). 
By ‘gay governance’, following the work of scholars on governance feminism,4 
I mean the forms in which LGBT advocacy and ideas get incorporated into 
*  Previous versions of this chapter were presented at the Symposium to Celebrate the Work of 
Dianne Otto held at SOAS, the University of London, September 2016, and at the Faculty 
Seminar, Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law, November 2016. I am grateful to the participants 
in these forums for their helpful comments. Thanks to Roy Mattar and Idan Seger for their 
research assistance. Thanks to Mimi Oorloff for her assistance in preparing the chapter for 
publication in this volume. Special thanks to Di Otto for inviting for me to be part of this book 
and for her many suggestions. Special thanks to Catriona Drew for her excellent editorial and 
substantive suggestions. 
1  See below nn 79–89 and accompanying text.
2  ‘World Bank Announces New Advisor on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Issues’ 
(Press Release, 27 October 2016) <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/ 
2016/10/27/world-bank-announces-new-advisor-on-sexual-orientation-and-gender- 
identity-issues>.
3  I use the terms LGBT or LGBTI depending on the original use to which I cite.
4  See Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Hila Shamir and Chantal Thomas, ‘From the International 
to the Local in Feminist Legal Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work and Sex Trafficking: 
Four Studies in Contemporary Governance Feminism’ (2006) 29 Harvard Journal of Law 
and Gender 335.
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state, state-like and state-affiliated power. In previous work,5 I showed that gay 
governance occurs at the municipal, national and global levels. This chapter 
extends this work by focusing on GGG at the level of global institutions.
Even before the recent appointments, the growing engagement of global 
institutions with LGBT issues had attracted academic attention. Rahul Rao for 
example, has described the International Financial Institutions’ (IFI) campaign 
against homophobia as ‘global homocapitalism’.6 Others have addressed the 
United Nations’ engagement with LGBT issues.7 These institutional developments 
are, I suggest, part of an emerging ‘homoglobalism’. The rise of homoglobalism 
cannot be detached from recent developments at the national level – the dramatic 
shifts from the depiction of the homosexual as a threat to the nation,8 to the 
notion of the homosexual as embedded in the nation, or of LGBT rights as de 
rigeur in the branding of states as liberal and democratic.9 Some of this process 
has been captured in the discussion of ‘homonationalism’, described by Jasbir 
Puar as ‘nationalist homonormativity’, whereby ‘domesticated’ gay entities 
provide ammunition for strengthening the nationalist project,10 and by growing 
interest in the use of LGBT rights by states (especially but not only Israel) for 
public diplomacy and propaganda purposes, often referred to as ‘pinkwashing’.11
 5  Aeyal Gross, ‘Gay Governance: A Queer Critique’ in Janet Halley, Prabha Kotiswaran, Rachel 
Rebouche and Hila Shamir (eds), Governance Feminism: A Reader (University of Minnesota 
Press, forthcoming 2017).
 6  Rahul Rao, ‘Global Homocapitalism’ (2015) 194 Radical Philosophy <https://www.
radicalphilosophy.com/article/global-homocapitalism>.
 7  See, eg, Elizabeth Baisley, ‘Reaching the Tipping Point?: Emerging International Human 
Rights Norms Pertaining to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (2016) 38 
Human Rights Quarterly 134; Anthony S Winer, ‘Levels of Generality and the Protection of 
LGBT Rights before the United Nations General Assembly’ (2015) 41 William Mitchell Law 
Review 80; Eduard Jordaan, ‘The Challenge of Adopting Sexual Orientation Resolutions at 
the UN Human Rights Council’ (2016) 8 Journal of Human Rights Practice 298; Françoise 
Girard, ‘Negotiating Sexual Rights and Sexual Orientation at the UN’ in Richard Parker, 
Rosalind Petchesky and Robert Sember (eds), Sex Politics: Reports from the Front Lines 
(Report, Sexual Policy Watch, 2007) 311 <http://www.sxpolitics.org/frontlines/book/
pdf/capitulo9_united_nations.pdf>; Tina Beattie, ‘Whose Rights, Which Rights? – The 
United Nations, the Vatican, Gender and Sexual and Reproductive Rights’ (2014) 55 
Heythrop Journal 1080.
 8  See Aeyal M Gross, ‘Between the Homosocial and the Homoerotic: Gays/Military in 
Comparative and International Law’ in A-Ch Kiss and Johann G Lammers (eds), Hague 
Yearbook of International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 2001) vol 13, 86.
 9  See, eg, Katherine Franke, ‘Dating the State: The Moral Hazards of Winning Gay Rights’ 
(2012) 44 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 1; David Paternotte, Manon Tremblay and 
Carol Johnson (eds), The Lesbian and Gay Movement and the State: Comparative Insights into 
a Transformed Relationship (Ashgate, 2011).
10  Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University Press, 
2007) 36–40. See also Jasbir Puar, ‘Rethinking Homonationalism’ (2013) 45 International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 336, 337.
11  Aeyal Gross, ‘The Politics of LGBT Rights in Israel and beyond: Nationality, Normativity, 
and Queer Politics’ (2015) 46 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 81; Sarah Schulman, 
Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (Duke University Press, 2012).
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The changing relationship between LGBT rights and the state has given rise to 
complex questions about the appropriation of LGBT rights both internationally 
and domestically.12 However, the appropriations at the national and global levels 
can differ. While GGG is only in its infancy, it is already receiving concerted 
opposition. Many states oppose treating violence and discrimination on LGBT 
grounds as a human rights issue. Of course, there is also opposition at the national 
level. But at the global level, the opposition is interstate, rather than intrastate, 
and the political context is different. Moreover, as I will show, the emergence of 
homoglobalism is fragile and dependent upon factors that are politically, temporally 
and also, to some degree, personally contingent.
Puar describes homonationalism as an analytic category deployed to understand 
and historicise how and why a nation’s status as ‘gay-friendly’ has become desir-
able in the first place,13 and posits that homonationalism ‘goes global’ as it 
undergirds US imperial structures through, in her words, ‘an embrace of a sexually 
progressive multiculturalism justifying foreign intervention’.14 I argue in this 
chapter that the shifts by global institutions, as well as the associated activism 
by LGBT advocates, are not limited in their impact to the politicised use of LGBT 
rights by states. I argue further that what I call GGG is not limited to, and quite 
different from, the global aspects of homonationalism described by Puar. The 
shifts discussed also change attitudes towards LGBT issues at the global level, a 
change that is advocated not only by global North states, but by some states from 
the global South, as well as by civil society activists. These shifts go beyond the 
politicised use of a state’s status or image as gay friendly, and its wish to vilify other 
states as homophobic or to justify intervention, even if these elements also exist. 
The gay governance framework I offer, and specifically the GGG framework, 
considers not only the changing attitude of the state to homosexuality, but also 
the growing participation of LGBT advocacy and ideas – and sometimes people 
– in governance itself.
The discussion proceeds as follows. In the first part, I address the emergence 
of GGG in the attempts of the United Kingdom and the United States on the one 
hand, and IFIs on the other, to export LGBT rights through aid conditionality 
and other financial measures. In the second part, I explore recent developments 
at the United Nations primarily – but not only – in its human rights institutions. 
In conclusion, I highlight some common challenges presented to LGBTI human 
rights advocates by both tracks of homoglobalism: the financial and the 
human rights dimensions. I argue that in assessing the trend towards GGG there 
is a need to carry out a cost-benefit analysis that assesses the promise of advancing 
LGBT rights at the global level against the risk of co-option by global institutions 
for their own purposes. 
12  See Gross, ‘The Politics of LGBT Rights’, above n 11; Franke, above n 9.
13  Puar, ‘Rethinking Homonationalism’, above n 10, 336. 
14  Ibid.
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The emergence of global gay governance: Exporting rights 
and imposing conditionality15
The United Kingdom, the World Bank and gay conditionality 
In 2011, then British Prime Minister David Cameron announced that a state’s 
domestic policy towards LGBT rights would henceforth be a factor in determining 
UK aid policy. States that criminalised homosexuality could lose financial aid 
unless they reformed.16 Britain is ‘one of the premier aid givers in the world’, said 
Cameron. It wants countries that receive its aid to adhere to ‘proper human 
rights’, including in how they treat gay men and lesbians.17 Rao has called this ‘gay 
conditionality’.18 It provides a telling example of GGG because of the way in 
which LGBT rights are used within a power structure. Later, in 2013, after same-
sex marriage was legalised in the United Kingdom, Cameron said he wanted to 
‘export’ gay marriage to the entire world as part of the ‘global race . . . to export 
more and sell more’.19
Cameron’s conditionality announcement provoked angry (and arguably 
homophobic) reactions from many political and religious leaders in Africa. A 
Ugandan presidential advisor accused Cameron of having an ‘ex-colonial 
mentality’ and of treating Ugandans ‘like children’.20 A broad coalition of African 
social justice activists expressed concern over Cameron’s statements and similar 
decisions by several other donor countries in relation to Uganda and Malawi. 
‘While the intention may well be to protect the rights of LGBTI people on the 
continent’, they said, ‘the decision to cut aid disregards the role of the LGBTI 
and broader social justice movement on the continent and creates the real risk of 
a serious backlash against LGBTI people’.21 Instead, the activists urged the British 
government to expand its aid to community-based LGBTI programmes aimed 
at fostering dialogue and tolerance, and support national and regional human 
15  Some of the discussion in this section draws on parts of Gross, ‘Gay Governance’, above n 5.
16  ‘Countries that Ban Homosexuality Risk Losing Aid, Warns David Cameron’, The Guardian 
(online) (30 October 2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/oct/30/ban- 
homosexuality-lose-aid-cameron>.
17  BBC News, ‘Transcript Philip Hammond Interview’, The Andrew Marr Show, 30 October 
2011 (David Cameron) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/andrew_marr_
show/9627898.stm>.
18  Rahul Rao, ‘On “Gay Conditionality”, Imperial Power and Queer Liberation’, Kafila 
(1 January 2012) <https://kafila.online/2012/01/01/on-gay-conditionality-imperial- 
power-and-queer-liberation-rahul-rao/#more-11088>.
19  Christopher Hope, ‘David Cameron: “I Want to Export Gay Marriage around the World”’, 
The Telegraph (online) (24 July 2013) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/ 
10200636/I-want-to-export-gay-marriage-around-the-world-says-David-Cameron.html>.
20  ‘Uganda Fury at David Cameron Aid Threat over Gay Rights’, BBC News (online) 
(31 October 2011) <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15524013>.
21  ‘Statement on British “Aid Cut”: Threats to African Countries that Violate LGBTI Rights’, 
Pambazuka News (online) (27 October 2011) <http://www.pambazuka.net/en/category.
php/advocacy/77470>. 
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rights mechanisms to ensure the inclusion of LGBTI issues in their protective and 
promotional mandates. They further urged the United Kingdom to support 
the ‘entrenchment’ of LGBTI issues into broader social justice issues through the 
financing of locally led and nationally owned projects.22
The perceived attempt to ‘export’ gay marriage has been blamed for an 
escalation of homophobic violence in some parts of Africa,23 and a backlash 
against ‘gay conditionality’ has been reported in several countries.24 For example, 
shortly after Cameron’s statement, the President of Ghana declared he would 
never legalise homosexuality, and religious groups used Cameron’s speech as an 
opportunity to foster homophobia,25 while Nigeria introduced a bill criminalising 
same-sex marriage.26
In Uganda, gay conditionality turned from threat to reality. Some of Uganda’s 
budget support was suspended over concerns about its attitude to gay rights.27 
In February 2014, the World Bank announced it would indefinitely delay a US 
$90 million health-care loan to Uganda because of its anti-gay law.28 The money 
in question had been earmarked to address maternal mortality, which is extremely 
high in Uganda.29 Aid conditionality with regard to health-care systems has a 
problematic history, in the past requiring ‘economic restructuring’, including the 
cutting of social expenditure under the so-called Washington Consensus.30 
22  Ibid.
23  See also Rahul Rao, chapter 1, this volume, ‘A tale of two atonements’.
24  For a discussion of the backlash showing that homosexuality is portrayed in several African 
countries by a hostile media, and by the political elite as an imported cultural abomination, 
see Stephen Wood, ‘Sexuality, Development and Continued Colonialism?’, An Institute of 
Development Studies Blog (3 November 2011) <https://participationpower.wordpress.
com/2011/11/03/sexuality-development-and-continued-colonialism/>.
25  Luis Abolafia Anguita, ‘Aid Conditionality and Respect for LGBT People Rights’ in The 
Global Context: Sexuality and Geopolitics, Selected Texts (SPW Working Paper No 7, Sexual 
Policy Watch, April 2012) 9 <http://www.sxpolitics.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/
spw-wp7-the-global-context-sexuality-and-politics.pdf>. On Ghana, see also Scott Long, 
‘Backlash in Ghana: New Anti-Gay Legislation Discussed’ on Scott Long, A Paper Bird 
(3 November 2011) <http://paper-bird.net/2011/11/03/backlash-in-ghana-new-anti- 
gay-legislation-discussed/>.
26  Anguita, above n 25.
27  See ‘Uganda Fury at David Cameron’, above n 20.
28  J Lester Feder, ‘World Bank Delays $90 Million Loan to Uganda as Bank President Blasts 
Anti-Gay Laws’, BuzzFeed News (online) (28 February 2014) <http://www.buzzfeed.com/
lesterfeder/world-bank-delays-90-million-loan-to-uganda-as-bank-presiden#.kr32Bve0G>. 
29  Scott Long, ‘Uganda, the World Bank and LGBT Rights: Winners and Losers’ on Scott Long, 
A Paper Bird (10 March 2014) <http://paper-bird.net/2014/03/10/uganda-the-world-bank- 
and-lgbt-rights-winners-and-losers/>.
30  Sue McGregor, ‘Neoliberalism and Health Care’ (2001) 25 International Journal of 
Consumer Studies 82; Alicia Ely Yamin, ‘Power, Suffering and Courts: Reflections on 
Promoting Health Rights through Judicialization’ in Alicia Ely Yamin and Siri Gloppen (eds), 
Litigating Health Rights: Can Courts Bring More Justice to Health? (Harvard University Press, 
2011) 340.
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The possibility of health care again becoming a victim of conditionality resonated 
alarmingly.31
Since the enactment of anti-homosexuality legislation in Uganda, other donors 
too have slashed or suspended aid.32 Project and budget support worth about US 
$140 million has been suspended or redirected by the World Bank, the United 
States and several European countries. While some human rights groups have 
advocated continuing these sanctions,33 health officials, activists and NGOs have 
warned of the impact on health-care services, particularly for HIV/AIDS 
patients.34
Some Ugandan activists have been critical of aid cuts, protesting that they do 
not want the people of Uganda to suffer because of the government’s political 
choices. They support only strategic cuts to specific sectors that fail to demonstrate 
respect for human rights and which support the anti-gay bill.35 Advocates note 
that there are many ‘horrible laws’ in Uganda. Singling out the anti-gay bill is 
patronising and increases the vulnerability of LGBT people to homophobia.36 The 
different positions taken by advocacy groups, even within Uganda itself, attest to 
the real dilemmas raised by the issue of conditionality.
In 2015, after the Ugandan Constitutional Court struck down the new anti-gay 
legislation for procedural reasons,37 the Ugandan President said the law was no 
longer necessary and he would no longer pursue it. 38 Although the country’s 
previous law criminalising ‘carnal knowledge . . . against the order of nature’ 
(which carried the threat of life imprisonment) remained in force, international 
pressure may have affected the President’s decision to desist from further pursuing 
the new legislation that targeted homosexuality more specifically, dramatically 
increasing sentences compared to existing legislation and criminalising LGBT 
rights advocacy in Uganda.39 Can we assume, then, that international pressure was 
useful here? Obviously making this judgment is difficult, but it is an important 
31  See Peter Dunne, ‘LGBTI Rights and the Wrong Way to Give Aid’ (2012) 12 Harvard 
Kennedy School Review 66.
32  ‘Briefing: Punitive Aid Cuts Disrupt Healthcare in Uganda’, IRIN (online) (2 April 2014) 
<http://www.irinnews.org/printreport.aspx?reportid=99878>. 
33  Aaron Dorfman, Kevin Robert Frost, Chad Dobson et al, Joint CSO Letter to World Bank on 
Discrimination in Uganda’s Health Sector, The Council for Global Equality <http://
globalequality.org/newsroom/latest-news/1-in-the-news/203-worldbankcsoletter>.
34  ‘Briefing: Punitive Aid Cuts’, above n 32.
35  Scott Long, ‘From Uganda: Guidelines for Action against the Anti-Homosexuality Bill’ on 
Scott Long, A Paper Bird (5 March 2014) <http://paper-bird.net/2014/03/05/from-
uganda-guidelines-for-action-against-the-anti-homosexuality-bill/>. 
36  ‘Briefing: Punitive Aid Cuts’, above n 32.
37  Oloka-Onyango v Attorney General, Petition No 8, 1 August 2014 reported in [2014] UGCC 
14 (Constitutional Court of Uganda).
38  Joe Williams, ‘Uganda’s President Says New Anti-Gay Laws “Not Necessary”’, Pink News 
(online) (16 September 2015) <http://www.pinknews.co.uk/2015/09/16/ugandas- 
president-says-new-anti-gay-laws-not-necessary/>.
39  For a discussion of the differences between the existing and the proposed laws, see ‘Uganda 
Action Alert: Dismiss the Anti-Homosexuality Bill’ (16 October 2009) Outright Action 
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factor if we are to calculate the costs and benefits of GGG. In such a calculation, 
we would also need to consider whether this case risked the lives of women (and 
babies) to save the lives of gay people – as it should not be acceptable to advocate 
for LGBT rights at the expense of the rights of other groups. For a more exact 
assessment, we would need to know on the one hand whether the loan suspension 
indeed damaged maternal health and on the other whether it played a role in 
preventing the reintroduction of the anti-gay legislation. We would also need to 
account for the effects of the backlash on LGBT lives. All in all, the story of gay 
conditionality points to the risks inherent in GGG. Once LGBT rights are 
incorporated into global governance, they can be appropriated to reinforce or 
strengthen the political and/or economic power of Northern states over states in 
the global South, and potentially harm vulnerable populations. 
The United States and global gay governance
In 2011, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton addressed the need for 
global consensus on the recognition of the human rights of LGBT individuals 
everywhere: ‘The Obama Administration defends the human rights of LGBT 
people as part of our comprehensive human rights policy and as a priority of our 
foreign policy.’40 In US embassies, Clinton said, diplomats are raising concerns 
about specific cases and laws, and working with a range of partners to strengthen 
human rights protections for all. In Washington, the State Department created a 
task force to support and coordinate this work.41 A memorandum issued by 
President Obama directed US foreign aid agencies to engage regularly with 
governments, citizens, civil society and the private sector to foster awareness of 
LGBT human rights.42 Ugandan officials responsible for anti-LGBT human rights 
abuses were banned from entering the United States.43
Further signs of the expanding scope and power of US-led global LGBT 
advocacy were evident in 2015, when the State Department announced the 
International <https://www.outrightinternational.org/content/uganda-action-alert- 
dismiss-anti-homosexuality-bill>.
40  Hillary Rodham Clinton, ‘Remarks in Recognition of International Human Rights Day’ 
(6 December 2011) US Department of State <http://online.hillsdale.edu/file/presidency/
lecture-6/Clinton--Remarks-in-Recognition-of-International-Human-Rights-Day.pdf>.
41  Ibid.
42  See Presidential Memorandum – International Initiatives to Advance the Human Rights of 
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Persons (6 December 2011) The White House 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/12/06/presidential-memorandum-
international-initiatives-advance-human-rights-l>; Chris Johnson, ‘Obama, Clinton Push 
Int’l LGBT Rights’, Washington Blade (online) (6 December 2011) <http://www.
washingtonblade.com/2011/12/06/obama-administration-takes-action-on-intl-lgbt- 
rights/>.
43  Michael K Lavers, ‘U.S. to Ban Uganda Officials for LGBT Rights Abuses’, Washington Blade 
(online) (19 June 2014) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/06/19/u-s-ban-uganda- 
officials-lgbt-rights-abuses/>. 
Homoglobalism  155
appointment of a special envoy to advocate for the rights of LGBT people.44 The 
executive director of the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission called this a ‘welcome development and historic moment in the US 
government’s progress in promoting the dignity and equality of LGBT people 
around the world’.45 At the same time, argued Adebisi Alimi, many outside the 
United States were concerned that the appointment might be more symbolic than 
substantive, and that the symbolism might be ‘negative’ – why focus on LGBT 
violence and discrimination, rather than gender violence, poverty, child labour 
and so on? Moreover, there is a risk that the envoy might look like ‘a white person 
trying to save brown and black LGBT people from their brown and black 
oppressors’, reinforcing the notion that ‘homosexuality is something white 
people in Western countries do that is then imported into African countries’.46 
This is an idea that LGBT activists in Africa have worked hard to debunk. These 
questions resonated when US officials – including Secretary of State John Kerry 
in Nigeria and President Obama in Kenya – raised the issue of gay rights during 
visits to Africa.47
At the same time, the importance of the US-led campaign to LGBT activists 
around the world, who often work in extremely difficult conditions, should not 
be underestimated and, indeed, this support is often gratefully acknowledged.48 
However, it is also necessary to consider whether the US position, as formulated 
by Clinton and Obama, entails risks in its implementation. Some differences are 
evident between the UK position, as expressed by Cameron, and the Clinton-
Obama messages, which not only omit explicit advocacy of gay conditionality, but 
also endorse a less proselytising style, with Clinton herself acknowledging the 
United States’ own problematic record on LGBT rights.49 Nevertheless, it 
remained ‘unclear whether those countries that target and discriminate against 
44  Sylvan Lane, ‘Kerry Establishes LGBT Envoy to Advocate for Rights Overseas’, The Boston 
Globe (online) (5 February 2015) <http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2015/ 
02/05/secretary-state-john-kerry-establishes-new-post-lgbt-envoy-advocate-for-rights-
overseas/zW9x9QfPFsBGsnQbAdoOKL/story.html?event=event25>.
45  Michael K Lavers, ‘State Department Envoy to Promote Global LGBT Rights’, Washington 
Blade (online) (5 February 2015) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/02/05/
state-department-envoy-promote-global-lgbt-rights/>.
46  Adebisi Alimi, ‘Why I Oppose the United States’ Special Envoy for LGBT Human Rights’, 
The Daily Beast (online) (3 October 2015) <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/ 
03/10/why-i-oppose-the-united-states-special-envoy-for-lgbt-human-rights.html>.
47  Michael K Lavers, ‘Kerry Raises LGBT Rights with Nigerian President’, Washington Blade 
(online) (22 July 2015) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/07/22/kerry-raises- 
lgbt-rights-with-nigerian-president/>.
48  Ugandan activist Frank Mugisha, for example, said that, thanks to Clinton and others, 
‘we are no longer alone’. Frank Mugisha, ‘Gay and Vilified in Uganda’, The New York Times 
(23 December 2011).
49  Scott Long, ‘More on Hillary and Barack’ on Scott Long, A Paper Bird (9 December 
2011) <http://paper-bird.net/2011/12/09/more-on-hillary-and-barack/>. See also the 
distinction Rao draws between Cameron’s and Clinton’s statements. Rao, ‘On “Gay 
Conditionality”’, above n 18.
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gay and lesbians would have their funding cut’,50 even though neither Clinton 
nor Obama had mentioned conditionality.51 Eventually, the United States was one 
of the countries that suspended health-related aid to Uganda because of its 
violation of LGBT rights, although it promised that the cuts would not affect 
essential health services, agricultural programming or initiatives in democracy and 
governance.52
The question of weighing the costs and benefits of US LGBT global advocacy 
– and thus more broadly of the processes I describe as homoglobalism – resonated 
in the mainstream media when the New York Times ran a story in December 
2015 entitled ‘US Support of Gay Rights in Africa May Have Done More Harm 
than Good’.53 Gay Nigerians were reported as blaming not only Nigerian society 
and authorities for the harassment and violence that was triggered by the new 
anti-gay law, but also the United States, whose support, some argued, had made 
things considerably worse. The new law was widely regarded, according to the 
article, as a response to US pressure. A great deal of US money and diplomacy 
had been deployed in Africa which had opened conversations on a previously 
taboo subject, but which also made gay men and lesbians more visible and so more 
vulnerable to harassment and violence.54
Unsurprisingly, the New York Times story drew criticism. Some argued that the 
article’s focus on Nigeria failed to take sufficient account of the way in which 
the risk of losing US money may have persuaded the Ugandan government not 
to revive the Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014, or how public criticism by the US 
ambassador and others may have led to the release in Malawi of men arrested 
on homosexuality charges.55 The US State Department criticised the article 
as fundamentally misrepresenting the situation of LGBTI people in Africa, 
50  Karen McVeigh, ‘Gay Rights Must Be Criterion for US Aid Allocations, Instructs Obama’, 
The Guardian (online) (7 December 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/
dec/07/gay-rights-us-aid-criteria?INTCMP=SRCH>; cf Steven Lee Myers and Helene 
Cooper, ‘US to Aid Gay Rights Abroad, Obama and Clinton Say’, The New York Times 
(7 December 2011).
51  Long, ‘More on Hillary and Barack’, above n 49. For a comparative critical discussion of 
Cameron’s and Clinton’s statements, see also Adam J Kretz, ‘Aid Conditionality as (Partial) 
Answer to Antigay Legislation: An Analysis of British and American Foreign Aid Policies 
Designed to Protect Sexual Minorities’ (2013) 7 Vienna Online Journal on International 
Constitutional Law 476.
52  ‘Briefing: Punitive Aid Cuts’, above n 32; Philippa Croome, ‘U.S. Suspends Some Aid to 
Uganda over Anti-Gay Law’, Reuters (online) (13 March 2014) <http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/03/13/us-uganda-usa-idUSBREA2C1Y120140313#f6T8is6jwDt6p
MPF.97>; Peter Baker, ‘Uganda: Anti-Gay Law Draws Sanctions’, The New York Times 
(20 June 2014).
53  Norimitsu Onishi, ‘US Support of Gay Rights in Africa May Have Done More Harm than 
Good’, The New York Times (21 December 2015).
54  Ibid.
55  Colin Stewart, ‘N.Y. Times: Pro-Gay U.S. Makes Life Worse for Gay Africans’ on Colin 
Stewart, Erasing 76 Crimes (20 December 2015) <https://76crimes.com/2015/12/20/ 
n-y-times-pro-gay-u-s-makes-life-worse-for-gay-africans/>.
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emphasising that the State Department always works in close consultation with 
local groups in civil society and affected communities, based on the principle to 
‘do no harm’.56 Similar sentiments were expressed by Frank Mugisha, the Executive 
Director of Sexual Minorities Uganda, who stated that the United States follows 
the lead of local activists before taking action on their behalf, and that LGBTI 
people in Uganda sounded the global alarm because the proposed legislation 
placed lives at risk.57 Mugisha argued that Ugandan activists advised the US 
government on how to minimise harm, ‘and they listened’. In his account, it is 
African politicians who employ the narrative of a ‘neo-colonial’ phenomenon in 
order to maintain their power at the expense of LGBTI people. Mugisha does not 
deny the backlash, but argues that, if there is greater violence now that LGBTI 
people are more visible, the blame lies with homophobia, not funding.58
These statements are important because if we want to evaluate the way in which 
GGG involves an exercise of power along the global North/South divide, we 
should not only look at the power axis between states. States also exercise power 
over individuals within their jurisdiction, and if actions by the global North 
reinforce the power of LGBT individuals and groups who are vulnerable 
in relation to their home states, then this must also be considered. Describing 
GGG as an exercise of North/South imperial power is only part of a complex 
grid of costs and benefits. A cost-benefit analysis must also consider what GGG 
means for other power relationships, including the empowerment (or weakening) 
of LGBTI individuals and communities, and their civil society advocacy 
organisations. 
The international financial institutions
In 2014, the World Bank implemented ‘gay conditionality’ in its decision 
regarding Uganda. This decision, along with other initiatives such as the World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund’s contributions to the ‘It Gets Better’ 
pro-LGBT campaign, and World Bank attempts to build an economic case 
against homophobia, is part of what Rao calls ‘global homocapitalism’.59 Analysing 
these developments – to which should be added the recent appointment of 
a SOGI advisor at the World Bank mentioned earlier – Rao argues, drawing on 
critical analysis of IFI’s engagement with gender issues, that the World Bank may 
be (again) exemplifying the tendency of imperial governmentality to legitimate its 
56  Michael K Lavers, ‘State Department Defends LGBT Rights Efforts in Africa’, Washington 
Blade (online) (22 December 2015) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/2015/12/22/
state-department-defends-lgbt-rights-efforts-in-africa/>. See also the Letter to the Editor by 
Tom Malinowski, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 
‘Support for Gay Rights in Africa’, The New York Times (29 December 2015).
57  Frank Mugisha, Executive Director, Sexual Minorities Uganda, Letter to the Editor, ‘Support 
for Gay Rights in Africa’, The New York Times (29 December 2015).
58  Ibid.
59  Rao, ‘Global Homocapitalism’, above n 6, 38–42.
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will to power by humanitarian justifications.60 Rao argues that the approach of 
IFIs obscures their own culpability in producing the conditions of homophobia, 
which allows them to position themselves as external to the problems they seek 
to alleviate, as a progressive force, at a time when the devastating effects of 
capitalist crisis and austerity threaten to bring them into disrepute.61
But the question to be considered here is not only how anti-homophobia 
measures may ‘pinkwash’ the IFIs, but also what the additional costs (however 
hidden) of this form of GGG are. The controversy about the effect of GGG on 
the situation of LGBT people in Africa highlights the complexity of carrying 
out a cost-benefit analysis of gay governance. How can we assess the costs of 
pinkwashed IFIs? How do we calculate the costs of backlash (more homophobia) 
and harm to other groups (less maternal healthcare in Uganda)? In making these 
assessments, we should consider which costs are merely symbolic – their imperial 
or colonial resonance – and which are material – the risk of increased levels of 
homophobia, and greater harm to other groups.
The aspects of emerging GGG suggest then a package deal, one that makes 
LGBT rights advocacy complicit in pinkwashing IFIs and risks harming LGBT 
rights and other causes, at the same time potentially strengthening local advocacy, 
changing government policies and making some lives safer. Therefore, the emer-
gence of GGG creates a familiar double bind: the draw of harnessing powerful 
global institutions to the LGBT cause on the one hand, thereby doing a lot of good, 
and the risk of co-option on the other, which can result in considerable harm. 
The emergence of global gay governance: LGBT human rights 
discourse in the United Nations
Advocacy and governance in UN human rights bodies
The development of LGBT rights discourse at the United Nations has emerged 
in stages: first, through the work of UN expert-based human rights treaty bodies 
and human rights special procedures; second, through civil society advocacy; and, 
third, the stage we are at today, through a combination of state involvement 
and strong UN leadership, especially by former UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon and former High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay. It is 
only at this third stage that we see the recognition of LGBT rights in UN bodies 
that are composed of states.62 Furthermore, in 2011, the UN Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) launched a campaign called ‘Free 
and Equal’,63 which promotes LGBT rights from within the UN Secretariat. As 
part of this campaign, the OHCHR released various videos advocating LGBT 
60  Ibid 39.
61  Ibid 38.
62  Baisley, above n 7. 
63  UN Free and Equal <https://www.unfe.org/>.
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rights, some of which featured messages from high-profile individuals including 
Ki-moon and Pillay, as well as others from within the LGBT community, 
advocating the issue in diverse ways.64
Despite facing hostility from many states, LGBT rights advocacy has seen some 
success at the United Nations. In 1994, the Human Rights Committee, which 
monitors implementation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)65 and comprises experts acting in an independent capacity, 
found that a statute in Tasmania criminalising sex between men violated the right 
to privacy.66 Since then, the Committee has also held that the ICCPR requires 
equal treatment of same-sex couples by the law,67 but found that the ICCPR 
does not require states parties to recognise same-sex marriage.68 In another 
significant decision, it found that convicting a person for displaying pro-gay 
posters breached the right to freedom of expression.69
Other UN human rights treaty bodies, as well as the Human Rights Committee, 
have addressed LGBT rights in concluding observations, given after reviewing 
states’ periodic reports, and in general comments interpreting their treaty 
provisions.70 However, it was the Human Rights Committee’s decisions in 
individual complaints, launched under the ICCPR’s Optional Protocol, that drew 
much attention and signalled the emerging interpretation of universal human 
rights norms as offering protection – even if limited – in this area. 
Recognition of LGBT rights in the UN-Charter-based human rights bodies, 
comprised of states, has been much more contested.71 Developments have there-
fore come much later and only after some notable failures, such as the decisions 
not to proceed with a resolution on ‘Human Rights and Sexual Orientation’ at 
the Commission on Human Rights in 2003 and 2004, and at the Human Rights 
64  See, eg, ‘Ban Ki-Moon’s Call To World Leaders at the UN’, UN Free and Equal <https://
www.unfe.org/en/actions/world-leaders>; ‘Navi Pillay Knows We Need to Start Changing 
the World’, UN Free and Equal <https://www.unfe.org/en/actions/navi-pillay-psa>.
65  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 16 December 
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Council (which replaced the Commission) in 2005, because of fierce opposition 
from the Organisation of the Islamic Conference and the Holy See.72 In 2010, 
the UN General Assembly adopted its first resolution on LGBT issues, which 
called for an end to extrajudicial killings of persons based on their sexual orienta-
tion.73 The following year, the Human Rights Council, by a narrow margin, 
adopted a resolution, presented by South Africa, Brazil and others, which 
expressed grave concern over acts of violence committed against individuals 
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity and called on the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights to report on the extent of the problem.74 
The resulting report – ‘Discriminatory Law and Practices and Acts of Violence 
against Individuals Based on Their Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ – 
was published in December 201175 with a follow up in 2015.76 In 2016, the 
Human Rights Council decided to appoint an Independent Expert to deal with 
protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and 
gender identity.77 
These gains have been hard won.78 Discussions at the Human Rights Council 
over the resolution calling for the appointment of the Independent Expert, for 
example, were a battleground.79 The resolution proposing the appointment was 
72  Matthew Waites, ‘Critique of “Sexual Orientation” and “Gender Identity” in Human Rights 
Discourse: Global Queer Politics Beyond the Yogakarta Principles’ (2009) 15 Contemporary 
Politics 137, 141; Baisley, above n 7, 149 –50.
73  Resolution on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, GA Res 65/208, UN GAOR, 
65th sess, Agenda Item 68(b), UN Doc A/RES/65/208 (30 March 2011). 
74  Human Rights Council, Human Rights, Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, GA 
Res 17/19, UN GAOR, 17th sess, Agenda Item 8, UN Doc A/HRC/RES/17/19 (14 July 
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Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity, UN GAOR, 29th sess, Agenda Items 2 and 8, UN 
Doc A/HRC/29/23 (4 May 2015). 
77  Human Rights Council, Protection against Violence and Discrimination Based on Sexual 
Orientation and Gender Identity, GA Res 32/2, UN GAOR, 32nd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN 
Doc A/HRC/RES/32/2 (12 July 2016).
78  Waites, above n 72, 141 and sources cited therein.  
79  For a compilation of the debate, see ‘Compilation of the Adoption of the 2016 SOGI 
Resolution’ (Compilation Report, ILGA, 30 June 2016) <http://ilga.org/downloads/
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A/HRC/32/L.71–A/HRC/32/L.81 (29 June 2016). 
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brought to the Human Rights Council by several Latin American states.80 The 
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (except Albania) objected to the appointment 
and proposed 11 different amendments to the resolution.81 While those that 
would have undermined the mandate altogether, by deleting all references to 
sexual orientation and gender identity, were rejected, seven were accepted and 
incorporated into the text of the resolution.82
Most of the seven amendments read as a litany of familiar objections to the 
encroachment of human rights on domestic or cultural space – the ‘protection 
of sovereignty’,83 the importance of ‘respecting regional, cultural and religious 
value systems’, the need for ‘joint ownership of human rights’, the need to pay 
attention to the ‘relevant domestic debates at the national level on matters 
associated with historical, cultural, social and religious sensitivities’84 and to 
consider human rights in an ‘objective and non-confrontational manner’.85 But 
less familiar was an amendment to the Preamble ‘deploring the use of external 
pressures and coercive measures against states, particularly developing countries, 
including through the use and threat of use of economic sanctions and/or 
application of conditionality on official development assistance, with the aim of 
influencing the relevant domestic debates and decision-making processes at the 
national level’.86
Read out of context, this paragraph could be mistaken for a critical discussion 
of homonationalism or pinkwashing. Yet here the critique is by states opposing 
UN recognition of LGBT rights by proposing to delete any reference to sexual 
orientation or gender identity. In what could be termed homophobic-nationalism, 
states are here participating in whitewashing – dressing up their homophobia as 
global South opposition to conditionality, denial of cultural difference and 
trampling of sovereignty.87 Once we focus on the global, it is crucial that we look 
not only at the pro-LGBT states and their political use of LGBT rights,88 but also 
at the anti-LGBT states and their political use of the topic. When we discuss 
GGG, we should also discuss the governance (global or otherwise) that is part 
of its backlash.
80  ‘Compilation of the Adoption’, above n 79, 3, 7 –9. The states were Argentina, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Uruguay.
81  Ibid.
82  Ibid 3.
83  Ibid 54, Ninth Amendment.
84  Ibid 43, Fifth Amendment.
85  Ibid 34, Third Amendment. 
86  Ibid 46, Seventh Amendment.
87  For a discussion of the ways in which sexual minorities became ‘pawns’ in an international 
‘sensitivity game’, see Eric Heinze, ‘Sexual Orientation and International Law: A Study in 
the Manufacture of Cross-Cultural “Sensitivity”’ (2001) 22 Michigan Journal of International 
Law 283. 
88  For a discussion of the growing support by states of LGBT advocacy at the UN level and the 
dilemmas this creates, see Long, ‘More on Hillary and Barack’, above n 49.
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Following the adoption of the Independent Expert resolution, in September 
2016, the Human Rights Council appointed a Thai national, Vitit Muntarbhorn, 
to the newly created position,89 a choice that continues efforts to shift the face 
of UN LGBT rights activism, and GGG, to the global South. In the same month, 
the Secretary-General addressed a meeting of government leaders at a high-level 
side-event of the United Nations’ LGBT Core Group.90 Notably, Muntarbhorn 
joins Ki-moon and Pillay, all non-white voices outside the West, as leaders of 
SOGI rights within the United Nations – not an insignificant development, 
especially when the leading role of global South states in challenging these 
developments is recalled. This is in contrast to the economic strategies aimed at 
promoting LGBTI rights, where the United Kingdom and the United States take 
a leading role.
The developments promoted by human rights bodies are important and 
promising to many, but also raise the concern that they may create more backlash 
than emancipatory change on the ground. South African human rights activist, 
Gabriel Hoosain Khan, has argued that the appointment of an Independent 
Expert on SOGI seems remote from the realities of culture, geography and 
poverty of black LGBTI youth in South African townships. ‘[W]hat does an 
independent expert mean to a black gender non-conforming woman tortured by 
police in Zimbabwe?’, he asks, concerned that human rights ‘has little to do with 
the messy colonial, racial, gendered, sexualized, classed realities of humans’.91
This question also arose with the unlikely arrival of LGBT rights issues at the 
UN Security Council in the form of an informal closed meeting on the persecu-
tion of LGBT Syrians and Iraqis by the so-called Islamic State (ISIS).92 For Scott 
Long, the meeting was at best ‘useless’ and at worst likely to ‘cause more killings’, 
giving ISIS ‘an easy chance to affirm its law and write its defiance of the Security 
Council in blood’.93 Indeed, there have been reports of a rise in the number of 
ISIS executions for homosexual acts after the meeting.94 Long argues that putting 
89  See ‘Vitit Muntarbhorn’, UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner <http://
www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SexualOrientationGender/Pages/VititMuntarbhorn.aspx/>
90  ‘Ban Calls for Continued Efforts to Secure Equal Rights for LGBT community’, UN News 
(online) (21 September 2016) <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55014#.
WC7RFuZ97b0>.
91  Gabriel Hoosain Khan, ‘The UN, Seen from Khayelitsha: Guest Post’ on Scott Long, 
A Paper Bird (6 July 2016) <https://paper-bird.net/2016/07/06/the-un-seen-from- 
khayelitsha/>.
92  Michael K Lavers, ‘Islamic State Focus of U.N. Security Council’s First LGBT Meeting’, 
Washington Blade (online) (24 August 2015) <http://www.washingtonblade.com/ 
2015/08/24/islamic-state-focus-of-u-n-security-councils-first-lgbt-meeting/>.
93  Scott Long, ‘The UN Security Council Debates Gays and ISIS: Why This Is a Bad Idea’ 
on Scott Long, A Paper Bird (23 August 2015) <http://paper-bird.net/2015/08/23/
the-un-security-council-terrible-idea/>.
94  Scott Long, ‘New ISIS Execution for “Sodomy”: Attention, UN Security Council’ on Scott 
Long, A Paper Bird (17 September 2015) <http://paper-bird.net/2015/09/17/
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LGBT victims of ISIS under the symbolic protection of the United States and the 
Security Council would make sense only if there was something the United States 
and the United Nations could and would do to help them.95 If all they can do is 
talk, argues Long, the only result is the cost to gay lives. Many LGBT groups, 
however, support and encourage these processes. The Council for Global Equality 
– an organisation that describes its mission as ‘advancing an American foreign 
policy inclusive of sexual orientation and gender identity’96 – in granting an award 
to Samantha Power, US Ambassador to the United Nations, for her support of 
LGBT rights abroad, praised the Security Council meeting as the ‘centrepiece’ 
of her work.97 The Security Council engaged with the topic again in 2016, fol-
lowing the mass killings in a US gay night club in Orlando, and for the first time 
adopted a statement expressly mentioning sexual orientation.98
In response to the governance feminism critique in the context of international 
law, Dianne Otto has argued that, while gender-focused resolutions of the 
Security Council may amount to co-option, they can nonetheless create opportu-
nities for further feminist engagement both locally and globally.99 She argues that 
the subsequent development of monitoring mechanisms, for example, provide an 
opportunity for feminist activism.100 Gender-based Security Council resolutions 
are, then, a double-edged sword: they provide ‘footholds’ for feminist activism, 
on the one hand, and a means for the Security Council to enhance its legitimacy 
and power, on the other.101 The resolutions divert attention away from the under-
lying structural causes of armed conflict (in particular, the inequitable distribution 
of global power and wealth) while, at the same time, providing a powerful organis-
ing tool for local, national, regional and international feminists networks and 
 95  Ibid.
 96  The Council for Global Equality <http://globalequality.org/>. 
 97  Michael K Lavers, ‘Council for Global Equality Honors Samantha Power in D.C.’, 
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she highlighted the Security Council meeting. See Michael K Lavers, ‘Samantha Power: 
LGBT Equality Not “Special Category of Rights”’, Washington Blade (online) (12 March 
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100  Ibid 115. 
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movements.102 The shifts described by Otto in her own position over time point 
to how future assessment of the SOGI rights developments occurring at the 
United Nations – in both the human rights system and the Security Council – will 
require examining the effects they generate, in a way similar to that offered by 
Otto in relation to gender issues.
In any case, the changes described here – particularly the fact that states, as well 
as UN officials, are taking a leading role in advocacy for LGBT rights – point 
further to the nature of emerging GGG, whereby advocacy is led by national 
governments through their membership of key UN institutions. Elizabeth 
Baisley considers the states and high-ranking UN officials involved to be the most 
effective norm entrepreneurs in this area – achieving more success than individual 
experts within the UN system and civil society organisations, which nevertheless 
continue to play an important advocacy role.103 However, success needs to be 
weighed against the costs involved. One cost is that the issue of LGBT rights is 
now a feature of transnational political contestations, with some states, as well 
as some global institutions, using their support for LGBT rights to bolster their 
superiority, and others using their opposition to LGBT rights to fuel accusations 
of neo-imperial interference with their domestic affairs, thereby whitewashing 
their own reputations. Moreover, the content of the discourse generated at this 
stage of development shies away from the language of ‘sexual rights’ utilised 
earlier by NGOs at UN forums, to a terrain that deploys accepted terms drawn 
from the existing human rights system. The focus is particularly on violations of 
civil and political rights of people based on their sexual orientation and gender 
identity.104 While this language shift may account for some of the success of those 
supportive of LGBT rights because they are not advocating for ‘new rights’ or 
‘special rights’,105 the inclusion (or some would argue appropriation) of LGBT 
rights into the existing human rights framework may also have a restricting effect 
as discussed in the next section. Assessing the costs and benefits of the GGG that 
is emerging in UN institutions is therefore complicated, not only because of 
the risk of states pinkwashing themselves by advocating for LGBT rights, while 
ignoring other human rights issues and vilifying oppositional states, but also 
because of the risk that global LGBT rights governance spreads a certain restricted 
version of sexuality, focused more on identities than on sexual rights and freedoms 
– a risk to which I now turn. 
102  Dianne Otto, ‘Contesting Feminism’s Institutional Doubles: Troubling the Security 
Council’s Women Peace and Security Agenda’ in Halley et al, above n 5. 
103  Baisley, above n 7, 161–5. 
104  Ibid 162.
105  See Navi Pillay’s insistence on this point in her video statement from 2012: UN Human 
Rights, ‘Pillay on Homophobia: Punish Violence and Hatred, Not Love!’ (7 May 2012) 
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The SOGI framework revisited
An important moment in the genealogy of the current SOGI human rights 
framework was the adoption of the Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of 
International Human Rights in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender 
Identity (‘Yogyakarta Principles’) in 2007.106 The Principles were prepared by a 
group of human rights experts, and launched at the Human Rights Council.107 
Since then, the SOGI language and framework have defined the mandate of 
both the UN Independent Expert and the World Bank advisor. Principle 3 of the 
non-binding Yogyakarta Principles, entitled ‘The Right to Recognition before 
the Law’, declares that ‘[p]ersons of diverse sexual orientations and gender 
identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects of life’, and that ‘[e]ach person’s 
self-defined sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to their personality 
and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and freedom’. 
Thus, the Principles interpret states’ existing human rights obligations to include 
ensuring that all persons are accorded legal capacity without discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.
The concept of sexual orientation – assigning people an identity based on the 
gender of their object-choice being identical or opposite to their own gender – as 
reflected in the Yogyakarta Principles definition,108 has its historical and cultural 
origins in modern Western states, but not of all humanity subscribes to it.109 Nor 
do all societies subscribe to an understanding of sexuality that divides people into 
two categories – hetero- and homosexuals. In societies where men have sex with 
men regardless of any specific sexual identity, for example, to attach a sexual 
orientation label would be to impose a Western model that categorises men having 
sex with men as an identity, as a distinct and autonomous feature of the self.
While the SOGI framework avoids other Western categories such as ‘gay’ and 
‘lesbian’, in an attempt to be more open to sexual and gender diversities, its 
categories of sexual orientation and gender identity110 still universalise a Western 
cultural framework, giving charges that the West is seeking to ‘export’ its own 
values a great deal of legitimacy. Neville Hoad, for example, asks whether the 
universalisation of ‘the homosexual’ as a trans-historical trans-spatial subject in 
human rights law closes down spaces for other participants in same-sex acts 
106  Alice M Miller and Mindy J Roseman, ‘Sexual and Reproductive Rights at the United 
Nations: Frustration or Fulfilment?’ (2011) 19(38) Reproductive Health Matters 102, 108; 
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in various places.111 Attempting to ‘transform participants in certain corporeal 
intimacies into homosexual persons’ may, he argues, do a disservice to the majority 
of participants in same-sex acts outside the West.112 Similarly, Sonya Katyal argues 
that focusing on identity-based protections in order to achieve equality for sexual 
minorities fails to take into account individuals who fall out of the neatly 
circumscribed categories of sexual identity.113
For Joseph Massad, it is the discourse of the LGBT advocacy groups, which he 
collectively calls the ‘Gay International’, which both produces gays and lesbians 
where they do not exist and represses same-sex desires and practices that refuse to 
be assimilated into its sexual epistemology. In relation to the trials of men accused 
of ‘debauchery’ at the ‘Queen Boat’ club in Cairo, Massad argues that a crackdown 
on gay men followed increased visibility of Westernised, Cairo-based, upper- and 
middle-class Egyptian men who identified as gay. The Gay International, argues 
Massad, misses an important distinction: that what is being repressed by the 
Egyptian authorities is not same-sex sexual practices, but, rather, the sociopolitical 
identification of these practices with the Western identity of gayness. In his harsh 
critique of the international gay rights project, Massad argues that by exporting 
gay identity, this movement imposes the hetero/homo binary on societies where 
it may not exist, and incites a discourse on homosexuality that will paradoxically 
make same-sex sex less feasible.114 Against Massad’s argument, it is important to 
consider whether international gay identity is indeed a product of ‘universalisation’ 
through human rights, or whether it is actually exported through the globalised 
world of information, tourism, money and media. In my view, while Massad 
misses identifying the main agents of ‘export’, and also offers an account of 
identities being ‘implanted’, which is too simplistic,115 the point remains that 
addressing the ways in which identities are exported and globalised remains critical 
in application of the SOGI framework.
Queer theory has taught us that the binary hierarchical categories of gender 
and sexuality (men/women, heterosexual/homosexual) are themselves part of the 
problem, as this structure mandates that every person must have a gender and 
sexual orientation that is legible in terms of these binaries. Yet the Yogyakarta 
Principles, and the subsequent adoption of the SOGI framework as central to 
111  Neville Hoad, ‘Arrested Development or the Queerness of Savages: Resisting Evolutionary 
Narratives of Difference’ (2000) 3 Postcolonial Studies 133. 
112  Ibid 152.
113  Sonya Katyal, ‘Exporting Identity’ (2002) 14 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 
97, 100.
114  Joseph Massad, ‘Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World’ (2002) 
14 Public Culture 361. See also Joseph Massad, Desiring Arabs (University of Chicago 
Press, 2007).
115  See also Aeyal Gross, ‘Queer Theory and International Human Rights Law: Does Each 
Person Have a Sexual Orientation?’ (2007) 101 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 129; Amr Shalakany, ‘On a Certain Queer Discomfort with Orientalism’ (2007) 
101 American Society of International Law Proceedings 125; Rahul Rao, Third World Protest: 
Between Home and the World (Oxford University Press, 2010) 176–9.
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GGG, have not challenged these binaries, but instead have helped to further 
naturalise them. It is true, as Vanja Hamzi  argues, that the Yogyakarta Principles 
framework does not explicitly crystallise a binary concept of homo/hetero-
sexuality and it avoids the explicit language of immutability.116 But as I have 
shown, its understanding of sexual orientation does not escape the identitarian 
locus of Western sexuality. An alternative route was offered by the Sexual 
Rights Initiative, in the discussion that preceded the Human Rights Council’s 
decision to appoint a SOGI Independent Expert. The Initiative suggested a broad 
framing of sexual rights which would not be limited to addressing violations of 
the rights of LGBTI people but extended to include sex workers, others who 
suffer discrimination due to their sexual or gender expression, women seeking 
access to abortion and other reproductive rights, and the issue of sex education 
in schools for everyone.117 However, this option was rejected in favour of the 
SOGI approach.118 It is thus concern with discrimination on the grounds of SOGI, 
rather than sexual rights, that is central to the human rights dimension of GGG.
When assessing this new form of governance, it is also necessary to address 
critiques that point to the heteronormative assumptions that underpin inter- 
national human rights law more generally.119 Other critiques point to the LGBT 
embrace of liberal rights discourse as devoid of a focus on the development 
agenda,120 and as being drawn into a neoliberal narrative of private individual rights, 
in which gay rights serve as a marker of a civilisational divide between states.121
These concerns highlight some of the costs of GGG, but the picture at the UN 
level, as discussed, is more complex. For example, individuals from the global 
South have assumed a leading promotional (as well as oppositional) role and states 
116  Vanja Hamzi , ‘The Case of “Queer Muslims”: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 
International Human Rights Law and Muslim Legal and Social Ethos’ (2011) 11 Human 
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opposing LGBT rights have appropriated counter-hegemonic arguments as 
apologia for homophobia. The GGG, which has emerged in the context of UN 
human rights advocacy, has adopted the SOGI framework rather than the 
potentially more radical sexual rights framework, but in so doing has gained access 
to and successes in UN bodies as unlikely as the Security Council. The human 
rights dimension of GGG shares some features with the financial dimension 
discussed earlier, but is also different in many regards, particularly with regard to 
who the key players are. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have pointed to the emergence in recent years of GGG. In 
conclusion, it is important to recognise just how fragile this emerging phenomenon 
is. Unlike, for example, the growing recognition of women’s rights, which is 
occurring against a background where international law explicitly recognises 
women’s equality in various human rights treaties, with a treaty dedicated 
specifically to the issue, GGG is building from a much weaker starting point. This 
is not only because of the absence of explicit recognition within international 
law when it comes to LGBT equality, which allows oppositional states to make 
the argument that the SOGI concept is not one recognised at all in international 
law,122 but also because LGBT people are a relatively small minority, often not 
represented or visible. The fragility of GGG is also apparent in the continuing 
objections to the recognition of LGBT rights, most recently seen in the failed 
attempt, in the UN General Assembly,123 to suspend the establishment of the 
mandate of the SOGI Independent Expert, questioning its ‘legal basis’.124 
The fragility of the recognition of LGBT rights, and consequently of GGG, is also 
apparent in the shifts in US positions. The United States only started to take a 
leading role during the Obama Administration, which undoubtedly influenced 
developments at the United Nations. With the election of Donald Trump and the 
subsequent change of Administration, the future US role in GGG is unpredictable, 
and may affect future developments.125 Moreover, with both Pillay and Ki-moon 
being replaced, it is not clear whether the strong UN leadership on this issue 
will continue.
122  For a discussion of these arguments, see Baisley, above n 7, 150–4; Ignacio Saiz, ‘Bracketing 
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I also want to say a few words about how homoglobalism, as discussed in this 
chapter, compares to Puar’s discussion of homonationalism. Her focus is on the 
recent protections provided for some homosexual bodies – mainly white people 
living in Western pro-gay states. The changes described here show how, when gay 
governance goes global, it not only enters geopolitics by pitting gay-friendly states 
against states which are hostile to LGBT rights, but also promotes the global 
protection of LGBT people, including those in anti-gay states, and engages a 
variety of actors in advocacy, including a diverse range of states, civil society and 
global institutions. As I have argued, at the global level, the questions of the role 
of pinkwashing and homonationalism take a different turn, especially when LGBT 
advocacy is instigated by NGOs and by states and UN leaders from the global 
South. It is therefore not possible to explain the way in which states vote on LGBT 
rights at the United Nations only through the prism of homonationalism, which 
considers ‘the circumstances through which nation-states are now vested with the 
status of “gay-friendly” versus “homophobic”’.126 Whereas the global dimensions 
of the homonationalism discussion point to the way in which states leverage their 
support (real or perceived) of LGBT rights to mark themselves as civilised or 
progressive and to brand others as uncivilised, the GGG developments taking 
place at the global level require that we also engage critically with the actions (and 
agency) of opposing states. 
I have focused on gay governance questions arising at the level of global 
institutions, where states leverage both advocacy for and opposition to LGBT 
rights as both part of, and as a response to, GGG. I have examined GGG as it is 
emerging along two different tracks – through the global financial and human 
rights systems. While both tracks use the SOGI framework, the first is led by 
powerful states (the United States and the United Kingdom) from the global 
North, and by IFIs. In the second track emerging at the United Nations, 
particularly in its human rights system, states and UN officials from the global 
South are taking a leading role. A meeting point between the two tracks took 
place when it was agreed to adopt an amendment to the UN Human Rights 
Council resolution appointing the SOGI Independent Expert, which condemned 
gay conditionality. This indicates that we are now witnessing a few developments 
occurring at the same time: the emergence of states from the South taking 
the lead on LGBT rights together with civil society and UN leadership; the 
appropriation by some global North states of LGBT rights for political purposes; 
and both critical opposition to this appropriation by various actors, and cynical 
opposition to it by homophobic-national (or rather heteronational) states.
Both tracks of GGG risk co-option, backlash, exporting Western concepts of 
identity, pinkwashing, whitewashing and legitimating violation of the human 
rights of others in the name of LGBT rights. Both tracks have also seen some 
successes, including heightened awareness and emphatic condemnation of the 
serious threats to life and well-being faced by LGBT people in many parts of 
126  Puar, above n 10, 337.
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the world. It is not possible to carry out a full cost-benefit analysis at this early 
stage, but some current aspects of GGG – such as suspending aid directed at 
maternal healthcare, or using LGBT rights to pinkwash states and institutions – 
are clearly objectionable. Other aspects raise more complex questions of rhetoric 
versus reality and of the risks of backlash as well as of exporting identities in a way 
that may create harm – all risks that those involved in global LGBT rights advocacy 
must take into account.
9 Governing  
(trans)parenthood 
The tenacious hold of biological 
connection and heterosexuality
Anniken Sørlie*
I have only thought that I am a man without sperm, and there are many men who 
are and who can be fathers . . . [To be legally registered as a father] is important 
for me. It is so important, in fact, that I haven’t been able to think of anything 
else.1
[P]regnant men engender a critical re(conceive)ing of the idea that sex is biologically 
determined, that pregnancy is necessarily sexed as female, and that one’s sex, 
gender identity and identification as mother/father neatly align.2
In states like Argentina, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark, Malta, Ireland and Norway, 
laws have recently been amended or new laws enacted to facilitate change of legal 
gender. Most importantly, the requirements of sterilisation or infertility have 
been abolished.3 At the core of these reforms, especially since 20124 onwards, are 
the fundamental human rights principles of individual autonomy, integrity, non-
discrimination and dignity. If not yet a global trend, the recent legal reforms 
represent a paradigm shift in law’s conception of gender.
Concepts of legal gender are being constructed in response to legal claims 
brought by transgender5 litigants.6 In the case of the United Kingdom, A Sharpe 
*  My thanks to Dianne Otto, Anne Hellum and May-Len Skilbrei for their valuable comments 
and feedback on earlier drafts of this chapter. 
1  Informant interviewed in 2015 in conjunction with my doctoral project. The informant was 
registered in Norway as female at birth and has a female personal identification number. He 
identifies as a man. Note, all interview translations are by the author.
2  Lara Karaian, ‘Pregnant Men: Repronormativity, Critical Trans Theory and the Re(conceive)
ing of Sex and Pregnancy in Law’ (2013) 22 Social & Legal Studies 211, 212–13.
3  I use legal or registered gender to refer to gender specific national identity numbers or insurance 
numbers, gender according to birth certificates and passports.
4  In 2012, Argentina adopted Ley de Identidad de Género [Act on Gender Identity] (Argentina) 
9 May 2012, No 26.743.
5  Transgender, trans or trans* have emerged as umbrella terms for trans identities. For the 
purpose of this chapter, I use transgender to refer to people whose birth-assigned gender 
mismatches their gender identity, and wish to, or have, changed their legal gender.
6  A Sharpe, Foucault’s Monsters and the Challenge of Law (Routledge, 2010) 88–9.
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is concerned that ‘the body has been privileged in legal (re)constructions of sex, 
or, more particularly, the (binary) categories male and female’.7 This describes the 
situation under earlier Norwegian administrative practice on change of legal 
gender, but also, as will be demonstrated, under recently reformed Norwegian 
law. Before 2016, transgender people in Norway, who sought correction of their 
legal gender and wanted biological children, had to conceive or beget children 
before completing the legal gender recognition process. In many states, surgical 
removal of reproductive organs served as a precondition for correction of legal 
gender, considered necessary in order to rule out legal men giving birth and 
legal women begetting children.8 However, in an increasing number of states, 
including Norway, this has changed: both legal men and legal women can give 
birth to children as a result of new gender recognition laws that base correction 
of legal gender on self-declaration, repealing earlier requirements of surgical 
interventions.9 By way of this change, assumed reproductive capacity, or its 
absence, is no longer a decisive element in legal gender categories. It breaks – at 
least to some extent – the strong medico-legal link that previously characterised 
gender recognition practices. In the aftermath of these new rules, new questions 
emerge for human rights bodies, activists and NGOs. How, for example, should 
law deal with the diversity of legal genders it now recognises? Is a legal woman 
always a ‘woman’ for legal purposes?
This leads to the question of how current Norwegian law governs and should 
govern parenthood in relation to transgender parents. Informed by Michel 
Foucault’s concept of ‘governmentality’,10 I see law as one of many ‘tactics’ used 
to govern and order the population.11 Rather than being the most significant 
tactic, law interweaves with others, such as the media and politics, which, seen as 
a whole, govern the population and construct what is understood as legitimate 
and illegitimate parenthood. Particularly important to my argument is how, 
according to Foucault, the ‘legal complex’, understood as inter alia statutes, legal 
codes, legal institutions, texts and norms, is permeated by non-legal forms of 
knowledge and expertise, such as the medical.12 This is a point of departure for 
 7  Ibid 108.
 8  ‘Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on Transsexual People’ (Report, Home 
Office, April 2000) 21 <http://docs.scie-socialcareonline.org.uk/fulltext/wgtrans.pdf>; 
Prop. 1972:6 Kungl. Maj:ts proposition nr 6 år 1972 [Proposition to Riksdagen (bill)] 
(Sweden) 23.
 9  For an overview of legal reforms, see Jens M Scherpe (ed), The Legal Status of Transsexual 
and Transgender Persons (Intersentia, 2015).
10  Michel Foucault introduced the notion of ‘governmentality’ in his lecture at the Collège de 
France in February 1978. Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ (Pasquale Pasquino trans) in 
Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in 
Governmentality with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (University of 
Chicago Press, 1991) 87.
11  Ibid 87–104.
12  Nikolas Rose and Mariana Valverde, ‘Governed by Law?’ (1998) 7 Social and Legal Studies 
541, 542–3.
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my thinking of how law works in constructing gender and ‘normality’. Legal 
parenthood has been based on the biological two-sex model, reconstituting 
conventional norms of binary gender and (hetero)sexuality. I examine how gender 
emerges as a ‘problem’ for law when transgender litigants claim legal recognition 
of their gender identity, especially in the context of parenthood.13 When the 
‘problem’ of gender emerges before and under law, gender as biology and medical 
‘truth’, referred to as ‘biologic’ by Sharpe,14 is questioned.
By focusing on the legal recognition of transgender people and laws that 
regulate the field of reproduction and parenthood in Norway, I examine how 
law works as a tactic in governing parenthood and gender by promoting certain 
forms of living arrangements, gender identities and kinship relations while 
dismissing others as invalid or irrelevant. This provides a window into what law is 
doing and why law matters. This leads to the question of whether it is necessary 
for law to apply gendered parental categories (mother, father and co-mother) at 
all, or whether terms referring to functions, like being pregnant or giving birth, 
should replace the current parental categories and thereby remove legal concepts 
that do not match the identity or functions of all the people they are supposed 
to apply to.
The chapter unfolds in three sections. The first presents the legal backdrop 
against which the rights of transgender people have emerged, and subsequently 
how international and European human rights law, as well as Norwegian law, are 
constructing gender. In the second section, I look at the establishment of parent-
hood under the Act Relating to Children and Parents 1981 (‘Children Act’)15 and 
how the rules apply to transgender parents. The continuing operation of biologic 
is clearly apparent, working as a constant reminder of the ‘otherness’ of parents 
whose gender identity differs from their birth-assigned gender. The third 
section provides a more thorough discussion of how law works to govern parent-
hood and why law matters. I argue that, even though law does not preclude 
transgender parents, parenthood is regulated in such a way that transgender 
people appear as other to the norm. I conclude by suggesting that it would be 
beneficial to gender-neutralise parenthood under the law as a way of covering all 
gender identities, including those that the law currently marginalises or does not 
recognise at all.
13  Michel Foucault, Seksualitetens Historie I: Viljen til Viten (Espen Schaaning trans, Pax, first 
published 1976, 1999 edn) [trans of: Histoire de la sexualité 1: La volonté de savoir].
14  A Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (Cavendish, 2002) 9–10.
15  Lov om barn og foreldre [Act Relating to Children and Parents] April 1981, No 7 [Ministry 
of Children, Equality and Social Inclusion trans, 2014 <https://www.regjeringen.no/en/
dokumenter/the-children-act/id448389/>] (‘Children Act’). All laws and preparatory work 
refer to Norway, except where otherwise indicated.
174  Anniken Sørlie
The road to legal men giving birth and its legal  
framework: The ambiguous scope of gender
Against the backdrop of universal human rights, the rights of transgender people 
have only recently started to be recognised. Legal developments have focused on 
rights related to legal recognition of preferred gender identity, and on expanding 
coverage of anti-discrimination provisions to include the grounds of gender 
identity/expression. In this section, I provide a brief overview of these develop- 
ments, starting with the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), turning then to the work of international human rights mechanisms and 
finally to describing the recent developments in Norwegian law. 
The European Court of Human Rights – acknowledging gender  
as social yet holding on to biology
Because transgender people have brought claims to the ECtHR, its jurisprudence 
has played a crucial role in developing and clarifying the obligations of states 
parties under the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR),16 to protect 
and respect transgender people’s human rights. In these cases, gender explicitly 
emerges as a problem for law by way of appearing as a question. Most complaints 
have been tried as a matter of the right to respect for one’s private life under 
article 8. Nevertheless, it is now uncontested that gender identity falls within 
the proscribed grounds of discrimination under article 14, which prohibits 
discrimination in the enjoyment of all ECHR rights and freedoms.17 Article 8, by 
contrast, only protects individuals against arbitrary interference with their privacy 
or family life by public authorities, although it does place positive obligations on 
states to ensure that everyone’s right to private life is respected.18 According to 
the ECtHR, respect for human dignity and human freedom constitute the very 
essence of the ECHR, and the notion of personal autonomy is an important 
principle in the interpretation of article 8.19 The right to respect for private life 
covers the personal integrity of a person and encompasses issues such as personal 
16  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened 
for signature 4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 (entered into force 3 September 
1953) (‘ECHR’) is incorporated into Norwegian law by Lov om styrking av menneskeret-
tighetenes stilling i norsk rett (menneskerettsloven) [Human Rights Act] 21 May 1999, 
No 30 (‘Human Rights Act’). The incorporation gives precedence to the Convention if it 
comes into conflict with other Norwegian law. Human Rights Act § 3.
17  See, eg, Identoba v Georgia (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application 
No 73235/12, 12 May 2015) [96]. Protocol No 12 to the Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature 4 November 2000, ETS 
No 177 (entered into force 1 April 2005) sets forth a general prohibition of discrimination: 
see article 1. To date, Norway has signed, but not ratified, the optional protocol.
18  Van Kück v Germany (2003) VII Eur Court HR 1, [70].
19  Goodwin v the United Kingdom (2002) VI Eur Court HR 1, [90].
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identity and personal development.20 States parties have a positive obligation to 
take measures to ensure that transgender people can live in accordance with their 
gender identity by amending identity documents that refer to gender.21 However, 
states’ obligations beyond the question of mere correction of gender understood 
as binary have not been explicitly clarified.
In 1997, when the first and so far only case on transgender parenthood brought 
to the ECtHR was heard, the ECtHR had not yet identified any obligation 
on states parties to legally recognise transgender people’s gender identity. In 
X, Y and Z v UK,22 the United Kingdom refused to register X (post-operative 
female-male ‘transsexual’)23 as the father of Z (conceived by donor insemination 
and born to his partner Y). The ECtHR found the United Kingdom not to be 
in contravention of the applicants’ right to respect for family life under article 8 
because of the state’s interest in maintaining a coherent system of law, arguing 
that it would lead to inconsistency if somebody who was not legally a man was 
registered as a father and that such a change to the law could have negative 
implications for children. The question now is whether the ECtHR will, 
in future cases, find that states are obliged to register transgender parents in 
alignment with their legal gender when gender recognition laws are based on 
self-determination.
It was not until 2002, in Christine Goodwin v UK, that the ECtHR ruled 
decisively in favour of transgender people seeking legal gender recognition.24 
Goodwin, a post-operative male-female transgender person, argued inter alia that 
the ECHR required the United Kingdom to modify her birth certificate to 
recognise her preferred gender. The ECtHR agreed, finding no decisive reason 
for chromosomes to be determinative when establishing a ‘transsexual’s’ legal 
gender.25 Thereby, gender was acknowledged as a social construct and it was 
accepted that legal gender is not always synonymous with biological gender. 
Yet, Goodwin’s case, and others that have since been considered by the ECtHR, 
have all involved people who have undergone or intend to undergo gender-
confirmation surgery. Furthermore, in the rulings, ‘transsexualism’ has been 
treated as a medical condition for which gender-confirmation26 treatment has 
been understood as providing relief. The ECtHR’s analysis has been carried out 
along this medical pathway. Thus, in these cases, the ECtHR has not raised 
20  Torkel Opsahl, Internasjonale Menneskerettigheter: En Innføring (Institutt for 
Menneskerettigheter, 2nd edn, 1996) 44–6; Paji  v Croatia (European Court of Human 
Rights, Chamber, Application No 68453/13, 23 February 2016) [61].
21  Goodwin v the United Kingdom (2002) VI Eur Court HR 1.
22  X, Y and Z v The United Kingdom (1997) II Eur Court HR 143.
23  In its case law the ECtHR uses the term ‘transsexual’ to refer to most of the transgender 
applicants. Many consider this term to be offensive and pathologising trans identities. 
See above n 5.
24  Goodwin v the United Kingdom (2002) VI Eur Court HR 1.
25  Ibid [82].
26  Gender reassignment surgery is another term often used. However, I use confirmation, as this 
term reflects that the purpose of the surgery is to confirm and not reassign a person’s gender.
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concern about the legitimacy of requiring gender-confirmation surgery.27 So, 
even though the ECtHR has claimed to recognise gender as a social category, 
in practice it has not distinguished it from biology or medical science. Therefore, 
the biological two-sex model continues to provide the basis for legal gender.
In 2015, in Y Y v Turkey,28 the ECtHR found that a refusal by Turkish courts 
to authorise access to gender-confirmation surgery for a transgender person, 
on the ground that he was not permanently infertile (a condition of court 
authorisation), encroached on his right to respect for his private and family life 
under article 8.29 The core question for the majority was whether the non-
procreation requirement was necessary in order to protect the health of trans- 
gender people. Since Turkish authorities failed to justify the requirement in 
light of article 8, the ECtHR ruled that Turkish authorities violated the 
applicant’s privacy rights, finding that freedom to establish gender is an essential 
part of the ECHR.30 Although not dealing with the question of medical 
intervention as a precondition for correction of legal gender directly, but entry 
to gender-confirmation surgery which leads to correction of registered gender, 
the consequence of the ruling is a move in the direction of separating reproductive 
capacity from the biological basis of gender categories.31 Yet the ECtHR seems 
reticent to take a clear stand about whether gender is biologically or socially 
determined.32
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, the Committee of 
Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly have all recommended that states 
abolish sterilisation and other harmful procedures as criteria for legal gender 
recognition, based on the view that requiring gender-confirmation surgery as a 
precondition to altering legal gender violates the human rights of transgender 
people, including the right to bodily integrity and self-determination.33 If followed, 
the recommendations will foster a construction of gender that will have significant 
implications in many different areas of life. Yet, even though the recommendations 
27  See, eg, Goodwin v the United Kingdom (2002) VI Eur Court HR 1.
28  Y Y v Turkey (European Court of Human Rights, Chamber, Application No 14793/08, 
10 March 2015).
29  Peter Dunne, ‘Commentary: YY v Turkey: Infertility as a Pre-condition for Gender 
Confirmation Surgery’ (2015) 23 Medical Law Review 646, 647–8. 
30  Ibid 646, 648–50.
31  See ibid 646.
32  Pending cases before the Court on gender-confirmation surgery and transsexualism as 
preconditions for correction of registered gender: AP v France (Application No 79885/12, 
5 December 2012), Garçon v France (Application No 52471/13, 13 August 2013) and Nicot 
v France (Application No 52596/13, 13 August 2013).
33  See, eg, Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Human Rights and Gender Identity’ (Issue Paper, 
Council of Europe, 29 July 2009) [3.2.1]; Committee of Ministers, ‘Recommendation CM/
Rec(2010)5 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Measures to Combat 
Discrimination on Grounds of Sexual Orientation or Gender Identity’ (Recommendation 
No CM/Rec(2010)5, Council of Europe, 31 March 2010) cl 35; Parliamentary Assembly, 
‘Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity’ (Resolution 
No 1728 (2010), Council of Europe, 29 April 2010) [16.11.2].
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are clear, they fail to address how states are to implement the changes. For 
example, do they now have an obligation to protect pregnant or breast-feeding 
legal men from sex/gender discrimination and an obligation to recognise 
transgender people’s gender identity in relation to registration of parenthood?
International law – combating sterilisation – yet blind to  
its consequences
In international human rights law, sex/gender has also been traditionally 
understood in binary male/female categories.34 While there has been some 
progress in the context of women’s rights towards understanding gender as a 
social category, it remains moored on a biological base, understood as ‘sex’.35 
More recently, human rights treaty bodies and many of the Special Procedures 
of the UN Human Rights Council (and its predecessor the Commission on 
Human Rights) have explicitly recognised that discrimination on the basis of 
gender identity is prohibited by the non-exhaustive anti-discrimination clauses 
in international human rights instruments.36 Yet little attention has been paid 
to specific human rights obligations with regard to gender identity, let alone 
transparenthood.
Several human rights treaty bodies have now expressed concern about requiring 
medical intervention as a precondition for correction of registered gender, 
recommending that states abolish such requirements. In its ‘Concluding 
Observations’ to Belgium (2014), Finland (2014) and Slovakia (2015), the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women recommended 
that sterilisation, as a requirement for legal gender recognition, be abolished.37 
Also in 2015, the Committee against Torture recommended that China (Hong 
Kong) remove preconditions, such as sterilisation, for legal gender recognition.38 
34  See generally Dianne Otto, ‘International Human Rights Law: Towards Rethinking Sex/
Gender Dualism and Asymmetry’ in Margaret Davies and Vanessa Munro (eds), A Research 
Companion to Feminist Legal Theory (Ashgate Companion Series, 2013) 197.
35  Dianne Otto, ‘Queering Gender [Identity] in International Law’ in Anne Hellum (ed), 
Human Rights, Sexual Orientation, and Gender Identity (Routledge, 2017) 299.
36  Anne Hellum, ‘Vern mot Diskriminering på grunnlag av seksuell legning, kjønnsidentitet og 
kjønnsuttrykk – religiøse kjønnsdogmer i møte med internasjonal og norsk rett’ in Reidun 
Førde, Morten Kjelland and Ulf Stridbeck (eds), Festskrift til Aslak Syse 70 år (Gyldendal, 
2016) 191.
37  UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), Concluding 
Observations on the Seventh Periodic Report of Belgium, 59th sess, UN Doc CEDAW/C/
BEL/CO/7 (14 November 2014) [45]; UN CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the 
Seventh Periodic Report of Finland, 57th sess, UN Doc CEDAW/C/FIN/CO/7 (10 March 
2014) [29]; UN CEDAW, Concluding Observations on the Combined Fifth and Sixth 
Periodic Reports of Slovakia, 62nd sess, UN Doc CEDAW/C/SVK/CO/5-6 (25 November 
2015) [37].
38  UN Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the Fifth Periodic Report of 
China with respect to Hong Kong, China, 56th sess, UN Doc CAT/C/CHN-HKG/CO/5 
(3 February 2016) [29].
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However, trans-specific issues have yet to be adequately addressed by international 
human rights treaty bodies.39
As early as 2001, two of the Human Rights Council’s Special Procedures 
made reference to human rights abuses suffered by transgendered people, in the 
context of the question of torture and extrajudicial, arbitrary and summary 
executions.40 Since then, other Special Procedures have raised the issue within 
mandates covering human rights defenders, health and minority issues.41 In 
2013, and again in 2016, the Special Rapporteur on Torture recommended that 
states abolish and outlaw sterilisation as a requirement for legal gender recognition 
because it constituted torture and/or other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment.42 If states follow these recommendations and bring domestic law into 
compliance with international human rights law by adopting gender recognition 
acts based on self-determination, legal gender will be detached from reproductive 
capacity. Legal men will, for example, like in Norway, be able to give birth. 
However, none of these bodies has made recommendations about how they 
should be implemented in practice or what effect legal gender should have on 
parenthood.
The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights 
Law in Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (‘Yogyakarta 
Principles’) also do not address these matters directly. Adopted in 2007 by a 
group of LGBT human rights experts and advocates to provide guidance in 
interpreting existing human rights law, the Principles are not legally binding, but 
as more formal bodies rely on them, their potential to guide legal developments 
increases.43 The Yogyakarta Principles clearly state that the universal right to 
39  Rikki Holtmaat and Paul Post, ‘Enhancing LGBTI Rights by Changing the Interpretation 
of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women?’ in 
Hellum, above n 35, 319.
40  Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Question of Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN GAOR, 56th sess, Agenda Item 132(a), UN 
Doc A/56/156 (3 July 2001) [17]; Asma Jahangir, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Extrajudicial, Arbitrary and Summary Executions, UN ESCOR, 57th sess, Agenda Item 
11(b), UN Doc E/CN.4/2001/9 (11 January 2001) [50].
41  Hina Jilani, Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary General on Human Rights 
Defenders, UN ESCOR, 62nd sess, UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/95/Add.1 (22 March 2006) 
[290]; Paul Hunt, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Right of Everyone to the 
Enjoyment of the Highest Attainable Standard of Physical and Mental Health, UN 
ESCOR, 60th sess, Agenda Item 10, UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/49 (16 February 2004) [33], 
[38]–[39]; Gay McDougall, Report of the Independent Expert on Minority Issues, 
UN ESCOR, 62nd sess, Agenda Item 14(b), UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/74 (6 January 2006) 
[28], [42].
42  Juan E Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman 
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN GAOR, 31st sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc 
A/HRC/31/57 (5 January 2016) [72(e)]; Juan E Méndez, Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, UN GAOR, 
22nd sess, Agenda Item 3, UN Doc A/HRC/22/53 (1 February 2013) [88]. 
43  Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Yogyakarta Principles at Ten’ in Hellum, above n 35, 280.
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recognition before the law includes the right to have your self-defined gender 
legally recognised without the requirement of medical interventions.44 Yet, 
while recognising that transgender people have the right to found a family, and 
that no family should face discrimination because of the gender identity of any 
of its members, they are, as the soft law mentioned above, silent about parental 
categories for LGBT people as a matter of legal recognition.45 Therefore, even 
though the Principles are clear on self-declared gender and the right to non-
disclosure of gender identity,46 they do not directly address the problem of 
heteronormative and cisnormative47 domestic parenting laws.
Norwegian law – self-declared binary gender
Returning to Norway, the binary gender-specific national identity number is 
based on physical sex characteristics at birth. Before 2016, a person’s national 
identity number could be changed on the condition of completed gender-
confirmation treatment, including hormonal therapy, real-life-experience living 
as the preferred gender for a minimum of 12 months and removal of testes or 
ovaries.48 Since this administrative practice was established in the 1970s, Norway 
was one of the first states to provide for correction of legal gender.49 By implication, 
at this point the law recognised gender as social. Yet clear-cut boundaries between 
male and female bodies were maintained, as no other genders were recognised 
and a correction was reliant on alignment of the body with biological sex. Gender 
assignment at birth continued to be based on physical sex characteristics and the 
gender binary.
As a result of amendments to Norway’s anti-discrimination legislation in 2013, 
the prohibition of discrimination was extended to include gender identity and 
gender expression.50 In 2014, the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud 
concluded that the Ministry of Health and Care Services violated this legislation 
44  Yogyakarta Principles, principle 3.
45  Yogyakarta Principles, principle 24.
46  Yogyakarta Principles, principles 3, 6.
47  Cis is a term used to refer to people who self-identify with their birth-assigned gender.
48  Directorate of Health, ‘Rett til rett kjønn – Helse til alle kjønn: Utredning av vilkår for 
endring av juridisk kjønn og organisering av helsetjenester for personer som opplever 
kjønnsinkongruens og kjønnsdysfori’ (Report, Ministry of Health, April 2015) 36, 43–7; 
See generally Anniken Sørlie, ‘Legal Gender Meets Reality: A Socio-Legal Children’s 
Perspective’ in Hellum, above n 35, 353.
49  Lag (1972:119) om fastställande av könstillhörighet i vissa fall [Gender Recognition Act] 
(Sweden) 21 April 1972; Gesetz über die Änderung der Vornamen und die Feststellung der 
Geschlechtszugehörigkeit in besonderen Fällen [Act on Change of Names and Gender] 
(Germany) 10 September 1980, BGBl I, 1980, 1654; Norme in materia di rettificazione di 
attribuzione di sesso [Gender Recognition Act] (Italy) 14 April 1982, No 164.
50  Lov om forbud mot diskriminering på grunn av seksuell orientering, kjønnsidentitet og 
kjønnsuttrykk [Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Act] 21 June 2013, No 58. The Act 
applies in all sectors of society except from within family life and other purely personal 
relationships. Sexual Orientation Anti-Discrimination Act § 2. 
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when requiring a diagnosis of transsexualism, hormonal therapy and gender-
confirmation surgery for correction of legal gender.51 This determination increased 
the pressure to abolish medical requirements for change of legal gender.52 The 
Norwegian Parliament then adopted the Act on Change of Legal Gender 2016 
(‘Gender Recognition Act’), which entered into force on 1 July 2016.53 The Act 
provides for change of legal gender from the age of 16 based on self-declaration. 
For children between the ages of 6 and 16, parental consent is required. If only 
one parent gives their consent, children at this age may change their legal gender 
if the County Governor, by way of an individual decision, finds correction of legal 
gender to be in the best interests of the child.54
Legal gender therefore develops from biological determination at birth to 
self-declaration for people who have reached the age limits prescribed by the Act. 
Hence, gender recognition breaks the biological link between legal gender and 
parenthood, which had earlier seemed logical, as reproductive capacity is no 
longer tied to legal gender. However, the Act relies on the gender binary by 
way of providing only two gender options. The Act also does not challenge the 
role of physical sex characteristics for gender assignment at birth. This means that 
biology continues to serve as the basis of legal gender orthodoxy, but that law 
accepts gender as social for people over the age of 6. By constructing gender, 
the Act shapes contemporary norms about gender, which play a powerful role in 
governing expressions and practices of gender. The Act grants ‘authenticity’ to 
certain forms of gender identity and the distinction between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ emerges – a distinction which medical science previously constructed, 
before gender appeared as a problem for law. As pointed out above, it can be 
questioned whether law fully recognises gender as social, or if biology still plays a 
decisive role also in other relations – for example, in relation to parenthood.
Parenthood under Norwegian law: The heterosexual, 
dualistic and biological norm
Law also governs ways of becoming a family with children, through provisions on 
assisted conception, egg donation and adoption. In Norway, assisted conception 
is available to same-sex and different-sex couples as a part of the public health 
51  Statement, Norwegian Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud, Case No 14/840, 
9 September 2014 <http://www.ldo.no/nyheiter-og-fag/klagesaker/2014/18840- 
diskriminering-pa-grunn-av-kjonnsidentitet/>.
52  For work of great significance in advocating for change, see, eg, ‘The State Decides Who 
I Am: Lack of Legal Gender Recognition for Transgender People in Europe’ (Report, 
Amnesty International, 2014).
53  See generally Anniken Sørlie, ‘Rettighetssubjekter i Endring: Den Fødende Mannen’ in 
Ingunn Ikdahl and Vibeke Blaker Strand (eds), Rettigheter i Velferdsstaten: Begreper, Trender, 
Teorier (Gyldendal, 2016) 227.
54  Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn [Act on Change of Legal Gender] 17 June 2016, No 46, 
§§ 2, 4, 5 (‘Gender Recognition Act’).
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service. It preconditions dual parenthood by way of requiring either marriage or 
a stable relationship resembling marriage.55 Conversely, adoption is available to 
single persons, as well as couples.56 Norwegian law does not permit surrogacy 
or egg donation.57 In this section, I explore how parenthood is established under 
the Children Act and how the rules apply to transgender parents. The focal point 
is to examine whether the rules follow a presumed biological link between 
parenthood and gender, or whether the rules recognise gender as social.
The term ‘legal parents’ means ‘those persons who have established parenthood 
in a manner recognised by legislation’.58 Parenthood means the child’s mother, 
father or co-mother pursuant to the Children Act or the Adoption Act 1986.59 
Mere registration of parenthood in the Population Register has no legal effect if 
it does not comply with the rules in these Acts.60 Legal parenthood entails rights 
and obligations for the legal parents and, in parallel, it provides rights for the 
children vis-à-vis their parents. The Children Act is based on the premise that 
a child is to have two legal parents.61 In the Population Register and on birth 
certificates, parents are not categorised as mother, father or co-mother, but simply 
registered as an individual who has children. Children are registered with 
information about their parents that lists their names.62 In this chapter, focus is 
given to legal parenthood following from the three categories recognised in the 
Children Act.
Motherhood
Until 1997, motherhood was not regulated by law, but based on the biological 
principle of mater semper certa est (the mother is always certain).63 However, 
technological advances in medicine that enabled egg donation generated a need 
for regulation of motherhood, even though the Act Relating to the Application 
55  Lov om humanmedisinsk bruk av bioteknologi m.m. [Biotechnology Act] 5 December 2003, 
No 100, § 2-2 (‘Biotechnology Act’).
56  In 2001, registered partners were given the right to adopt the child of their partner. Lov om 
endringer i lov 28. februar 1986 nr. 8 om adopsjon og i lov 30. april 1993 nr. 40 om registrert 
partnerskap [Act Amending the Adoption Act and the Act on Civil Partnership] 15 June 
2001, No 36. In 2008, the Adoption Act was amended so as to give same-sex couples the 
right to adopt in general. Lov om endringer i ekteskapsloven, barnelova, adopsjonsloven, 
bioteknologiloven mv. [Act Amending the Marriage Act, the Children Act, the Adoption Act 
and the Biotechnology Act] 27 June 2008, No 53.
57  Biotechnology Act § 2-15, § 2-18.
58  Commission on Paternity, ‘NOU 2009:5 Farskap og annen morskap’ [‘Norwegian Official 
Report’] (2009) [3.1].
59  Adoption Act.
60  Ibid [14.7.4].
61  Children Act § 5; Prop. 105 L (2012–2013) [Proposition to the Storting (bill)] 52–3.
62  Prop. 74 L (2015–2016) Lov om endring av juridisk kjønn [Proposition to the Storting 
(bill)] [8.5.3].
63  Lov om endringer i lov av 8. april 1981 nr. 7 om barn og foreldre (barnelova) m.v. [Act 
Amending the Children Act] 13 June 1997, No 39.
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of Biotechnology in Medicine 1994 did not allow for this.64 It was still possible 
that donated eggs could be acquired in a foreign state.65 As explained in 
the preparatory work, the Children Act takes the view that a child’s biological 
kinship with the person bearing the child to delivery should be attributed greater 
weight than any genetic kinship with another woman or egg donor.66 Therefore, 
the biological principle, which says that the ‘woman’ who gives birth to the child 
is the child’s legal mother, was codified into the Children Act in 1997.67 This 
regulates giving birth as an exclusively female function. The determination of legal 
motherhood moves from egg to uterus, and can be changed only by adoption.
According to the Gender Recognition Act, as a main rule, legal gender shall 
apply when applying other statutes and regulations. Yet an exception is made 
when it comes to parenthood. If it is ‘necessary’ to establish parenthood and 
parental responsibility pursuant to the Children Act, birth-assigned gender 
shall be applied.68 Therefore, a legal man who gives birth will be assigned parent-
hood pursuant to the rules on motherhood. The rationale for this is that the 
conditions for fatherhood or co-motherhood are not fulfilled. The purpose is to 
ensure that parenthood can be established and to avoid uncertainty about how 
parenthood is established.69 The rules on motherhood break with the main rule 
on self-declared and social legal gender. As a consequence, law treats gender 
identities, which differ from birth-assigned gender, as justifying differential 
treatment under the Children Act. In this way, law does not recognise gender or 
pregnancy as social. Law continues to govern giving birth as a female function, 
rendering legal men giving birth invisible and not ‘really’ men (or fathers). 
Motherhood is ‘always’ biology.
Fatherhood
The rules governing paternity are closely linked with regulation of who the child’s 
mother is. When a child is born in wedlock, the pater est rule applies70 and the 
legislator assumes the biological likelihood that the husband is the father of 
the child. That is, the man who is married to the mother at the time of birth 
is the father of the child, irrespective of whether or not the latter is the biological 
64  Lov om Medisinsk Bruk av Bioteknologi [Act Relating to the Application of Biotechnology 
in Medicine] 5 August 1994, No 56 (repealed).
65  Ot.prp. nr.33 (2007–8) [Proposition to the Odelsting (bill)] [9.2.1]; Inge Lorange Backer, 
Barneloven: Kommentarutgave (Universitetsforlaget, 2nd edn, 2008) 46–7.
66  Ot.prp. nr. 56 (1996–7) Om lov om endringer i lov 8. April 1981 nr 7 om barn og foreldre 
(barnelova) [Proposition to the Odelsting (bill)] ch 3. 
67  Children Act § 2.
68  Gender Recognition Act § 6.
69  Prop. 74 L (2015–2016) [Proposition to the Storting (bill)] 37.
70  Shortening of pater est quem nuptiae demonstrant (the true father is established through 
marriage). The pater est rule has been stated by statutory law since 1892. Children 
Act Commission, ‘NOU 1977: 35 Lov om barn og foreldre’ [Norwegian Official Report] 
(1977) 12.
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father.71 At the outset, the rule is based on the biological principle, but it applies 
as well to assisted conception. The basis for the rules governing paternity and 
determination of fatherhood is thus of a social nature.72 The rule is meant to 
ensure the integrity of the family as a social unit and that the child will be cared 
for by both parents.73 This means that for paternity, social kinship and the best 
interests of the child, rather than biological kinship as for motherhood, is seen 
as more favourable. With the pater est rule, the biological principle yields to 
governmental support for the nuclear family and its privileged position in society.74
For heterosexual cohabitants or parents not living together, the law requires 
active deeds on the part of the father. The father must declare paternity either 
during pregnancy or after the child is born and the mother has to agree with the 
paternity.75 Social kinship is given less weight because of the couple’s form of 
living arrangement. This marks marriage as the preferred living arrangement. 
The distinction between the rules of paternity in marriage and in cohabitation is 
founded on the rationale that cohabitants are a diverse and shifting group. The 
presumption that the mother’s cohabitant is the child’s father is therefore weaker 
than for marriage.76
Furthermore, legal paternity can be allocated or altered by a court ruling on 
the basis of a DNA test or, if the analysis provides no conclusive answer (or 
has not been conducted), based on the probability that the person is the father 
because of the mother having had sexual intercourse with the man in question.77 
In the case of assisted conception, paternity can be attributed if the husband or 
cohabitant consented to the conception and it is probable that the child was born 
as a result of assisted conception.78 Legal paternity can never be allocated to a 
donor by way of a court ruling.79
Paternity established on the basis of marriage or declaration can be changed 
if another man declares paternity, provided the mother and the person who 
initially was assigned paternity consent in writing and a DNA analysis confirms 
paternity.80 With the consent of the parties, biological evidence gives grounds 
for paternity, whereas social paternity provides no opportunity to change a 
biologically established paternity. The only way to do this is through adoption.
71  Children Act § 3. See generally Backer, above n 65, 73–80.
72  Ot.prp. no.33 (2007–8) [Proposition to the Odelsting (bill)] [9.2.2].
73  Prop. 105 L (2012–13) Endringer i barnelova (farskap og morskap) [Proposition to the 
Storting (bill)], [4.1.1]–[4.1.4].
74  Sigrun Saur Stiklestad, ‘Det biologiske prinsipps skiftende anvendelse’ (2007) 24 Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift 138, 143.
75  Children Act § 4; Prop. 105 L (2012–2013) Endringer i barnelova (farskap og morskap) 
[Proposition to the Storting (bill)] [4.3].
76  Prop. 105 L (2012–13) Endringer i barnelova (farskap og morskap) [Proposition to the 
Storting (bill)] [4.2.4].
77  Children Act §§ 6, 9. See generally Backer, above n 65, 56–8, 100–18.
78  Children Act § 9.
79  Ibid § 9.
80  Ibid § 7.
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According to the Gender Recognition Act, for a legal woman who begets a 
child with her own semen, legal parenthood is established based on the rules on 
paternity, as described above.81 The legal woman cannot, in this case, be the legal 
mother. Nor are the requirements for co-motherhood fulfilled, as discussed in 
the next section. In a similar way, the rules on fatherhood cannot be applied to 
establish parenthood for a legal man who gives birth since the person who gives 
birth is the child’s mother. When birth-assigned gender and gender identity 
conflict, birth-assigned gender wins out in determining parenthood. The rules 
(re)constitute the biological link between semen and man/father. In regulating 
families, the wording of the law does not recognise a legal woman who begets a 
child as a woman.
Co-motherhood
The woman to whom the mother is married at the time of birth, when the child 
is born after assisted conception, is considered to be the co-mother.82 The 
prerequisites are that she has consented to conception and that the couple has 
used a known donor in an approved health institution.83 The pater est rule is thus 
applied to regulate co-motherhood despite the absence of biological or genetic 
kinship. As explained in the preparatory work, this approach was based on 
considerations of the best interests of the child and of gender equality.84 For 
women cohabitants, co-motherhood can be acquired by declaration, in the same 
manner as for fatherhood,85 or allocated by a court ruling if the co-parent 
consented to conception.86 The rules for assigning and declaring co-motherhood 
are thus founded on social parenthood and the consent of both lesbian cohabitants 
or married partners. Here, the Act differs from the otherwise increased emphasis 
on biology with regard to fatherhood.87
The rules on co-motherhood also apply if the partner of a legal woman (who 
has changed her legal gender) avails herself of assisted conception by the use of 
donor semen. Since the requirements for co-motherhood are fulfilled, it is not 
necessary to apply the birth-assigned gender in order to establish parenthood.88 
Thereby, in the case of co-mother, the rules recognise gender as social.
81  Prop. 74 L (2015–2016) [Proposition to the Storting (bill)] 37.
82  The term co-father is not a legal term and is not applied in any regulation on parenthood.
83  Children Act § 3. 
84  Ot.prp. nr.33 (2007–2008) [Proposition to the Odelsting (bill)] [9.6.1.2].
85  Children Act § 4.
86  The rules in §§ 6–9 apply likewise for a co-mother to the extent that they are fitting. 
The legal effects of co-motherhood are the same as for fatherhood. Children Act 
§§ 4a, 9.
87  Backer, above n 65, 50.
88  Prop. 74 L (2015–2016) [Proposition to the Storting (bill)] 37.
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Disrupting the biological link
As illustrated above, the basis of the parental rules under the Children Act remains 
that of a man and a woman whose legal genders match their birth-assigned 
genders. A father is presumed to be a cisman and a mother a ciswoman. As 
recognition of the rights of lesbian couples to assisted conception challenged the 
male/female parenting dyad, the new legal term ‘co-mother’ was introduced. 
The Act also establishes that a child cannot have both a father and a co-mother, 
as this would be too much of a violation of the biological principle, since there 
will always be a ‘father’ when donor insemination is not used, as explained in the 
preparatory work.89 Nor can a child have two legal mothers or co-mothers. 
Although the Act opens social parenthood as a basis for legal parenthood, such 
as for co-motherhood, it remains anchored in the biological principle.
As we have seen, the Gender Recognition Act challenges the biological parent-
ing dyad by making it possible for legal men to give birth and legal women to 
produce semen. Yet whereas the basis for legal genders is in motion from biologic 
to social recognition, the birth-assigned gender, which is based on biological 
characteristics at birth, continues to be the basis for the establishment of legal 
parenthood. In relation to parenthood, law governs gender as biological.
However, rules that govern parenthood by treating gender as biological are not 
unique to Norway. For example, in Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, the 
person who gives birth is the child’s mother, irrespective of legal gender.90 
The one exception may be the Gender Recognition Act 2004 (UK), which states 
that ‘[t]he fact that a person’s gender has become the acquired gender under this 
Act does not affect the status of the person as the father or mother of a child’.91 
The provision is ambiguous, but in the view of Stephen Gilmore, it is likely that 
it refers to parenthood prior to legal gender recognition, meaning that parenthood 
before transitioning remains the same after legal gender recognition. Gilmore 
suggests that, after recognition of preferred gender, legal parenthood can be 
acquired in keeping with legal gender, which would mean that a transgender man 
could be legal father, as wished for by my informant quoted at the start of this 
chapter.92
89  Children Act § 4a; Ot.prp. nr.33 (2007–8) [Proposition to the Odelsting (bill)] [9.6.1.2].
90  Natalie Videbæk Munkholm, ‘Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons in 
Denmark’ in Jens M Scherpe (ed), The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons 
(Intersentia, 2015) 147, 171; Prop. 2012/13: 107 [Proposition to Riksdagen (bill)] 
(Sweden) 18–22; Marjolein van den Brink and Jet Tigchelaar, ‘The Equality of the (Non) 
Trans-Parent: Women Who Father Children’ in Marjolein van den Brink, Susanne Burri and 
Jenny Goldschmidt (eds), Equality and Human Rights: Nothing but Trouble? (SIM special, 
2015) 247, 249–50.
91  Gender Recognition Act (UK) c 7.
92  Stephen Gilmore, ‘The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons in England and 
Wales’ in Jens M Scherpe (ed), The Legal Status of Transsexual and Transgender Persons 
(Intersentia, 2015) 183, 200, 203.
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So why has the legislature held onto the traditionally presumed link between 
gender and parenthood categories? Why not change the wording of the Act 
so as to comply with the purpose of the Gender Recognition Act, which is self-
determined gender, or even better gender-neutralise the rules regarding 
parenthood in the Children Act? The law cannot prevent forms of genetic kinship 
that do not conform with the paradigm of ‘normality’ produced and governed by 
law. For example, since transgender people undergoing gender-confirmation 
treatment are unable to arrange for the preservation of their eggs in Norway, 
because surrogacy is not permitted, one of my young transgender informants 
told me that he is travelling abroad to preserve his eggs to ensure that his partner 
can carry and give birth to his child.93 He will be genetically related to his child, 
whereas his partner will be biologically related by way of carrying their child. Since 
his partner will give birth, she will be the child’s mother. It would be in line with 
the objectives of the rules on parenthood, such as ensuring the integrity of the 
family and ensuring the best interests of the child by ensuring that the child has 
two legal parents, if he is assigned fatherhood to the child born by his partner.94 
If he gave birth, he would automatically be assigned motherhood. By overcoming 
the limitations imposed by law, these parents will challenge the ‘normal’ biological 
link between gender and reproduction. This means that the rules on parenthood 
under the Children Act are no guarantee for presumed biological parent/child 
relations, and as we have seen above, they are inconsistent in whether or not 
transgender peoples’ gender identity is recognised.
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So, how are the Gender Recognition Act and the Children Act governing 
parenthood? In particular, what are their effects in the lives of transgender 
Norwegians? As Foucault argues, in modern societies power operates through 
normative discourses, which lead to the normalisation of certain conduct and 
behaviour. Law works as an important medium that produces power,95 which 
works to discipline populations by defining what are normal ways to live and what 
are not.
93  Informant interviewed 2015. Since surrogacy is not permitted in Norway preservation 
of eggs has not been provided for transgender people who are starting hormone therapy 
and undergoing gender-confirmation surgery. Biotechnology Act § 2-15; Directorate of 
Health, ‘Evaluering av bioteknologiloven 2015: Oppdatering om status og utvikling 
på fagområdene som reguleres av loven’ (Report, Directorate of Health, 2015) [2.2.9.3]. To 
date, the Biotechnology Act is under revision and biotechnology options for transgender 
people are considered.
94  It is uncertain how this would work out in practice. Yet, if they are married, as a main rule 
the pater rest rule shall apply. 
95  See, eg, Jane Scoular, ‘What’s Law Got to Do with It? How and Why Law Matters in the 
Regulation of Sex Work’ (2010) 37 Journal of Law and Society 12, 26–8.
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Exceptions to the rule of self-declared legal gender are regulated by section 6 
of the Gender Recognition Act. The provision establishes which rules to apply 
when the rules on establishment of parenthood under the Children Act do not fit 
the situation of transgender people conceiving children, clarifying what concep-
tion of gender operates in relation to parenthood. For example, giving birth is not 
a function only legal women or people identifying as women have. Yet the rules 
do not reflect this situation. When the rules on parenthood do not fit the ‘reality’, 
the provision requires that birth-assigned gender shall be applied at the expense 
of (legal) gender. The operation of power of this provision is not by way of 
precluding transgender people from establishing families with children, like the 
requirements of sterilisation or infertility did previously. Rather, it draws on nor-
mative expectations embedded in this provision. The operation of power works 
by way of governing what the population sees as ‘normal’ and their wish to be 
‘normal’, and not by way of coercion. It is a shift from how the requirement of 
surgery governed the population and how the less visible form of power of today’s 
legislation works. Yet this less visible form of power affects the personal experi-
ences of transgender people and shapes the wider expectations of society by 
constituting subjects based on conventional norms. In relation to transgender 
people, the provision works by way of implying that they are not ‘real’ men or 
women even though their legal gender indicates that they are. It imposes certain 
limits on the expulsion of the biologic of gender from the law. The line is drawn 
at parenthood and reproduction.
The enactment of the Gender Recognition Act did not lead to a subsequent 
change of the wording of the Children Act to bring it into compliance with the 
new situation. This probably enabled a more rapid introduction of the Act, which 
was beneficial to transgender people because it abolished medical requirements 
for change of legal gender. At the same time, this works to limit the effects of the 
change and protect cisgendered conventions relating to both gender and sexuality. 
The power of the Children Act works through its gender-specific wording, in 
other words from the texts as such, which constructs heterosexual, married, 
cisgender families as the norm. In ‘denying’ the realities of transgendered people’s 
lives, the Act constructs normative expectations about gender and parenthood, 
which reconstitute and reconfirm their ‘otherness’. Rather than challenging 
conventional norms, the Act thereby pursues and supports these norms and their 
power in normalising the population.
Yet most people never look at the specific wording of legislation and, as was 
argued in the preparatory work to the Gender Recognition Act, parents are not 
listed as mother, father or co-mother in the National Population Register or on 
birth certificates, unlike in Sweden.96 In 2014 and 2015, Swedish courts found 
that a mismatch between a person’s gender identity/legal gender and gendered 
parental status in the Swedish Population Register was in breach of article 8 
(privacy) and article 14 (non-discrimination) of the ECHR in relation to both the 
96  Prop. 74 L (2015–16) [Proposition to the Storting (bill)] [8.5.3].
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parent and the child. It is, as argued by the Administrative Court in Gothenburg, 
in compliance with the best interests of the child to register parents in such a way 
that parents’ ‘change of gender’ is not involuntarily disclosed. The courts 
concluded that a legal man who gives birth, and a person who changes legal 
gender after giving birth, can be registered as a father.97 Such registration was 
considered to be in keeping with the object of population registration, which 
is to secure correct and relevant information about individuals. In the view of the 
Swedish courts, to register a legal man as a mother implies that he is registered as 
a woman, and as a consequence his gender identity is not fully legally recognised.98
Even though the Norwegian Population Register registers parents differently 
from the Swedish register, other Norwegian laws and regulations also apply 
cisgendered categories of parenthood. If we look at the National Insurance Act 
1997 provisions on pregnancy, birth and adoption benefits, the terms ‘man’, 
‘woman’, ‘mother’ and ‘father’ appear throughout.99 These rules actively impact 
on the lives of trans-parents. Indeed, the new legislation specifies that these rules 
also apply to those who have changed their legal gender, yet, the terms are used 
in application forms for parental benefits and for assisted conception,100 which 
means that applicants are forced to disclose their gender history. These rules are 
therefore a constant reminder of ‘otherness’ – of not being recognised as a parent 
on an equal footing with cisparents. Here, law continues to disqualify transgendered 
parenthood as fully normal, signalling transgender people’s questionable fitness 
for parenthood. This might affect not only the well-being of transgender parents, 
 97  A and B v Skatteverket [Swedish Tax Agency], Förvaltningsrätten i Göteborg [Administrative 
Court in Gothenburg], 11435-13, 30 October 2014. The appeal made by the Swedish Tax 
Agency was rejected by Kammarrätten i Göteborg [Administrative Court in Gothenburg], 
6186-14, 5 October 2015. Warren Kunce v Skatteverket [Swedish Tax Agency], 
Förvaltningsrätten i Stockholm [Administrative Court in Stockholm], 24685, 14 April 
2015. The appeal made by the Swedish Tax Agency was rejected by Kammarrätten i 
Stockholm [Administrative Court of Appeal in Stockholm], 3201-14, 19 July 2015. Cf 
Kammergericht in Berlin [Higher Regional Court], 1. Zivilsenat 1 W 48/14, 30 October 
2014. In 2011, the German Constitutional Court ruled that the requirement of sterilisation 
under the Act on Change of Names and Gender was in breach of the German Constitution 
and the ECHR, and annulled the requirement. Bundesverfassungsgericht [German 
Constitutional Court], 1 BvR 3295/07, 11 January 2011.
 98  Förvaltningsrätten i Göteborg [Administrative Court in Gothenburg], 11435-13, 
30 October 2014.
 99  Lov om folketrygd [National Insurance Act] 28 February 1997, No 19.
100  See, eg, Søknad om foreldrepenger, mødrekvote eller fedrekvote ved fødsel [Application 
on Parental Benefits, Mother’s Quota or Father’s Quota at Birth] (Form No NAV 14 to 
05.09, NAV) <https://www.nav.no/internett/no/Person/Skjemaer-for-privatpersoner/
skjemaveileder/vedlegg?key=267385&veiledertype=privatperson>; Varsel om avvikling av 
foreldrepermisjon [Notice of Parental Leave] (Form No 703147e, Meløy Kommune); 
Tilrettelegging/omplassering pga graviditet [Adaptation/Reposition Due to Pregnancy] 
(Form, Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority); Samtykke til assistert befruktning fra 
ektefelle/registrert partner/samboer [Consent to Assisted Conception from Spouse/
Registered Partner/Cohabitant] (Form No Q-0314B, Folkeregistermyndigheten).
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but also indirectly their children. As argued by the Swedish courts mentioned 
above, there is no reason to not see birth-giving legal men as fathers.
The 2016 legislative change operates quietly to shape normality by maintaining 
the fictive link between legal men and semen and legal women and eggs, thereby 
privileging a cisgendered reality. Law’s power does not work by way of prohibiting 
particular forms of parenthood, such as it does for egg donation, surrogacy and 
assisted conception. On the contrary, in relation to transgender parenthood, the 
wording of the law operates behind the appearance of trans inclusion, interweaving 
with other tactics in governing gender identities, rewarding preferable forms of 
(cis)parenthood and casting doubt on the legitimacy of others.
One of my informants, a woman in her 20s, says: ‘I would of course see myself 
as a mother, but I’m not sure how that would work out on paper. It would have 
felt quite weird to be defined as a father, creepy actually . . . I am a woman.’101 
She, like all the other transgender people I have interviewed, would identify as 
the parent matching their gender identity if they have children. However, the 
wording of the Act reflected in many application forms will signal that they are 
not ‘really’ women or men. The same informant says: ‘Being trans is a part of my 
identity, but not a significant part of my identity. Being trans has evolved from 
figuring prominently, to wind up in the background [to being a woman].’ 
To introduce the Gender Recognition Act and not amend related laws works 
against the purpose of the Act, which is to recognise gender identity based on 
self-determination. Instead of diminishing the relevance of being transgender, 
it is continually foregrounded by law’s representation of the ‘otherness’ of trans-
parents. Norwegian rules on parenthood create a hierarchy of preferred parents 
where matters of gender identity, sexual orientation, whether you are in a 
relationship and whether you use a ‘proper’ form of conception all matter.
Norwegian law is based on the male/female gender dualism. No other genders 
are recognised, and biology serves as the predominant basis of determining 
gender in the context of recognising legal parenthood. Would it not be preferable 
to introduce gender-neutral terms into the laws regulating and establishing 
parenthood? The use of gendered terms could be replaced with language that 
relates to the function or substance that the law is governing: such as pregnancy, 
cash benefits for the birth-giving parent or caring parent, protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of pregnancy or becoming or being a parent, access 
to abortion and parental leave.102 This would include all parents no matter what 
their gender identity or sexual orientation, and contribute to ending reliance on 
gender and sexuality hierarchies based on biologic. It could be a way to disrupt 
the tenacity of rigid normative and socially constructed dualistic gender roles that 
101  Informant interviewed 2015.
102  Other scholars have also suggested this as a possible option. See, eg, Sheelagh McGuinness 
and Amel Alghrani, ‘Gender and Parenthood: The Case for Realignment’ (2008) 
16 Medical Law Review 261, 282; van den Brink and Tigchelaar, above n 90, 247, 259; 
Karaian, above n 2, 211–30.
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continue to rely on biologic, even as they purport to recognise trans-parenthood. 
It would be in compliance with the best interests of the child that shall be a 
primary consideration in all actions concerning children, as it would ensure that 
the child has legal parents.103 Furthermore, it would diminish the role of law in 
creating authenticity and normalising subjects which could positively influence 
the well-being of transgender parents and thereby also their children.
I have argued that recent developments in the legal and social regulation 
of gender identity and parenthood hold fast to the importance of biological 
foundations, heterosexual family forms and cisnormativity. In Norway, the 
Children Act, in combination with the Gender Recognition Act, while not 
explicitly excluding transgender parenthood, establishes a governing hierarchy of 
parenthood, gender identities and sexualities that normalises heterosexuality and 
reinstates the biological link between birth/legal woman and semen/legal man. 
Law’s recognition of gender as social and fluid is extremely limited. A great deal 
depends on the subject matter. In the case of parenthood, law refuses the full 
inclusion of transgender people, and returns to the biologic of the two-sex model. 
I suggest that it may be time to adopt gender-neutral parental categories under 
the law, arguing that gender-neutral terms would better include and reflect the 
reality of parents living in contemporary Norway, and many other parts of 
the world. Gender-neutral parenthood would also help to realise the human 
rights principles of self-identification, personal integrity and autonomy that 
underlie new laws relating to change of legal gender. The goal should be to 
recognise transgender people’s gender identity in all aspects of their lives.
103  Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature 20 November 1989, 1577 







10 Queer border crossers 
Pragmatic complicities,  
indiscretions and subversions
Bina Fernandez*
Borders are set up to define the places that are safe and unsafe, to distinguish us 
from them. A border is a dividing line, a narrow strip along a steep edge. A border-
land is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an 
unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbid-
den are its inhabitants. Los atravesados live here: the squint-eyed, the perverse, the 
queer, the troublesome, the mongrel, the mulato, the half-breed, the half dead; in 
short, those who cross over, pass over, or go through the confines of the ‘normal’.1
Gloria Anzaldúa’s words provide an apt preface to the concerns of this chapter 
with borders, and the people who cross them, those whom she calls los atravesados. 
In a Spanish–English dictionary, the source verb ‘atravesar’ means ‘to cross, to 
pierce, to lay across, to go through (a situation or crisis)’ and also ‘to obstruct and 
to interfere’.2 With Anzaldúa, I view queer border crossers as transgressors of 
boundaries whose disruptions of normative categories may be contradictory, 
provocative and alien, but have critical and transformative possibilities.
By invoking at the outset the work of Chicana lesbian feminist activist Gloria 
Anzaldúa, I engage the anti-identitarian and anti-normative traditions in queer 
critique that Anzaldúa pioneered a few years before the ‘canonical’ texts of 
queer theory by Judith Butler and Eve Sedgwick were published. It is nearly 
30 years since Anzaldúa’s pioneering work, and the robust scholarship on queer 
migrations that has since emerged acknowledges that ‘queer’ is a contested 
term, and goes beyond the identitarian categories of lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex (and the diverse gender and sexual identities and practices 
*  I am grateful to Debolina Dutta and Dianne Otto for their comments on this chapter. Their 
thoughtful feedback enriched my thinking and helped me clarify arguments in the chapter. 
I also thank Isabella Ofner for her meticulous assistance with the references.
1  Gloria Anzaldúa, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza (Aunt Lute Books, 1987) 25.
2  See, eg, Britannica, ‘Atravesar’, Nglish: Translation and English Learning <http://www.nglish.
com/spanish/en/atravesar?rr=L1>; Henry Neuman and Giuseppe Marco Antonio Baretti, 
Neuman and Baretti’s Dictionary of the Spanish and English Languages (William Kerr & Co, 
1842) vol 1, 85 (definition of ‘atravesar’).
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not captured by these terms). ‘Queer’ is used as a tool of critique that offers 
‘resistance to regimes of the normal’ and is simultaneously ‘calibrated to account 
for the social antagonisms of nation, race, gender, and class as well as sexuality’.3
‘Borders’ are also contested: they are not merely the physical markers of territory, 
lines on the map, barbed wire fences or check posts that demarcate divisions 
between states. Borders are ideological constructs that generate particular 
identities, denote power relationships and the ontological boundaries of political 
space. Anzaldúa described the border as ‘una herida abierta [an open wound] 
where the Third World grates against the First and bleeds’.4 She challenged the 
imperial imposition of the (US) border that violently divided her people, yet 
inevitably failed to contain them. Borders are ‘polysemic’, carrying meanings that 
are contingent on context and perspective.5 They may denote national cultural 
belonging, may be constitutive of the production of gender, sexualities, families 
and households, confer membership privileges of entitlements and protections due 
to national citizens, filter out ‘desirable’ from ‘undesirable’ workers and construct 
labour relations, and under globalisation, may also be irrelevant to the circulation 
of certain types of commodities, services and finances.
In focusing on queer border crossers, this chapter seeks to explore what happens 
when these two inherently unstable signifiers ‘queer’ and ‘border’ intersect. In 
doing so, I aim to move beyond the limited narrative of such individuals crossing 
international borders to ‘escape repression in the global South and gain freedom 
in the global North’, and ask instead, what are the modes of inclusion, dissidence, 
subversion or normalisation that are produced when queers cross the border? 
How do the boundaries of the nation-state and citizenship get redrawn? While 
queer border crossers may be categorised by states as migrants, asylum seekers, 
refugees, economic migrants, family or partner migrants, business travellers and 
tourists; in this chapter I restrict my discussion to the first three categories, with 
the caveat that all these categories have fuzzy often overlapping boundaries, and 
that they must be recognised as contingent on the prior existence of nations 
and borders.
The chapter is structured as follows: the second section outlines some of the 
significant victories of LGBTI struggles for the recognition of gender and sexuality 
as grounds for migration and asylum seeking. I show that while there has been 
progress, particularly in immigration law in the past few decades, recognition of 
LGBTI asylum seeker claims has been troubled. In the third section I examine 
the practices of the law and activist responses in two domains: the practices 
around ‘credibility’ of LGBTI applicants for migration and asylum; and, second, 
the paradoxes of sexual (in)visibility related to LGBTI claims. Here, I argue that 
although such practices may be viewed as ‘pragmatic complicities’ supporting 
3  Eithne Luibhéid and Lionel Cantú Jr (eds), Queer Migrations: Sexuality, US Citizenship, and 
Border Crossings (University of Minnesota Press, 2005) x–xi. 
4  Anzaldúa, above n 1, 25.
5  Étienne Balibar, Politics and the Other Scene (Verso, 2002) 81.
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individual claimants, they legitimate the reification of identity politics and a homo- 
nationalist consolidation of power. In the concluding fourth section, the chapter 
introduces the ‘no borders’ position, differentiating it from an ‘open borders’ 
position, and develops my argument for why the former offers emancipatory 
possibilities for a politics of los atravesados or queer border crossers that seeks to 
transform, rather than accommodate to, existing social structures.
Reforms in LGBTI immigration and asylum law
In the nineteenth century, nation-states’ prerogatives and capacity to control the 
entry of los atravesados to their territories became the mode of signalling state 
authority, indeed their very ‘stateness’. National identities were deeply entwined 
with ideologies of race, ethnicity, class and sexuality, particularly in settler colonial 
countries like the United States, Australia and Canada. Citizenship became 
naturalised as delimited by the nation, and immigration legislation enacted in 
this period6 explicitly denied entry to a long list of people considered undesirable: 
lunatics, criminals, sex workers, polygamists, paupers, people unable to take care 
of themselves without becoming a public charge, people suffering from contagious 
disease, anyone convicted of a crime of ‘moral turpitude’, people deemed to have 
‘psychopathic personalities’, ‘deviants’, homosexuals and ‘non-white’ populations 
(Asians, Africans, Eastern Europeans).
The ban on people with mental illness was interpreted in practice to exclude 
lesbians, gays and gender non-conformist people in the United States, Australia 
and Canada. These restrictions were tightened in the mid twentieth century 
in the United States (and to a lesser degree in the other two countries), largely in 
response to the Cold War wave of anti-Communist paranoia.7 As Margot Canaday 
observes, ‘homosexuals were, like communists, not only unnatural but dangerously 
subversive’ unworthy of entry and citizenship.8 In 1952, the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, published by the American Psychiatric 
Association, officially classified homosexuality as a ‘sociopathic personality 
disturbance’; in the same year, the McCarran–Walter Act’s ban on psychopathic 
personalities was used for the first time by the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service in the United States to explicitly refuse immigration of lesbians and gays. 
It was only in the 1990s that these explicitly discriminatory provisions of the law 
were removed in the United States and several other countries, allowing individual 
lesbian and gay applicants to make immigration applications. Notwithstanding 
these changes, lesbians and gays continued to face significant barriers to 
6  For instance, see An Act Supplementary to the Acts in Relation to Immigration, USC (1875); 
Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth); Immigration Act, C 1906. 
7  Randolph W Baxter, ‘“Homo-Hunting” in the Early Cold War: Senator Kenneth Wherry and 
the Homophobic Side of McCarthyism’ (2003) 84 Nebraska History 118. Margot Canaday, 
‘“Who Is a Homosexual?”: The Consolidation of Sexual Identities in Mid-Twentieth-Century 
American Immigration Law’ (2003) 28 Law and Social Inquiry 351.
8  Canaday, above n 7, 355.
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immigration over the next two decades, due to the inability of lesbian and gay 
couples to marry, and the legal non-recognition of their families.
Australia and Canada were the first countries to allow immigration of the 
same-sex partners of nationals in the late 1980s, through compassionate and 
humanitarian visas that were issued by ministerial discretion. Today, around 
20 countries9 recognise immigration rights for bi-national same-sex couples, 
if one of them is a citizen. These countries have followed two distinct routes to such 
recognition. The first route is the creation of an immigration sponsorship category 
broad enough to include same-sex relationships. This was the path adopted by 
Australia in 1991, through the introduction of the Emotional Interdependency 
visa category to allow non-familial migration (amended in 2000 to the family 
stream same-sex interdependency visa); the majority of countries subsequently 
followed this pathway. Initially, many of these countries continued to make 
discriminatory distinctions between heterosexual and homosexual relationships 
– for instance, in the proviso for the number of years prior to and post-entry that 
the couple was required to provide evidence of a continued relationship. Since 
2000, these differences have been gradually eliminated, and same-sex couples 
enjoy the same rights as opposite-sex couples to sponsor their non-citizen partners, 
or to include their partner in visa applications. The second route to recognition 
of same-sex immigration rights is through civil unions legislation, which confers 
some of the rights of heterosexual marriage, including partner sponsorship. This 
route was adopted by Norway, Iceland, Denmark and Switzerland.
Until very recently, the United States was the major outlier from this group 
of countries that recognise same-sex partner immigration rights. According to a 
study using US census data conducted by the Williams Institute in 2010, there 
were an estimated 28,500 bi-national same-sex couples and nearly 11,500 
same-sex couples in which neither partner was a US citizen.10 However, estimates 
of actual numbers exceeded these 40,000 couples, as many would be unlikely to 
declare their status to authorities. Thus, over 40,000 lesbian and gay bi-national 
couples were prevented from sponsoring their non-citizen partners to live in the 
United States.
In a comparative analysis of the United States, Israel and Australia, S Iimay Ho 
and Megan Rolfe argue that the structure of political opportunity constrained 
the efforts of gay rights advocates in the United States.11 In contrast, in Israel and 
Australia, access to elite allies, ministerial autonomy and parliamentary politics 
 9  These include Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
the Netherlands, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal, Belgium, Switzerland, Ireland, the 
United Kingdom, South Africa, Brazil, Israel and, most recently, the United States.
10  Craig J Konnoth and Gary J Gates, ‘Same-Sex Couples and Immigration in the United States’ 
(Report, The Williams Institute, November 2011) <http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/
wp-content/uploads/Gates-Konnoth-Binational-Report-Nov-2011.pdf>.
11  S Iimay Ho and Megan E Rolfe, ‘Same-Sex Partner Immigration and the Civil Rights Frame: 
A Comparative Study of Australia, Israel, and the USA’ (2011) 52 International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology 390.
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allowed activists to successfully use a civil rights frame to legitimise their cause and 
reduce opposition. Conservatives in the United States succeeded in mounting 
significant opposition at state and federal levels, which culminated in the regressive 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) that restricted marriage to the union of 
one man and one woman, and allowed states to refuse recognition of same-sex 
marriages granted under the laws of other states.12 This restrictive definition of 
‘marriage’ to heterosexual couples thus aggressively reinforced the bar against 
same-sex couples receiving federal marriage benefits, including the right to 
sponsor a non-citizen partner.13 These restrictions were recently lifted with 
two Supreme Court decisions: the 2013 ruling in Windsor v United States that 
section 3 of DOMA was unconstitutional, and the 2015 ruling in Obergefell v 
Hodges that state-level bans on same-sex marriage were unconstitutional. The 
US Department of Homeland Security now reviews immigration visa petitions 
filed on behalf of a same-sex spouse in the same manner as those filed on behalf 
of an opposite-sex spouse.14
In contrast to same-sex immigration reforms, legislative reforms that recognise 
the eligibility of lesbians and gays to be considered refugees and asylum seekers 
have been slower to be implemented and are still deeply contested, even in the core 
countries that accept immigration of same-sex partners. Drawing on the extensive 
scholarship documenting these struggles across national contexts, I identify below 
some of the key reform moments in this history.15
12  John Medeiros, ‘Immigration after DOMA: How Equal Is Marriage Equality?’ (2014) 35 
Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy 196.
13  Logan Bushell, ‘“Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses” – Just as Long as 
They Fit in the Heteronormative Ideal: US Immigration Law’s Exclusionary and Inequitable 
Treatment of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgendered, and Queer Migrants’ (2012) 48 
Gonzaga Law Review 673; Daniela G Domínguez, Bernadette H Solórzano and Ezequiel 
Peña, ‘Nonheterosexual Binational Families: Resilient Victims of Sexual Prejudice and 
Discriminatory Immigration Policies’ (2012) 8 Journal of GLBT Family Studies 496.
14  See Department of Homeland Security, ‘Implementation of the Supreme Court Ruling on 
the Defense of Marriage Act’ (21 July 2015) <http://www.dhs.gov/topic/implementation- 
supreme-court-ruling-defense-marriage-act>.
15  See Arwen Swink, ‘Queer Refuge: A Review of the Role of Country Condition Analysis in 
Asylum Adjudications for Members of Sexual Minorities’ (2006) 29 Hastings International 
and Comparative Law Review 251; Sabine Jansen, ‘Fleeing Homophobia, Asylum Claims 
Related to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Europe’ in Thomas Spijkerboer (ed), 
Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum (Taylor and Francis, 
2013) 1; Jenni Millbank, ‘Sexual Orientation and Refugee Status Determination over the 
Past 20 Years: Unsteady Progress through Standard Sequences?’ in Thomas Spijkerboer (ed), 
Fleeing Homophobia: Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity and Asylum (Taylor and Francis, 
2013) 32; Heather Scavone, ‘Queer Evidence: The Peculiar Evidentiary Burden Faced by 
Asylum Applicants with Cases Based on Sexual Orientation and Identity’ (2013) 5 Elon Law 
Review 389; Nan Seuffert, ‘Haunting National Boundaries LBGTI Asylum Seekers’ (2013) 
22 Griffith Law Review 752; Rachel A Lewis, ‘“Gay? Prove it”: The Politics of Queer 
Anti-Deportation Activism’ (2014) 17 Sexualities 958; Amy Shuman and Carol Bohmer, 
‘Gender and Cultural Silences in the Political Asylum Process’ (2014) 17 Sexualities 939; 
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The 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee 
Convention’) defines a refugee as a person who is outside their country of citizen-
ship because they have well-founded grounds for fear of persecution because of 
their race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, and is unable to obtain sanctuary from their home country or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of that country.16
As the Refugee Convention did not explicitly include lesbians and gays as a 
group requiring protection, in the first three decades, lesbian and gay applications 
for refugee status were routinely denied until the Netherlands became the 
first Northern nation to recognise sexual orientation as grounds for protection 
from persecution,17 followed by the United States in 1990 in the Matter of Toboso-
Alfonso,18 Canada in a 1991 ruling by the Supreme Court in (AG) v Ward and 
other countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom.19 In the 1990s, 
international human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch argued that protection from homosexual and gender-based 
persecution fell within the purview of refugee rights. The LGBTI rights activism 
by these organisations documented persecution on the basis of gender and sexual 
orientation around the world. This documentation was partially responsible for 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugee’s (UNHCR) Guidelines on International 
Protection: Gender-Related Persecution in 2002, which recognised that 
‘membership of a particular social group’ entailed sharing a common characteristic 
which is ‘innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, 
conscience or the exercise of one’s human rights’.20 The Guidelines explicitly stated 
that sexual orientation should be considered as ‘membership of a particular social 
group’ and thus a relevant ground in claims for protection against persecution 
under the Refugee Convention.
Two additional important steps forward taken in these Guidelines were the 
recognition first, that the criminalisation of homosexuality could amount to 
persecution; and, further, that even when there is no explicit criminalisation, a 
claimant can establish a valid claim if the state condones the persecution or fails 
to protect the claimant from persecution. Second, the Guidelines recognised 
that non-state actors may also be responsible for persecution. Subsequently, the 
UNHCR has issued additional guidance, resource documentation and guidelines 
Amy Shuman and Wendy S Hesford, ‘Getting Out: Political Asylum, Sexual Minorities, and 
Privileged Visibility’ (2014) 17 Sexualities 1016.
16  Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951, 189 
UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954).
17  Jansen, above n 15, 1.
18  Scavone, above n 15, 393.
19  Millbank, above n 15.
20  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-
Related Persecution within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, UN Doc HCR/GIP/02/01 (7 May 
2002) (emphasis in original).
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on sexual orientation and gender identity claims (in 2008 and 2011) which 
explicitly included LGBTI persons as among those migrants who ‘may be at 
particular risk at international borders’.21 Similar legislative action followed within 
the European Union: in 2004, EU member states adopted a Council directive 
that specified sexual orientation as ‘membership in a particular social group’, 
which by 2015 was recognised in 24 EU countries either through case law or 
national legislation.22
In an authoritative, longitudinal, comparative review of LGBTI refugee case 
law in the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Canada, Jenni Millbank 
outlines the development of legislative reforms through a sequence of steps that 
have been (and continue to be) undertaken by countries, which include:23
social group’ in refugee claims;
persecution;
deny LGBT claimants asylum on the grounds that they would be safe if they 
were discreet about expressing their sexual orientation); and
discrimination.
Notwithstanding these gains, Millbank argues that the recognition of sexual 
orientation within refugee status determination processes progressed unsteadily, 
with large ‘symbolic’ legislative gains not quite matched by equivalent advances 
in legal practice, especially at lower judicial levels.24
To conclude this section, two observations about same-sex immigration and 
asylum law reforms are worth noting. First, the reforms discussed are relevant 
to a very small handful of countries. Queer border crossers who negotiate the 
borders of the majority of countries where such reforms do not apply must do so 
through various means of subterfuge, and are constantly at risk of exposure 
21  Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Recommended Principles and 
Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders, 69th sess, Agenda Item 69, UN Doc 
A/69/CRP. 1 (23 July 2014).
22  Alejandro Rada, ‘Persecution on the Grounds of Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity – 
Asylum Rights, Procedures and Decisions in the European Union’ (Report, Observatory for 
Sociopolitical Developments in Europe, March 2016) <http://www.sociopolitical-
observatory.eu/uploads/tx_aebgppublications/2016-03_ENG_Expertise_Asylum_rights_
for_LGBTI.pdf>.
23  Millbank, above n 15, 36.
24  Ibid.
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to laws that discriminate against and criminalise homosexuality and ‘deviance’, 
however defined.
Second, the parameters of ‘successful’ legislative reform in these countries are 
crucially contingent on structural and normative markers of difference such as 
race, citizenship and class, that mediate which queer migrants actually cross 
borders, and how. Queer border crossers without a partner who is a citizen or 
permanent resident have only two possible, individualised, routes of legal entry: 
to apply as a refugee or asylum seeker, or to apply under an economic immigration 
category (such as the highly skilled migrant programmes). In the latter case, 
usually only one spouse/partner needs to meet the selection criteria in order for 
both to enter the country. The income, education and skills requirements of these 
visa categories preclude the vast majority of potential migrants (gay or otherwise) 
from considering applications. Border laws thus work to produce a select group 
of lesbian and gay border crossers as ‘acceptable’ citizens. 
Practices of LGBTI immigration and asylum law
By ‘practices of the law’, I refer not only to the activities of functionaries of 
the state who make, interpret and implement laws, but also to the interstitial 
engagements of LGBTI claimants and activists who are affected by the law – who 
conform to, ignore, resist, challenge or subvert it, and in so doing, reconstitute 
(though not always ‘queer’) the law. I focus here on two aspects of immigration 
and asylum law to which scholars have drawn attention: first, the need for LGBTI 
claimants to establish the credibility of their cases; and, second, the paradoxes 
of sexual (in)visibility and (in)discretion produced through the practice of asylum 
law. I conclude the section with reflections on the contradictions and tensions 
wrought by the pragmatic complicities with LGBTI immigration and asylum law. 
Telling tales: The credibility of LGBTI individuals’ claims
Close scrutiny of evidence to establish the credibility of LGBTI applicants is 
undertaken in the practice of both immigration and asylum law. The demand 
for evidence in immigration applications requires proving the credibility of the 
bi-national couple’s relationship; the demand for evidence in asylum cases has a 
higher credibility requirement of, first, proving their sexual and/or gender 
identity, and, second, proving that they are persecuted because of it. While the 
specific demand for evidence may vary, the demand itself must be marked as a 
mechanism that legitimates the state’s authority and assures citizens of its control 
of the border and the nation.
In countries that accept same-sex partner immigration, applicants must marshal 
credible evidence of a relationship. Depending on the country, this may be done 
through proof of marriage or domestic partnership; or it may be through personal 
testimony, testimonies of others as witness to the relationship, proof of joint 
residence, joint banking accounts, travel and so on. In many countries, proof of 
the stability and longevity of the relationship also needs to be established, and 
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these requirements have in the past been more stringent than those for heterosexual 
couples.
Within the limited parameters of countries that accept same-sex partner 
migration, it is worth reflecting on the exclusions and inclusions effected through 
the credibility practices of immigration law. First, establishing the credibility 
of the relationship does not necessarily guarantee entry for all bi-national couples. 
As I pointed out previously, non-citizen bi-national couples are excluded. Further, 
bi-national couples in which the non-national partner has a chronic illness (such 
as HIV), a disability or is ‘too old’ can be excluded on grounds that they would 
be a potential burden on the state because they would be unable to support 
themselves. Thus, the recognition of a bi-national same-sex relationship can be 
precarious and contingent on the inherently productivist assumptions underlying 
contemporary border control practices. There is also an implicit exclusion of 
people based on their class and education, as only those with the requisite financial 
capacity (to pay the required fees) and language capacity and internet literacy (to 
navigate complex application systems that are often now online) are in a position 
to apply for same-sex partner migration.
Second, immigration inclusion for bi-national couples is achieved in practice 
through homonormative appropriations of the construct of a ‘good citizen’. Lisa 
Duggan defined homonormativity as ‘a politics that does not contest dominant 
heteronormative assumptions and institutions, but upholds and sustains them, 
while promising the possibility of a demobilized gay constituency and a privatized, 
depoliticized gay culture anchored in domesticity and consumption’.25 Lesbian 
and gay couples make their immigration claims by establishing their status as 
happy families and productive workers. Audrey Yue offers an insightful analysis of 
how homonormativity plays out in the immigration of younger Asian men as the 
same-sex partners of older Anglo-Australian men. She describes this pairing of 
the ‘rice and potato queen’ as constituted through the sedimented histories 
of colonialism and the ‘unequal neocolonial and neoliberal geopolitics of how 
marginalised groups within and outside the nation, are forced to conform to the 
norm so as to make claims to the resources of mobility’.26
Establishing credibility is more difficult for LGBTI asylum seekers, in part 
because sexual and gender orientation are relatively new grounds, accepted only 
since 2002 under the Refugee Convention as constituting ‘membership of a 
particular social group’. Although the broader principle of sexual orientation and 
gender-related persecution was accepted, individual LGBTI claimants still have to 
present credible evidence of, first, the persecution they have suffered, and, second, 
their sexual and/or gender identity. Evidence of persecution entails four aspects: 
evidence about the source of persecution, the location of persecution, that the 
25  Lisa Duggan, The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on 
Democracy (Beacon Press, 2003) 50.
26  Audrey Yue, ‘Same-Sex Migration in Australia: From Interdependency to Intimacy’ (2008) 
14 Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 239, 255–6.
202  Bina Fernandez
persecution is sufficiently severe and that it warrants a ‘well-founded fear’. Initially, 
many LGBTI asylum applicants struggled to establish credible claims against the 
state as a ‘source’ as the existence of anti-sodomy statutes in the country of origin 
was considered the only evidence of persecution – that is, that the applicants were 
in violation of the laws of their country.27 Non-state actors (family, community, 
employers and so on) as perpetrators of persecution were also not traditionally 
within the purview of political asylum cases, where the state was typically consid-
ered the source of persecution. Similarly, persecution within the private domain 
of the home was excluded from consideration. These exclusions particularly 
invalidated the dangers experienced by lesbian asylum seekers who typically faced 
violence within families.28 Establishing that the persecution is severe, and not 
‘merely’ everyday discrimination and oppression is the next requirement, which 
is linked to the need to establish ‘well-founded fear’. Refugee law establishes a 
legal requirement to negotiate the intensely subjective emotion of fear in a rights 
claim, necessitating a complex subject positioning situated at the spatial and tem-
poral intersections of bodily integrity, pain and trauma, sexual shame, erotic 
agency and desires, as well as other positions such as race, nationality, religion, 
gender and class.29
Further, LGBTI applicants must prove their sexual and/or gender identity, 
and in order to credibly do so, they must fit their experiences into stereotypical 
asylum seeker narratives acceptable to immigration authorities in the global 
North. Some of the assumptions underlying decision-making in asylum cases are 
that all lesbians and gays engage in cross-gender identification, are active in queer 
social spaces, are knowledgeable about queer culture, are sexually active but always 
only with persons of the same gender, don’t have children, and if they have not 
‘come out’, they will (or should) when they arrive in the country of immigration. 
These assumptions about identities and behaviours, even the terms LGBTI, are 
based on gendered, racialised and classed assumptions of a Western white gay male 
norm, and in effect erase experiences along the spectrum of sexual and gender 
diversity, and may lead to judgments such as the one below in the case of a 
Lebanese asylum seeker in Australia:
[T]he applicant’s oral evidence to the Tribunal was that he had had no 
relationship with anyone who shared his sexual orientation since he left 
school – a period of over 20 years, spanning his entire adult life to date – 
either in Lebanon or in Australia. He does not claim ever to have spoken to 
a homosexual since then. He asks the Tribunal to accept that this was because 
27  Scavone, above n 15, 411.
28  See Susan A Berger, ‘Production and Reproduction of Gender and Sexuality in Legal 
Discourses of Asylum in the United States’ (2009) 34 Signs 659; Bushell, above n 13; Rachel 
Lewis, ‘Lesbians under Surveillance: Same-Sex Immigration Reform, Gay Rights, and the 
Problem of Queer Liberalism’ (2010) 37(1) Social Justice 90.
29  Senthorun Raj, ‘Affective Displacements: Understanding Emotions and Sexualities in 
Refugee Law’ (2011) 36 Alternative Law Journal 177.
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he was, as he has said, a ‘closet gay’. In my view this is implausible, and is far 
more consistent with his being heterosexual.30 
The evidentiary demands of the asylum process and Eurocentric models of identity 
as ‘outness’ necessitate the presentation of an ‘authentic’ or genuine LGBTI 
person such that those with previous histories of passing or concealment (as in the 
case of the Lebanese applicant above) create a ‘credibility gap’ in their narratives. 
Furthermore, cases primarily based on testimonial evidence can be considered 
personal and subjective, vulnerable to ‘adverse credibility’.31
Paradoxes of sexual (in)visibility and (in)discretion
The credibility requirement in the practice of the LGBTI asylum law has produced 
paradoxes of sexual (in)visibility. At different times and places, queer border 
crossers have been expected to, or compelled to disavow their sexualities, be 
‘discreet’ or invisible, in order to avoid state surveillance or persecution (whether 
perpetrated by the state or non-state actors). Thus, in countries that do not allow 
same-sex partner immigration (which included the United States until very 
recently), such couples were often forced into invisibility as an adaptive strategy 
to deflect attention from the foreign partner’s absence of legal status. This 
invisibility led to an underestimation of the number of such couples in the United 
States.32 Forced invisibility is accompanied by fear of separation and deportation, 
and often necessitates staying under the radar of the government, which in turn 
has resulted in restricted access to essential services such as health care, education 
and housing.33
Asylum seekers too were forced into invisibility, as initially ‘discretion reasoning’ 
was used as a common ground for the rejection of LGBTI applicants. This was 
the claim that if applicants lived ‘discreetly’ (basically, became invisible) in their 
country of origin, they could avoid persecution. Widely applied until the late 
1990s (until sexual orientation was recognised as constituting ‘membership in a 
particular social group’), the discretion argument worked against lesbian asylum 
applicants in particular, as women are already less visible in the private sphere, and 
‘less likely to engage in targeted public activities’.34
Since the early 2000s, landmark judgments in Australia (2003), New Zealand 
(2004), the Netherlands (2007) and the United Kingdom (2010) have rejected 
‘discretion reasoning’ as grounds for denying LGBTI applications.35 These 
30  Ibid 178.
31  Scavone, above n 15, 395–6.
32  Domínguez et al, above n 13.
33  Karma R Chávez, ‘Identifying the Needs of LGBTQ Immigrants and Refugees in Southern 
Arizona’ (2011) 58 Journal of Homosexuality 189.
34  Shuman and Bohmer, above n 15, 241.
35  Jansen, above n 15. 
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judgments led to intense debates on whether or not they were ‘bad law’.36 While 
it is beyond the scope of this chapter to enter into these debates, what can be 
noted here is that the rejection of ‘discretion reasoning’ has only been partial, and 
resistance to LGBTI asylum claims persists now through the heightened scrutiny 
of credibility.
The paradoxes of visibility produced were made most apparent in the highly 
publicised case of Brenda Namigadde, a lesbian asylum seeker from Uganda who 
was initially denied asylum in the United Kingdom on the grounds that the UK 
government could not ‘see’ that she was lesbian in Uganda. The publicity around 
her case ‘ironically produced the very visibility [the British state] claimed it could 
not “see”’, as Brenda became visible to the Ugandan government and public, 
facing life imprisonment charges and death threats.37 Thus, ‘in order to survive 
Brenda is expected to still prove in the UK that she is a lesbian and at the same 
time to prove that she is not a lesbian in Uganda’.38
New practices of indiscretion have been generated by LGBTI responses to the 
demands of credibility and (in)visibility framed through ‘discretion reasoning’, 
which compel applicants to ‘prove’ their gender and sexual identities through 
‘hyper-visible’ public performances of sexuality that are sometimes explicitly 
sexual, as a means of resisting deportation.39 Illustrative of this is the experience 
of Kiana, an Iranian film-maker and gay rights activist documented by Rachel 
Lewis.40 Kiana was initially told by UK officials that her asylum claim was rejected 
on the grounds that she could return to Iran and live ‘discreetly’. The release of 
her short documentary Cul de Sac which depicted her in an explicit lesbian sex 
scene, and its dissemination through multiple social media networks, resulted in 
a reversal of the decision, on the grounds that it was no longer possible for her to 
return and be discreet about her sexual orientation. Paradoxically, performing her 
identity as an out lesbian film-maker activist makes her un-deportable, but 
problematically also reproduces gendered, racial and classed stereotypes (of 
lesbians as butch, out and outspoken women who like to hang out in bars).41 
Similar projects of queer migrant activism resisting deportation of undocumented 
LGBTI individuals, such as the Toronto-based campaign ‘Let Alvaro Stay’ and 
36  James C Hathaway and Jason Pobjoy, ‘Queer Cases Make Bad Law’ (2012) 44 New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 315; Jenni Millbank, ‘The Right of 
Lesbians and Gay Men to Live Freely, Openly, and on Equal Terms Is Not Bad Law: A Reply 
to Hathaway and Pobjoy’ (2012) 44 New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 497. See also other articles in the same issue of New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics.
37  Rachel Lewis, ‘Deportable Subjects: Lesbians and Political Asylum’ (2013) 25(2) Feminist 
Formations 174, 180.
38  Melanie Nathan, ‘UK Judge & “Blogger” Precedent – “The Brenda Namigadde Effect”: 
Another Ugandan’s Deportation Stayed’ on LezGetReal: A Gay Girl’s View on the World 
(8 March 2011), quoted in Lewis, above n 37. 
39  Shuman and Bohmer, above n 15; Shuman and Hesford, above n 15.
40  Lewis, above n 37.
41  Ibid.
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Julio Salgado’s collaborative visual arts project ‘I am Undocuqueer’, draw on 
personal testimony and political protest imagery, but as Melissa White points out, 
rely on methodological nationalisms and visibility politics to make their claims 
hearable to the state.42
Pragmatic complicities?
Taken together, the practices of breaking, re-making, and sometimes reinforcing 
immigration and asylum law have generated ‘successes’ for (some) LGBTI border 
crossers. Yet our appraisal of these successes must consider the instability of such 
gains, as even when the credibility of both identity and persecution is reasonably 
established, immigration officials are often inconsistent in their interpretations of 
case law and can be surprisingly inventive in their contorted counter-explanations 
justifying the denial of eligibility for asylum.43
More critically, and without diminishing the gains achieved through LGBTI 
activist practices, we must pay attention to the ways in which queer border crossers 
become legible to the state through the establishment of credible evidence and 
responding to the contradictory demands of (in)visibility. This legibility works 
through prior acceptance of the official categories of trans-border movement 
(migrant, refugee, asylum seeker) sanctioned by states and supranational bodies. 
Legal legibility is also rendered through racialising colonialist LGBTI identity 
categories understood in very specific ways. For example, by privileging ‘coming 
out’, public (hyper) visibility, particular kinds of white desirable citizens 
(productive, skilled, healthy) and homonormative happy families.
Queer struggles in this modality not only ossify an identitarian politics, they set 
up yet another missionary rescue project, reinforcing queer border crossers as 
‘victim subjects’ incapable of exercising agency. Citizenship in a country of the 
global North and its attendant entitlements (rights, welfare) are privileges that are 
contingent on conformity with these normative identity categories and subject 
positions. While such strategies may be pragmatic complicities with official regimes 
of knowledge about non-citizen queer lives, they produce a homonationalist44 
consolidation of power consonant with capitalist accumulation, the biopolitics 
of control over population movements and liberal rights discourses. They 
simultaneously leave unproblematised the methodological nationalism of 
normative constructs of state borders and territorially based citizenship.45
42  Melissa Autumn White, ‘Documenting the Undocumented: Toward a Queer Politics of 
No Borders’ (2014) 17 Sexualities 976.
43  Millbank, above n 15, 14.
44  Jasbir Puar, ‘Rethinking Homonationalism’ (2013) 45 International Journal of Middle East 
Studies 336; Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke 
University Press, 2007).
45  Liisa H Malkki, ‘Refugees and Exile: From “Refugee Studies” to the National Order of 
Things’ (1995) 24 Annual Review of Anthropology 495; Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick 
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If, however, we remind ourselves of José Esteban Muñoz’s articulation of 
‘[q]ueerness [as] essentially about the rejection of a here and now and an insistence 
on potentiality or concrete possibility for another world’,46 we can envision alternative 
imaginaries that allow critical refusal of queer pragmatics, to think and act beyond 
‘pragmatic complicities’ of the here and now outlined above. One such imaginary 
would be to consider how a politics of ‘no borders’ resonates with the anti-
normative thrust of a queer politics. Before I sketch the outline of these possibilities, 
I first clear the conceptual ground by distinguishing the ‘no borders’ from the 
‘open borders’ perspective.
Border controls, ‘open borders’ and ‘no borders’
The control of human mobility across state borders is one of the most politically 
urgent, yet divisive, issues of the twenty-first century, entangled as it is in concerns 
about employment, the economy, threats to national identity, terrorism and 
national security. Demographic pressures, colonial and neo-colonial legacies of 
structural inequality, poverty and conflict and the expansion of global transport 
and communication options have propelled increasing numbers of people to cross 
international borders. Yet border control policies to contain this migration have 
intensified, particularly in countries of the global North. Such policies are not 
only exercised at the border: they are activated in the surveillance of internal 
mobility, access to employment, social services and governance structures. They 
are exercised in the migrant origin countries in the global South, through aid and 
education programmes designed to encourage people to ‘stay put’, particularly 
on the African continent. They are also increasingly exercised in ‘buffer zones’: 
territories ‘excised’ from the nation (such as Christmas Island for Australia) or 
outside national or regional borders in transit countries such as Libya or Indonesia 
(for Europe and Australia respectively) or in detention ‘holding’ countries (such 
as Nauru for Australia).
Scholarship and activism in the past three decades has drawn attention to the 
ways in which border control policies have established an oppressive ‘global 
apartheid’47 that is gendered, heteronormative, racialised and classed. State border 
control policies are deeply implicated in the production and maintenance of 
relations of power and dependency through two circuits of global mobility. In the 
privileged circuit, highly skilled professional elites from both the global North and 
the global South experience free mobility, usually through regular channels of 
migration, while in the underprivileged circuit, unskilled migrants experience 
Schiller, ‘Methodological Nationalism and Beyond: Nation-State Building, Migration and 
the Social Sciences’ (2002) 2 Global Networks 301.
46  José Esteban Muñoz, Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity (New York 
University Press, 2009) 1 (emphasis added).
47  Nandita Sharma, ‘Anti-Trafficking Rhetoric and the Making of a Global Apartheid’ (2005) 
17(3) NSWA Journal 88; Michael Clemens, ‘A Labor Mobility Agenda for Development’ 
(Working Paper No 201, Centre for Global Development, January 2010).
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immobility, or constrained mobility, through irregular ‘undocumented’ channels 
of migration.48
Calls for liberalising border controls vary in the degree of liberalisation: they 
may offer an easing of quantitative restrictions, allowing larger numbers of 
migrants and/or asylum seekers. The 2015 pledge to welcome an increased intake 
of 800,000 Syrian refugees by Germany and 14,000 by Australia is in this mode. 
This modality does not disturb existing political arrangements in any significant 
way, as there is still a selective process of determining eligibility – who is ‘fit’ to 
enter the nation. The ‘open borders’ or ‘no borders’ perspectives are more radical 
in that they envision the free movement of all people. They point to the absurdity 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ recognition of the right to 
emigrate, without corresponding recognition of the right to immigrate and the 
‘fundamental . . . contradiction between the notion that emigration is widely 
regarded as a matter of human rights while immigration is regarded as a matter 
of national sovereignty’.49
Although the terms ‘open borders’ and ‘no borders’ are often used inter- 
changeably, there are important distinctions worth signalling.50 The framework 
of mobility in the ‘open borders’ perspective assumes the continued existence of 
nation-states and territorial borders, but articulates new modalities of citizenship 
and entitlements. Most liberal political arguments are situated in this framework, 
which defends open borders on egalitarian principles with the argument that 
freedom of movement within and across borders is an undeniable liberal right, 
and on the utilitarian principle that free mobility maximises collective utility.51 Yet 
the right to free movement confronts an intractable deadlock in liberal political 
theory with the right to national self-determination. The latter is premised on 
border controls as central to the construction of shared identity and political 
membership. This presents a paradox that liberal political theorists have reconciled 
by either prioritising one or the other right: John Rawls argues that rich countries 
have the right to bar migrants from poor countries on grounds of the right 
to protect national interest;52 Michael Dummett makes the opposite case for 
freedom of mobility on the grounds of freedom of thought and action.53 Other 
theorists have developed compromise positions that propose relatively open 
48  Saskia Sassen, ‘Two Stops in Today’s New Global Geographies: Shaping Novel Labor Supplies 
and Employment Regimes’ (2008) 52 American Behavioral Scientist 457.
49  Myron Weiner, ‘Ethics, National Sovereignty and the Control of Immigration’ (1996) 
30 International Migration Review 171, 171.
50  Harald Bauder, ‘Perspectives of Open Borders and No Border’ (2015) 9 Geography Compass 
395.
51  Joseph H Carens, ‘Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders’ (1987) 49 Review of 
Politics 251.
52  John Rawls, The Law of Peoples: With, the Idea of Public Reason Revisited (Harvard University 
Press, 2001).
53  Michael Dummett, On Immigration and Refugees (Taylor and Francis, 2001).
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borders54 and modalities of citizenship to accommodate new notions of the 
national and entitlements that are not merely contingent citizenship of ‘jus soli’ 
(meaning ‘right of the soil’, or birthright citizenship granted to anyone born in 
the territory of a state) or ‘jus sanguinis’ (meaning ‘right of blood’, or citizenship 
granted through descent, where one or both parents are citizens of the state). 
Thus, Veit Bader55 proposes ‘open borders’ conjoined with the concept of 
‘domiciliary citizenship’ as a form of citizenship based on residence. Similarly, 
Ayelet Shachar develops the concept of ‘jus nexi’ that is premised on the principle 
of a ‘real and effective link’ and ‘genuine connection of existence, interests and 
sentiments’ to determine entitlements of irregular migrants or non-status persons 
as having a claim to citizenship entitlements.56 Aligned with the liberal political 
perspective, the neoliberal economic perspective supports open borders because 
they are assumed to optimise efficiency and productivity globally; border controls 
conversely are assumed to distort labour markets. Yet the liberal perspective 
that promotes free labour mobility serves the interests of cross-border global 
capital accumulation that is achieved through the exploitation of the cheapest 
(migrant) labour.57
In contrast, ‘no borders’ advocates propose a more radical framework that 
‘calls into question the legitimacy of the global system of national states itself and 
the related global system of capitalism’.58 It envisions a political and social 
reorganisation of societies that includes the elimination of borders and controls 
on mobility.59 Bridget Anderson et al argue that:
A radical No Borders politics acknowledges that it is part of revolutionary 
change. If successful, it will have a very profound effect on all of our lives for 
it is part of a global reshaping of economies and societies in a way that is 
not compatible with capitalism, nationalism, or the mode of state-controlled 
belonging that is citizenship. It is ambitious and requires exciting and 
imaginative explorations, but it is not utopian. It is in fact eminently practical 
and is being carried out daily.60 
54  Veit Bader, ‘Fairly Open Borders’ in Veit Bader (ed), Citizenship and Exclusion (St Martin’s 
Press, 1997) 28; Jonathan Seglow, ‘The Ethics of Immigration’ (2005) 3 Political Studies 
Review 317.
55  Veit Bader, ‘The Ethics of Immigration’ (2013) 12(3) Constellations 331.
56  Ayelet Shachar, The Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Harvard University 
Press, 2009).
57  Nick Gill, ‘Whose “No Borders”? Achieving Border Liberalization for the Right Reasons’ 
(2009) 26(2) Refuge 107.
58  Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright, ‘Editorial: Why No Borders?’ 
(2009) 26(2) Refuge 5, 11.
59  Pam Alldred, ‘No Borders, No Nations, No Deportations’ (2003) 73 Feminist Review 152; 
Nandita Sharma, ‘No Borders Movement and the Rejection of Left Nationalism’ (2003) 
37(3) Canadian Dimension 37. 
60  Anderson et al, above n 58, 12.
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The examples they provide of this ongoing practical political project include a 
wide variety of groups, those that are explicitly political movements such as the 
Sans Papiers in France, Sin Papeles in Spain and the ‘No one is Illegal’ and ‘Don’t 
Ask Don’t Tell’ campaigns in the United States, but also groups such as Doctors 
of the World, who operate without consideration of nationality or residence status. 
Central to their political vision is the concept of rights to ‘the commons’ as a 
political, social and economic alternative vision of the future.61
Although Anderson et al distance themselves from the notion of ‘utopia’ as 
some abstract, unrealisable project, the counter-border activism to which they 
refer (above) as pre-figurations of the state of ‘no borders’ can potentially also 
signal the possibilities of what Muñoz describes as a concrete utopia. In contrast 
to an ‘abstract utopia’ that is untethered to historical consciousness, Muñoz 
deploys the concept of a concrete utopia to describe the critical politics of hope 
that is positioned in relation to historically situated struggles: 
In our everyday lives abstract utopias are akin to banal optimism . . . Concrete 
utopias can also be daydream-like, but they are the hopes of a collective, an 
emergent group, or even the solitary oddball who is the one who dreams for 
many. Concrete utopias are the realm of educated hope.62
The potential of concrete utopia is thus realised through collective action; it is a 
‘backward glance that enacts a future vision’.63 It is this critical politics of hope 
that I wish to activate in the discussion below.
Queer alignments with ‘no borders’ politics
In this concluding section, I draw out some of the emancipatory possibilities 
inherent in an alignment of queer politics with the vision of ‘no borders’. I outline 
below a few interrelated challenges offered by the ‘no borders’ perspective, and 
discuss how these challenges resonate with the experiences and activism of queer 
border crossers and activists.
First, the ‘no borders’ perspective offers a challenge to the sedentarist bias and 
temporal amnesia in our understandings of human migration. We must remember 
that migration is an essential human activity and human beings have always 
been on the move for varied reasons, even as these movements have often been 
forced, or restricted. Colonisation generated massive forced migration through 
the slave trade and indentured labour. It also shaped settler colonial nations 
like the United States, Canada and Australia, and countries in South America, 
61  Bridget Anderson, Nandita Sharma and Cynthia Wright, ‘“We Are All Foreigners” No 
Borders as a Practical Political Project’ in Peter Nyers and Kim Rygiel (eds), Citizenship, 
Migrant Activism and the Politics of Movement (Taylor and Francis, 2012) 73.
62  Muñoz, above n 46, 3.
63  Ibid 3–4.
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through (ongoing) violence and subjugation of indigenous populations and mass 
migrations of ‘free’ labour to the colonies. Industrialisation also resulted in 
controls on mobility related to the creation and maintenance of ‘free labour’ for 
nascent capitalism. In these different histories, borders as we understand them 
today either did not exist or were ignored, or the control of mobility was exercised 
along different criteria – for instance, class-based seigneurial control over serfs’ 
mobility, poor laws and vagrancy laws, and gender-based male control over 
women’s mobility. The introduction of border controls over migrants, as a 
‘problem’ that needed to be ‘managed’, emerged in the late nineteenth century 
as a feature of the nation-state-based organisation of citizenship, in contrast to the 
loose controls exercised by earlier city-based, or even empire-based, models of 
citizenship.64
From the ‘no borders’ perspective, then, the apparatus of contemporary border 
controls by nation-states is far from a logically inevitable, immutable outcome 
of the progressive development of nation-states. Rather, from this perspective, 
we could critique the inherent assumption of linear notions of development 
as sequential progress that holds the ‘developed’ global North as the normative 
standard, and pay attention instead to the diverse historically and culturally specific 
practices and structural arrangements around mobility, including queer mobilities. 
This critical attention to histories is particularly important for a queer politics of 
the border, as it allows us to interrogate the ways in which colonial and imperial 
states were, and continue to be, implicated in the production of homophobic laws 
that have generated global flows of queer refugees.
Following from above, a ‘no borders’ perspective challenges the nation-state 
centrism inherent in the presumption of the state’s power to control cross-border 
mobility. As scholars have argued, the state enforces but also produces the border. 
The structural violence inherent in border controls (wherever they are exercised) 
is that they situate border crossers within relationships of power, vulnerability and 
dependency. They also make untenable differentiations through the categories 
such as ‘migrant’, ‘asylum seeker’ and ‘refugee’. From this perspective, appeals to 
the state in LGBTI immigrant and asylum cases reinforces and reproduces this 
structural imbalance of power and dependency. As I have discussed above, such 
appeals necessitate pragmatic complicities in the marshalling of evidence to 
demonstrate ‘credibility’ and ‘visibility’ to functionaries of the state. Yet, in doing 
so, as White cautions, activists need to heighten their awareness of the ways in 
which demands for better, ‘improved’ laws and regulations may reinforce the 
nation-building project.65 Such an awareness would be foundational to any 
emancipatory project that is not nation-state centric.
64  John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Marlou Schrover, Joanne van der Leun, Leo Lucassen et al (eds), 
Illegal Migration and Gender in a Global and Historical Perspective (Amsterdam University 
Press, 2008). 
65  White, above n 42.
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Third, and related, is the challenge to the normative liberal construction of 
citizens as free and equal (implicitly homogenous) individuals with rights, 
entitlements and obligations, who ‘belong’ to a nation either through descent 
(jus sanguinis) or through birth (jus soli). The parameters of belonging and 
the inclusion of some as citizens are, however, invariably predicated on the 
exclusion of others as ‘non-citizens’. As we have seen, LGBTI applicants for 
immigration and asylum have to prove themselves ‘deserving’ recipients of state 
benevolence and, if they fail, they fall into irregular or ‘non-status’, and become 
vulnerable to deportation. The unfortunate effect is the reinforcement of a 
‘deserving’–‘undeserving’ dichotomy in which some queer subjects are deemed 
worthy of citizenship. The hierarchy of oppression and sympathy produced 
through this ‘queer migrant exceptionalism’ is sutured on to the differentiated 
hierarchies of social, political and economic inequalities that exist even among 
citizens. Dissatisfaction with existing models of citizenship has generated a rich 
scholarship on citizenship,66 including on queer citizens,67 which is beyond 
the purview of this chapter. All I wish to do here is signal, first, that from a ‘no 
borders’ perspective, citizenship would have to be detached from its current 
mooring in the nation-state. Second, it would be worthwhile for explorations in 
this area to offer queer perspectives on existing practices of ‘irregular citizenship’,68 
practices of cultural citizenship,69 and the multiple ways in which citizenship is no 
longer a territorially bound, nation-state centric institution or statute, but a 
‘collective practice’70 that is transforming the boundaries of belonging.
The fourth challenge of ‘no borders’ is to global capitalism. It recognises that 
borders function to produce differentiated labour regimes that can be exploited 
and dispossessed by capitalist forces.71 A ‘no borders’ position resists the capitalist 
social relations dependent on productivist assumptions that encourage the 
entry of ‘skilled workers’ and on social reproductivist assumptions allowing entry 
of heteronormative families as well as unskilled workers essential to the care 
economy. This challenge forces queer politics to take class hierarchies and the 
66  See, for example, Aihwa Ong, Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality 
(Duke University Press, 1999); Seyla Benhabib, The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and 
Citizens (Cambridge University Press, 2004); Shachar, above n 56. 
67  Arnaldo Cruz-Malave and Martin F Manalansan (eds), Queer Globalizations: Citizenship and 
the Afterlife of Colonialism (New York University Press, 2002); Luibhéid and Cantú, above 
n 3.
68  Peter Nyers, ‘Forms of Irregular Citizenship’ in Vicki Squires (ed), The Contested Politics of 
Mobility: Borderzones and Irregularity (Routledge, 2011) 184. 
69  See, for example, Fatima El-Tayeb, European Others: Queering Ethnicity in Postnational 
Europe (University of Minnesota Press, 2011); Renato Rosaldo, ‘Cultural Citizenship, 
Inequality, and Multiculturalism’ in Rodolfo D Torres, Louis F Mirón and Jonathan Xavier 
Inda (eds), Race, Identity, and Citizenship: A Reader (Blackwell Publishers, 1999) 253.
70  Etienne Balibar, ‘The Nation Form: History and Ideology’ in Etienne Balibar and Immanuel 
Wallerstein (eds), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities (Verso, 1991) 86.
71  Teresa Hayter, Open Borders: The Case against Immigration Controls (Pluto Press, 2000).
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global precariat72 more seriously than it has hitherto, and move beyond token 
acknowledgement of class as a dimension of intersectionality.
Finally, moving beyond the obsession with the state, a ‘no borders’ perspective 
challenges our predispositions to xenophobia (and I hope I am not being too 
optimistic here). As Leo Tolstoy famously (though possibly apocryphally) said: 
‘there are two primary stories: a person goes on a journey or a stranger comes 
to town’. Within these two archetypal plots, xenophobic reactions to the migrant 
stranger are not just a phenomenon of our contemporary age of anxieties. Erasing 
the salience of borders has the potential to diminish our fear of the foreigner, 
which is often premised on racialised, gendered, heterosexed, classed and national 
understandings of an ‘us’, positioned against a threatening ‘stranger/other’. It 
offers the opportunity to explore the histories of queer travellers and the affective 
possibilities that are generated.73 Perhaps also, the potential to open up new 
notions of ‘belonging’ that are not premised on exclusions, expanding our 
horizons of what is politically possible and morally desirable.
72  Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011). 
73  Leela Gandhi, Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism, and 
the Politics of Friendship (Duke University Press, 2006).
11 Queering international 
law’s stories of origin
Hospitality and homophobia
Nan Seuffert
The project of ‘queering’ international law suggests excavating concepts of 
sexuality and sexual conduct in its formative moments. This chapter argues that 
two of the works of the sixteenth-century Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria 
provide rich grounds for excavation. These works are often included in the 
genealogy of international law and sometimes in the formative moments of 
the modern Law of Nations. Vitoria’s influential work challenged prevailing 
justifications for the imperialist Spanish project of the invasion of Mesoamerica, 
replacing them with universal natural law duties of friendship and hospitality 
owed by the people of the ‘New World’ to the Spanish, facilitating the Spanish 
imperial project.
Little scholarly attention has been directed at unpacking the allegory of Sodom 
and Gomorrah, ‘sodomy’ and hospitality in Vitoria’s work, or on the implications 
of these theological concepts for the development of international law. Focusing 
on hospitality and sodomy, this chapter analyses Vitoria’s work, positioned at the 
cusp of European imperialism and the inception of modern international law, 
in the historical and theological contexts in which it was written. It first briefly 
traces the importance of hospitality in early interpretations of the allegory of 
Sodom. It then considers the emergence of the contested and amorphous cate-
gory of ‘sodomy’ in the eleventh century. In this context, it analyses the pivotal 
importance of sodomy in Vitoria’s work on the Law of Nations. It argues that 
Vitoria’s work engages with biblical, theological and scholarly debates and 
discourses on both hospitality and sodomy, elucidating the significance of the 
Sodom allegory to Vitoria’s justification of Spanish invasion. ‘Queering’ inter- 
national law requires attention to the sedimentation of these discourses of 
sexuality in its inception and their continuing resonances and reiterations in inter-
national law, especially in relation to the treatment of non-normative sexual and 
gender minorities in human rights and refugee law, and in relation to indigenous 
peoples’ self-determination claims.
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Vitoria and international law
Vitoria has been referred to as ‘one of the most influential political theorists in 
sixteenth-century Catholic Europe’.1 Although he was primarily a Dominican 
theologian, powerfully influenced by St Thomas Aquinas, he regarded theology 
as the ‘mother of sciences’ and claimed as his topic all of divine and natural law, 
which he saw as the realm of jurisprudence. He was the master of a number of 
Spanish theologians and jurists known as the ‘School of Salamanca’, famous 
internationally principally for their achievements in jurisprudence and moral 
philosophy. It is Vitoria’s two influential lectures, ‘On the Indians Lately 
Discovered’2 and ‘On the Law of War Made by the Spaniards on the Barbarians’,3 
which engaged with Spanish discourses on the invasion of Mesoamerica,4 that 
contributed to the development of international law5 and the justifications for 
European imperialism and colonisation,6 as well as the law applied to first nation 
peoples in what later became the United States.7 While Hugo Grotius is sometimes 
cast as the ‘father’ of modern international law,8 Vitoria’s work is seen by some 
legal scholars as providing its ‘primitive’ origins,9 as influencing Grotius, and 
as providing an early focus on the relationships between nations.10 As Robert 
A Williams has argued, Vitoria
inaugurated the first critical steps towards a totalizing jurisprudence of 
international order – a Law of Nations intended to regulate all aspects of the 
 1  Anthony Pagden and Jeremy Lawrance (eds), Vitoria: Political Writings (Cambridge 
University Press, 1991) xiii. 
 2  Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On the American Indians’ in Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 
231. 
 3  Francisco de Vitoria, ‘On the Law of War’ in Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 293. 
 4  Anthony Pagden, The Fall of Natural Man: The American Indian and the Origins of 
Comparative Ethnology (Cambridge University Press, 1982) 66.
 5  Franciscus de Victoria, ‘De Indis et de ivre belli relectiones’ in James Brown Scott and Ernest 
Nys (eds), The Classics of International Law (John Pawley Bate trans, Carnegie Institution, 
1917). See also Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations (Macmillan, 1947) 
63; Jane McAdam, ‘An Intellectual History of Freedom of Movement in International 
Law: The Right to Leave as Personal Liberty’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 1, 7.
 6  Antony Anghie, ‘Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law’ (1996) 
5 Social & Legal Studies 321.
 7  Felix S Cohen, ‘The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States’ (1942) 
31 Georgetown Law Journal 1, 17.
 8  Chantal Thomas, ‘What Does the Emerging International Law of Migration Mean for 
Sovereignty?’ (2013) 14 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1, fn 136.
 9  David Kennedy, ‘Primitive Legal Scholarship’ (1986) 27 Harvard International Law 
Journal 1, 1. 
10  See Illena M Porras, ‘Constructing International Law in the East Indian Seas: Property, 
Sovereignty, Commerce and War in Hugo Grotius’ De Iure Praedae – The Law of Prize and 
Booty, or “On How to Distinguish Merchants from Pirates”’ (2006) 31 Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law 741, 745 fn 8, 756, 770–1.
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relationships between independent states . . . initiat[ing] the process by 
which the European state system’s legal discourse was ultimately liberated 
from its stultifying, expressly theocentric, medievalized moorings and was 
adapted to the rationalizing demands of Renaissance Europe’s secularized 
will to empire.11 
This argument positions Vitoria’s work as progressing beyond explicitly theocentric, 
stultifying and Medieval foundations, towards rational secularism. Williams, like 
some others, sees Vitoria as making a break with the past, moving towards a secular 
order in which Christendom is relegated to the parochial, a place alongside, rather 
than integrated into, the state.12
More generally, the argument for the significance of Vitoria’s work to the develop- 
ment of a secularised international law assumes a movement from foundations 
in theocentric universal jurisdiction based on the authority of the Pope, or the 
Holy Roman Emperor, to a set of universal principles for a Law of Nations based 
on natural law.13 While Williams figures Vitoria as taking just ‘first steps’, his work, 
and that of other legal scholars, pays scant heed to how deeply embedded 
religious, and particularly Thomist, ideas remain in Vitoria’s work. The shift that 
his work embodies is described as a displacement of divine law and Papal authority 
by natural law, as though natural law is not also closely based on divine law.14
Yvonne Sherwood argues that Vitoria rewrote, rather than left behind, the 
theological underpinnings of the justifications for Spain’s imperial move into 
Mesoamerica, emphasising the extent to which his work is steeped in Christian 
theology and arguing that Western modernity more generally is allied to a 
Christian framework which tends to be taken for granted.15 Indeed, Vitoria 
responded to both the theological and the legal problems raised by the Spanish 
invasion. Vitoria’s reliance on Aquinas, the theologian whose work is formative 
for another discipline, Western (Christian) philosophy,16 in his discussion of ‘just 
war’ and his development of ideas of sovereignty and ‘right reason’, reveals the 
extent to which Christian ideas are embedded in the roots of international law. 
11  Robert A Williams, The American Indian in Western Legal Thought: The Discourses of Conquest 
(Oxford University Press, 1990) 96–7, citing Cohen, above n 7, 9–21 (emphasis added).
12  Williams, above n 11, 106; Yvonne Sherwood, ‘Francisco de Vitoria’s More Excellent Way: 
How the Bible of Empire Discovered the Tricks of [the Argument from] Trade’ (2013) 21 
Biblical Interpretation 215, 216–17. 
13  Kennedy, above n 9, 11–12.
14  Sherwood, above n 12, 259, fn 100, citing Anghie, above n 6, 31, and Pagden, above 
n 4, 63.
15  Sherwood, above n 12, 219; Martti Koskiennemi, ‘International Law and Raison D’état: 
Rethinking the Prehistory of International Law’ in Benedict Kingsbury and Benjamin 
Straumann (eds), The Roman Foundations of the Law of Nations: Alberico Gentili and the 
Justice of Empire (Oxford University Press, 2010) 297, 298.
16  Margaret Denike, ‘The Sex of Right Reason: Aquinas and the Misogynist Foundations of 
Natural Law’ in Maria Drakopoulou (ed), Feminist Encounters with Legal Philosophy 
(Routledge, 2013) 20.
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Aquinas’s particular emphasis on natural reason leading to recognition of repro- 
duction as the ultimate purpose of man, coupled with his linking of the allegory 
of Sodom to misuse of the natural power of reproduction, informed the Spanish 
law of 1497 prohibiting crimes ‘against God’s natural order’, discussed below, 
contributing to the debates on Spain’s conquest of the new world, and also 
infusing Vitoria’s work. The next part of this chapter considers hospitality in the 
allegory of Sodom, and the emergence of the category of sodomy.
Sodom and Gomorrah, hospitality and sodomy
The biblical allegory of Sodom is often assumed in popular contemporary political 
debates to be a story of God’s punishment of a city for ‘sodomy’, defined as the 
particular sexual act of anal penetration of one man by another. Ideas about 
‘sodomy’ as unnatural and against God’s divine laws have unevenly infiltrated 
the development of rights discourses and international human rights conven- 
tions and provided grist for contemporary conservative arguments against 
legislation decriminalising sodomy, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation and recognising same-sex marriage. Partly in response to these 
contemporary arguments, recent scholarship has challenged the assumption that 
the allegory of Sodom can be reduced to punishment for sodomy, arguing 
that the Sodomites were punished for breaches of hospitality, and that any punish- 
ment for sexual transgressions was not focused on sodomy so narrowly defined.17 
Indeed, the term ‘sodomy’ was not coined until the eleventh century, and is 
inherently amorphous and ill-defined.18 This section considers three aspects 
of recent scholarship on the allegory that are relevant to the shape and inter- 
pretation of Vitoria’s work. First, it discusses the importance of hospitality in 
the allegory of Sodom. Second, it analyses the historical framing of the allegory, 
which oscillates between an emphasis on hospitality and an emphasis on sexual 
transgression, and which is pertinent to Vitoria’s emphasis on hospitality in his 
justification of Spanish presence in Mesoamerica. Third, it considers the ambiguity 
and instability in the term ‘sodomy’, particularly in the work of Aquinas, which 
was important to Vitoria’s work.
Recent scholarship questions the strength of the link between the Sodom 
allegory, found in the Old Testament of the Bible in Genesis 19, and what became 
known as ‘sodomy’ and ‘Sodomites’. Instead, it is argued that Sodom can be seen 
as a founding allegory about the importance of hospitality, and of God’s ‘total 
17  John Boswell, Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality: Gay People in Western Europe 
from the Beginning of the Christian Era to the Fourteenth Century (University of Chicago 
Press, 1981); Jonathan Goldberg, ‘Introduction’ in Jonathan Goldberg (ed), Reclaiming 
Sodom (Routledge, 1994) 1; Robert Alter, ‘Sodom as Nexus: The Web of Design in Biblical 
Narrative’ in Jonathan Goldberg (ed), Reclaiming Sodom (Routledge, 1994) 28; Mark D 
Jordan, The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology (University of Chicago Press, 1997); 
Louis Crompton, Homosexuality and Civilization (Belknap Press, 2003) 36.
18  Jordan, above n 17. 
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divine judgment’19 for breaches of hospitality. In the version of the Bible used by 
Vitoria, from a translation in the sixteenth century, Lot was a foreigner, or visitor, 
staying in Sodom.20 In the evening two angels came to the city of Sodom in the 
form of men and Lot invited them into his house as their servant, to stay the night. 
After initially declining, they went to Lot’s house and ‘he made them a feast’. The 
next part of the story is crucial to its interpretation:
[T]he men of the city beset the house both young and old, all the people 
together. And they called Lot, and said to him: Where are the men that came 
in to thee at night? Bring them out hither that we may know them. Lot went 
out to them, and shut the door after him, and said: no not so, I beseech you, 
my brethren, do not commit this evil. 
I have two daughters who as yet have not known man: I will bring them 
out to you, and abuse you them as it shall please you, so that you do no evil 
to these men, because they are come in under the shadow of my roof. But 
they said: Get thee back thither. And again: Thou camest in, said they, as a, 
stranger, was it to be a judge? Therefore we will afflict thee more than them. 
And they pressed very violently upon Lot: and they were even at the point of 
breaking open the doors.
And behold the men [angels] put out their hand, and drew in Lot unto 
them, and shut the door. And them, that were without, they struck with 
blindness from the least to the greatest, so that they could not find the door.
The angels then told Lot to gather his family together and bring them ‘out of this 
city: [f]or we will destroy this place, because their cry is grown loud before the 
Lord, who hath sent us to destroy them’. The Lord then ‘rained upon Sodom and 
Gomorrah brimstone and fire’.
Interpreting this allegory as one of punishment for same-sex copulation relies 
on interpreting ‘to know’ as knowledge in a sexual sense. However, it has been 
argued that the Hebrew verb ‘to know’ is very rarely used in the Bible to refer to 
sexual intercourse (contrary to popular opinion). Derick Sherwin Bailey suggests 
that ‘in only 10 of its 943 occurrences in the Old Testament does it refer to carnal 
knowledge’.21 Lot’s offer of his daughters is sometimes taken to signify the sexual 
nature of the use of ‘to know’.22 However, others point out that in the parallel 
story in Judges 19, in which the men of Gibeah gather at the door of a host asking 
for the guest to be brought out so that they may ‘know’ him, and the host’s 
daughter is offered as a bribe to satisfy them, the demand to ‘know’ is interpreted 
19  Ibid 31.
20  Vitoria used the Latin Vulgate Bible. The Douay-Rheims translation of Genesis 19 from the 
Vulgate Bible is available online at ‘Genesis – Chapter 19’, Vulgate.org <http://vulgate.org/
ot/genesis_19.htm>.
21  Boswell, above n 17, 94, citing Derick Sherwin Bailey, Homosexuality and the Western 
Christian Tradition (Longmans, 1955) 2–3. 
22  See Goldberg, ‘Introduction’, above n 17, 6. 
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as a breach of hospitality without sexual connotations.23 Recognition of the 
importance of hospitality in the Old Testament (and more broadly, as discussed 
below), reflecting times when inns were unavailable outside of urban centres and 
travellers were dependent upon hosts for survival, is central to these arguments.
Mark D Jordan argues that many contemporary scholars agree that the Sodom 
allegory of sudden divine judgment and utter destruction is better read as a 
story of punishment for breach of hospitality than as a story about same-sex 
copulation.24 Early interpretations of the allegory, found in the writings of Ezekiel, 
Jesus and the Talmudists, support this argument, viewing the transgressions in 
Sodom as sins of inhospitality, arrogance born of an overabundance of wealth 
and leisure, and Sodom’s mistreatment of aliens and the poor.25 Contemporary 
queer scholarship also suggests that the allegory should be read in the context 
of the broader saga of Abraham, of which it forms a part.26 In Genesis 18, just 
prior to the Sodom allegory, Abraham pleads with God to spare the city if it has 
just 10 righteous men. This suggests that God had decided to punish Sodom 
prior to the arrival of the angels hosted by Lot. The only reference to the reason 
for God’s prior wrath is that ‘the men of Sodom were wicked and sinners before 
God exceedingly’,27 which is consistent with the other references to Sodom as 
gluttonous, inhospitable, arrogant and uncharitable.
In the contemporary consensus, in early interpretations the sexual overtones 
of the allegory were minor, if they figured at all. One interpretation is that Lot, a 
sojourner himself, was entertaining visitors at night without the permission of the 
city elders, which resulted in the citizens of the city showing up at his house.28 
The demand by the men of Sodom was simply to bring them out so that they 
might ‘know’ who they were.29 Their inhospitable behaviour at Lot’s door 
confirms God’s decision, already made, to punish, and sudden divine judgment 
is visited on Sodom as the result of this breach of hospitality.
However, over time, interpretations of Sodom as an allegory including sexual 
transgressions emerged. Philo, a Helenistic Jewish philosopher born in 25 BCE, 
in his text On Abraham recounts numerous sins of the Sodomites arising ‘from 
gluttony and lewdness’ resulting from wealth fed by a prolific harvest, and offers 
an early inclusion of sexual and gender transgressions: 
they threw off from their necks the law of nature and applied themselves to 
deep drinking of strong liquor and dainty feeding and forbidden forms 
of intercourse. Not only in their mad lust for women did they violate the 
marriages of their neighbors, but also men mounted men without regard for 
23  Boswell, above n 17, 95–6.  
24  Jordan, above n 17, 30, citing Bailey, above n 21, and Boswell, above n 17, 93–7.
25  Crompton, above n 17, 136; Jordan, above n 17, 31.
26  Jordan, above n 17, 36. 
27  Ibid 37, quoting Genesis 13.
28  Boswell, above n 17, 93–4.
29  Ibid 94.
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the sex nature which the active partner shares with the passive . . . [and] 
became like women . . . corrupting in this way the whole race of man.30 
The emphasis here is still on overindulgence, which leads to forbidden forms of 
intercourse, ‘men mounting men’ and the gender transgression of active and 
passive sex roles, corrupting ‘the whole race of man’.31
By the fifth century, Augustine, widely acknowledged as playing a crucial role 
in determining Western Christian attitudes to sexuality, and influential in Vitoria’s 
work, referred to Sodom as a place where sexual intercourse between males had 
become commonplace, and was widely accepted.32 The basis of the invention 
of the category of sodomy, as the sin of the men of Sodom, has been traced to an 
eleventh-century theologian, Peter Damian.33 As Jordan has argued, reducing the 
sin of Sodom to sodomy is part of a process of ‘thinning’ the allegory of its other 
meanings, and ignoring the centrality of the sins of excess, gluttony and greed 
to punishment by God’s divine judgment.34 Reducing the allegory to a link 
between ‘unnatural’ sexual intercourse and the inhabitants of a particular city also 
involved a high level of abstraction; all other traits are erased and the meaning 
of ‘Sodomites’ is condensed to sodomy. The term that emerges is amorphous, 
encompassing at times all non-procreative sexual acts between same-sex and 
opposite sex partners, at times including bestiality, at times focused on anal 
intercourse between opposite sex and same-sex partners, and sometimes including 
married couples. Integral to the chameleon term are ‘fundamental confusions and 
contradictions’, which make it particularly useful for ‘oppressive legislation 
and demagoguery’.35
Aquinas’s (1225–74) Summa Theologica36 played a crucial role in condensing 
the category of sodomy, positioning it contradictorily as both a sin of middling 
importance, and one of the gravest of all sins.37 Aquinas discussed six types of 
‘luxuria’, the vice of excess of venereal pleasure, which is one of seven capital sins, 
which are all subsidiary to the first sin of pride.38 The sixth type of venereal excess, 
dealt with in a relatively short passage, is the ‘vice against nature’, which includes 
masturbation, bestiality, sleeping with someone not of the proper sex and the use 
of improper instruments or ‘monstrous and bestial manners’.39 The worst of the 
30  Crompton, above n 17, 136–7, citing Philo of Alexandria, The Works of Philo (C D Yonge 
trans, H G Bohn, 1854) 133–5, [XXVI].
31  Crompton, above n 17, 136–7.
32  Ibid 137; Jordan, above n 17, 34–5. 
33  Jordan, above n 17, 29.
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid 7, 9. 
36  Thomas Aquinas, The Summa Theologiae (Fathers of the English Dominican Province trans, 
Benziger Brothers, 1974) pt 2-2, q 154, art 12.
37  Jordan, above n 17.
38  Aquinas, above n 36, pt 2-2, q 154, art 12; Jordan, above n 17, 144–51. 
39  Aquinas, above n 36, pt 2-2, q 154, art 11.
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vices against nature is bestiality.40 Focusing on the structure of Aquinas’s work 
suggests that, positioned in the middle of the vice against nature, itself of 
a subsidiary class of sins, same-sex sexual conduct is a ‘middling species of a 
subsidiary class of sins’.41 On the other hand, one passage in Aquinas suggests that 
it is one of the gravest sins, as it disrupts God’s order for nature: 
Just as the order of right reason is from man, so the order of nature is from 
God himself. And so in sins against nature [the vice against nature], in which 
the very order of nature is violated, an injury is done to God himself, the 
orderer of nature.42
Jordan argues that this statement is linked to three readings of earlier texts by 
Aquinas, which, first, shift interpretation of the Sodom allegory from a focus on 
the ferocity of God’s divine judgment to a response to a certain type of sin, a 
collection of acts that pervert natural reproductive powers; second, link it to 
cannibalism and bestiality, positioning it as an atrocity beyond reason and therefore 
beyond the human; and, third, dictate that it not be named, prescribing silence.43 
These readings contradict the reading of the vice against nature as less serious than 
other sins, such as adultery, deflowering and abduction, because it does not harm 
one’s neighbour. The vice against nature therefore oscillates in Aquinas’s work 
between a middling sin and one of the gravest.
Aquinas’s linking of sodomy, cannibalism and bestiality resonates with a long 
tradition of links between sexual excess, cannibalism, festivals, feasts and human 
sacrifice in the Bacchanalia. As described by the Roman historian Titus Livius, 
orgies of wine and sex ‘extinguished all sense of modesty’ and escalated out of 
control until ‘[w]hoever would not submit to defilement, or shrank from violating 
others, was sacrificed as a victim’ and frenetically consumed.44 These rituals or 
festivals were linked with the pleasures of city life, and the ample supply of luxuries, 
princely wealth and the ‘effeminacy’ of the enemy.45 They provide a moral 
cautionary tale, plotting Rome’s decline at a time when its power was increasing; 
a moral decline attributable to foreigners, women and plebians.46
40  Jordan, above n 17, 144 –6; Michael J Horswell, Decolonizing the Sodomite: Queer Tropes of 
Sexuality in Colonial Andean Culture (University of Texas, 2005) 33.
41  Jordan, above n 17, 143–7.
42  Aquinas, above n 36, pt 2-2, q 154, art 12 (emphasis added).
43  Jordan, above n 17, 148–56; Horswell, above n 40, 33. 
44  Anthony Pagden, The Uncertainties of Empire: Essays in Iberian and Ibero-American 
Intellectual History (Ashgate, 1994) ch 7, 19. For an accessible translation of Titus Livius, 
The History of Rome (Canon Roberts trans, Dent, 1905), see ‘Livy’s History of Rome: Book 
39’, Everyman’s Library <http://mcadams.posc.mu.edu/txt/ah/Livy/Livy39.html>.
45  Livius, above n 44, vol 6, ch 39. 
46  P G Walsh, ‘Making a Drama Out of a Crisis: Livy on the Bacchanalia’ (1996) 43 Greece & 
Rome 188, 188–9. 
Hospitality and homophobia  221
The injunction against speaking about same-sex sexual acts, combined with an 
imperative to regulate and prohibit,47 resulted in a third type of instability in the 
category of sodomy. Aquinas obliquely refers to the prohibited sexual act[s], 
which he says are ‘unnamable’ and ‘against nature’, and which he then sets 
aside.48 This injunction is produced by an anxiety that mentioning sodomy will 
performatively encourage it – it is simultaneously one of the gravest sins against 
God’s order and nature, and easily spreads like an epidemic. Silence also intensifies 
the transgression and simultaneously heightens the eroticisation of the forbidden, 
another of its contradictions.49 These characteristics of the vice against nature – 
as one of the gravest violations of God’s order, as a slippery category and as an 
unspeakable sin – become important to shaping justifications for Spain’s invasion 
of Mesoamerica. 
Spanish imperialism and sodomy
Understanding the debate with which Vitoria’s work engages, and the framing of 
the allegory of Sodom used in the Spanish conquest of the New World, requires 
consideration of the political and religious context, including the deployment of 
sodomy in the Spanish Inquisition, the law on sodomy and the centrality of ideas 
about sodomy to Spain’s invasion of the New World. 
The theological-juridical-political context
In his lectures, Vitoria responded to two sets of issues arising from the Spanish 
presence in the New World over the previous 40 years. The claim of the 
Spanish Catholic monarchs to Mesoamerica was based on the Papal Bulls of 
Donation made by Pope Alexander VI in 1493, which, ‘by the authority 
of Almighty God’, granted possession and ‘full free and integral power, authority 
and jurisdiction’50 in lands and islands inhabited by non-Christians discovered 
west of a north-south line located to the west of the Azores Islands (territory 
to the east of the line was granted to Portugal).51 The Bulls reflected Spain’s 
agreement to convert the indigenous peoples to the Catholic faith in return for a 
trade monopoly which was intended to finance the deal.52
The first issue to which Vitoria responded was a theological one. Initially, the 
Spanish viewed the Mesoamericans as animals, fit only for slavery.53 In 1511, 
47  See Leslie J Moran, The Homosexual(ity) of Law (Routledge, 1996) 33. 
48  Jordan, above n 17, 150. 
49  Ibid 156.
50  Williams, above n 11, 81, citing Sydney Z Ehler and John B Morrall (eds trans), Church and 
State through the Centuries (Biblo and Tannen, 1967) 156. 
51  Stephen C Neff, Justice among Nations: A History of International Law (Harvard University 
Press, 2014) 110. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Lewis Hanke, Aristotle and the American Indians: A Study in Race Prejudice in the Modern 
World (Indiana University Press, 1975) 14–15.
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the Dominican Antonio de Montesinos preached a radical sermon in the Caribbean 
warning that the Spanish invaders’ souls were in danger as a result of their 
treatment of the peoples of Mesoamerica. Implicit in his exhortation, ‘Are they 
not men?’ was reference to Spanish procreation with them – if they were animals, 
then the Spaniards had been committing bestiality.54 In response, the ‘Leyes 
de Burgos’ were enacted, regulating the establishment of Ecomiendas, granting 
individual Spaniards monopolies on the indentured labour of groups of 
Mesoamericans and regulating their treatment. While these laws nominally 
recognised the Mesoamericans as human, they still reflected contempt, and the 
indigenous peoples were still exploited, with significant declines in population.55
The second issue to which Vitoria responded was a theological-juridical-political 
question, raised in discussions on the ‘Leyes de Burgos’ of a just basis for the 
Spanish presence in the New World. In response, King Ferdinand asked loyal 
lawyer-scholars and theologians to draft regulations for future royal conquest.56 
The infamous 1513 Requerimiento, as a charter of conquest, unequivocally relied 
on the authority conferred by the Pope, who was said to have temporal jurisdiction 
above the princes and over the whole world, in the Bulls of 1493:
[A]s best we can, we ask and require you that . . . you acknowledge the 
Church as the ruler and superior of the whole world . . . But if you do not 
do this, and maliciously make delay in it . . . we shall powerfully enter into 
your country, and shall make war against you in all ways and manners that we 
can, and shall subject you to . . . the Church and [to] their highnesses; 
we shall take you, and your wives, and your children, and shall make slaves 
of them, and as such shall sell and dispose of them as their highnesses 
may command; and we shall take away your goods, and shall do you all the 
mischief and damage that we can . . . [and] the deaths and losses that shall 
accrue from this are your fault, and not that of their highnesses, or ours, nor 
of these cavaliers who come with us.57
Read in a language that they could not understand, and blaming the indigenous 
peoples for violence and death resulting from the Spanish invasion, the 
Requerimiento performativity claimed land for the Spanish, based on assumed 
authority of the Pope.58 However, Spanish conquistadores, such as Hernán Cortés, 
failed to abide by even these biased rules, by, for example, attacking the Aztecs 




56  Williams, above n 11, 89–91. 
57  Sherwood, above n 12, citing Patricia Seed, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of 
the New World, 1492–1640 (Cambridge University Press, 1995) ch 3, 69; see also ibid 88–93. 
58  Ibid 230–8.
59  Hernán Cortés, ‘Tercera Carta-Relación de Hernán Cortés al Emperador Carlos V, 
Coyacán, 15 de Mayo de 1522’ in Cartas de Relación (Porrúa, first published 1522, 
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By the time Vitoria wrote in the 1530s, Spain was attempting to achieve both 
secular and ecclesiastical autonomy from Papal Rome.60 Vitoria’s reliance on the 
natural law principles of the Thomists provided a good fit for Spain’s political 
project of gaining autonomy from Rome’s pontifical authority for civil and 
ecclesiastical orders.61 Vitoria’s project therefore had a theological-juridical-
political orientation, which involved drawing jurisdictional boundaries between 
the domains of the Pope and the monarchs.62 
The vice against nature and ‘sodomy’ 
At the time of Spain’s early imperialistic forays, the Catholic monarchs issued an 
edict in 1497 reflecting Aquinas’s categorisation of the ‘vice against nature’ as one 
of the gravest sins disrupting God’s natural order: 
Among the other sins and crimes that offend our Lord God and defame our 
lands, the worst is the crime committed against the natural order; . . . laws 
should be used to punish this nefarious crime, unworthy of naming, destroyer 
of the natural order, punished by divine justice; through which nobility is 
lost and the heart becomes cowardly. And it begets little firmness in faith; 
and it is abhorrence in the eyes of God, who is so angered as to deliver unto 
humankind pestilence and other torments on earth; and from this sin is born 
shame and insult toward people and lands that consent to it; . . . any person 
of any status . . . who commits the nefarious crime against nature . . . [shall] 
be burned in the flames of fire on the spot.63 
This characterisation reflects the thinning and condensing of the allegory of 
Sodom. Implicit in the reference to God delivering ‘pestilence and other torments 
on earth’ is that Sodom was destroyed exclusively because of the threat of sodomy, 
without reference to gluttony, overindulgence and breaches of hospitality. Gender 
transgression is also targeted in the references to defaming of lands and 
undermining the masculinity of the nation, its nobility and courage. The edict 
reflects the European obsession linking women and female sexuality with evil 
during the ‘Golden Age of Man’, resulting, for example in England, in a ‘church- 
and state-backed campaign of unmitigated violence against women’ facilitated 
through the witch hunts of the Malleus Maleficarum of 1486.64
2015 edn) 129, 132–3. Thanks to Dr Luis Gómez Romero for assisting with this analysis and 
for translation.
60  Williams, above n 11, 96; Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, xviii–xxiv, 85.
61  Williams, above n 11, 96.
62  See Sherwood, above n 12, 245–6.
63  Horswell, above n 40, 60, citing Rafael Carrasco, Inquisición y represión sexual en Valencia: 
historia de los sodomitas (1565–1785) (Laertes, 1985).
64  Margaret Denike, ‘The Devil’s Insatiable Sex: A Genealogy of Evil Incarnate’ (2003) 18 
Hypatia 10, 12–14.
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This edict was used to mobilise the category of sodomy against ‘outsiders’ in 
and out of Spain through the Inquisition. The Spanish were more likely to see 
sodomites in their long-time enemies the Moors, as well as in other ‘foreigners’, 
such as Jews, Germans, French and English, against whom the Inquisition was 
often directed.65 In Aragon and Valencia, the Moors were accused of sodomy, a 
pestilence capable of spreading, ‘if these debased kinds of men are not isolated 
they can drag down the faithful into this corruption’.66 Fuelled by racial and 
religious anxieties, sodomy was ‘excoriated, feared, and all but hidden from public 
view’, while simultaneously contributing to producing a ‘properly’ masculine 
nation in opposition.67
This culture of nation-building through attribution of the ‘nefarious sin’ to 
internal and external enemies was incorporated into Spain’s tactics in the New 
World, clashing with cultures where same-sex sexual acts sometimes appeared to 
be tolerated, openly avowed and even institutionalised. A report on the Caribes 
in 1525, emphasising sodomitic proclivities, resulted in a ruling by the Holy 
Roman Emperor Charles V declaring that the Indians were slaves as they were 
irrational, and hence inhuman.68 In 1526, Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo’s widely 
influential account of ‘native customs’ in the New World stated:
Very common among the Indians in many parts is the nefarious sin against 
nature; even in public the Indians who are headmen . . . have youths with 
whom they use this accursed sin, and those consenting youths as soon as they 
fall into this guilt wear naguas [skirts] like women . . . and the other things 
used by women as adornment; and they do not exercise in the use of weapons, 
nor do anything proper to men, but they occupy themselves in the usual 
chores of the house . . . and other things customary to women.69
Spanish rule and the expropriation of Indian wealth and land70 were represented 
as ‘the logical result of God’s punishment of the pagan Amerindians for their 
alleged effeminacy and propensity for homosexual intercourse’.71
Michael J Horswell argues that constructions of indigenous sexuality were 
centrally, not marginally, related to Spain’s project of conquest.72 Portraying 
65  Goldberg, above n 17, 6; Crompton, above n 17, 291–2.
66  Crompton, above n 17, 295, citing Carrasco, above n 63, 58.
67  Crompton, above n 17, 314.
68  Ibid 316.
69  Crompton, above n 17, 315, citing Francisco Guerra, The Pre-Columbian Mind: A Study into 
the Aberrant Nature of Sexual Drives, Drugs Affecting Behaviour and the Attitude towards 
Life and Death, with a Survey of Psychotherapy in Pre-Columbian America (Seminar Press, 
1971) 55, citing Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, De La Natural Historia de las Indias 
(Ramón de Petras, 1526) folio 44 verso, ch LXXXI. 
70  Crompton, above n 17, 315. 
71  François Soyer, Ambiguous Gender in Early Modern Spain and Portugal: Inquisitors, Doctors 
and the Transgression of Gender Norms (Brill, 2012) 29.
72  Horswell, above n 40, 75. 
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indigenous peoples as sodomites, deviant, monstrous and lacking in humanity and 
rationality meant that they were inferior to the Spanish, could not participate in 
a natural law based on reason, and could be conquered, consigned to slavery and/
or killed.73 Cannibalism, human sacrifice and sodomy formed a triumvirate trope 
mobilised to denote barbarity and inhumanity.74 For example, the coastal peoples 
of the Tawantinsuyu, with both a woman ruler and sodomites, were described 
as deviant, monstrous and transgressing natural law.75 Using the allegory of 
Sodom, with Spain in the divine role, the conquest of whole societies was justified 
on the basis of practices of sodomy, or of engagement in human sacrifice and 
cannibalism and ‘in addition’ sodomy,76 or on the more general basis that the 
Mesoamericans lacked rationality and were therefore incapable of engaging with 
natural law.77
Vitoria, the Law of Nations and Spanish imperialism  
in the Mesoamerica
Vitoria’s two lectures were delivered in the 1530s into this context where these 
discourses of sodomy infused key laws, policies and practices of the Spanish 
conquest of Mesoamerica. In this part, the first of three sections considers Vitoria’s 
analysis of reason and ownership of the peoples of Mesoamerica, which is central 
to his rejection of the universal jurisdiction of the Pope and the Holy Roman 
Emperor, and lays the foundation for the remainder of his work. The second 
section analyses his treatment of sodomy in responding to Spanish claims to title 
in Mesoamerica, and the third analyses his treatment of sodomy and the allegory 
of Sodom in his arguments justifying Spanish title and rule. Vitoria’s arguments 
reflect the historical trajectory of the allegory; the shifting relationships of 
hospitality, sexuality and gender in the allegory become an integral part of his 
work, and therefore of the foundations of international law. 
Vitoria on reason and ownership in Mesoamerica
By the late 1530s, theologians, who had been baptising the ‘Indians’ for some 
years, baulked at the idea that they lacked rationality. In 1537, Pope Paul III 
issued two Papal Bulls declaring the Indians to be rational beings.78 Arguments 
for the conquest of Mesoamerica, and the early experiment in the extension 
73  See Pagden, above n 4, 67–70. 
74  Horswell, above n 40, 73–7; Sherwood labels the grouping of cannibalism, human sacrifice, 
bestiality and sodomy together as the ‘Supersins’: at above n 12, 242. 
75  Horswell, above n 40, 75.
76  Jonathan Goldberg, Sodometries: Renaissance Texts, Modern Sexualities (Stanford University 
Press, 1992) 194–8. 
77  Horswell, above n 40, 73–7.
78  Crompton, above n 17, 316.
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of European empire to the west, were widely perceived to have failed in the 
face of mounting evidence of genocide and ‘demographic apocalypse’.79
In Vitoria’s scheme, participation in natural law and ownership was reserved 
to rational beings. Rejecting the authority of the Papal Bulls, Vitoria posed the 
question of whether the Mesoamericans were ‘true owners’ of their territory in 
public and private law, before the arrival of the Spanish. He recognises the 
Mesoamericans, whom he refers to as ‘Indians’,80 as possessing the power of 
reason, and as not ‘mad’:
[t]hey are not in point of fact madmen, but have judgment like other men 
[but have in their own way, the use of reason81]. This is self-evident, because 
they have some order [a certain rational order82] in their affairs: they have 
properly organised cities, proper marriages, magistrates, and overlords 
(domini), laws, industries and commerce, all of which require the use of 
reason. They likewise have a form (species) of religion, and they correctly 
apprehend things which are evident to other men, which requires the use of 
reason. Furthermore, ‘God and nature never fail in the things necessary’ for 
the majority of the species, and the chief attribute of man is reason;
Thus if they seem to us insensate and slow-witted, I put it down mainly to 
their evil and barbarous education. Even amongst ourselves we see many 
peasants (rustici) who are little different from brute animals.83
Here, reason is associated with institutions recognisable to Europeans, and 
civilisation, such as cities, marriages and magistrates, and allocated to indigenous 
peoples on that basis, positioning European culture as the universal measure of 
reason.84 These peoples, whose cities Hernán Cortés compared to Seville and 
Cordoba,85 are characterised as rational and human, but only to the extent that 
they reflect European institutions back to Europeans. At the same time, they are 
precariously placed at the margins, on the brink of rationality and humanity, 
positioned where they might, with education and guidance, be uplifted, but also 
might, at any moment, slide ‘backwards’ towards insensate or animal status, 
lacking in rationality.
Vitoria’s finding that the Indians have the capacity to reason, and his conclusion 
that they are true owners of their land, in both the public and private law senses, 
is therefore qualified by his positioning them at the margins of rationality. 
79  Sherwood, above n 12, 227. 
80  Translations of Vitoria often use the term ‘Indian’ to refer to the peoples of Mesoamerica. 
Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 233. 
81  Text in brackets provide alternative translations. See the footnotes in Pagden and Lawrance 
(eds), above n 1. 
82  See Pagden, above n 4, 68.
83  See Victoria, above n 5, 250 (citations omitted).
84  Pagden, above n 4, 67–79; Anghie, above n 6.
85  Pagden, above n 4, 70–2.
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Since they have at least the potential for the capacity to reason, the indigenous 
people are subject to Vitoria’s universal natural law, which aligns with the Law of 
Nations. The Pope’s universal jurisdiction and divine law are replaced with a 
universal natural law. 
Vitoria on unjust titles to Mesoamerica: Sodomy as a middling  
sin of a subsidiary class
Once Vitoria established that the Mesoamericans were rational owners of their 
land, he rejects seven possible rationales for Spanish rule, including that the 
Holy Roman Emperor is the master of the whole world, that the Pope is the 
monarch of the whole world, and that title may be claimed on the basis of 
discovery, or on the basis of the refusal of the peoples to accept the Christian 
faith.86 As a Thomist, Vitoria draws on and responds to the use of Aquinas’s 
work at the time, initially rejecting the argument that sins against nature justify 
invasion. However, in a move that parallels his equivocation on the rationality 
of the Mesoamericans, he is more ambivalent on his position in a later passage, 
which I discuss in the following section. Further, he does not reject the idea that 
these sins should be punished by monarchs among their own peoples within their 
jurisdiction.
Vitoria sets out the fifth rationale used by others to justify Spain’s conquest on 
the basis of the Indians’ sins against nature as follows:
Some sins, they [St Antonino and Innocent IV, justifying invasion] say, are 
not against natural law, but only against positive divine law; and for these the 
barbarians cannot be invaded. But others, such as cannibalism, incest with 
mothers and sisters, or sodomy, are against nature; and for these sins they 
may be invaded . . . in the case of sins against the law of nature the barbarians 
can be shown that they are committing an offense against God, . . . This is 
the opinion of St Antonino of Florence . . . and the same opinion is held by 
. . . Innocent IV . . . He adduces to this purpose the fact that the Sodomites 
were punished by God (Gen. 19); ‘since God’s judgments are examples 
to us, I do not see why the pope, who is the vicar of Christ, should not be 
empowered to do the same’. . . . and by this argument, they might also, on 
the pope’s authority, be punished by Christian princes.87 
In this view, the sins that justify invasion are those in Aquinas’s oscillating category 
of the gravest of sins, including sodomy which violates God’s natural order and 
was criminalised in the Spanish edict of 1497. Vitoria reiterates his rejection of 
the Pope’s authority as a basis for this justification: ‘Christian princes, even on the 
authority of the pope’, cannot punish sins against the law of nature outside of their 
86  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 252–72.
87  Ibid 273.
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jurisdiction.88 Second, he rejects the reliance on Aquinas’s singling out of the 
vice against nature as somehow particularly against God’s order more so than 
other sins, arguing that these sins are not worse than the sins of homicide and 
blasphemy, which do not justify invasion, and therefore these cannot either.89 
Vitoria here rejects Aquinas’s contradictory categorisation of sins against nature 
as both of middling importance and as the gravest sins, settling on these sins as of 
only ‘middling’ importance.  
This interpretation is buttressed by Vitoria’s lecture On Dietary Laws, delivered 
in 1537, where he rejects the proposition that Christian princes can wage war on 
unbelievers due to their ‘crimes against nature’, any more than for other crimes, 
explicitly mentioning sodomy. He aligns sodomy with fornication and theft, 
terming it a ‘merely unnatural sin’, and noting that murder is a more serious 
crime.90 Cannibalism and human sacrifice, which involve the killing of innocent 
people, justify invasion ‘since it is a fact that these barbarians kill innocent men, 
at least for sacrifice, princes can wage war on them to force them to give up these 
rituals’.91 By focusing on the right of individual self-defence of the victims of 
these sins, and using that to justify defence by a third party, Vitoria avoids any 
recourse to papal or church authority. This analysis disaggregates sodomy from 
the other two sins of the triumvirate trope, cannibalism and human sacrifice. 
Sodomy does not involve the death of innocent people and therefore invasion to 
punish it is not justified.
Vitoria is clearly concerned with authority for invasion rather than protection 
of sodomites. Clearing the way for punishment of sodomy once Spain has taken 
over, he states that Christian princes can compel their non-Christian subjects to 
give up not only those of their sins and rituals which are against natural law, but 
also those which are against divine law.92 Non-Christian princes who have been 
converted can force their own subjects to give up all of these sins,93 by abolishing 
idolatry and other unnatural rituals.94 His statement that ‘Christian princes have 
no more powers with the authority of the pope, than without it’95 clarifies that his 
concern is with the authority of the Pope. 
Just titles of the Spanish to the New World: Sodomy as a 
sin against God’s order
Once Vitoria refutes the seven ‘unjust’ reasons for the assertion of Spanish 
authority in Mesoamerica, he moves on to the justifications that he considers 
88  Ibid.
89  Ibid. 
90  Ibid 224.
91  Ibid 225. 
92  Ibid 219–29.
93  Ibid 219.
94  Ibid 221. 
95  Ibid 223. 
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legitimate. In considering the fifth of these, Vitoria is, perhaps, more ambivalent 
than with the previous four.96 He reiterates his rejection of the Pope’s authority 
as a basis for invasion, but he equivocates on sodomy:
The next [legitimate] title could be either on account of the personal tyranny 
of the barbarians’ masters towards their subjects, or because of their tyrannical 
and oppressive laws against the innocent, such as [that which allows97] human 
sacrifice practiced on innocent men or the killing of condemned criminals 
for cannibalism. I assert that in lawful defence of the innocent from unjust 
death, even without the pope’s authority, the Spaniards may prohibit the 
barbarians from practising any nefarious custom or rite. . . . The barbarians 
are all our neighbours, and therefore anyone, and especially princes, may 
defend them from such tyranny and oppression. . . . This applies not only to 
the actual moment when they are being dragged to death; they may also 
force the barbarians to give up such rites altogether. If they refuse to do so, 
war may be declared upon them . . . and if there is no other means of putting 
an end to these sacrilegious rites, their masters may be changed and new 
princes set up. In this case, there is truth in the opinion held by Innocent IV 
and Antonino of Florence, that sinners against nature may be punished. 
It makes no difference that all the barbarians consent to these kinds of rites 
and sacrifices, or that they refuse to accept the Spaniards as their liberators in 
the matter.98 
The use of the phrases ‘any nefarious custom or rite’ and ‘sinners against nature’, 
which commonly denote the triumvirate of cannibalism, human sacrifice and 
sodomy, open up the possibility that this passage includes sodomy. The phrase 
‘sinners against nature’ is used with reference to Innocent IV and Antonino, both 
of whom are cited by Vitoria earlier for the proposition that the Spanish may 
justify conquest on the basis of breaches of sins against nature, including sodomy.99 
He embraces their opinion, at least with regard to ‘putting an end to sacrilegious 
rites’. This broader interpretation is supported by Anthony Pagden, who points 
out that while some translations qualify ‘sins against nature’ with ‘when their sins 
are to the detriment of the innocent’, this qualification is not contained in the 
earliest, most authoritative manuscripts of Vitoria’s work.100
Vitoria’s use of the phrase ‘personal tyranny of the barbarians’ masters towards 
their subjects’, combined with the broad phrases just discussed, also suggests that 
 96  Ibid 287, fn 82, Vitoria’s choice of words is less certain than in the previous justifications. 
 97  This phrase suggests that the examples following are of oppressive laws against the innocent, 
leaving the interpretation of ‘personal tyranny of the barbarians’ open. Victoria, above n 5, 
xliv.
 98  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 287–8 (first emphasis in original, second emphasis 
added).
 99  Ibid 273. See also above n 90 and accompanying text.
100  Ibid 288, fn 83, xxxiii–xxxvi.
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he is invoking the triumvirate trope. A story from Vasco Núñez de Balboa’s arrival 
in Panama in 1513, widely reported by Peter Martyr in 1516,101 provides some 
context for linking Vitoria’s references to personal tyranny with this trope. Balboa 
and his men killed the leader of the people of Quarequa and 600 of his warriors. 
The event is described with terms usually used for the slaughter of animals, stating 
that they were ‘hewed . . . in pieces as the butchers do flesshe from one an arm, 
from another a leg, here a buttock, there a shoulder’, in a scene of carnage.102 
Martyr reported that, after killing the Quarequa people, Balboa found the leader’s 
brother attended by ‘smooth and effeminately decked’ men who engaged in ‘most 
abominable and unnaturall lechery’ whom he ‘abused with preposterous venus’. 
Balboa had 40 of these men ‘gyven for a pray to his dogges’.103 Although the term 
‘sodomy’ is not used here, consistent with the trope of silence surrounding it, the 
other terms make the reference clear: ‘preposterous’ here refers to a ‘confusion of 
before and behind’ and ‘venus’ to sexual acts; and the references to abominable 
and unnatural lechery also invoke sodomy.104
Uncannily, Martyr’s report operates similarly to the allegory of Sodom, read as 
a punishment for excesses of wealth and sex, with Balboa positioned as the divine. 
Combining questions of transgendering, ‘effeminately decked’ men and sodomy 
by the elite, it provides a moral purpose for Balboa’s slaughter, a righting of 
transgressions of gender and sexual excess, that evokes (misogynist) disgust in the 
Spanish, positioning the Spanish as ‘properly’ masculine in contrast.105 Presented 
as a story of degenerate wealth and sexual excess among the elite, it positions 
Balboa as the friend and saviour of the commoners.106 This creates a link between 
the ‘right thinking men’ of Balboa and the commoners, liberating the commoners 
from oppressive rulers who are immoral and unfit to lead, and justifying Balboa’s 
brutal conquest.107
The event and its portrayal occur in the context of the first meeting of 
theologians, canon and civil lawyers to discuss the legitimacy of the Spanish 
conquests in Mesoamerica.108 Martyr’s influential report was published in 
numerous editions throughout Europe.109 Vitoria’s references to ‘any nefarious 
custom or rite’, and the ‘personal tyranny’ and ‘abuse’ of rulers, and his insistence 
that this principle applies not just when people are actually being dragged to 
death, but justifies stopping these rituals altogether, reasserts sodomy as a 
101  Pietro Martire d’Anghiera was an Italian serving in Spain as a councillor of the Indies. The 
Decades (De Orbo Novo) was a series of letters and reports of the early invasions of 
the Spanish. See Goldberg, above n 76, 180.
102  Goldberg, above n 76, 180–3.
103  Ibid 181.
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid.
106  Ibid.
107  Horswell, above n 40, 71–2.
108  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, xxix.
109  Goldberg, above n 76, 180.
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justification for invasion along with the closely aligned human sacrifice and 
cannibalism. In this context at least, sodomy is connected with, and collapsed 
into, inhumane rites and customs, ‘those sins against nature which constituted an 
injury to humanity itself ’,110 positioning the Mesoamericans as not human, and 
justifying Spanish conquest. The justification follows the logic of the Sodom 
allegory, reflecting the historical trajectory at the moment where whole societies 
may be punished (by the Spaniards in the position of God) for sins against nature, 
including the triumvirate of sodomy, cannibalism and human sacrifice.
Vitoria on hospitality 
I have argued that Vitoria’s intervention in debates about the legitimacy of Spain’s 
titles to Mesoamerica engage with, and pivot around, the debates of his time 
concerning sodomy, Sodomites and the attendant oscillations and ambivalence in 
these categories. In this part, I argue that his eight possible just titles for Spain 
in the New World are shaped by biblical and philosophical traditions of hospitality 
to which the Sodom allegory is central. I argue that the allegory is ‘the shape 
described by an absence’; while it is not explicitly mentioned, its outline, in 
which God or his emissaries appear and the Mesoamericans, as hosts, must offer 
hospitality, informs his duties of hospitality owed by the indigenous Mesoamericans 
to the Spanish, and his Law of Nations more generally.111 In effecting a shift to 
natural law justifications, Vitoria pivots around his equivocal position disaggregating 
sodomy from cannibalism and human sacrifice, and focuses on duties of love, 
friendship and hospitality. Vitoria’s duties of hospitality, though perhaps more 
palatable (to Europe), were no less expansionary, and still a trap for the peoples 
of Mesoamerica.112 
Vitoria’s duties of hospitality
Vitoria begins his discussion of the possible lawful titles ‘by which the barbarians 
could have come under the control of the Spaniards’,113 with a general principal 
of hospitality, ‘natural partnership and communication’.114 His first rule is justified 
on the basis that it is part of the Law of Nations, because ‘natural reason has 
established among all [Christian, European] nations’ the principle that it is 
inhuman to treat travellers badly without cause.115
110  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, xxvii.
111  Avery F Gordon, Ghostly Matters: Haunting and the Sociological Imagination (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1997) 24–5. 
112  Sherwood, above n 12, 255.
113  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 277.
114  Ibid 278.
115  Ibid.
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[T]he Spaniards have the right to travel and dwell in those countries [of the 
Mesoamericas], so long as they do no harm to the barbarians, and cannot be 
prevented by them from doing so.116
Vitoria initially recognises Mesomericans as having reason, and therefore rights to 
property and lordship, as discussed above. This brings them under his universal 
natural law and the Law of Nations, which imposes upon them wide-reaching 
duties of hospitality, friendship and love in welcoming the Spanish to their lands. 
Many of these duties are based on the Bible and religious texts, for example, the 
duty to ‘love their neighbours as themselves’.117 He also notes that it is relevant 
that hospitality is commended in Scripture, and it follows that ‘to refuse to 
welcome strangers and foreigners is inherently evil’.118
The Christian European genealogy of hospitality invoked by Vitoria can be 
traced back to the Sodom allegory, which participates in founding the duty to 
behave hospitably to strangers. The limits of the extent of this duty are unclear; 
Lot offered his daughters to be abused by the men of Sodom as it pleased them 
in an attempt to divert attention from, and protect, his guests.119 For this, he is 
rewarded by the angels, suggesting that sacrificing harm to women family members 
is the appropriate extent of the duty of hospitality. Jacques Derrida highlights the 
analogously misogynistic bargaining in the Bible’s allegory in Judges 19, with a 
plot that parallels Sodom, where the townsmen who demand to ‘know’ the guest 
are given the guest’s concubine to abuse, after which the guest cuts her limb by 
limb into pieces120 and, interestingly, God’s divine wrath does not rain down on 
the city of Gibeah and nor does the name of the city come to represent ‘unnatural’, 
or anal, or male-to-male sex.121 
In the biblical hospitality trope that informs Vitoria’s duties:
God or his emissaries appear to human beings in the guise of unknown 
strangers, challenging the host to prove his worthiness by offering the wanderer 
food and shelter.122
In Vitoria’s scheme, where the Spanish have the right to travel and present 
themselves to the peoples of Mesoamerica, and those people must treat the 
Spanish hospitably, the Spanish take the place of God’s emissaries, if not God 
himself. The peoples of the New World are challenged to prove their worthiness 
116  Ibid (emphasis in original).
117  Ibid 279.
118  Ibid 281.
119  See Jacques Derrida and Anne Dufourmantelle, Of Hospitality (Rachel Bowlby trans, 
Stanford University Press, 2000) 49–150. 
120  Ibid 153–5.
121  Jordan, above n 17, 30.
122  Tracy McNulty, Hostess: Hospitality, Femininity, and the Expropriation of Identity (University 
of Minnesota Press, 2006) xiv.
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to the Spanish by offering hospitality. While Sodom and sodomy are absent from 
this discussion, it nevertheless takes the shape of the Sodom allegory.
Vitoria’s punishment for breaches of duties of hospitality
In the Sodom allegory, the punishment for breaches of hospitality is the raining 
down of God’s wrath. In Vitoria’s scheme, the duties of hospitality are broad 
and deep, and breaching them justifies the Spanish punishing the Mesoamericans 
with war. Resisting the Spanish, not allowing them in, or expelling them after 
they arrive, are not only violations of the right to travel, but are acts of war and, 
in particular, acts of an unjust war: 
[I]t is an act of war to bar those considered as enemies from entering a city 
or country, or to expel them if they are already in it. But since the barbarians 
have no just war against the Spaniards, assuming they are doing no harm, it 
is not lawful for them to bar them from their homeland.123
The Spanish, when doing no harm, must be welcomed. The fundamental offence 
of the peoples of Mesoamerica becomes any refusal to engage in a loving relationship 
with the Spaniards.124 Every encounter between people long resident in a place and 
the Spanish strangers becomes a potential justification for war.
The biblical bases for Vitoria’s duties, such as the commandment to love 
one’s neighbour, and the hospitality trope, are generally duties owed between 
individuals. Vitoria extends these to require welcoming large groups of Spanish 
people, who may present themselves in full military regalia, ‘armed men, who 
surround a fearful and defenceless crowd’,125 as they did when reading the 
Requerimiento in Latin:
[T]hese barbarians are by nature cowardly, foolish and ignorant besides. 
However much the Spanish may wish to reassure them and convince them 
of their peaceful intentions, therefore, the barbarians may still be under- 
standably fearful of men whose customs seem so strange, and who they can 
see are armed and much stronger than themselves. If this fear moves them to 
mount an attack to drive the Spaniards away or kill them, it would indeed be 
lawful for the Spaniards to defend themselves, within the bounds of blameless 
self-defence.126
The use of ‘understandably’ here suggests empathy at the same time as it patronises 
by assuming inferiority. The scenario challenges the peoples of the New World to 
123  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 278. 
124  Porras, above n 10, 773. 
125  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 276. 
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calmly accept an invasion of armed men, and judges their conduct in response by 
a set of rules to which they have no access, but which are nevertheless claimed to 
be universal and recognisable by all. Antony Anghie concludes that Vitoria’s 
discussion of breaches of these duties results in justifying ‘inevitable and endless’ 
war by the Spanish in response.127
Breach of the duties of hospitality also threatens to send the Mesoamericans, 
who Vitoria has left precariously perched on the brink of rationality and 
humanity, plunging into the abyss of the inhuman. Vitoria states that as ‘nature 
has decreed a certain kinship among all men’, it is against natural law for one 
man to turn against another without due cause because ‘man is not a wolf to his 
fellow man . . . but a fellow’.128 This is further equivocation on the status of 
the Mesoamericans, paralleling the equivocation on sodomy and shoring up the 
demands for hospitality.
The allegory of Sodom, and biblical hospitality tropes more generally, shape 
Vitoria’s work explicitly in his recognition of the possibility that the punishment 
for failure to offer hospitality may take the shape of God’s sudden divine wrath. 
In a passage in Vitoria’s second lecture, On The Law of War,129 the allegory of 
Sodom is invoked, suggesting the possibility of punishing a whole society without 
regard to the individual ‘guilt’ of each person. The question is whether the killing 
of guiltless people is lawful when they may be expected to cause danger in the 
future.130 Justifying killing everyone even though some are not guilty relies on the 
allegory of Sodom, where everyone was killed in a demonstration of God’s 
sudden, divine wrath. Vitoria argues that this licence does not extend beyond 
God.131 The references to Sodom nevertheless reveal how the allegory continued 
to shape contemporary thought and his work. 
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Vitoria’s lectures on the Law of Nations, positioned 
at the inception of international law, participate in, and shape, biblical, theological 
and scholarly debates and discourses interweaving hospitality, homophobia and 
misogyny. Questions central to international law today, of who may travel, invade 
and conquer, and who must welcome into their lands, and provide hospitality to, 
travellers, invaders and outsiders, arise from the shapes provided by the deployment 
of these ancient discourses at the particular moment of Spain’s invasion of 
Mesoamerica. Sedimented in these shapes and bounds of hospitality and 
international law are questions of homophobia and misogyny in the recognition 
127  Anghie, above n 6, 328; cf Christopher Tomlins, Freedom Bound: Law, Labor, and Civic 
Identity in Colonizing English America, 1580–1865 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 
122–31, on Anghie’s analysis of Vitoria on Indian sovereignty.
128  Pagden and Lawrance (eds), above n 1, 280, fn 76.
129  Ibid 316.
130  Ibid.
131  Ibid. 
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of humanity and rationality, and of worthiness in the provision, and punishment 
for breaches, of hospitality. Like Derrida, I want to promote further inquiry into 
the extent to which we are heirs to the homophobia and misogyny in these 
traditions, facing the challenge of embracing the law of hospitality, opening our 
homes to the other, while rejecting its miring in injustice.132 This project is crucial 
to rethinking current responses to urgent issues, such as the treatment of asylum 
seekers around the world, particularly sexual and gender minorities, and the 
assertion of self-determination of colonised indigenous peoples.
132  Derrida and Dufourmantelle, above n 119.
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Rethinking kinship and border 
protection
Dianne Otto*
Make love not war.1
‘This way if you are gay.’ Thus read the invitation to Russian sailors, transmitted 
in Morse code from a waterproof box, lowered into the sea near Stockholm. 
The box also contained a flashing neon sign of a gyrating singing sailor, clad only 
in his suggestively bulging underwear, and an invitation in pink Russian script 
saying ‘Welcome to Sweden – Gay since 1944’ (the year Sweden decriminalised 
homosexuality).2 The mock invitation was directed at Russian submarines, which 
had reportedly been patrolling Swedish waters (reports that were dismissed 
by some Swedish commentators as a scare campaign orchestrated by those who 
stood to profit from increased military spending in Sweden).3 In the press release 
that accompanied the launch of the box and its message on 27 April 2015, the 
Swedish peace group responsible explained that it was launching a new border 
protection strategy, which it hoped would persuade the Swedish government ‘to 
think in new ways [about responding to threats from Russia] instead of falling 
back on territorial defence, conscription and rearmament’.4 And, I would add, the 
anxious proliferation of walled borders.
The idea of Russian submarines retreating, rather than risking defection by gay 
sailors, has its own pleasures. But the action by the venerable Swedish Peace and 
Arbitration Society (SPAS), established in 1883 by Nobel Peace Prize laureate 
*  Thanks to Kara Connolly for early research assistance, Joan Nestle for inspiration, patience and 
care, and Mimi Oorloff for consummate editorial skills and enthusiastic support.
1  Anti-war slogan popularised, particularly in the United States, by anti-Vietnam War protests 
in the 1960s. 
2  The Singing Sailor Underwater Defense System <http://www.svenskafreds.se/singingsailor/>. 
3  Sven Hultberg Carlsson, ‘Russia’s “Threat” to Sweden – An Exaggeration?’, Radio Sweden 
(online) (7 March 2013) <http://sverigesradio.se/sida/artikel.aspx?programid=2054&arti
kel=5466480>. 
4  Nick Miller, ‘The Swedes Introduce the “Singing Sailor”, Gay Propaganda to Repel Unwanted 
Russian Submarines’, The Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) (13 May 2015).
Figure 12.1 The singing sailor, Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society, 2015
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Klas Pontus Arnoldson,5 can be read in a number of ways that illustrate some of 
the risks, as well as possibilities, facing queer thinkers and activists in the present 
global conjuncture. On the one hand, the spectacle provides a graphic illustration 
of the ‘homonationalism’ that marks some of the international advocacy for gay 
and lesbian rights, whereby sexual liberality joins the long line of indicators of 
Western superiority6 and non-Western development.7 In this reading, SPAS’s 
protest risks buffering present-day geo-political hierarchies of civilisation and 
backwardness which, in turn, help to justify carceral states. On the other hand, 
the idea that non-state-based forms of global relationality could offer alternative 
non-military means of border protection points to the imaginative possibilities 
of queer ways of thinking. The invitation challenges heteronormative kinship 
systems that prioritise national loyalties, support militarism and normalise 
quotidian inequalities. As explained in its press release, SPAS hopes to promote 
a radical rethinking of state security, which would shift military resources into 
(transformative) development. The neon protest links together many queer, 
feminist, critical race and postcolonial efforts to think in new ways about the 
current paradigm of international law and politics.
On almost every measure, the state-based international legal order is failing. 
It is proving impossible for states to reach agreement on robust measures to 
reduce global warming; there is no end in sight for dozens of armed conflicts and 
militarised stalemates, many of which have been exacerbated by international 
efforts at intervention; the international trade in arms, both legal and illegal, 
continues to grow, even in the reputedly less militaristic countries of Scandinavia; 
the gap between rich and poor keeps widening, exposing the hollowness of the 
inclusionary promises of prevailing neoliberal economics; the human rights project 
has been seriously undermined in the name of defending nation-states against 
terror; and free-trade agreements and dynamics have carved the heart out of 
democracy everywhere. Yet international law and global politics remain firmly 
anchored in national imaginaries, as dramatically illustrated by the call to fear-
based white patriotism that saw the election of Donald Trump as the next US 
President. As seen in Trump’s election campaign, the technologies of walling 
states (‘I will build a great wall’)8 and sexual panics (Mexican immigrants are 
‘rapists’)9 both feature prominently in attempts to shore up and continue to 
privilege and naturalise the nation-state as the primary locus of identity, community, 
security and well-being.
5  The Swedish Peace and Arbitration Society <http://www.svenskafreds.se/english/>.
6  Jasbir K Puar, Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times (Duke University Press, 
2007) 38–9. 
7  Jon Binnie, The Globalization of Sexuality (Sage, 2004) 75–7.
8  ‘Full Text: Donald Trump Announces a Presidential Bid’, The Washington Post (online) 
(16 June 2015) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/06/16/
full-text-donald-trump-announces-a-presidential-bid/?utm_term=.cfaa90757acd>.
9  Ibid.
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The iron grip that imagined communities of nationhood have on our sense 
of identity and belonging10 presents a major obstacle to thinking in radically 
inclusive and plural ways about law, politics, markets, militaries, individuals and 
communities. The SPAS is not alone in calling for a radical reconsideration of 
the way in which things are normally done. In the context of the post-2015 
UN development agenda, a coalition of 167 NGOs committed themselves to 
creating a ‘transformative’ development model that ‘works for everyone’;11 on 
10 March 2015, the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom 
(WILPF) withdrew from its long-standing engagement with the Conference on 
Disarmament, which it accused of ‘[m]aintaining the structures that reinforce 
deadlock’;12 and queer activists are joining other movements demanding human 
rights, social justice and open borders across the globe, including anti-occupation 
Jewish queers joining with Palestinians to support the academic and cultural 
boycott of Israel.13 These are among mounting efforts to actively rethink the way 
in which things have been done. What they have in common is the hope that the 
alternative practices of solidarity and alliance they foster will lay the foundation for 
an international community based on forms of kinship and human interconnection 
other than militaristic nationalism.
In this chapter, I join the calls for change. I argue that queer relational practices 
offer emancipatory non-state-centred imaginaries of human connection and 
interdependence. I start by examining recent efforts to strengthen the hetero- 
normative underpinnings of the nation-state by measures including the recogni-
tion (or rejection) of same-sex marriage as a human rights issue. I then link these 
internal efforts, to strengthen the identity of the nation-state, with the increasing 
militarisation of state borders and the use of elaborate border fortifications 
to project power in the face of alleged external threats and provide reassurance to 
fearful (heteronormative) national loyalties. I conclude with some thoughts on 
how queer kinship systems might reshape border protection strategies and pro-
mote a shift of military resources into development, as hoped for by the Swedish 
activists. I am not arguing for a post-state world, although this may be a logical 
conclusion to draw. Rather, my argument is that the primacy of national loyalty 
needs to give way to the myriad other assemblages of human kinship that refuse 
to confine loyalty and connection to the narrow and racially imbued band of 
‘natural’ reproductive ties. 
10  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of 
Nationalism (Verso, revised edn, 1991). 
11  ‘Feminist Sustainable Development: A Transformative Alternative for Gender Equality, 
Development and Peace’ (Vision Statement, Post-2015 Women’s Coalition, 11 March 2015) 
<http://www.post2015women.com/post-2015-womens-coalition-vision-statement/>.
12  WILPF, ‘Statement to the Conference on Disarmament on International Women’s Day 
2015’ (Statement delivered at Conference on Disarmament, 10 March 2015) <http://www.
reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-news/9559-wilpf-statement-to-the-conference-on- 
disarmament-on-international-women-s-day-2015>. 
13  Sarah Schulman, Israel/Palestine and the Queer International (Duke University Press, 2010).
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The heteronormative analytics of the normal nation-state
If the precarious lives of sexual and gender minorities are taken seriously as lives 
that matter,14 it becomes apparent that the nation-state is so deeply enmeshed in 
the regulation of sexuality that its very existence depends on it. Heterosexual 
analytics saturate our everyday lives without most of us even noticing. It is widely 
recognised that ‘responsible’ heterosexuality (state-sanctioned, monogamous, 
adult and reproductive) was a key component of Europe’s ‘civilising mission’.15 
In Europe, too, the same disciplinary heteronormative sexual configuration has 
been a core technique of state governmentality.16 Going further, my argument is 
that the nation-state is itself made possible by putatively natural heterosexual 
kinship arrangements. Therefore, to question these arrangements, and give 
primacy to other forms of relational attachment, will help us to imagine other 
conceptions of state security, as the SPAS action suggests. Alternative kinship ties 
will also open new possibilities for challenging the hegemony of loyalties, based 
on nationhood, that currently structure the international community.
The debate about whether the Vatican properly qualifies as a state for the 
purposes of admission to full UN membership provides a revelatory starting point. 
The classic indicia of ‘normal’ statehood, as conceived, regulated and privileged 
by international law, include defined territory, permanent population, govern- 
mental authority and international independence in the form of the capacity to 
enter into legal relations with other states.17 While the Vatican satisfies many of 
these requirements, more or less, the main stumbling block is its lack of reproduc-
tive continuity. Pundits have argued that the Vatican’s population of celibate 
priests and nuns lacks ‘permanency’ because it is not self-sustaining.18 This argu-
ment recalls the Law of Nations, as explicated by Emmerich de Vattel in 1758, 
which included the ‘right of carrying off women’ because ‘[a] nation cannot 
preserve and perpetuate itself except by propagation’. 19 This ‘right of nations’ 
makes it crystal clear that the nation is, naturally, ‘a nation of [heterosexual] men’, 
14  Judith Butler, ‘Indefinite Detention’ in Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence 
(Verso, 2004) 50.
15  See also Nan Seuffert at chapter 11, ‘Queering international law’s stories of origin: Hospitality 
and homophobia’.
16  See generally Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’ (Pasquale Pasquino trans) in Graham 
Burchell, Colin Gordon and Peter Miller (eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality 
with Two Lectures by and an Interview with Michel Foucault (University of Chicago Press, 
1991) 87.
17  Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, signed 26 December 1933, 165 
LNTS 19 (entered into force 26 December 1934) art 1.
18  M H Mendelson, ‘Diminutive States in the United Nations’ (1972) 21 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 609, 611.
19  Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations; or Principles of Natural Law, Applied to the Conduct 
and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns (first published 1758, 1844 edn) bk II, ch IX, s 122, 
179 <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/Lieber_Collection/pdf/DeVattel_
LawOfNations.pdf>. Thanks to Rosemary Grey, who drew my attention to this early right 
of nations.
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and that force is justified if used ‘to procure women, who are absolutely necessary 
to its preservation [reproductive continuity]’.20
Strangely, this means the non-reproductive Vatican provides one starting point 
for imagining a queer state – assuming such an entity would even be recognisable 
as a state. That the nation-state depends so fundamentally on heteronormative 
reproductive relations for the transfer and reproduction of national loyalty and 
culture has been entirely overlooked by theorists of nationalism, including 
Benedict Anderson.21 Further, as Judith Butler observes, in reproducing the 
nation and its culture, the state’s kinship configurations carry ‘implicit norms of 
racial purity and domination’.22 This helps to explain the current anxiety of many 
European states over their falling birth rates and why increasing (racially diverse) 
immigration is not necessarily seen as the answer.23 It also explains why same-sex 
marriage (presumed reproductive) has become so widely embraced in the West, 
because it promises to (re)produce citizens loyal to the nation-state, rather than 
outlaws likely to question the idea of state loyalty.
‘Taking a break’24 from normal ways of thinking about other key attributes 
of statehood – defined territory, governmental authority and international 
independence – makes it clear that they are all are anchored and stabilised by 
heteronormative imaginaries, which have helped legitimate claims of sovereignty 
over territory, shaped modes of governance and made states recognisable as 
independent international actors. As Michel Foucault argued, the ideal of the 
‘Malthusian couple’ – monogamous, heterosexual, reproductively and socially 
responsible – is one of the anchors of Western sexual normativity.25 Understood 
as the elemental, natural form of human association, conjugal heterosexuality 
not only produces and disciplines ‘normal’ interpersonal and familial relationships, 
but is constitutive of the nation-state, international law’s primary subject. Today, 
almost every aspect of national life is organised along the grid-lines of (patriarchal) 
heterosexual kinship relationships – census forms, surnames, marriage regulation, 
birth registration, child custody, tax arrangements, inheritance, wages, education, 
social security, medical decision-making, funeral arrangements, immigration, 
insurance, parenting rights, housing and health care assistance and much more.26 
20  Ibid.
21  Anderson, above n 10.
22  Judith Butler, ‘Is Kinship Always Already Heterosexual?’ in Undoing Gender (Routledge, 
2004) 102, 110.
23  Ashifa Kassam, Rosie Scammell, Kate Connolly et al, ‘Europe Needs Many More Babies to 
Avert a Population Disaster’, The Guardian (online) (23 August 2015) <https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/23/baby-crisis-europe-brink-depopulation-disaster>. 
24  Thanks to Janet Halley for the provocative idea of ‘taking a break’ in Janet Halley, Split 
Decisions: How and Why to Take a Break from Feminism (Princeton University Press, 2006).
25  Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Robert Hurley trans, Vintage, 
first published 1976, 1990 edn) vol 1, 104–5.
26  See, eg, ‘Same Sex: Same Entitlements: National Inquiry into Discrimination against 
People in Same-Sex Relationships: Financial and Work-Related Entitlements and Benefits’ 
(Report, Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission , May 2007), which 
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Extensive rights and privileges are conferred by the state on married couples, 
granting them full humanity in the frame of the law. Other sexual relationships, 
encounters, exchanges and practices are less privileged and, depending on how far 
they depart from the Malthusian couple standard, may be marked as perverse, 
anomalous, abnormal, criminal and even unthinkable. It is heteronormativity that 
makes the imagined community of the nation-state possible, giving such power 
to national feelings of belonging and attachment that, as Anderson observes, 
people are willing to die for it.27
Colonial administrations clearly understood that the regulation and control 
of sexuality was essential to their imperial state-building projects. Conjugal 
reproductive heterosexuality, closely associated with whiteness, was projected as 
the most civilised expression of sexuality, affirming in the family sphere the modern 
liberal values of ‘civility, self-control, self-discipline and self-determination’.28 The 
developing technologies of colonial governance treated sexuality, as described 
later by Foucault, as an ‘especially dense transfer point’ of power, endowed with 
the ‘greatest instrumentality’.29 The criminalisation of ‘unnatural’ sexual practices 
was standard procedure. New systems of birth, sex and marriage registration 
enforced gender binary, monogamy and heterosexuality, and prohibited arranged 
and child marriages. These colonial technologies of governance rendered perverse 
many local practices and beliefs about kinship and community responsibility. 
In a similar vein, there was ‘heavy imperial investment’ in representing the sexual 
behaviours of indigenous peoples as deviant.30 Evolutionary theories were drawn 
into imperial service, classifying homosexual practices and male effeminacy as 
signs of the ‘arrested development’ of savages.31 As Neville Hoad notes, nineteenth-
century evolutionary anthropologists posited sexual promiscuity as the primitive 
stage of human social organisation. The ‘family’ emerged through several develop- 
mental stages, including incestuous and polygamous relations, until it reached the 
final stage of the ‘civilised family’ of state-sanctioned monogamous conjugal 
reproductive heterosexuality.32
identified 58 federal laws that discriminate against same-sex couples, and sometimes their 
children as well, and a further 21 that potentially discriminate against same-sex couples and 
families. (Marriage law was not included in the terms of the inquiry.)
27  Anderson, above n 10, 7.
28  Ann Laura Stoler, Race and the Education of Desire: Foucault’s History of Sexuality and the 
Colonial Order of Things (Duke University Press, 1995) 8.
29  Foucault, above n 25, 103.
30  Maddee Clarke, ‘Are We Queer? Reflections on “Peopling the Empty Mirror” Twenty Years 
On’ in Dino Hodge (ed), Colouring the Rainbow: Blak Queer and Trans Perspectives – Life 
Stories and Essays by First Nations People of Australia (Wakefield Press, 2015) 238, 241; Mark 
Rifkin, When Did Indians Become Straight? Kinship, the History of Sexuality, and Native 
Sovereignty (Oxford University Press, 2011).
31  Neville Hoad, ‘Arrested Development or the Queerness of Savages: Resisting Evolutionary 
Narratives of Difference’ (2000) 3 Postcolonial Studies 133.
32  Ibid 140.
Resisting the heteronormative imaginary  243
Colonial discourses of sexuality were not just concerned with controlling and 
normalising populations. The tropes of sexuality also served an analytical function 
by marking the superiority of the Western nation-state. As Teemu Ruskola’s 
study of the anthropomorphic metaphors of colonial international law reveals, 
the rhetoric of sexual violation was often used to describe (and legitimate) 
Western expansionism.33 European states were attributed a normatively masculine 
position, while non-European states and peoples were understood as expressing 
deviant forms of masculinity. Africa, for example, was monolithically represented 
as ‘hypermasculine’34 and, ironically, Oriental civilisations were considered 
‘too civilized’ and therefore not masculine enough.35 Thus, as Ruskola argues, 
imperial homo-erotic ‘penetrations’ were necessary to produce the ‘full sovereign 
manhood’ necessary for acceptance into the international community of modern 
states.36 Yet, despite Europe’s best penetrative efforts, the standard is one of 
impossibility for postcolonial states. They continue to be racially and sexually 
marked as underdeveloped, illiberal, degenerate and threatening to (Western) 
civilisation. The post-colony is also the site of many counter-heteronormative 
movements, the diversity of which cannot possibly be captured by language of 
LGBTI, as Ratna Kapur cautions.37 Instead, she uses the term ‘sexual subalterns’ 
to resist the assimilationism of the neoliberal project and reflect the ‘extraordinary 
range’ of these movements in postcolonial states.38
In the West, fears about homosexuality threatening the survival of the nation-
state became explicit in many of the recent same-sex marriage debates. One of 
the strident opponents of marriage equality in the United States, law professor 
Maura Strassburg, asserted that monogamous heterosexual marriage was ‘uniquely 
capable of producing free-thinking and independent individuals who are 
also capable of choosing to be loyal and trusting citizens’.39 This view was echoed 
in the US Congressional debates that preceded the passing of the Defense of 
Marriage Act 1996 (‘DOMA’),40 when Senator Jesse Helms warned that ‘at 
the heart of this debate is the moral and spiritual survival of this Nation’.41 
33  Teemu Ruskola, ‘Raping like a State’ (2010) 57 UCLA Law Review 1477.
34  Ibid 1498 (emphasis in original).
35  Ibid.
36  Ibid 1497.
37  Ratna Kapur, ‘De-Radicalising the Rights Claims of Sexual Subalterns through “Tolerance”’ 
in Robert Leckey and Kim Brooks (eds), Queer Theory: Law, Culture, Empire (Routledge, 
2010) 37, 39.
38  Ibid.
39  Maura I Strassberg, ‘Distinctions of Form or Substance: Monogamy, Polygamy and 
Same-Sex Marriage’ (1997) 75 North Carolina Law Review 1501, 1577.
40  Defense of Marriage Act, Pub L No 104–199, 110 Stat 2419 (1996) 1 USC § 7, 28 USC § 
1738C 28, later struck down by the Supreme Court in US v Windsor (133 S Ct, 26 June 
2013) slip op 2675, 2682–4.
41  Jesse Helms, 142 Congressional Record S10068 (daily ed, 9 September 1996), quoted 
in David L Chambers, ‘Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage’ (1997) 26 Hofstra Law Review 
53, 56.
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The DOMA stipulated that marriage was the union of one man and one woman. 
Adopted by an overwhelming majority of both houses of Congress, it took the 
unprecedented step of overriding many aspects of American states’ powers to 
regulate marriage – a step that was justified in defence of the nation.42
In France, the explosion of opposition to the 1998 bill seeking to recognise 
same-sex civil partnerships43 focused on the threat to national culture that would 
be presented by legally recognised gay couples having children.44 The bill was 
eventually adopted, but only after heterosexual (and patriarchal) kinship relations 
had been protected by banning same-sex couples from adopting children and 
accessing reproductive technologies.45 In the subsequent same-sex marriage 
debates in France, gay men were again depicted as a ‘menace to the nation’ 
because they procure foreign surrogates (bypassing French law) and so contaminate 
the French polity with racially diverse babies.46 Despite this fear-mongering, 
same-sex marriage legislation was adopted in 2013,47 which also allowed same-sex 
married couples to jointly adopt children, although it pointedly did not extend 
state aid to help same-sex couples procreate.48
Well before same-sex marriage became a battleground, queer sexualities were 
considered antithetical to the nation. In the West, state efforts to dehumanise and 
even eradicate sexual dissidents are legion. The common law of England defined 
the crime of sodomy broadly as the abominable and detestable ‘crime against 
nature’, which was, like treason, punished by death.49 In Europe, homophobic zeal 
reached its zenith during the Third Reich, when homosexuals were among the 
‘degenerates’ slated for extermination. Heinrich Himmler argued that ties between 
homosexuals (like Jews) were stronger than their loyalty to the state.50 On the 
discovery by his secret police that homosexuals were present in every government 
and party office, he feared that gay men would hire other gay men when positions 
42  Chambers, above n 41, 53, 76.
43  Loi n°99-944 du 15 novembre 1999 relative au pacte civil de solidarité (France) JO, 
16 November 1999. The ‘pacts of civil solidarity’ (PACS) legislation provided civil partnership 
recognition for any two individuals who organise their lives jointly, regardless of sexual 
orientation.
44  Butler, above n 22, 110.
45  Ibid.
46  Michael J Bosia, ‘Strange Fruit: Homophobia, the State, and the Politics of LGBT Rights 
and Capabilities’ (2014) 13 Journal of Human Rights 256, 257.
47  Loi n° 2013-404 du 17 mai 2013 ouvrant le mariage aux couples de personnes de même 
sexe (France) JO, 18 May 2013.
48  Steven Erlanger, ‘Hollande Signs French Gay Marriage Law’, The New York Times (19 May 
2013). 
49  William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (Robert Bell, 1st edn, 1772) bk 
4, ch 15, s 4.
50  Geoffrey J Giles, ‘The Institutionalization of Homosexual Panic in the Third Reich’ in Robert 
Gellately and Nathan Stoltzfus (eds), Social Outsiders in Nazi Germany (Princeton University 
Press, 2001) 233, 239.
Resisting the heteronormative imaginary  245
became vacant, and thus that gay cliques would eventually run whole areas of 
government, destabilising the state.51
In an unnervingly similar vein, since the strengthening of Russian laws in 2013 
banning ‘gay propaganda’,52 the state news media has ‘worked hard to portray gay 
activists as traitors doing the work of foreign powers [meaning particularly the US 
– perhaps also Sweden?] to undermine the Russian state’.53 A trial judge sentenced 
members of the feminist punk rock band Pussy Riot, under earlier legislation, to 
long terms of imprisonment for questioning Russian democracy, homophobia and 
gender conformity. He described their protest as ‘shatter[ing] the constitutional 
foundations of the state’.54 This kind of alarm about gender and sexual non-
conformity helped justify the strengthening of Russia’s anti-propaganda laws. 
Even women’s crisis centres have now been caught in the legislation’s broad net 
of menacing sexual and gender deviancy, threatening their access to ‘foreign’ 
funding.55
The heated UN debates over the last decade, about recognising the marginali-
sation and violence experienced by sexual and gender minorities as human rights 
violations, have also relied heavily on heterosexualised tropes of the normal 
nation-state. A solid block of states from the global South, consisting of most 
African and Caribbean countries and members of the Organisation of Islamic 
Conference (OIC) (joined often by the Vatican, apparently oblivious to its own 
queerness), has presented formidable opposition to the idea that such minorities 
might exist outside the West.56 They have reflected back the colonial paradigm of 
sexual degeneracy as a ‘white man’s disease’57 and accused the West of imposing 
their ‘perceived cultural superiority’.58 On the other hand, Western and Latin 
American states have been eager to display their liberal sexual credentials by advo-
cating for the recognition of GLBTI rights, emphasising the universality of human 
51  Ibid.
52  Miriam Elder, ‘Russia Passes Law Banning Gay “Propaganda”’, The Guardian (online) 
(12 June 2013) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/11/russia-law-banning- 
gay-propaganda>. 
53  Ivan Nechepurenko, ‘Russian Newspaper’s Scoop? Based on Fake Letters, US Says’, The New 
York Times (21 November 2015).
54  Janet Elise Johnson and Aino Saarinen, ‘Twenty-First-Century Feminisms under Repression: 
Gender Regime Change and the Women’s Crisis Center Movement in Russia’ (2013) 38 
Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 543, 562.
55  Ibid. The new law requires NGOs receiving foreign funding to register as ‘foreign agents’.
56  Dianne Otto, ‘Transnational Homo-Assemblages: Reading “Gender” in Counter-Terrorism 
Discourses’ (2013) 4(2) Jindal Global Law Review 79.
57  Oliver Phillips, ‘Zimbabwean Law and the Production of a White Man’s Disease’ (1997) 
6 Social & Legal Studies 471.
58  See, eg, Egypt introducing amendments to draft SOGI resolution UN Doc A/HRC/ 
27/L.27/Rev.1: Human Rights Council, Report of the Human Rights Council on its 
Twenty-Seventh Session, 27th sess, Agenda Item 1, UN Doc A/HRC/27/2 (22 December 
2014). 
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rights norms and obligations.59 As Michael Bosia points out, the speeches in these 
debates can all be read as states articulating a purposeful and often innovative 
homophobia to serve their own interests, rather than responding to GLBTI 
rights claims.60 He argues that many states use queer identities as ‘ready-made 
bogeymen’, creating sexual panics which divert attention from the pressures of 
globalisation and demands from their own populations for increased opportunities 
and freedoms,61 a theme to which I return in the next section.
I agree that states that present themselves as gay-friendly also have a homo- 
phobic agenda.62 Their goal is to domesticate (civilise) queer expressions and 
communities of desire by granting them normalising rights. Domestication 
buttresses GLBTI loyalties to the nation-state and encourages responsible 
reproductive practices, minimising the potential for alternative arrangements, 
outside state control, which may disrupt their national projects.63 Lisa Duggan has 
described this as the ‘sexual politics of neoliberalism’ or the ‘new homonormativity’.64 
As she argues, this frustrates the democratic potential of sexual dissidence by 
extending familial rights and privileges to those who model their relationships 
on the heterosexual, monogamous, reproductive norm. Jasbir Puar has aptly 
described this process as ‘biopolitical reorientation’,65 whereby the quid pro quo 
for admission into the heterosexual institutions of the nation is to abandon 
queer and feminist critiques of the monogamous heteronormative family.66 
The granting of rights can de-radicalise a movement, and patriotism can demand 
abandonment of queer curiosity.67
It is not, as commonly believed, that marriage in the West (and elsewhere) 
has shifted from its pre-modern incarnation of serving to consolidate alliances 
between men or lines of descent and protect male property interests, to becoming 
a matter of individual freedom and choice. Rather, disguised as individual choice, 
the privileging of dyadic heteronormative marriage, and its gradual extension 
to same-sex couples, provides a powerful means of instituting primary loyalty to 
the modern nation-state,68 helping to make territorial sovereignty and state 
59  See, eg, Human Rights Council, ‘Joint Statement on Human Rights, Sexual Orientation 
and Gender Identity – Delivered by Argentina on Behalf of 66 States’ (18 December 
2008) <http://arc-international.net/global-advocacy/sogi-statements/2008-joint- 
statement/>.
60  Bosia, above n 46.
61  Ibid 266.
62  Otto, above n 56.
63  Butler, above n 22, 104.
64  Lisa Duggan, ‘The New Homonormativity: The Sexual Politics of Neoliberalism’ in Russ 
Castronovo and Dana D Nelson (eds), Materialising Democracy: Towards a Revitalised 
Cultural Politics (Duke University Press, 2002) 175, 190.
65  Puar, above n 6, 211.
66  Margaret Denike, ‘What’s Queer about Polygamy?’ in Robert Leckey and Kim Brooks (eds), 
Queer Theory: Law, Culture, Empire (Routledge, 2010) 137, 145.
67  See also Dianne Otto at ‘Introduction: Embracing queer curiosity’, this volume.
68  Butler, above n 22, 103; Hoad, above n 31, 139.
Resisting the heteronormative imaginary  247
governance possible in chaotic times. Heterosexual (presumed biological) kinship 
arrangements are thus constitutive of the modern nation-state and, it follows, 
of the ‘normal’ system of state-centred international law. It underpins a system of 
human (dis)connectedness that is endangering us all.
The border protection strategies of the normal nation-state
The broader context in which these contestations and (re)alignments over 
sexuality are taking place is the increasing precarity of the nation-state itself, due 
largely to global developments, in which it may nevertheless be implicated. More 
familiar threats, like the fear of Russian expansionism that prompted the Singing 
Sailor invitation and civil conflicts spilling into neighbouring states, have been 
eclipsed by the devastating effects of neoliberal economic globalisation which has 
created a vast underclass of people living precarious lives. The borders of nation-
states have become increasingly porous, in the face of increased demands for 
cheap labour mobility and ever-larger flows of desperate (and hopeful) people 
seeking economic opportunities while also often fleeing intractable conflicts and 
environmental disasters. At the same time, fears about international terrorism have 
skyrocketed, fanned by perversely sexualised and racialised bigotry, as has anxiety 
about transnational criminal networks trafficking people as well as weapons, 
drugs, diamonds, ivory and all manner of contraband. While the movement 
of people and goods across borders has always been highly regulated, involving 
immigration and customs officials, border police, military back-up and extensive 
technological systems of international cooperation, border security has now, in 
national imaginaries, reached crisis point.
Control of borders, and thus of defined territory, is another of the key attributes 
of statehood. Borders are an important marker of the limits of domestic jurisdiction 
and governmental power, although the jurisdiction of states extends extra-
territorially where they exercise ‘effective control’.69 In recent years, we have seen 
states take unprecedented measures to secure their borders, primarily by employing 
the kind of aggressive shows of force that SPAS, WILPF and other peace groups 
oppose. Many of these measures are in violation of international legal obligations. 
This includes breaching the sovereignty of neighbouring states, using force 
arbitrarily, denying due process to many of those attempting to cross, refoulment 
of refugees and asylum seekers, extrajudicial executions, indefinite detention, and 
the use of torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. 
Borders have, in many instances, become zones of state lawlessness. The ‘frenzied’ 
wall-building that has accompanied these developments70 spectacularly symbolises 
the sense of crisis for the nation. At the same time, the spectacle provides some 
69  See, eg, Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 31: The Nature of the General 
Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, 80th sess, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (26 May 2004). 
70  Wendy Brown, Walled States, Waning Sovereignty (Zone Books, 2010) 8.
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measure of reassurance that the imagined community of the nation-state can be 
protected from menacing outsiders.
While not a new technique of border security, never before have walls 
proliferated in such numbers.71 There are currently almost 70 border walls.72 
They project the image of fortress nation-states determined to impose order in a 
world of uncertainty and chaos produced by terrorism, criminal networks and 
amorphous globalisation. The displays of impregnability also serve to deny our 
global interdependence. The main enthusiasts for projecting sovereign power in 
this way include the United States, Israel, India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Turkey, 
Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kenya, Botswana, Egypt, China and North Korea.73 
Walls are also increasingly commonplace in Europe, at its perimeters as well as 
within its Schengen free-travel zone.74 Yet there is little proof that militarisation 
and walling are effective as a means of border security. Instead of acting 
as a deterrent, there is a great deal of evidence that they simply make crossing 
borders more perilous. Clearly undeterred, millions of people continue to 
cross borders as ‘irregular’ migrants. According to the International Organisation 
on Migration, in the first half of 2016 alone, over 3,700 people had gone missing 
or died in the process.75
So how has the increasingly lawless securitisation of borders been justified in a 
post-Cold War world that celebrated the fall of the Berlin Wall less than three 
decades ago? Here, again, the analytics of sexuality have played an important role 
in stoking the fear and panic that has manufactured public support. Recall that 
those directly responsible for the 9/11 atrocities were cast as sexually dubious by 
reports in the West of their apparent preference for masculine company while on 
earth, and their hopes for reward in the form of eternal access to virgins in the 
afterlife.76 Ever since, the intonation of sexual perversity has assisted the Western 
project of denigrating Islam and demonising its adherents, casting a pall of 
suspicion and fear of contagion. These sexualised tropes have helped fuel the panic 
that has made walls, and the lawlessness and death that they foster, seem both 
necessary and desirable. As Puar contends, the ‘invocation of the terrorist as a 
queer, nonnational, racially perverse other [became] part of the normative script 
71  Barbara Tasch, ‘The Number of Border Walls around the World More than Quadrupled in 
25 Years – Here’s Why’, Business Insider Australia (online) (15 November 2016) <http://
www.businessinsider.com.au/more-border-walls-around-world-2016-11>. 
72  Ibid.
73  Brown, above n 70, 8–19.
74  Matthew Holehouse and Isabelle Fraser, ‘Migrant Crisis: European Council President Tusk 
Warns Schengen on Brink of Collapse’, The Telegraph (online) (23 November 2016) <http://
www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/eu/11991098/Migrant-crisis-Donald-
Tusk-warns-that-Schengen-is-on-brink-of-collapse-latest-news.html>. 
75  IOM’s Global Migration Data Analysis Centre, ‘Dangerous Journeys – International 
Migration Increasingly Unsafe in 2016’ (2016) (4) Data Briefing Series 1 <https://
missingmigrants.iom.int/sites/default/files/gmdac_data_briefing_series_issue4.pdf>. 
76  Anna M Agathangelou, ‘Power, Borders, Security, Wealth: Lessons of Violence and Desire 
from September 11’ (2004) 48 International Studies Quarterly 517, 530.
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of the US war on terror’.77 This undertone of erotic depravity also helped then 
US President Bush to declare the advent of a ‘different kind of conflict against a 
different kind of enemy’ in 2001,78 a manoeuvre that simultaneously released him 
from the need to comply with existing law and signalled the necessity of different 
law(lessness) to deal with the new emergency of endless war. The idea of perpetual 
conflict has since been buttressed by the proliferation of border walls and their 
sense of permanency.
Also compounding the nervousness about security and undocumented 
(perverse, racialised and potentially terrorist) migration, and helping to justify 
extreme border protection measures in defence of the nation, is the spike in anti-
trafficking crusades, driven largely by the United States.79 These crusades rely 
heavily on traditional narratives of innocent and helpless Third World women, 
unable to exercise free will, needing to be rescued from the sexual depravity and 
exploitation of (foreign) traffickers, and even sometimes their own (backward) 
families.80 The anxiety induced by these images has enabled states to adopt 
draconian laws that impose harsh criminal penalties on supposed traffickers as well 
as, in many cases, on their purported victims;81 laws which are then applied more 
generally. These laws have, in turn, justified states devoting substantially increased 
financial and administrative resources to border surveillance, security police and 
detention facilities, all cloaked in a ‘mantle of righteousness’82 that claims to be 
protecting defenceless women and children. In fact, these efforts have made 
matters worse for many women, who see themselves as economic migrants, but 
are treated as victims of trafficking.
Outside the reassuring boundaries of state-based affiliation, any man can be a 
sexually deviant terrorist or trafficker, any woman – especially if she wears a veil 
– can be a supporter and/or reproducer of terrorists, and any person who defies 
the heteronormative order in other ways, such as sex workers and queers, can 
potentially contaminate national loyalties and heteronormative purity. These 
sexually charged figurations of threatening outsiders utilise sexuality productively, 
in the Foucauldian sense of instrumentalising it as a transfer point of power. 
As Gayle Rubin describes this process, sexual acts are burdened ‘with an excess of 
significance’ making them available to ‘function as signifiers for personal and social 
77  Puar, above n 6, 37.
78  ‘Radio Address of the President to the Nation’ (15 September 2001) The White House: 
President George W Bush <https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/
releases/2001/09/20010915.html>.
79  Janie Chuang, ‘The United States as Global Sheriff: Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat 
Human Trafficking’ (2005–6) 27 Michigan Journal of International Law 437.
80  Jayashri Srikantiah, ‘Perfect Victims and Real Survivors: The Iconic Victim in Domestic 
Human Trafficking Laws’ (2007) 87 Buffalo University Law Review 157, 191–5.
81  Janie A Chuang, ‘Exploitation Creep and the Unmaking of Human Trafficking Law’ (2014) 
108 American Journal of International Law 609.
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apprehensions to which they have no intrinsic connection’.83 The mystification 
of sexuality, at least in Western societies, she says, makes sex a productive site for 
the generation of ‘rage, anxiety, and sheer terror’ which, in turn, enables the state 
to enact new laws and regulations that extend its control even more deeply into 
our intimate lives.84 With regard to border protection, the image of the sexually 
perverse migrant, in its many avatars,85 has helped to fuel the panic and fear 
that has justified otherwise unthinkable restrictions on individual rights and 
freedoms, the otherwise indefensible militarisation of borders, and an otherwise 
inconceivable wall-building frenzy. In the process, attention is diverted from the 
‘real’ crises of the systemic injustices of neoliberal economics, the burgeoning 
global trade in arms and military equipment, escalating environmental destruction 
and the resurgence of xenophobia, racism, misogyny and homophobia as 
national values.
It is therefore not coincidental that we have seen the intensification of militarised 
empire at the same time as gay ‘victories’ – like the legalisation of same-sex 
marriage – are being celebrated, at least in some parts of the world. They are both 
measures designed to fortify the power and autonomy of the nation-state. From 
within, this fortification is advanced by either redrawing or reinforcing their 
heteronormative ‘internal frontiers’86 with displays of either sexual liberality or 
conservatism. On the border, efforts to restore confidence in the idea of national 
unity, purity and transmissibility take the form of heightened securitisation which 
(ostensibly) will protect the nation from deviant intrusions. The technologies of 
same-sex marriage (or opposition to it) and walling states are both strategies 
aimed at rejuvenating the nation, in the face of the uncertainties and disruptions 
of the neoliberal present. Both technologies engage what Cynthia Weber describes 
as the ‘sexualised orders of international relations’,87 produced through particular 
encodings of genders and sexualities that shore up, privilege and naturalise the 
nation-state as the primary locus of identity, community, security and well-being. 
As a consequence, the failures of the state-based international economic, legal and 
political order are occluded, critique is branded as disloyalty, even treasonous, 
and alternative imaginings of kinship and belonging become unthinkable. 
International law and global politics remain firmly anchored in militaristic, 
heteronormative, national imaginaries, in which other hierarchies of inequity are 
also securely sedimented.
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Non-state queer relational imaginaries: Thinking in new 
ways about border protection 
State-authorised heteronormative kinship ties hardly exhaust the field of life-
affirming and life-sustaining relational connections. If we release kinship from 
the fixed, presumptively biological parameters enforced by the nation-state, and 
embrace Butler’s understanding of kinship ‘as a set of practices that institutes 
relationships of various kinds which negotiate the reproduction of life and the 
demands of death’,88 we start to see how it can be ‘self-consciously assembled from 
a multiplicity of possible bits and pieces’.89 Indeed, many forms of heterosexual 
parenthood already rely on social rather than biological connection. In the 
context of ‘queer non-biokinship’,90 the technologies of adoption, surrogacy, 
donor insemination, other forms of reproductive assistance and various parenting 
arrangements between gay men, lesbians, non-sex-specific and transgender 
people have produced many more filial relations that are not based on biological 
connections or confined to only two parents. Many others have committed 
themselves to bringing their children up queerly, often against great odds.91 
Despite this, the emerging legal language of queer parenting remains mired in a 
heteronormative script.92
However, even these alternative family arrangements do not exhaust the 
possibilities. Around the world, queer communities, whether or not they are 
publicly visible, are founded on alternative kinship ties that, as Butler observes: 
constitute a ‘break-down’ of traditional kinship that not only displaces the 
central place of biological and sexual relations from its definition but gives 
sexuality a separate domain from that of kinship, which allows for the durable 
tie to be thought outside the conjugal frame and thus opens kinship to a set 
of community ties that are irreducible to family.93
Kinship possibilities are multiplicitous, and not necessarily dependent on the 
state for recognition and rights in order to engender a sense of belonging and 
self-worth.
Many queer people have self-consciously set about building alternative comm- 
unities, based on non-reproductive kinship ties, thereby seeking to diffuse the 
88  Butler, above n 22, 102–3.
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nation or at least reduce its hold on their loyalties and lives. They have sought to 
establish relations of care, intimacy, pleasure, shared values, self-esteem, economic 
interdependence, community obligation and public visibility, recognising diverse 
sexual and intimate relations, and non-binary expressions of gender, as worthy 
of respect, affirmation, protection and celebration. Many of these communities 
have also explicitly sought to challenge other exclusionary practices that anchor 
nation-states, like hierarchies of class, race, religion and ethnicity. They are 
characteristically urban communities, readily visible in cosmopolitan cities like 
Buenos Aires, Cape Town, London, Manila, New York, Rio de Janeiro, Shanghai, 
Sydney, Taipei, Tel Aviv and Tokyo. These communities have ‘cultivated unprece- 
dented kinds of commonality, intimacy, and public life’.94 They also include 
long-established, although stigmatised, hijra communities spread across South 
Asia,95 kathoey (third gender) communities in Thailand,96 and relatively recent 
formations like the sister-girl and brother-boy networks of support in Australian 
indigenous communities.97 Many of these queer kinship communities are 
transnational, like the ‘underground railway’ between queer communities in 
Kampala and Paris that provides safe passage for Ugandan activists,98 the members 
of the NGO Proud Lebanon that have welcomed queer refugees from Syria 
into the relative safety of their community,99 and the bonds of solidarity and sup-
port between Palestinians and anti-occupation Jewish queers to which I alluded 
earlier.100
In the past, active resistance to state regulation of sexuality was the hallmark of 
many queer communities in the West. Michael Warner describes the resistance 
that was at the heart of gay and lesbian politics in the United States until the 
1990s (when same-sex marriage started to dominate the gay political agenda) 
 94  Michael Warner, ‘Beyond Gay Marriage’ in Wendy Brown and Janet Halley (eds), Left 
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as emanating from an ‘ethical vision of queer politics’.101 Among the principles 
that this ethical vision rested upon was alertness to the ‘invidiousness’ of the 
institution of marriage and other state-regulated institutions, which are ‘designed 
both to reward those inside it and discipline those outside it’.102 In his list of those 
rendered ‘queer’ by marriage law, Warner includes ‘adulterers, prostitutes, 
divorcees, the promiscuous, single people, unwed parents, [and] those below the 
age of consent’.103 Warner’s catalogue is reminiscent of Rubin’s earlier mapping 
of sexual hierarchy in the United States, maintained by a broader set of laws, which 
she describes as establishing a ‘charmed circle’ of ‘good’ heteronormative, 
reproductive, vanilla sexuality, and locating ‘bad’ sexuality at the ‘outer limits’.104 
These American catalogues resonate with Kapur’s identification of sexual 
subalterns in the contemporary Indian context, which includes ‘kush, queer, hijra, 
kothis, panthis’105 and others who are tarred with threatening Indian culture and 
nationhood, like sex workers, homosexuals and lesbians.106 Being inclusive 
of demonised sexual communities, who are excluded from the charmed circle, 
was fundamental to earlier queer politics in the West, which refused to accord 
legitimacy to only some forms of consensual sex. In 1972, for example, the US 
National Coalition of Gay Organizations called for the ‘extension of the legal 
benefits of marriage [not marriage itself] to all persons who cohabit regardless of 
sex or numbers’.107
Much changed with the end of the Cold War and the dramatic rise of neoliberal 
economic globalisation. The emerging homonormative agenda of Western and 
Latin American states, which extended the circumference of the charmed circle 
to include same-sex de facto and marital unions, has splintered many queer 
communities. The effect has been to weaken relational ties that rested on radical 
sexual politics, alternative relational economies and communities unbound from 
the nation-state. Some of the earlier inclusivity of queer communities has been 
blunted by the lure of respectability that comes with legal recognition and human 
rights. Inadvertently – sometimes purposefully – many GLBTI activists have given 
credence to nationalist evolutionary discourses by portraying same-sex marriage 
as the high water-mark of ‘civilisation’.108 Western-domesticated sexual identities 
have been projected by some advocates as universal, thereby stigmatising, 
disqualifying and silencing resistive Western and non-Western practices and 
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expressions of community and desire.109 While the recognition of same-sex 
marriage means that some former deviants have been welcomed into the nation-
state’s charmed circle of good sexuality, the demonisation of those who remain 
on the outer limits has intensified.
Yet there are also those in queer communities who remain committed to radical 
sexual politics and to forging relational ties with all those living precariously on 
the outer limits, not just sexual and gender outsiders. Some bonds of queer 
relationality have been strengthened and extended in reaction to the exclusionary 
effects of the new respectabilities.110 There is so much more to be done. As Lisa 
Duggan argues, the neoliberal ‘recoding’ of some of the key aspirations of queer 
movements – equality, freedom and the right to privacy – needs to be actively 
resisted.111 The struggle to invest rights with emancipatory grammars that help to 
articulate a world in which justice is possible must continue.112 And, as SPAS urges 
through the device of the Singing Sailor, we need to utilise our transnational 
relational ties to think beyond imagined communities of nationality that rely on 
militarism and walls to deliver security. The neon message of gay solidarity points 
to the possibility that alternative kinship practices suggest non-violent methods of 
border protection, or may end the need for border ‘protection’ altogether.
Hannah Arendt’s powerful critique of the devastation wreaked by nationalist 
states asks whether there are other modes of belonging that can be ‘rigorously 
non-nationalistic’.113 Like Butler, I think we should understand Arendt’s question 
as ‘an inducement, an incitement, a solicitation’, as ‘part of the discursive process 
of beginning something new’.114 Queer communities suggest some contours of 
non-nationalistic modes of belonging, starting with the incitement that it is non-
reproductive kinship ties that give communities the desire to be diverse, resistive 
and inclusive. Further, at the heart of practices of queer belonging is the inclusion 
of sexual and gender ‘outcasts’ – a variable grouping of those excluded from 
the charmed circle of normative sex and relationships. Queer kinship engages 
dynamic ties based on what Duggan describes as the ‘democratic potential of 
109  Joseph Massad, ‘Re-Orienting Desire: The Gay International and the Arab World’ (2002) 
14 Public Culture 361. 
110  Karma R Chávez, Ryan Conrad and Yasmir Nair for Against Equality, ‘Against Equality, 
Against Inclusion’ in Sandeep Bakshi, Suhraiya Jivraj and Silvia Posocco (eds), Decolonizing 
Sexualities: Transnational Perspectives, Critical Interventions (Counterpress, 2016) 215. 
See also ‘Against Equality: Queer Challenges to the Politics of Inclusion’ (online archive) 
<http://www.againstequality.org/>. 
111  Duggan, above n 64, 190.
112  Wendy Brown, ‘Suffering Rights as Paradoxes’ (2000) 7 Constellations 230, 240.
113  Judith Butler and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Who Sings the Nation-State? Language, 
Politics, Belonging (Seagull Books, 2010) 49, discussing Hannah Arendt, ‘The Decline of 
the Nation State and the End of the Rights of Man’ in The Origins of Totalitarianism 
(Harcourt, 1994) 267.
114  Ibid 55.
Resisting the heteronormative imaginary  255
sexual [and gender] dissidence’,115 Warner as an ‘ethical vision of queer politics’116 
and Gayatri Spivak as ‘persistent critique’.117 They are ties that refuse to be walled 
in by national loyalties, and refuse to accept the civilisational hierarchies, 
inequitable distributional arrangements and militaristic geopolitics that structure 
the international community of states.
So what do queer kinship practices offer to border protection strategies? This 
leads me first to a prior question, posed by Spivak, which is to ask what part of 
the state remains useful?118 Her answer, which I read as queer, is that we need the 
state to be an ‘instrument of redistribution’.119 Indeed, one of the aspirations 
of the SPAS action was to promote the redistribution of military resources 
to development. We also need the state to hold onto and strengthen, but not 
control or homogenise, the public spheres of politics – local, national, transnational, 
regional and global – without which we are reduced to ‘bare life’.120 Both the 
redistributive and democratic aspects of the state have been severely eroded, if 
not destroyed, by the global spread of neoliberal economics which demand a 
minimal state in the sense of political engagement and distributional justice, and 
a strengthened state with regard to militarised security. As Butler proposes, we 
need to find ways to open up an analytics of power that would include sovereignty 
as one of its features, but would also be able to talk about the kinds of mobilisations 
and containments of populations that are not conceptualisable as the acts of a 
sovereign, and which proceed through different operations of state power.121 That 
is, we need to reimagine the state in a way that is not built on national loyalties. 
Instead, we should expect it to be an entity that emerges from modes of belonging 
which resist and escape state regulatory power and refuse all hierarchies of human 
worth. It is everyone’s responsibility to foster everyday practices of inclusion, 
freedom and equality in our communities, however they are defined and wherever 
they are located.
Having reimagined the state as in some respects an ally, rather than an adversary 
in all respects, the question of reimagining border security becomes more 
thinkable. We can start to reconceive the border as a site that is ‘regulated’ for 
queer purposes – to ‘smash’ the charmed circle and recognise durable kinship ties 
based on diverse relational practices and community ties that do not conform to 
the conjugal family; to further the redistributive efforts of the state by welcoming 
crossings by those most disadvantaged by global analytics of power; and to refuse 
‘falling back on territorial defence, conscription and rearmament’ and walled 
fortifications. Instead, border ‘security’ should rely on enriched critical thinking 
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and engaged political discussion which enable its negotiation peacefully and 
cooperatively. This is not cosmopolitanism in an abstract sense, but as affective, 
embodied and material human connectedness.
The paradoxes facing queer efforts to change meanings, unsettle taxonomies 
and invert conventions in international law and politics present many challenges. 
As Butler observes, we need the ‘thinkability’ of human lives for politics, yet 
nation-states set the terms of that thinkability.122 This makes engagement with 
politics an endeavour that risks reaffirming state regulatory power. Further, as 
queer relationalities extend across national boundaries, challenging the state’s 
control of kinship arrangements and displacing the primacy of national loyalty, 
they become entangled in imperial histories of racial hierarchy and exploitation. 
And as queer communities become more visible and more adept at providing 
safety and affirmation, they risk commodification and commercialisation as a 
central feature of neoliberal urban governance. Despite these difficulties, we need 
to value queer curiosity, and the critical thinking that it enables, and continue the 
struggle to build queer kinship networks in and beyond the nation-state. Queer 
communities give voice and substance to emancipatory imaginaries of community 
and life that will one day release us from the militaristic, inequitable and anti-
democratic grip of national loyalty and carceral modes of defence and security.
Conclusion
The nation-state is made possible by the powerful personal and cultural feeling of 
national belonging which, as I have argued, is founded on heteronormative 
kinship ties, now extended by some states to include same-sex filial relations. 
These state-regulated family arrangements instil and naturalise primary loyalty 
to the nation-state. Relational ties that invoke human solidarities that are 
inconsistent with the national story of belonging are demonised, criminalised or 
pathologised. Sexuality and gender non-conformity are particularly amenable to 
this type of instrumentalisation. The danger of these arrangements lies in the 
enormous power of the state to serve elite and inequitable neoliberal interests 
in the name of the nation, and foreclose or devalue other imaginaries of human 
kinship and connection. Newly domesticated queer bodies help to reinforce 
nationalist projects and reduce the space for living and imagining alternatives.
In the current global conjuncture, the continued primacy of state interests 
and loyalties is endangering us all. Global warming continues, a new arms race 
is underway, right-wing bigotry and hatred is spreading, states of emergency have 
become commonplace, the flows of people fleeing conflicts, environmental 
degradation, poverty, persecution and terror are endless, and market demands are 
threatening what remains of democratic governance. Border protection has 
become more brutal and lawless, as states take unprecedented measures, including 
122  Butler, above n 22, 106.
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the construction of more and more walls, to assert their sovereignty and ensure 
that it is understood that we are divided and separated along national lines.
We urgently need to reshape border protection strategies and shift military 
resources into transformative development ‘that works for everyone’. Communities 
based on queer kinship ties offer us hope that human solidarities and loyalties can 
break free of the bonds of the nation-state and extend to include others, particularly 
those most disadvantaged by the brutal heteronormative ordering that states 
impose. We need to foster and value transnational queer assemblages of human 
belonging that are much harder to colonise and domesticate than their nationalist 
counterparts.
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